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Document 1192 24th November 1989 
AGENDA 
of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session 
Paris, 4th-7th December 1989 
I. Report of the Council 
Thirty-fifth annual report of the Council 
(first part) 
11. Political questions 
1. WEU in the single European market -
reply to the half-yearly report of the 
Council 
2. European security and events in the 
Near and Middle East 
Ill. Defence questions 
1. Force comparisons (NATO and 
Warsaw Pact military potential) -
reply to the annual report of the 
Council 
2. Western European security: defence 
implications of the People's Republic 
of China's evolving geopolitical situ-
ation 
IV. Technical and scientific questions 
Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls (Cocom) 
V. Budgetary and administrative questions 
1. Draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1990 
2. Accounts of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1988 - the auditor's 
report and motion to approve the final 
accounts 
VI. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
Revision of the Charter and Rules of Pro-
cedure 
VII. Parliamentary and public relations 
1. WEU's information policy 
2. Western European Union (draft of a 
new booklet) 
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Report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Steiner on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer-
ospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration 
Report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration 
Report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf 
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and 
Privileges 
Report tabled by Sir William She/ton on behalf of 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations 
Report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions 
Document 1193 14th November 1989 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session 
Paris, 4th-7th December 1989 
MONDAY, 4th DECEMBER 
Meetings of political groups. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Statement by the President of the Assembly on a motion tabled with a request for urgent 
procedure and distribution of the text of the motion. 
5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session. 
6. Vote on urgent procedure. 
7. Action by the Presidential Committee: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the 
Assembly. 
Debate. 
8. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
9. Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft decisions. 
10. WEU in the single European market - reply to the half-yearly report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. 
Debate. 
TUESDAY, Sth DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. WEU in the single European market - reply to the half-yearly report of the Council: 
Resumed debate. 
10.30 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
11.30 a.m. 
3. Address by Mr. Schafer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the federal Republic of 
Germany. 
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Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Address by Mr. Chevenement, Minister of Defence of France. 
2. WEU in the single European market - reply to the half-yearly report of the Council: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
3. European security and events in the Near and Middle East: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, 6th DECEMBER 
Morning 11 a.m. 
1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft budget. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 - the 
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts. 
If urgent procedure is adopted: 
3. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Address by Mr. Coeme, Minister of Defence of Belgium. 
2. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe. 
Vote on the motion for an order. 
3. Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential)- reply to the annual report 
of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Steiner on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
4. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
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THURSDAY, 7th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
11 a.m. 
1. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom): 
Resumed debate. 
2. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy. 
3. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom): 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
4. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving 
geopolitical situation: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving 
geopolitical situation: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Western European Union's information policy: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir William Shelton on behalf of the Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
3. Western European Union (draft of a new booklet): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
CLOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1988 
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT 
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Letter from the President of the Assembly 
to the Auditor submitting the accounts 
for the financial year 1988 
1Oth April 1989 
Dear Mr. Van de Velde, 
In accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU, 
I have the honour to submit to you the accounts 
for the financial year 1988 in accordance with 
the statements attached hereto, which refer to: 
1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure 
- financial position as at 31st 
December 1988 (Appendix I); 
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(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11); 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill); 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
As is customary, after being audited these 
tables will be signed by the President of the 
Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the 
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration before being sub-
mitted to the Assembly. 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a 
saving ofF 82 179, whereas the final statement 
of income and expenditure shows a credit 
balance ofF 6 591. The difference between these 
two figures, i.e. F 75 588, represents a deficit of 
receipts over estimates: 
- Bank interest 
- Sundry receipts 
- Sale of publica-
tions 
- Contributions 7% 
- Receipts for 1988 
estimated in the 
budget 
F 
148 669 
14 886 
42 169 
442 688 
F 
648 412 
724 000 
- 75 588 
3. Excess expenditure under Heads Ill and V 
of the operating budget, amounting to F 583 745, 
has been met by transfers from other heads of 
the budget. 
4. All contributions for the financial year 
1988 (revised 1988 budget) have been received 
from the Secretary-General of WEU London. 
5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident 
fund are incorporated with those of the other 
organs of WEU and the joint fund is adminis-
tered by the Secretary-General in consultation 
with the Clerk of the Assembly. 
On 31st December 1988, these amounts 
totalled F 4 853 511 as shown in Appendix IV. 
On that date there remained two loans to two 
staff members amounting to F 199 7 40. 
The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of these funds. On 31st December 
1988 the fund was held by Montagu Investment 
Management Limited in London. 
6. Also appended to the accounts of the 
Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed 
to the political groups drawn up in accordance 
with the directives issued by the Presidential 
Committee (document NWEU/CP (86) 39) as 
follows: 
- Communist Group; 
- Federated Group of Christian Demo-
crats and European Democrats; 
- Liberal Group; 
- Socialist Group. 
These reports will be considered as an 
integral part of the accounts of the Assembly; 
they give details of the use of credits included in 
15 
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Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the 
Assembly. 
Yours sincerely, 
Charles GoERENs 
President of the Assembly 
Mr. J. V AN DE VELDE 
Premier President de la 
Cour des Comptes 
Rue de la Regence 2 
B- 1000 BRUXELLES 
Letter from the Auditor to the President 
of the Assembly 
12th llllle 1989 
Dear Mr. Goerens, 
I have the honour to enclose the accounts 
of the Assembly of Western European Union for 
the financial year 1988 together with my 
opinion and report on these accounts. 
Yours sincerely, 
Jeroom L.-E. VAN de VELDE 
(Premier President de la 
Cour des Comptes de Belgique) 
Commissaire aux comptes 
Mr. Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
43, avenue du President Wilson 
75016 PARIS 
Report of the External Auditor 
to the Assembly of Western European Union 
on the accounts for the financial year 1988 
12th l11ne 1989 
I have audited the accounts of Western 
European Union for the financial year 1988 in 
accordance with Article 14 of the Financi .. J Reg-
ulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the 
correct management of the budget and the book-
keeping. 
The final statement of income and 
expenditure shows a credit balance of F 6 591 
whereas the statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a 
saving ofF 82 179. 
The difference, i.e. F 75 588, stems from a 
deficit in sundry receipts which are F 648 412 
instead of the estimated F 724 000. 
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The total saving in the budget may be 
summarised as follows: 
Total 
credit Total Balance 
after expenditure 
transfers 
F F F 
Head I 
Permanent 
staff 10 639 875 10636311 3 564 
Head 11 
Temporary staff 2 843000 2 841 363 1 637 
Head Ill 
Expenditure 
on premises 
and equipment 1 461 800 1 461 513 287 
Head IV 
General adminis-
trative costs 1 738 450 1 662 147 76 303 
HeadY 
Other expend-
iture 1 879 575 1 879 233 342 
Head I 
Pensions, allow-
ances and social 
charges 2 719 800 2 719 754 46 
Total: 82 179 
The financial situation compared to that 
on 31st December 1987 has improved slightly 
thanks to the fact that bank interest, which was 
F 60 523 in 1987, amounted to F 143 669 in 
1988. 
Situation of transfers between heads in 1988 
+ 
Head I 151400 213 525 
Head 11 66 700 217 700 
Head Ill 279 900 105 100 
Head IV 20400 425 450 * 
Head V 416 675 ** 7 100 
Head I 55 350 21 550 
TOTAL 990 425 990425 
* Sub-head 20 " Printing and publication of documents " 
was reduced by F 319 450. 
** Considerable increase in sub-heads: 
F 
27 - " Official 
journeys" + 95 200 
28 - "Expenses of 
experts" (architect) + 75 626 
29 - " Expenditure on 
information " + 164 250 
of which about F 149 000 is the cost of recruiting as an 
expert adviser a person who retired on 1st February 1989. 
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I thank the President, the Clerk and staff 
of the Assembly for the willingness with which 
all requests for information were met and for 
their co-operation and assistance in the exercise 
of my duties as Auditor. 
Jeroom L.-E. VAN DE VELDE 
(Premier President de la 
Cour des comptes de Belgique) 
Commissaire aux comptes 
Certificate of the Auditor 
for the /iiUlncial year 1988 
12th JuM 1989 
In application of Article 15 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, I have examined the 
appended financial statements of the Assembly 
comprising the summary of income and expend-
iture and the statement of assets and liabilities 
for the financial year 1988. 
My examination included verification of 
the books and other relevant documents that I 
deemed necessary. As a result of this exami-
nation, my opinion is that these statements are a 
correct record of the financial operations con-
ducted during the 1988 financial year, that these 
operations were in conformity with the budget 
estimates, the financial regulations, the financial 
instructions and other decisions of the legis-
lative authority, and that they are a correct 
record of the financial situation for the year 
ended 31st December 1988. 
Jeroom L.-E. V AN DE VELDE 
(Premier President de la 
Cour des comptes de Belgique) 
Commissaire aux comptes 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 198~ 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) ............. . 20 558 500 
Miscellaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest .............................................. . 148 669 
Sundry receipts ............................................ . 14 886 
Sale of publications ........................................ . 42 169 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7%) ......................................... . ft42 688 
648 412 
Expenditure under budget authorisation ...................... . 21 206 912 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads 11, IV 
and I-P .................................................... . 
Total expenditure (see Appendix 11) ......................... . 21 200 321 
Excess of income over expenditure .......................... . F 591 
Financial position as at 31st December 1988 
Assets 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances ........................................... . 
Accounts receivable ........................................ . 
Liabilities 
Accounts payable ........................................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure .......................... . 
Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
Certified correct: 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
17 
~34 215 
117 736 
257 265 
F 1 209 216 
1 ~02 625 
6 591 
F 1 209 216 
Roger LINSTER 
Chairman of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration 
DOCUMENT 1194 
APP 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITU 
(in Frc 
PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1988 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 Basic salaries 7 542 000 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 673 000 
2.2. Household allowance 317000 
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons 341 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 40000 
2.5. Education allowance 65 000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2000 
2.7. Overtime 50000 
2.8. Home leave 20000 
Sub-Head 3 Social charges 
3.1. Social security 1 018 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 314 000 
3.3. Provident fund 151 000 
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of 
permanent officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts 10000 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent officials and their families 13 000 
4.3. Removal expenses 40000 
4.4. Installation allowance 98 000 
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination 8000 
Total of Head I 10 702 000 
18 
[X 11 
~D UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 
ncs) 
Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
104 525 7 437 475 
52 200 725 200 
2 200 319 200 
39 400 380 400 
27 900 67 900 
6 500 58 500 
1 500 500 
13 000 63 000 
16 000 36000 
49 000 969 000 
13 000 301 000 
500 150 500 
5 000 5000 
8000 5 000 
5 500 34 500 
20000 78 000 
700 8 700 
151 400 213 525 10 639 875 
19 
APPENDIX 11 
Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
7 436 867 608 
725 196 4 
319 172 28 
380 396 4 
67 863 37 
58 408 92 
487 13 
62 785 215 
35 934 66 
968 474 526 
300 525 475 
150 103 397 
4 873 127 
4 485 515 
34 076 424 
77 974 26 
8 693 7 
10636311 3 564 
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PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
HEAD 11- TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head 6 
6.1. 
6.2. 
6.3. 
6.4. 
Sub-Head 7 
Sub-Head 8 
Sub-Head 9 
9.1. 
9.2. 
9.3. 
Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly 
Sittings service 
Interpretation service 
Translation service 
Other services 
Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between 
sessions 
Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 
Social charges 
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 
Provident fund for interpreters 
Insurance for interpreters 
Total of Head 11 
HEAD Ill - ExPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 10 
Sub-Head 11 
Sub-Head 12 
Sub-Head 13 
Sub-Head 14 
Sub-Head 15 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head 17 
Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises 
Hire of committee rooms 
Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions 
Various services for the organisation of sessions 
Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the 
Clerk 
Purchase or repair of office furniture 
Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment 
Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other 
office equipment 
Total of Head Ill 
20 
Total budget 
for 1988 
1 072 000 
401 000 
772 000 
40000 
500000 
80000 
4000 
120 000 
5 000 
2 994 000 
418 000 
15 000 
365 000 
45 000 
18 000 
43000 
11 000 
372 000 
1 287 000 
APPENDIX 11 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
11000 1 083 000 1 082 848 152 
42000 359 000 358 850 150 
115 900 656 100 656 051 49 
3 800 36 200 36 188 12 
49500 549 500 549 471 29 
26 500 53 500 53 428 72 
6 200 10 200 9 119 1 081 
27 500 92 500 92 473 27 
2000 3000 2 935 65 
66 700 217 700 2 843 000 2 841 363 1 637 
87 900 330 100 330035 65 
15 000 - - -
12 000 377 000 376 930 70 
3 550 48 550 48 506 44 
2200 15 800 15 795 5 
93 500 136 500 136 460 40 
139 700 150 700 150 640 60 
31150 403 150 403 147 3 
279 900 105 100 1 461 800 1 461 513 287 
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1988 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents 490000 
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other 
office supplies 264 000 
Sub-Head 20 Printing and puplication of documents 1 214 000 
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents 60000 
Sub-Head 22 Official cars 115 000 
Sub-Head 23 Bank charges 500 
Total of Head IV 2 143 500 
HEAD VI - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance 
for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of corn-
mittees and rapporteurs 155 000 
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation 210 000 
Sub-Head 26 Committee study missions 5 000 
Sub-Head 27 Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk 370 000 
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor 60000 
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information 320 000 
Sub-Head 30 Expenses for political groups 327 000 
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for 3000 
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes 20000 
Total of Head V 1 470 000 
Total 18 596 500 
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APPENDIX 11 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
90000 400000 393 794 6 206 
7000 271 000 270 998 2 
319 450 894 550 825 626 68 924 
13 400 73 400 73 396 4 
16 000 99000 98 333 667 
500 - 500 
20400 425 450 1 738 450 1 662 147 76 303 
10 800 165 800 165 709 91 
68000 278 000 277 975 25 
5000 - - -
95 200 465 200 465 167 33 
75 625 135 625 135 608 17 
164 250 484 250 484 213 ! 37 
327 000 327 000 -
2100 900 892 8 
2 800 22 800 22 669 131 
416 675 7100 1 879 575 1 879 233 342 
935 075 968 875 18 562 700 18 480 567 82 133 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET Total budget for 1988 
HEAD I - PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES 
Sub-Head 1 Pensions and leaving allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 2 161 000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 218 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 50000 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions 
1.5. Leaving allowances 
Sub-Head 2 Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 97 000 
2.2. Children's and dependants' allowances 53 000 
2.3. Education allowances 42000 
Sub-Head 3 Supplementary insurance 65 000 
Total of Head I 2 686 000 
Total 21 282 500 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1988, and paid for up 
Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
24 
Georl 
Clerk 
Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
47 220 2 208 220 
1 250 219 250 
- 450 49 550 
6030 103 030 
14 350 38 650 
6 750 35 250 
850 65 850 
55 350 21 550 2 719 800 
990 425 990 425 21 282 500 
:t March 1989, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
)ULIAS 
~Assembly 
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Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
2 208 219 1 
219 247 3 
49 549 1 
103 022 8 
38 646 4 
35 227 23 
65 844 6 
2 719 754 46 
21 200 321 82179 
Roger LINSTER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1988 
Budget Budget Supplementary 
Member states 600ths surplus for budget Contributions received 
from 1987 1988 for 1988 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 3 1 947 147 81 911 2 029 055 
France 120 (-) 7 3 960 300 166 600 4 126 893 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 7 3 960 300 166 600 4 126 893 
Italy 120 (-) 7 3 960 300 166 600 4 126 893 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 1 66006 2 778 68 783 
Netherlands 59 (-) 3 1 947 147 81 911 2 029 055 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 7 3 960 300 166 600 4 126 893 
600 (-) 35 19 801 500 833 000 20 634 465 
1987 Budget surplus ........................ . 35 
76000 Transfer of credits to the financial year 1989 .. 
1988 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 558 500 
Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
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Roger LINSTER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration 
APPENDIX IV 
PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1988 
F 
Balance brought forward: 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 
1988 4 425 218 Withdrawals 
Contributions of staff members and of the 
Assembly of Western European Union 224 708 Management fee 
Repayments of loans by staff members 81 600 
Interest received during the year 343 997 
Accounts of existing 
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1988 119 269 31st December 1988 
5 194 792 
Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
in French francs 
F 
320 973 
20 308 
staff members as at 
4853511 
5 194 792 
Roger LINSTER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1988. 
4th July 1989 
Jeroom VAN DE VELDE 
Premier President de 
la Cour des Comptes de Belgique, 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
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APPENDIX V 
1988 Balance sheet for the Communist Group 
Assets 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash) ...................... . 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1988 ................. . 
Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ............... . 
3. Seminars and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) ..................... . 
5. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
7. Sundry expenses ........................................................ . 
11. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash) ......................... . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Signatures of the Treasurer ........................... . 
and two auditors of the group ........................ . 
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F 
38 138 
14 725 
5 462 
5 856 
4 880 
2405 
3 375 
1435 
38 138 
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APPENDIX VI 
1988 Balance sheet for the Federated Group 
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats 
Assets 
F 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash)....................... 176 589.70 
2. Interest.................................................................. 10 539.91 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987.................. 140 146.00 
Total ................................................................. : 327 275.61 
Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ............... . 
3. Seminars and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) ..................... . 
5. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
84 100.00 
187.68 
16 704.15 
25 568.00 
7. Sundry expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150.00 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 709.83 
11. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (banks accounts, cash) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 565.78 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 275.61 
Signatures of the Treasurer ........................... . 
and two auditors of the group ........................ . 
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APPENDIX VII 
1988 Balance sheet for the Liberal Group 
Assets 
l. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash) ...................... . 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1988 ................. . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Lillbilities 
I. Expenditure 
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ............... . 
3. Seminars and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial stafl) ..................... . 
5. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
7. Sundry expenses ........................................................ . 
Total ................................................................. . 
11. Surplus at 31st December 1988 (banks accounts, cash) ........................ . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Signatures of the Treasurer ........................... . 
and two auditors of the group ........................ . 
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F 
37 550.25 
1 467.80 
49 965.00 
88 983.05 
23 821.00 
4000.00 
8 500.00 
2 460.00 
6 460.00 
45 241.00 
43 742.05 
88 983.05 
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APPENDIX VIII 
1988 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group 
Assets 
l. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash) ...................... . 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1988 ................. . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Lillbilities 
I. Expenditure 
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) ...................................... . 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ............... . 
3. Missions and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) ..................... . 
5. Seminars ............................................................... . 
6. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
7. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
8. Sundry expenses .................................................... ' .... . 
Total ................................................................. . 
II. Surplus at 31st December 1988 (banks accounts, cash) ........................ . 
Total ............................................................ · · · · · · 
Signatures of the Treasurer ........................... . 
and two auditors of the group ........................ . 
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F 
175 270.87 
10 541.44 
98 751.00 
284 563.31 
75 396.00 
1 483.81 
15 803.50 
1 664.00 
4 620.25 
127.00 
99 094.56 
185 468.75 
284 563.31 
Document 1194 Addendum 
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1988 
5th October 1989 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 1 
The Assembly, 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1988, together with 
the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
financial responsibility. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, Biefnot 
(Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Dhaille, Durand, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco (Alternate: Rubner), Hof]kes, de 
Kwaadsteniet, Morris (Alternate: Lorrl), Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Coleman), Sinesio (Alternate: 
Mezzapesa), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Worrell. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 467 to 473 
RECOMMENDATION 467' 
on the establishment of a European institute for advanced security studies 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling the proposals to establish a European institute for advanced security studies and 
noting that these proposals correspond to the wishes expressed by the Assembly, particularly in Recom-
mendations 442 and 463; 
(ii) Believing that there could be fruitful co-operation between such an institute and the services of 
the Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL 
1. That a European institute for advanced security studies be established under the terms of Article 
VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty in order to promote a European spirit in matters of 
defence; 
2. That this institute be housed in the same building as the Assembly; 
3. That members of the staff of this institute be recruited on the basis of specific qualifications 
required by virtue of their employment; 
4. That the Office of the Clerk be made responsible for common services (management of the 
building, meeting rooms, documentation, security); 
5. That the mandate of the WEU security agencies be brought to an end; 
6. That this recommendation be implemented without delay. 
1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 16th March 1989, in accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Assembly. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 467 
On 3rd April 1989, WEU ministers instructed the Permanent Council to" review the question of 
an institute for strategic studies ( ... ) with a view to further discussion at (their) next meeting" in 
November. 
The Permanent Council requested its Institutional Working Group (IWG) to prepare a report on 
the subject, taking account of the proposals contained in Assembly Recommendation 467. 
The Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU member states, at their Council meeting in 
Brussels on 13th November 1989, examined the report and decided to set up a WEU Institute for 
Security Studies 2• The purpose of this institute is to strengthen the organisation's impact on the identi-
fication of European security interests by giving it a study capacity. The institute has been set up in 
accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty and with the conclusions on 
institutional questions reached by ministers in The Hague on 27th October 1987 and 19th April1988. 
It will comprise a director and five permanent experts. Funds will also be earmarked for enlisting 
the expertise available in the member countries to carry out specific and in-depth studies. 
The director and the experts will carry out their tasks independently and objectively. The 
director will report to the Council on the execution of the scientific tasks assigned to him and on how 
the budget has been used. For 1990, the budget will be F 11 380 000, including F 1 730 000 for func-
tional expenditure. The director is to be appointed by the Council by 1st February 1990 at the latest 
and will take up his duties as soon as possible to enable the institute to be operational from 1st July 
1990 onwards. The Council also decided to wind up the Paris-based Agencies for Security Questions 
and Standing Armaments Committee 3• The Council will take the necessary measures to terminate the 
contracts of staff currently employed by those bodies, in accordance with the legal provisions in force. 
Ministers have asked the Permanent Council to take appropriate decisions, after consulting the 
Assembly, on the organisational aspects of setting up the institute in the organisation's building. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 24th November 1989. 
2. See Annex. 
3. This does not apply to the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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Ministerial decision concerning the setting-up of a 
" WEU Institute for Security Studies " 
Brussels, 13th November 1989 
THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL: 
DOCUMENT 119 5 
Convinced that, as stated in the platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague 
on 27th October 1987, the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it 
does not include security and defence and that WEU makes an important contribution to the broader 
process of European unification; 
Determined to increase the effectiveness of the organisation and to contribute to an overall 
solution to its institutional problems; 
Stressing the importance of having within WEU a capacity to study, and provide documentation 
on, questions concerning European security; 
Recalling that the Assembly, in Recommendation 467, has expressed interest in the estab-
lishment of such a capacity; 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. A" WEU Institute for Security Studies" shall be set up. Essentially, the role of this institute shall 
be to promote a European security identity and to assist the organisation in pursuing the objectives laid 
down in the platform. Accordingly, its main tasks shall be: 
(a) to carry out research, principally for the Council, calling on national experts if necessary and 
in consultation with the Secretariat General; this research will be carried out independently 
and objectively; 
(b) to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states to promote a greater 
awareness of European security issues and specifically to organise courses and seminars to 
that end; 
(c) in collaboration with existing institutes, to organise meetings with institutes in countdes not 
belonging to W estem Europe, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact countries; 
(d) to establish and keep up to date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence 
efforts of the WEU member countries and for studies relating to European security - the rel-
evant practical arrangements will be the subject of an institute propos~l to the Council; 
(e) to contribute to academic work on the same topics. 
2. It is decided that the Agencies for Security Questions 1 and the Standing Armaments Committee 
shall be abolished. 
3. The institute shall be placed under the authority of the Council which shall appoint the director 
for a period of three years. The director shall be responsible to the Council for the management of the 
institute. 
4. The institute shall be located in Paris in the premises of WEU. The question of its location shall 
be reviewed in the light of the conclusions of the Ministerial Councils of 27th October 1987 and 
19th April 1988 regarding the collocation of WEU institutions, necessary in the context of the 
European construction process. 
5. The Assembly may, with the Council's approval, assign to the institute studies relating to the 
Assembly's own activities. The Assembly shall have access to the results of the institute's unclassified 
work. 
6. The director of the institute shall be appointed by 1st February 1990 at the latest. He shall take 
up his duties as soon as possible, at the latest by 1st June 1990. 
1. This does not apply to the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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RECOMMENDATION 468 1 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1988 (revised) and 
1989, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) no decision has yet been taken by the Council on the restructuring of the ministerial organs; 
(b) the budgets of these organs are still based on former organograms; 
(c) consequently these budgets are not a valid estimate of requirements in relation to pro-
grammed work; 
(d) consequently the Assembly is not in a position to give an opinion on the budgets in question 
on the basis of a cost/efficiency ratio; 
(e) in the framework of budgetary management, a new practice seems to be introduced (which is 
to transfer from one financial year to the next unused credits within the limits of the total con-
tributions of member states), which does not correspond to Article 10 (c) ofthe Financial Reg-
ulations of WEU which is referred to as justification; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) the staff of the Paris agencies is still uncertain about its future; 
(b) furthermore, in the framework of " co-ordination " there is a tendency to limit the partici-
pation of staff representatives in the negotiations on determining conditions of 
employment, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Follow up without delay Recommendation 467 adopted by the Presidential Committee on 16th 
March 1989; 
2. Make the necessary amendments to the Financial Regulations to regularise the procedure for 
transferring credits from one financial year to another outside the provisions of Article 10 (c) of the Reg-
ulations; 
3. Afford its backing to the staff associations in their action to defend the right of their representa-
tives to take part in negotiations in the framework of " co-ordination " on the conditions for the 
employment of staff; 
4. Make a study to determine how to facilitate the transfer of staff between the co-ordinated organ-
isations in order to improve career possibilities. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Pack on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration (Document 1184). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 468 
1. Recommendation 467, proposing substantial organisation and management changes, is still 
being considered. The Council will, in due course, inform the Assembly of prog~ess. 
2. The Council has considered the recommendation of the Assembly concerning the transfer of 
budgetary credits from one financial year to the next. It recognises that the system of budgetary control 
has to have some flexibility in practice to meet special circumstances, providing modifications to 
agreed budgets are made with the authority of the Council on the recommendation of the Budget Com-
mittee. The Council notes that, in the instances referred to, the secretariat sought and obtained the 
appropriate authority. 
The Council is fully aware of the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which the secretariat 
has to operate at present. It does not consider that a new criterion has been set in adopting a practical 
response to meet the unusual situation. 
Whilst it may be somewhat premature to modify permanently the Financial Regulations to meet 
what is in effect a transient phase, this matter will be examined by the Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee to consider whether a change would be advisable in the long term. 
3. The role of the staff associations to take part in the negotiations in the framework of " co-
ordination " is recognised. Considerable progress has been made in the past ten years to establish and 
develop this participation and the process continues to be refined and improved. The positive attitude 
of the staff, as well as their contributions during the discussions and negotiations, are much appre-
ciated. 
The framework of" co-ordination " is, however, complex and often time-bound, and sometimes 
one or other of the three parties involved may feel that it should have had more influence or that the 
outcome of the negotiating process should have resulted in a more favourable compromise. 
The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, within its splllere of competence, 
endeavours to give each side its proper due and arrive at a common consensus as much as possible 
before submitting its recommendations to the councils. 
4. The movement of staff between co-ordinated organisations ought not to be considered 
" transfers ", but rather the leaving of one autonomous organisation (resignation, expiry of contract, 
etc.) and the entering of another autonomous organisation (recruitment). 
Staff mobility between co-ordinated organisations is enhanced by the more or less automatic 
transfer of pension entitlements under the common pension scheme, and in that generally in 
recruitment, preference will be given to appropriate staff members from other co-ordinated 
organisations, maintaining, wherever possible, acquired grade and seniority, whilst recognising also 
opportunities for career advancement. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4691 
on the state of European security -
intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the improved relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet with-
drawal from Afghanistan and the arms reduction agreements that have been achieved or are being nego-
tiated; 
(ii) Noting nevertheless that the USSR and its allies are still maintaining a high level of arms pro-
duction and that the present disarmament agreements have been reached by NATO maintaining its own 
high level of security and unity of purpose; 
(iii) Recognising that it will be politically difficult to maintain western defence budgets in real terms, 
let alone increase them; 
(iv) Underlining therefore the increased urgency of making as cost effective as possible existing pro-
curement, personnel, and command, control and communication systems; 
(v) Stressing the key strategic importance to NATO of reinforcement and resupply from North 
America to Europe, which itself can act as a deterrent in time of tension, and increases the importance of 
the northern flank, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments to recommend to NATO: 
1. That the highest priority be given to improving command, control and communication systems: 
(a) firstly, aircraft" identification friend or foe" (IFF) systems, to achieve a high-grade common 
standard in NATO air operations which is now long overdue; 
(b) secondly, in interoperability of tactical radio equipment between multinational units; 
(c) thirdly, in communication, tactics and doctrine, for better control of the land/air battle; 
2. That France be encouraged to join the United Kingdom in taking part with its four Boeing E-3 
AWACS ab initio in the training and development of the teams destined for the alliance air defence 
system aircraft; 
3. That in view of the importance of the northern flank in securing maritime and air superiority for 
transatlantic reinforcement and resupply, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands should reach an 
early decision on new amphibious ships; 
4. That in view of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the northern flank, apart from their 
replacement by other allies, consideration should be given to the skilled elements of the force d'action 
rapide being assigned to Norway; 
5. That still greater efforts be made on weapon and ammunition standardisation, interoperability of 
equipment and more cost-effective joint procurement ventures; 
6. That through the member countries ofWEU the following steps should be taken to give practical 
expression to the European pillar of defence: 
(a) encourage more multinational units such as the United K.ingdom-Netherlands landing force 
and the Franco-German brigade; 
(b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between 
countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity 
for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive 
at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (2nd sittmg). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Speed on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 1183). 
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7. That proper recognition and understanding be given to greater concepts of speed and flexibility in 
European forces to meet the changing situation in Europe. The doctrines and equipment which underly 
the force d'action rapide and 24 Airmobile Brigade are good examples that could be emulated and 
enhanced throughout the alliance (although dedicated helicopter lift capacity for 24 Brigade is an 
essential priority). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 469 
1. The Council of WEU attaches great importance to maintaining the security and defence of the 
frontiers of all its member states, in particular in the northern and central areas. In view of the 
diversity of the member states, particularly in geographical terms, the fullest use must be made of the 
complementary features of their defence doctrines and postures. This requires above all a continuation 
of the efforts to which the member countries are committed in order to achieve better interoperability 
of forces and to improve their performance and availability (training, logistic support). The Council is 
also aware of the need to take account of technological progress in order to improve command, control 
and communications systems, and it pays close attention to these matters. 
2. Moreover, the heads of state and government of the WEU member countries have, in their 
capacity as ministers of the Atlantic Alliance, adopted the comprehensive concept of arms control and 
disarmament, formulated within that forum, the principles of which are consistent with the commit-
ments entered into within the framework of WEU; thus, paragraph 30 of the comprehensive concept 
states that " the conventional forces must be able to respond appropriately and to confront the 
aggressor immediately and as far forward as possible with the necessary resistance to compel him to 
end the conflict and to withdraw or face possible recourse to the use of nuclear weapons by the allies. 
The forces of the allies must be deployed and equipped so as to enable them to fulfil this role at all 
times". 
3. It is in this spirit that studies are being carried out as part of the current work on the implemen-
tation of the platform regarding exchanges of military personnel and the pooling of training facilities. 
Other forms of co-operation, including the pertinent suggestions in Recommendation 469, will also be 
examined. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4701 
on current aspects of arms control: the Western European position 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the successful outcome ofthe third review conference in Vienna in January 1989, and 
more specifically the signing of the mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe 
and the promising start to these negotiations; 
(ii) Stressing that the mistakes which hampered the MBFR negotiations should not be repeated, espe-
cially the disagreements over actual numbers and the quality of weapons systems and military personnel 
and differences regarding an effective and strict verification regime; 
(iii) Certain that it is in the interests of all twenty-three participants in the CFE talks that the negotia-
tions should be fruitful and harmonious, avoiding any unnecessary obstructive action; 
I (iv) Considering that political reality calls for equal ceilings of armaments and troops, visibly lower 
than the present NATO levels; 
(v) Convinced that the absence of offensive equipment near the contact line would strengthen mutual 
confidence; 
(vi) Recognising that SNF weapons are part of a credible deterrent - even with a balance of conven-
tional armaments - and that a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons remains a necessity in the fore-
seeable future; 
(vii) Noting, however, that time is required for further technical and tactical research on a replacement 
for the Lance missile and that a final decision about production does not require to be taken at present 
in consideration of the CFE talks; 
(viii) Underlining the useful contribution to mutual confidence-building which would result from the 
publication of detailed and clear defence budgets, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Strive for simple definitions of equal ceilings in which qualitative complications should be 
avoided insofar as possible, and take the view that disagreements about the actual numbers of forces is a 
matter of secondary importance; 
2. Advocate that, for the sake of effective and strict verification, the exchanges of information men-
tioned in the mandate should refer not only to levels of armaments and military personnel but also exact 
locations; 
3. Take the necessary steps to ensure that practical research is carried out by WEU on the vital 
subject of verification and report fully to the Assembly; 
4. Consider the possibility of including in the CFE talks all conventional weapons systems which are 
not explicitly excluded in the mandate, if this is essential for both parties for the smooth progress of the 
negotiations; 
5. Aim to achieve equal ceilings by asymmetrical reductions, lower than the present NATO levels, 
at least a 10% reduction in tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery being a provisional 
goal; 
6. Participate on a national basis in all the preparations necessary for replacing the Lance missile, 
but decide on production/deployment at a later time; 
7. Ask for the start of negotiations on SNF weapons; 
8. Promote the publication of complete, detailed and clear defence budgets by all participants in 
the CSCE talks; 
9. Urge the Chairman-in-Office to establish at the highest level in his country's delegation in 
Vienna, a WEU liaison officer for the CFE talks. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (3rd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Beer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 1182). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 470 
1. The aim of the proposals concerning conventional forces in Europe, as put forward by the 
sixteen member countries of the Atlantic Alliance at the CFE negotiations in Vienna on 6th March 
1989 and supplemented on 13th July, is to increase security and stability in Europe with the lowest 
possible balanced levels of forces and weapons, having regard to vital security requirements. 
2. The Council considers that these proposals take account of the specific security interests not only 
of Europe as a whole, but of the member states of the Western European Union, all of whom con-
tributed to their drafting. During the CFE negotiations, which came within the general framework of 
the CSCE process, all the WEU member states took part and had the opportunity, in the preparatory 
discussions between the western countries, to highlight specific national and European interests. 
3. On the basis of both the aforementioned proposals and those made by the Warsaw Treaty coun-
tries, the twenty-three participating states have agreed that the negotiations should cover five conven-
tional weapon categories: main battle tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, combat aircraft and 
attack helicopters. However, the scope of the negotiations can only be clearly defined and agreements 
on the proposed levels for either side only be determined on the basis of definitions yet to be agreed. 
Other essential aspects of the proposals made by the western states, which have still to be negotiated, 
concern regional variations involving a number of interdependent sub-limits aimed at preventing con-
centrations of residual forces, and stabilising measures to underpin the reductions. 
4. Any agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe will have to be accompanied 
by stringent and effective verification measures. 
As has been demonstrated by the INF and the chemical weapons negotiations, the preparation of 
a verification regime calls for exacting and vigorous effort. 
With regard to the CFE verification system, a possible WEU contribution is under consider-
ation, the emphasis being on the exploitation of European capabilities and the pooling of member 
states' assets. 
In this connection, attention is drawn to the deliberations of the Council's ad hoc working group 
which is studying the possible uses of space-based means for the verification of conventional arms 
control agreements. 
5. The member states of the integrated military structure have agreed that the question of intro-
ducing and developing a successor to the Lance missile will be dealt with in 1992 and in the light of 
general security developments. 
6. They have also stated that as soon as an agreement on conventional forces is implemented, the 
United States, in consultation with the allies concerned, will be ready to enter negotiations with a view 
to achieving a partial reduction, to equal and verifiable levels, of United States and Soviet ground-
based short-range nuclear forces. 
7. Exchanges of information on the annual military exenditure of the participating states are 
planned in the context of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures. 
The Presidency of WEU will keep the Assembly and the Council informed of developments in 
the Vienna arms control negotiations. Furthermore, the Presidency will endeavour to ensure that the 
concerns expressed by both the Council and the Assembly are taken into account in the negotia-
tions. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989. 
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RECOMMENDATION 471 1 
on the development of East- West relations and Western European security 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the new policy of reforms started in the Soviet Union four years ago has now 
created conditions allowing decisive progress to be made towards a negotiated limitation of armaments, 
the opening and development of a sincere dialogue and a wide spectrum of co-operation between the 
countries of Eastern and Western Europe; 
(ii) Noting that, after the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the opening of the conference on 
chemical disarmament and adoption of the mandate of the conference on conventional disarmament 
offer prospects of a general reduction in the level of armaments in Europe; 
(iii) Welcoming the Soviet Union's effort to base armaments reduction negotiations on greater 
openness by publishing accurate, detailed information on Soviet military strength and to prepare data 
that are effectively comparable with those provided by the western countries and also welcoming the 
first unilateral measures to reduce Soviet troop levels in Eastern Europe; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the heads of state of or government of the member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance agreed in Brussels on 29th and 30th May to present a proposal for a substantial 
reduction in conventional armaments and to say in what conditions they would be prepared to nego-
tiate a reduction in short-range nuclear weapons in Europe; 
(v) Noting with satisfaction that many conflicts in the world calmed down in 1988; 
(vi) Welcoming the exchanges started between the WEU Assembly and the Supreme Soviet of the 
Soviet Union; 
(vii) Taking into account the fact that the new Soviet concept of" reasonable sufficiency " has not yet 
been translated into specific measures and cannot therefore yet be considered irreversible, but hoping 
the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments will be successful; 
(viii) Noting further that the new deployment and reorganisation of Soviet forces are still far from 
complete and awaiting the implementation of the defensive strategy, the principle of which has been 
proposed by the Soviet Union; 
(ix) Welcoming the participation of the Soviet Union and its allies in all efforts by the international 
community designed to restore or strengthen peace in areas where it is threatened and to avoid nuclear 
proliferation, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Follow closely the evolution of the strategy, organisation and deployment oil Soviet forces and 
report to the Assembly on the conclusions it draws from its analysis; 
2. Compare the tables of the two alliances' forces and arms published by NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact to explain existing differences between the figures quoted by the two sides; 
3. For each of the negotiations on limiting or banning armaments in which member countries are 
participating, hold consultations between their delegations so as to co-ordinate their position on the 
basis of the principles defined in the platform of The Hague; 
4. Hold close consultations with its American allies in order to: 
(a) apply the principles defined in Brussels on 29th and 30th May to ensure the progress of nego-
tiations on the limitation of conventional armaments and to link all initiatives in regard to 
short-range nuclear weapons with their success; 
(b) define ways and means of introducing a new security concept which ensures that no part of 
Europe has its security diminished or made inferior to that of others; 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
1187). 
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(c) define a security system based on the maintenance of conventional and nuclear means at the 
necessary level to avoid deterrence being circumvented; 
(d) conduct a redefinition of burdens and responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance with a 
view to a multilateral approach to security; 
(e) determine the requirements for effective verification of the application of agreements on 
conventional and chemical armaments; 
(f) take no steps contrary to commitments entered into or liable to jeopardise further progress in 
the negotiations on the limitation of conventional armaments; 
5. Urge the earliest possible resumption of the START negotiations; 
6. In the framework of the Council of Europe, promote an active dialogue on all matters for which it 
is responsible with all appropriate Eastern European countries fulfilling the conditions and expressing 
the desire to take part; 
7. In all appropriate forums, promote the development of exchanges of all kinds between Western 
Europe and the Eastern European countries and a rapprochement between those countries and all 
organisations seeking to foster the free circulation of ideas, persons, currencies, services and goods. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 471 
1. Meeting in Council on 3rd Aprill989, ministers had a wide-ranging exchang~ of views on Soviet 
intentions with regard to Western Europe. On 4th April, the Presidency communicated the conclusions 
of that discussion to the Assembly. 
2. The Council of WEU continues to follow very closely developments in Soviet defence concepts, 
and the effects of such developments on our security. 
3. The differences between the figures published by the Atlantic Alliance and by the Warsaw Pact 
with regard to their forces and weapons are the subject of negotiations in Vienna. It is by being present 
at the negotiating table and by holding consultations with one another and with their western allies that 
the WEU member states can help to advance those discussions. 
4. The principles and objectives with regard to European security defined in The Hague platform 
remain as valid as ever and will continue to guide the activities of the member states. 
It is also interesting to note that other members of the alliance, particularly the United States, 
whose President, Mr. Bush, actually said so recently, are expressing support for the emergence of a 
European security identity and for WEU's role in that connection. 
The development of East-West relations is the subject of regular consultations within the 
alliance. 
As far as the Council is concerned, however, it is unnecessary to develop a new security concept: 
existing alliance proposals, notably the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, 
adopted by the heads of state and government in Brussels in May 1989, aim to guarantee an equivalent 
level of security for all the European members of the alliance. 
5. The Council of WEU also follows all the initiatives taken by the United States with a view to 
progress in the area of strategic arms reduction. 
6. The Council welcomes all measures likely to promote exchanges of any kind between East and 
West, especially the fruitful dialogue that is developing between Eastern European countries, on the 
one hand, and the European Community, member states of the EC, and the Council of Europe, on the 
other. Such a dialogue will inevitably help to create a climate of confidence and mutual respect. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 472 1 
on the future of European security -
reply to the annual report of the Counci/ 2 
(i) Noting the motion for a resolution in Document 1168; 
(ii) Having taken cognisance of the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council; 
(iii) Noting that member governments decided on the occasion of the accession of Portugal and Spain 
to WEU to prepare a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty and noting the statement by the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 16th March 1989 that " the Assembly will be regularly consulted 
on this matter as the work progresses "; 
(iv) Noting that the Council has said it is" willing to meet those needs of the Assembly which are the 
direct result of enlargement "; 
(v) Noting that the Council of Ministers has "instructed the Permanent Council to review the 
question of an institute for strategic studies and the related question of the WEU agency "; 
(vi) Recalling that the Presidential Committee expressed an opinion on these points in Recommen-
dation 467, urging that the Council establish" a European institute for advanced security studies ... in 
order to promote a European spirit in matters of defence " and " that the mandate of the WEU security 
agencies be brought to an end "; 
(vii) Considering that the colloquy on the future of European security held in Florence from 21st to 
23rd March 1989 allowed a useful review to be made ofthe new facts of this question which will guide 
the work of WEU in the coming years; 
(viii) Believing the attempts of the European Parliament to take over the European security file to be 
misplaced, 
I 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Give an organogram of the intergovernmental organs of WEU; 
2. In its annual report, give the Assembly detailed information on every aspect of the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty; 
3. Continue to keep the Assembly regularly informed about all its activities, in particular through 
regular letters from the Secretary-General; 
4. Ensure that it gives more detailed and quicker answers to Assembly recommendations; 
5. Make available without delay the premises needed to accommodate the Portuguese and Spanish 
Delegations in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly; 
6. To this end, take early action on Recommendation 467; 
7. Promote a more active public information policy on the requirements of European security; 
8. Define without delay a draft statute for a European institute for advanced security studies and 
submit it to the Assembly for a joint examination of the implications of its implementation; 
9. Ensure that an incorrect interpretation of the Rome Treaty and the single European act does not 
affect the application of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Doc-
ument 1185). 
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11 
ALSo RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Specify as soon as possible which provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty it intends to revise; 
2. Adopt no provision which might weaken the impact of Article V; 
3. Retain in full the preamble and Articles I, 11 and Ill of the treaty which make WEU an essential 
factor in the establishment of a European union; 
4. Maintain the provision in Article IX for the Assembly to be composed of delegations from the 
national parliaments of member countries. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 472 
1. The protocol of 14th November 1988 for the accession of Portugal and Spain indicates that the 
enlargement of WEU, which must be considered" a significant step in the development of European 
solidarity in the field of security and defence ", should remind the member states of " their com-
mitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act ". 
The Council is fully aware of the implications of this accession for the future ofWEU. For that 
reason, the member states adopted not only the aforementioned protocol, but also, at the same time, a 
political declaration stating that" the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, 
and its corresponding protocols (would) be re-examined, as appropriate, having regard for the practice 
and achievements of, and the prospects for, their co-operation in security matters". 
The Council will pursue its consideration of this matter, bearing in mind the information 
referred to in point 11 of Recommendation 472. The Assembly's role in this process was acknowledged 
by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in his letter of 16th March 1989. 
2. Enlargement has also affected the work of the Assembly, particularly with regard to meeting 
rooms for committees and political groups, and offices for the delegations. 
In order to evaluate the budgetary implications, the Council consulted two architects about the 
alterations to be made to the WEU building in Paris. 
Subsequently, it requested the WEU administration in Paris to issue the necessary invitations to 
tender so that the work proposed in the revised version of the first study could go ahead. 
3. Ministers also tasked the Permanent Council to re-examine the question of setting up an 
institute for strategic studies, together with the related issue of the WEU Agency. 
The Institutional Working Group has been instructed to prepare proposals for submission at the 
forthcoming ministerial meeting. 
Recommendation 467 of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly and contributions from 
individual member states are included in the working group's dossier. 
4. The Council and the Secretary-General will provide the Assembly with accurate, up-to-date 
information on all aspects of the implementation ofthe modified Brussels Treaty and on the activities 
of WEU bodies. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989. 
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RECOMMENDATION 473 1 
on new technologies and their implications for European defence 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising that for the foreseeable future the defence ofthe Central European front will continue 
to play a vital role for the armed forces responsible for the defence of Western Europe; 
(ii) Warning that the specific attention and high priority given to that area shouldmot lessen alertness 
regarding overseas lines of communication, freedom of movement on the high seas and pressure on the 
northern and southern flanks of Europe; 
(iii) Conscious that the governments of WEU nations at the same time have to deal with declining 
demographic trends and compelling constraints in defence budgets; 
(iv) Aware that high-technology weapon systems have a valuable potential for saving manpower, 
recognising that they require higher standards of training and maintenance; 
(v) Aware of the greatly-enhanced capabilities in firepower, accuracy, battle management and vir-
tually any area of military activity offered by high technology; 
(vi) Anxious, however, about the vulnerability, reliability and availability of high-tech weapon 
systems, in particular in prolonged battle conditions; 
(vii) Emphasising that, including research and development, it takes ten to fifteen years to field high-
technology weapon systems and other military hardware; 
(viii) Recalling its recommendations on the importance of increased Western European co-operation in 
research, development and production of defence equipment; 
(ix) Stressing the need for a determined and actively integrated European space policy, which should 
include an opinion on military aspects and a possibly imminent ASA T weapon race, the latter of which 
could have a destabilising effect on the security of Europe; 
(x) Aware that NATO is preparing a new comprehensive concept of the military potential of new 
technologies, the outcome of which could influence existing analyses, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Formulate revised concepts in the light of the new technologies for the security of Western Europe 
and the defence of the central front; 
2. Assess the European effort required in manpower, military equipment, research, development 
and the production capacity of the defence industry and financial means; 
3. Present a comprehensive report on the dependence on military satellites of all nations actually 
using them and the political/military consequences of this dependence, taking into account the existence 
of ASAT weapons and the different options for limiting or banning the deployment of these weapons; 
4. Examine in which areas of defence high technology the European defence industry has real 
chances for eo-production, including research and development, on an equal footing with the United 
States defence industry; 
5. Urge member governments: 
(a) to continue their efforts as mentioned in Recommendation 455 and the relevant reply of the 
Council more vigorously and explicitly; 
(b) to prevent any unilateral cuts in defence budgets which might cause unilateral role changes in 
their armed forces; 
(c) to start seriously considering rationalisation and division of labour among armed forces 
involved in the defence of Europe lest they be trapped by this problem when the next gene-
ration of even more expensive high-technology weapon systems is announced for pro-
curement; 
(d) to insist that military experts and the defence industry make it their first priority to develop 
more reliable, more available and less vulnerable high-technology weapon systems. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary sessjon (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions (Document 1186). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 473 
1. The Council is aware of the need to make an on-going assessment of Western Europe's security 
and defence requirements on the lines indicated in The Hague platform and taking particular account 
of the opportunities presented by new technologies and the prospects for arms control. The Special 
Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group are pursuing a process of long-term reflection 
on these issues. The Ministerial Council of 13th November confirmed the value of such activity and 
laid down the necessary guidelines for its continuation. 
2. An ad-hoc group ofWEU is preparing an interim report for the Council on the value of, and pos-
sibilities for, the joint use of space-based observation systems in the field of security, principally in con-
nection with the verification of arms control agreements. 
3. The Council is aware of the need to develop all useful forms of co-operation in those areas of 
defence high technology in which the European defence industry has real chances of becoming 
involved in eo-production, including research and development, on an equal footing with the indus-
tries of other alliance countries. 
The Council shares the Assembly's concerns in this respect. 
In order to give fresh impetus to the efforts being made to increase the competitiveness of the 
European defence industry, the Council considers it important to make use of the framework provided 
by WEU and other forums, in particular the IEPG, a body comprising the European members of the 
alliance which is concerned with equipment co-operation. 
4. (a) In accordance with its reply to Recommendation 455, the Council reaffirms that it attaches 
great importance to enhancing co-operation, especially within the IEPG and alliance framework, in the 
field of armaments research and development, the aim being to save costs, reduce duplication, 
promote increasing standardisation of equipment and hence genuine interoperability between forces. 
(b) Pending the hoped-for conclusion in 1990 of a CFE agreement and its implementation, the 
Council calls on member governments to make every endeavour to maintain their budgetary contribu-
tions to the defence effort. 
Moreover, to be effective, a CFE agreement will have to include strict verification measures. 
WEU is studying to what extent the member countries can co-ordinate their efforts with regard 
to the implementation of provisions stemming from the agreement. 
The efforts made by WEU to further co-operation in the field of simulator training should 
prompt member countries to look into ways ofbringing some measure of standardisation to simulation 
equipment. 
(c) The Council would point out that it is not within the direct competence of WEU to address 
questions concerning the rationalisation and sharing of roles among allied armed forces involved in the 
defence of Europe, but that such matters are dealt with mainly in the context of discussions of 
problems arising from the implementation of a CFE agreement. 
(d) The Council agrees that priority should be given to the development of those weapon systems 
offering the best possible trade off between high technologies and their cost. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th November 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 28th November 1989. 
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INFORMATION LETTER 
from the Secretary-General of WEU, 
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs 
(June- September 1989) 
18:th September 1989 
Dear President, 
As the Permanent Council and its working groups prepare to resume th~ir activities, I am 
sending you the first information letter of my term of office. It concerns mainly the activities of the 
WEU ministerial organs between the end ofthe first part of the 35th ordinary session ofthe Assembly 
and 1st September. 
* 
* * 
Developments in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe are continuing apace. A totalitarian 
state for seventy years, the Soviet Union has kept half of Europe in its iron grip for nearly forty years. 
Today, the democratisation of Poland and Hungary seems irreversible, Soviet society is in a state of 
unrest, the nationalists are asserting themselves openly in the West and South, and the nature of the 
regime itself is changing - a factor borne out by the partially free elections held on 26th March. The 
will to reform is indisputable, but there is still a long way to go beyond the present constitutional com-
promise - the future of which is uncertain - if " Soviet democracy " is one day to become authentic. 
The greatest pitfalls are to be found at the half-way stage, which is where we should be at our most vig-
ilant. 
As far as Europeans are concerned, the most important thing is to promote confidence within the 
context of the new East-West relations that are developing within the CSCE process, to reach a conven-
tional arms control agreement as soon as possible, and to devise a dynamic policy that will give the 
peoples of Eastern Europe the renewed hope of a promising future. Rent already, the iron curtain must 
be swept away, not by the flight of the elite, but by the flow of cultural, economic and technological 
exchanges. 
* 
* * 
In this context, political consultations within the framework of WEU and I the activities of the 
Council's working groups have continued at a steady rate. 
The Permanent Council, meeting on 28th June and 12th July, continued to assess the progress 
made by the working groups in accordance with the terms of reference laid down by the Ministerial 
Council. 
With regard to the problems of the Assembly, it was at pains to expedite cdnsultations with the 
architects with regard to the alterations to the Palais d'Iena required in the wake of WEU enlargement 
to include Portugal and Spain. Substantial funds have been released, therefore, to enable invitations to 
tender to be issued so that work can begin as soon as the second part of the 35th oqiinary session of the 
Assembly has ended. To deal with problems as they arise, the Council will The represented by a 
"troika" with members from Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, whose responsibility it will 
be to oversee the proceedings in close collaboration with the Office of the Clerl. 
The Special Working Group, focal point of political consultation on European security interests 
within WEU, met on 13th June and 11th July. It discussed the implications of the alliance summit for 
Mr. Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
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the European countries and as regards progress in the negotiations on conventional forces. There were 
three main topics of discussions: problems relating to personnel, the question of zones and procedures 
for verification of the eventual agreement. All these issues potentially jeopardise the military balance in 
Europe that is likely to ensue from the proposed reduction and stabilisation measures. They also have 
long-term implications for European defence planning and indicate the need to examine the distri-
bution of reductions among WEU member states. 
At an extraordinary meeting on 24th August 1989, the Special Working Group discussed 
European security interests in connection with the proposals being prepared by the High Level Task 
Force of the Atlantic Alliance for the next stage of the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. 
Those proposals primarily concern the Europeans, who are anxious to have a treaty that can be imple-
mented effectively. They also need to estimate as soon as possible the very considerable resources 
(human and technical) likely to be required for that purpose. They must, therefore, assess not only the 
role they will be expected to play in proper, satisfactory implementation, but also the degree of 
co-operation and co-ordination that will inevitably be required of them. 
The Special Working Group also made an initial evaluation of European security requirements 
for the period 1992-1995, bearing in mind not only changes in the nature and perception of threats, but 
also the ways and means of ensuring defence at the borders. The defence implications of " dateline 
199 3 " will be analysed in this context. The vital need for a joint European exploration of the subject is 
underlined by the fact that an interministerial group of experts has been set up, paradoxically, at the 
Pentagon to consider the matter. 
Lastly, the Group concluded an exchange of information on member states' security-related pro-
grammes of assistance, which was intended to reveal not only their strong points, but also any gaps. 
The Defence Representatives Group held two meetings, on 6th and 27th July. The incident 
involving a MiG 23 that crashed onto a Belgium hamlet on 4th July prompted an exchange of views on 
possible European initiatives to prevent military accidents, consistent with the agreement concluded 
on 12th June by the governments of the United States and the USSR. The increasingly frequent and 
constructive military contacts between WEU member states and the USSR were discussed and will 
become a regular item on the agenda. 
The Group continued its work on training in the armed forces of the member states with a view 
to completing a report for submission to ministers next November. Lastly, there was preliminary dis-
cussion, within a broad European context, of the practical military implications of arms control verifi-
cation and inspection. It could be appropriate for WEU to play a co-ordinating role in that field, given 
that it now appears desirable for there to be some pooling of national resources. Another aspect of the 
likely consequences of a future CFE reduction agreement included on the Group's agenda was the 
impact on defence planning in each member state. 
In accordance with the instructions given by ministers, an ad hoc Sub-Group on Space of the 
Special Working Group was set up to make recommendations as to the advisability offuture European 
co-operation, on the basis and in-depth study of the potential for space technology in three areas: 
- verification of arms control agreements, particularly in the conventional field; 
- crisis management; 
- prevention and control of environmental crises. 
On that basis, the Sub-Group was requested, more specifically, to summarise the member states' 
existing space activities and projects, and to examine the technical options that would be available if it 
became appropriate for Europe to use satellite equipment as an independent means of ensuring com-
pliance with the verification obligations laid down in arms reduction agreements applicable from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. 
The Sub-Group's work has progressed remarkably quickly because it was able to agree, at only its 
second meeting, upon the main lines of the interim report to ministers. Since the third meeting on 28th 
July, preparation and drafting of the report have reached their final stages. 
The Recommendation of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly adopted on 16th March 
1989 helped to convince the Ministerial Council ofWEU that it should instruct the Permanent Council 
to study the question of setting up an institute for strategic studies within WEU. For that purpose, the 
Institutional Working Group was reconvened. It met on 1st June and 3rd July 1989, the two meetings 
proving highly constructive. There is undoubtedly a role for such an institute as part of the strength-
ening of a reactivated WEU in the area of both security research co-ordination in a specifically 
European context, and the promotion of public awarness of a European security identity in the 
member states. 
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At present, the experts are continuing their consideration of the terms of reference, tasks and 
structure of the institute. Indications are that the report for submission to the Ministerial Council in 
November will enable the latter to take the expected decision. 
* 
* * 
Since taking up my appointment on 15th May, I have endeavoured to meet all the foreign and 
defence ministers of the member states. Naturally, I first made contact with those of the outgoing Pres-
idency, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. George Younger, whom I met on 24th May and 18th May, respec-
tively. They shared with me the lessons that they had learnt from an exceptionally fruitful Presidency, 
with regard to the future ofWEU. On 3rd July, I went to Brussels to discuss with Mr. Eyskens and Mr. 
Coeme prospects for, and aims of, the Belgian Presidency with a view to the forthcoming ministerial 
meeting. 
At the invitation of Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Ambas-
sador Holthoff and I visited Bonn on 30th August to have talks with Dr. Stercken, President of the 
Foreign Affairs Commission of the Bundestag, the Defence Minister, Dr. Stoltenberg, Minister of 
State, Mr. Schafer (standing in for Mr. Genscher), and Admiral Wellershoff, Inspector-General of the 
Bundeswehr. Our detailed discussions were indicative of the high priority the German Government 
attaches to security-related co-operation within WEU. 
* 
* * 
With regard to institutional relations, WEU was invited to send representatives to the Atlantic 
Alliance's SHAPEX exercise, which took place from 8th-10th May. Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Sec-
retary-General, and Mr. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the Political Affairs 
Division, participated as observers. The exercise provided the opportunity for valuable exchanges of 
views on developments in the Soviet Union, current thinking as regards military concepts, and the alli-
ance's defence planning. The participation of WEU representatives also provided the opportunity to 
publicise the organisation's role and activities, and to strengthen links with SHAPE and NATO. 
For the same purpose, I visited Evere on 13th July to meet the NATO Secretary-General, Dr. 
Manfred Worner. In a warm spirit of openness, we had a wide-ranging discussion of the tasks facing the 
allies in the wake of the alliance summit. As I described the work programme of the WEU ministerial 
organs, I emphasised how keen our organisation was for its activities to complement those of the 
alliance, and for all its NATO partners to be kept informed of developments. We agreed to have similar 
exchanges of views on a regular basis. 
* 
* * 
The Secretariat maintained its public relations drive and efforts to inform public opinion of the 
role of WEU in building the defence dimension of Europe. 
I represented WEU in Europe at the following events: 
- Conference on stability in Europe, organised by the Foundation of International Security-
Ammerdown, 16th May 1989; 
- Round-table discussion on the future of WEU, with the FDP Bundestag Group- Bonn, 9th 
June 1989; 
- SEALINK Symposium- Annapolis, 12th-15th June 1989; 
- Symposium of the Foundation for International Security- Washington, 16th-17th June 1989; 
- Annual Joint Conference of the Aspen Strategy Group and the European Strategy Group on 
the future American role in Europe- Aspen Institute, Berlin, 18th-20th June 1989; 
- Seminar on security concepts, organised by the Stiftung Wissenschaft umd Politik in collabo-
ration with the Polish Institute oflnternational Affairs- Ebenhausen, 22nd-24th June 1989; 
-Conference of Young Europeans for Security (YES)- The Hague, 29th June 1989; 
- Seminar of the Defence Systems Management College - Bad Godesberg, 19th July 1989; 
- Conference of the Clausewitz Gesellschaft e. V. - Hamburg, 25th August 1989. 
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Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented WEU at the spring session of the 
North Atlantic Assembly, held in Antalya from 26th to 30th May 1989. Furthermore, he spoke to the 
Academic Associates group, invited to Europe by the United States Atlantic Council and the NATO 
Information Service (Kerkrade-Limburg, 23rd June 1989). 
Mr. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the Political Affairs Division, represented 
WEU at a symposium organised by the Istituto A. de Gasperi on European security in the 1990s -
Rome, 14th-15th May 1989. 
Lastly, a group of American journalists visiting Europe at the invitation of the Netherlands 
Atlantic Commission was received at the Secretariat on 12th June 1989. Ambassador Holthoff 
described the structures and activities of WEU at both intergovernmental and parliamentary level. 
Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to send you a copy of the booklet I prepared on the 
basis of discussions within the European Strategy Group. As you will see, it is dated 12th May and pre-
dates, therefore, my present appointment. 
Willem V AN EEKELEN 
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Explanatory memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Klejdz:.inski, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. In January 1989, a supplementary budget was submitted to the Council for adapting the means 
available to the Assembly to the requirements stemming from the accession of Portugal and Spain to 
WEU. This budget was not examined by the Council, however, since, in analysing the Assembly's 
requirements, it first wished to study the work necessary for reorganising the headquarters which 
accounted for the major part of the supplementary appropriations requested. 
2. This work had been the subject of a feasibility study conducted by an architect on a list supplied 
by the Premises and General Affairs Service of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The estimates 
set out in this study were those given in the supplementary budget for 1989. 
3. At the request of the Council, a second study was requested from another architect (also on the 
abovementioned list) in order to verify the financial assessment of the work and to suggest means for 
reducing the cost. To this end, the Council asked for a reduction in the space attributed to national del-
egations and the Office of the Clerk in the first study and the cancellation of work planned in the 
basement. 
4. Comparison of the two studies (in the meantime an alternative to the first study had been pre-
pared with a view to reducing the cost of work) led the Council to opt for the first study as modified. At 
its meeting on 12th July 1989 therefore, it authorised the representatives of the Office of the Clerk and 
of the Secretariat-General to meet the architect concerned in order to launch the call for bids as soon as 
possible on the basis of the alternative of 25th May 1989, without the work connected with transferring 
the reproduction services from the first floor to the basement. At the same time it invited the Assembly 
to prepare a new draft supplementary budget detailing all the expenditure made necessary by the 
enlargement of the organisation. 
5. This expenditure was the subject ofthe supplementary budget for 1989 presented to the Council 
in January 1989. It proved necessary to revise this budget in order to update the estimates connected 
with the reorganisation of the seat and also those relating to other budgetary heads since, in the 
meantime, certain factors which were taken as a basis for estimating these heads have changed. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, Biefnot 
(Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Dhaille, Durand, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco (Alternate: Rubner), Hojjkes, de 
Kwaadsteniet, Morris (Alternate: Lord), Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Coleman), Sinesio (Alternate: 
Mezzapesa), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Worrell. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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6. The appended table sets out the variations envisaged. Each sub-head calls for detailed exami-
nation. 
7. The estimates for Sub-Head 6 "Staff recruited for sessions" were based on the organisation of 
two sessions in 1989. The June session, however, was held in the usual conditions because the pro-
cedure for ratifying the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain had not yet been completed. These 
estimates should therefore be reduced to take into account the December 1989 session only, the three 
parts of these estimates being amended as follows: 
- Interpreters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . from F 440 000 to 130 000 
- Verbatim reporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . from F 180 000 to 90 000 
- Translators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . from F 130 000 to 65 000 
ToTAL F 750 000 to 285 000 
8. The large reduction in the estimate for interpreters which comes to less than half of the previous 
estimate is due to the fact that the forthcoming entry into force of the new convention between the 
co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI) will 
allow the team of 22 interpreters (three per cabin plus the co-ordinator) to cover both interpretation in 
plenary sitting and also interpretation at the various meetings during sessions (political groups, com-
mittees, etc.), it no longer being necessary to recruit the five interpreters initially planned for these 
meetings. 
9. The estimates under Sub-Head 7 "Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between ses-
sions " were based on the programme of work for the second half-year. The procedure for ratifying the 
convention of accession will presumably not be completed before the autumn, the result being that it 
will not be necessary to strengthen the interpretation teams before then. It is therefore possible to 
reduce the additional amounts requested under this sub-head from F 185 000 to F 90 000. 
10. The reductions made in Sub-Heads 6 and 7 bring a consequential reduction in the amount 
requested under Sub-Head 9 "Social charges" from F 60 000 to F 30 000. 
11. The installation of a new simultaneous interpretation system in the chamber of the Economic 
and Social Council was included in the supplementary budget for 1989 for the sum ofF 550 000. In 
view of the need to harmonise certain work (precabling) with the Economic and Social Council's time-
table of meetings, the Council decided at its meeting of 28th June 1989 •• to approve as an exceptional 
measure the release of credits up to a maximum ofF 550 000 in order to set in motion the normal con-
tracting procedure ". The call for bids sent to about ten specialised firms allowed the Assembly to 
adopt the tender made by SA TI which seemed to be the most suitable from the financial and technical 
angle and also gave the best guarantee for protecting the classified furniture in the Chamber in 
accordance with the wishes of the head architect of Civil Buildings and National Palaces in charge of 
the Palais d'Iena. SA TI's tender, which includes contracts of various types (purchase, hire purchase, 
hire, on a case-by-case basis) includes a global commitment ofF 471 600 in 1989 (once-only work and 
hire of equipment for one session) and, on the basis of two sessions per year, subsequent commitments 
ofF 440 000 from 1990 to 1993, F 400 000 in 1994 and F 275 000 as from 1995. Since the ordinary 
1989 budget included a credit of F 150 000 for installing the old interpretation equipment for the 
December 1989 session, the initial supplementary amount of F 550 000 is therefore reduced to 
F 321 600. 
12. Estimates under Sub-Head 33 " Reorganisation of the building " should be reduced from 
F 10 634 125 to F 6 474 175, in accordance with the evolution of the feasibility study mentioned in 
paragraphs 1 to 4 above. The new sum is therefore broken down as follows: 
Sub-Head 33.1 -Feasibility study (This is the cost of the second feasibility study, 
the first having been settled in 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 68 300 
Sub-Head 33.2 - Work on utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5 880 000 
Sub-Head 33.3 - Prime contractorship...................................... F 525 875 
In regard to Sub-Head 33.3, it is specified that the amount for prime contractorship and super-
vision is F 588 000. The architect, Mr. Madon, has agreed to consider the F 62 125 paid in 1988 for the 
feasibility study as an advance on his overall fee. The amount requested under this sub-head, therefore, 
takes account of this reduction. 
The summary estimate of work in question is set out in the feasibility study prepared by Mr. 
Madon (Document NWEU/BA (89) 9). 
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13. No change is made in the summary estimates under Sub-Head 34 "Installation of committee 
rooms". It is emphasised that these estimates, based on average market prices, may vary considerably, 
particularly for furniture for the two new conference rooms since there is a very wide range of prices, 
depending on the type and quality of equipment. It would be possible to adjust them, therefore, only 
after examining the tenders submitted. 
14. Conversely, since national delegations are being attributed offices which are smaller than ini-
tially planned, it is possible to reduce from F 362 000 to F 130 000 the amounts included in Sub-Head 
35 "National delegation offices", including the purchase of two typewriters (one with a Spanish key-
board, the other with a Portuguese keyboard) for the two new delegations. In assessing these sub-heads, 
account has been taken of using the furniture already in the offices on the second floor which will be 
transferred to the Assembly by the ministerial organs of WEU. 
15. The credits under Sub-Head 36 are also yet to be confirmed in view of the creation in the 
basement of a lounge and other essential facilities which cannot be built on the ground floor. 
16. The installation in the entrance hall of a security system (check-post, screening doors, etc.) 
included in Sub-Head 37 is also to be confirmed. Security requirements will be of even greater impor-
tance after the accession of Portugal and Spain. Furthermore, the reorganisation of the building 
includes bringing into service staircase B and the lift at the end of the building (Economic and Social 
Council end) and the revision of the security measures in force and the way they are applied, placing 
the check-post in the entrance hall and not on the second floor as at present. WEU is the only interna-
tional organisation in Paris which has not yet made provision for the protection of persons. Only 
during sessions is an approximate means of control installed with a mobile screening door and a barrier 
of tables. This rudimentary arrangement is not efficient and does not give a good impression of the 
organisation. Since the estimate for the security system was made in November 1987, the initial 
amount has been updated by 6%. This brings the credits already requested to F 428 000. 
1 7. Overall, this revised supplementary budget includes: 
- under sub-section A.1 - ordinary expenditure: a global amount of F 726 600 which is an 
increase of 3.65% in relation to the net total of the initial operating budget for 1989; 
- under sub-section A.2 - extraordinary expenditure: a global amount ofF 9 188 335. 
18. It is to be noted that it will not be possible to use part of the funds included in this budget (sub-
section A.2 - extraordinary expenditure) until the financial year 1990 since actl!lal expenditure will 
have to follow the progress of work. In this case, Article 10 of the Financial Regulations of the 
Assembly will have to be followed: 
" If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the 
credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in 
the budget of the current financial year. " 
19. Because of the supplementary credits requested, the net total of the budget of the Assembly for 
1989 (Part I: operating budget, Part 11: pensions)- as set out in Table 11- amounts to F 32 219 935. 
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TABLE I 
Changes in the supplementary credits for 1989 requested in Document 1174 
Sub-Head Initial credits Variations Revised credits 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .............. 750 000 - 465 000 285 000 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
work between sessions .................. 185 000 - 95 000 90000 
9 - Social charges .......................... 60000 - 30000 30000 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ...................... 550 000 - 228 400 321 600 
33 - Reorganisation of the building ........... 10 634 125 -4159950 6474175 
34 - Installation of committee rooms ......... 2 101 160 - 2 101 160 
35 - National delegation offices .............. 362 000 - 232 000 130 000 
36 - Lounge in the first basement ............ 55 000 - 55 000 
37 - Security system ......................... 404 000 + 24000 428 000 
TOTAL ................................... 15 101 285 -5186350 9 914 935 
TABLE 11 
Summary of budget estimates for 1989 
Heads and sub-heads Budget for 1989 Additional Budget for 
credits requested 1989 (revised) 
PART I: 0PE~ATING BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Sub-Section A.1 - Ordinary expenditure ..... 19 934 000 726 600 20 660 600 
Sub-Section A.2 - Extraordinary expenditure . - 9 188 335 9 188 335 
Total expenditure .......................... 19 934 000 9 914 935 29 848 935 
Section B - Receipts ......................... 135 000 - 135 000 
Net total operating budget .................. 19 799 000 9914935 29 713 935 
PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure .................... 3 010 000 - 3 010 000 
Section B - Receipts ....................... 504 000 - 504 000 
Net total pensions budget ................... 2 506 000 - 2 506 000 
NET GRAND TOTAL ............................. 22 305 000 9 914 935 32 219 935 
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Part I - Operating budget 
Heads and sub-heads 
SECTION A - EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Section A.l - Ordinary expenditure 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
1 - Basic salaries ...................... . 
2 - Allowances ........................ . 
3 - Social charges ..................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment 
and departure of permanent officials . 
5 - Medical examination ............... . 
Budget for 1989 
8 320 000 
1 899 000 
1 630 000 
70 000 1 
9000 
TOTAL . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 11 928 000 
HEAD 11 - TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .......... . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assem-
bly work between sessions .......... . 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the 
2 300 000 
550 000 
Additional 
credits requested 
285 000 
90000 
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Budget for 
1989 (revised) 
8 320 000 
1 899 000 
1 630 000 
70000 
9000 
11 928 000 
2 585 000 
640 000 
Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 000 - 15 000 
9 - Social charges ...................... t---1_;.3...;_5_;.0_;_0-'-0 -t----30_0_0_0_-+-__ 1_6 5_0_0_0---; 
ToTAL.............................. 3 000 000 405 000 3 405 000 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES 
AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .......................... . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ........... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions .................. . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of 
sessions ........................... . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the 
Office of the Clerk ................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other 
office equipment ................... . 
1 7 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction 
406 000 2 
5000 
400000 
47 000 
13 000 
50000 
321 600 
406 000 
5 000 
721 600 
47000 
13 000 
50000 
and other office equipment .......... f---...:..4=-35:.......::.0..:..00-=---+--------I--4.:..:3:....:5-'-0=-0:....:0:....._4 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . • • • . 1 356 000 321 600 1 677 600 
l. Brought over from the financial year 1988. 
2. Including F 6 000 brought over from the financial year 1988. 
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Heads and sub-heads 
HEAD IV- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport 
of documents ...................... . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing 
Budget for 1989 
500000 
Additional 
credits requested 
Budget for 
1989 (revised) 
500000 
paper and other office supplies . . . . . . . 270 000 - 270 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents . 1 077 500 - 1 077 500 
21 - Purchase of documents.............. 63 000 - 63 000 
22 - Official cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 000 - 115 000 
23 - Bank charges ....................... f-------=-5..:..00-=---+----------l------=--50-=-0=-----~ 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 026 000 - 2 026 000 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances 
and insurance for the President of the 
Assembly, chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs ........................ . 
25 - Expenses for representation ......... . 
26 - Committee study missions .......... . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the 
Office of the Clerk ................. . 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor .. 
29 - Expenditure on information ........ . 
30 - Expenses for political groups ........ . 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure 
160000 
220000 
5000 
400000 
70000 
410000 
336 000 
160 000 
220000 
5000 
400000 
70000 
410000 
336 000 
not elsewhere provided for . . . . . . . . . . 3 000 - 3 000 
32 -Non-recoverable taxes .............. ·r-__ 20_0_00_-+----------l---2_0_00_0--1 
ToTAL.............................. 1 624 000 
ToTAL Sub-Section A.1 - Ordinary expenditure . 19 934 000 
Sub-Section A.2 -Extraordinary expenditure 
HEAD VI - PREMISES 
Sub-Head: 
33 - Reorganisation of the building 
33.1 - Feasibility study . . . . . . . . . 68 300 
33.2 - Work on utilities......... 5 880 000 
33.3 - Prime contractorship ..... 525 875 
Sub-Head: 
34 - Installation of committee rooms 
34.1 - Interpretation equipment . 1 240 160 
34.2 - Furnishing committee rooms 825 000 
34.3 - Furnishing corridor . . . . . . 36 000 
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1 624 000 
726 600 20 660 600 
6474175 6 474 175 
2 101 160 2 101 160 
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Heads and sub-heads Budget for 1989 Additional Budget for 
credits requeste4! 1989 (revised) 
Sub-Head: 
35 - National delegation offices 
35.1 - Furniture 
and other office equipment . 118000 
35.2 - Typewriters ............... 12 000 
- 130 000 130 000 
Sub-Head: 
36 - Lounge in the first basement ......... - 55 000 55 000 
Sub-Head: 
37 - Security system ..................... - 428 000 428 000 
ToTAL Sub-Section A.2 - Extraordinary expend-
iture ........................................ - 9 188 335 9 188 335 
TOTAL SECTION A - Expenditure ................ 19 934 000 9914935 29 848 935 
ToTAL SECTION B - Receipts ................... 135 000 - 135 000 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET ................... 19799000 9 914 935 29713935 
Part li - Pensions budget 
Budget for 1989 Additional Budget for 
credits requestep 1989 (revised) 
Section A - Pensions ......................... 3 010 000 - 3 010 000 
Section B - Receipts ......................... 504 000 - 504 000 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET .................... 2 506 000 - 2 506 000 
NET GRAND TOTAL (Operating budget and pensions 
budget) ...................................... 22 305 000 9 914 935 32 219 935 
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Ill. Tables showing the changes made to the initial draft budget in the light of the Coun-
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Explanatory Memorandum 
1. The draft supplementary budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1989, transmitted to the 
Council for its prior opinion in accordance with Rule 48(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, 
was examined attentively by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting in Paris on 
16th November 1989. 
At the close of this examination, the following decisions were taken: 
(a) Ordinary expenditure 
The sum ofF 285 000 requested under Sub-Head 6 was reduced, at the Assembly's request, by 
F 60 000 since neither Portugal nor Spain will be able to second teams of verbatim reporters and assis-
tants for the December 1989 session, only Portugal being able to send two editing staff. 
(b) Extraordinary expenditure 
(i) At the request of the United Kingdom Delegation, the sum ofF 825 000 under Sub-Head 34.2 
" Furnishing committee rooms " was reduced to F 600 000. However, it was understood that in the 
event of this proving insufficient in the light of the relevant tender, a further sum would be requested 
by the Assembly. 
(ii) The sum ofF 428 000 under Sub-Head 37 " Security system " was withdrawn from the draft 
budget since for the time being the delegations do not consider such a system necessary, the measures 
adopted by the Assembly during sessions being considered adequate. 
2. The draft supplementary operating budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 was thus 
reduced from F 29 713 935 to F 29 000 935. Thus reduced, the WEU Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee recommended that the Council approve it. 
3. At its meeting on 29th November 1989, the Council expressed a favourable opinion on the draft 
budget as amended by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee. 
4. The budget estimates revised in accordance with the opinion expressed by the Budget and 
Organisation Committee are set out in the tables at Appendix Ill hereto. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone (Alternate: Bowden), Lagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) 
(Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Durand (Alternate: Jeambrun), Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Greco, 
M~ .. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. Masseret, Morris, Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond, Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), 
Tngha, N ... (Alternate: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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APPENDIX I 
Secretary-General's Note 
WEU Assembly draft supplementary budget for 1989 
1. The WEU Assembly draft supplementary budget for 1989 (Assembly Document 1197) was circu-
lated to the Budget and Organisation Committee on 13th October 1989 under reference B(89)19 and 
was examined during the committee's meeting on 16th and 17th November 1989 (BR(89)2 to be circu-
lated). 
2. The supplementary budget reflects the cost of adapting the facilities available to the Assembly to 
the requirements stemming from the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. The supplementary 
credits requested in the document (1197) presented to the committee amounted to F 9 914 935. 
3. The committee acknowledged the efforts made by the Assembly to meet the wishes of the 
Council to adapt previous plans and to achieve substantial reductions. However, it emphasised the 
importance of allotting adequate and appropriate office space to the parliamentary delegations of Por-
tugal and Spain. 
4. The Budget and Organisation Committee recommended a total reduction of F 713 000 in the 
proposed credits, as follows: 
(i) the Assembly after further analysis of the requirements for staff recruited for sessions pro-
posed a reduction ofF 60 000 in Chapter 11, Sub-Head 6; 
(ii) the estimated cost of the installation of committee rooms was considered to be too high; a 
reduction of F 225 000 was made in Chapter VI, Sub-Head 34; 
(iii) the proposed amendments to the security system were considered not to stem from the 
adhesion of Portugal and Spain and should not therefore be included in this supplementary 
budget; consequently, the proposed provision in Chapter VI, Sub-Head 37 was reduced by 
F 428 000. 
5. In accordance with Document C-B (88) 19 as approved by the Council (CR(89)1,VIII,2) this 
special supplementary budget should be funded on the new pro-rata basis by the present seven member 
states together with Portugal and Spain (CR(88)19,111,1). 
Thus the supplementary contributions needed to cover the reduced total ofF 9 201 935 are as 
follows: 
% FF 
Belgium ................................ 8.35 768 361.57 
France ................................. 17.00 1 564 328.95 
Germany ............................... 17.00 1 564 328.95 
Italy ................................... 17.00 1 564 328.95 
Luxembourg ............................ .30 27 605.81 
Netherlands ............................ 8.35 768 361.57 
Portugal ................................ 2.00 184 038.70 
Spain .................................. 13.00 1196251.55 
United Kingdom ........................ 17.00 1 564 328.95 
100.00 9 201 935.00 
6. The committee recommends the Council to give a favourable opinion on the Assembly special 
supplementary budget for 1989, as amended. 
7. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting on 22nd November 1989. It is recalled 
that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 4th 
December 1989. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly 
APPENDIX 11 
29th November 1989 
I have the honour to inform you that, at its meeting today, the Council examined the draft sup-
plementary budget of the Assembly for 1989 and, in accordance with procedure in force, expressed a 
favourable opinion on this amended budget as given in document C-B (89) 23. 
I enclose copies of this document. 
Mr. G. MouuAs, 
Clerk of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, 
43, avenue du President-Wilson, 
75775 Paris Cedex 16. 
Willem V AN EEKELEN 
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APPENDIX Ill 
TABLE I 
Changes in the supplementary credits for 1989 requested in Document 1174 
Sub-Head 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions ............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
work between sessions ................. . 
9 - Social charges ......................... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Draft budget 
for 1989 
(revised) 
285 000 
90000 
30000 
Assembly sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 600 
33 - Reorganisation of the building........... 6 474 175 
34 - Installation of committee rooms . . . . . . . . . 2 101 160 
35 - National delegation offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 000 
36 - Lounge in the first basement . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 000 
Changes 
requested by 
the B.O.C. 
- 60000 
-225 000 
Recommended 
draft budget 
for 1989 
225 000 
90000 
30000 
321 600 
6474175 
1 876 160 
130 000 
55 000 
37 - Security system ......................... r-----4_2_8_0_0_0_-+-_-_4_2_:8_0'-0'--'0--+---------1 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 914 935 -713 000 9 201 935 
TABLE 11 
Summary of budget estimates for 1989 
Draft budget Changes Recommended 
Heads and sub-heads for 1989 requested by draft budget 
(revised) the B.O.C for 1989 
PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Sub-Section A.1 - Ordinary expenditure ..... 20 660 600 - 60000 20 600 600 
Sub-Section A.2 - Extraordinary expenditure . 9 188 335 -653 000 8 535 335 
Total of expenditure •••••••••••• 0 0 0. 0 •••• 0 0 29 848 935 -713 000 29135935 
Section B - Receipts • 0 0. 0 •••• 0. 0 •••••••••• 0 •• 135 000 - 135 000 
Net total operating budget .................. 29713935 -713 000 29 000 935 
PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure .................... 3 010 000 - 3 010 000 
Section B - Receipts ....................... 504 000 - 504 000 
Net total pensions budget. .................. 2 506 000 - 2 506 000 
NET GRAND TOTAL ............................. 32219935 -713 000 31 506 935 
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Part I - Operating budget 
Heads and sub-heads 
SECTION A - EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Section A. I - Ordinary expenditure 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
1 - Basic salaries ...................... . 
2 - Allowances ........................ . 
3 - Social charges ..................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment 
and departure of permanent officials 
5 - Medical examination ............... . 
Draft budget 
for 1989 
(revised) 
8 320 000 
1 899 000 
1 630 000 
70000 I 
9000 
TOTAL • • • .. • • .. . • • .. • • • . .. • • • .. • • . • • 11 928 000 
HEAD 11- TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .......... . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assem-
bly work between sessions .......... . 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the 
2 585 000 
640 000 
Changes 
requested by 
the B.O.C 
- 60000 
APPENDIX Ill 
Recommended 
draft budget 
for 1989 
8 320 000 
1 899 000 
1 630 000 
70000 
9000 
11 928 000 
2 525 000 
640 000 
Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 000 - 15 000 
9 -Social charges ...................... f----16_5_0_00_-+--------t---1_6_5_0_0_0---t 
TOTAL.............................. 3 405 000 - 60 000 3 345 000 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES 
AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .......................... . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ........... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions .................. . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of 
sessions ........................... . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the 
Clerk ............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other 
office equipment ................... . 
1 7 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction 
406 000 2 
5 000 
721 600 
47 000 
13 000 
50000 
406 000 
5 000 
721 600 
47000 
13 000 
50000 
and other office equipment .......... f----4_35_0_00_-+--------t--4_3_5_0_0_0_-t 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 677 600 - 1 677 600 
l. Brought over from the financial year 1988. 
2. Including F 6 000 brought over from the financial year 1988. 
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Draft budget Changes Recommended 
Heads and sub-heads for 1989 requested by draft budget 
(revised) the B.O.C for 1989 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport 
of documents ....................... 500 000 - 500 000 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing 
paper and other office supplies ....... 270000 - 270 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents . 1 077 500 - 1 077 500 
21 - Purchase of documents .............. 63 000 - 63 000 
22 - Official cars ........................ 115 000 - 115 000 
23 - Bank charges ....................... 500 - 500 
TOTAL .............................. 2 026 000 - 2 026 000 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances 
and insurance for the President of the 
Assembly, chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs ......................... 160 000 - 160 000 
25 - Expenses for representation .......... 220 000 - 220 000 
26 - Committee study missions ........... 5 000 - 5 000 
27 - Official journeys of members of the 
Office of the Clerk .................. 400000 - 400000 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor .. 70000 - 70000 
29 - Expenditure on information ......... 410 000 - 410000 
30 - Expenses for political groups ......... 336 000 - 336 000 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure 
not elsewhere provided for .......... 3 000 - 3 000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ............... 20000 - 20000 
TOTAL .............................. 1 624 000 - 1 624 000 
ToTAL Sub-Section A.1 - Ordinary expenditure . 20 660 600 - 60000 20 600 600 
Sub-Section A.2 -Extraordinary expenditure 
HEAD VI - PREMISES 
Sub-Head: 
33 - Reorganisation of the building 
33.1 - Feasibility study ......... 68 300 
33.2 - Work on utilities ......... 5 880 000 
33.3 - Prime contractorship ..... 525 875 6474175 - 6 474 175 
Sub-Head: 
34 - Installation of committee rooms 
34.1 - Interpretation equipment . 1 240 160 
34.2 - Furnishing committee rooms 825 000 
34.3 - Furnishing corridor ...... 36000 2 101 160 -225 0001 1 876 160 
1. Reduction in Sub-Head 34.2. 
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Draft budget Changes Recommended 
Heads and sub-heads for 1989 requested by draft budget 
(revised) the B.O.C for 1989 
Sub-Head: 
35 - National delegation offices 
35.1 - Furniture 
and other office equipment . 118 000 
35.2 - Typewriters ............... 12 000 
130 000 - 130 000 
Sub-Head: 
36 - Lounge in the first basement ......... 55 000 55 000 
Sub-Head: 
37 - Security system ..................... 428 000 -428 000 -
ToTAL Sub-Section A.2 - Extraordinary expend-
iture ........................................ 9 188 335 -653 000 8 535 335 
TOTAL SECTION A - Expenditure ................ 29 848 935 -713 000 29 135 935 
TOTAL SECTION B - Receipts ................... 135 000 - 135 000 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET ................... 29 713 935 -713 000 29 000 935 
Part II - Pensions budget 
Draft Budget Changes Recommended 
Heads and sub-heads for 1989 requested by draft budget 
(revised) the B.O.C for 1989 
Section A - Pensions ......................... 3 010 000 - 3 010 000 
Section B - Receipts ......................... 504000 - 504000 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET .................... 2 506 000 2 506 000 
NET GRAND TOTAL (Operating budget and pensions 
budget) ...................................... 32 219 935 -713 000 31 506 935 
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DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1990 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary A./fairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur 
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l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, Biefnot 
(Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Dhaille, Durand, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco (Alternate: Rubner), Hojjkes, de 
Kwaadsteniet, Morris (Alternate: Lord), Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Coleman), Sinesio (Alternate: 
Mezzapesa), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartim), Worrell. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. General 
1. When presenting the budget for the financial year 1989, the Rapporteur said the accession of 
Portugal and Spain to WEU would make it necessary to adapt the means at the Assembly's disposal 
and the financial implications would therefore be considerable. A first adaptation was proposed in the 
supplementary budget for 1989 and related mainly to work on reorganising the premises which is 
essential if the work of the Assembly and its committees is to be conducted in the manner laid down in 
the Rules of Procedure. 
2. The implications of enlargement for the structure of the Office of the Clerk must now be studied 
as it must be able to meet new requirements efficiently. 
3. In this context, the draft budget for 1990 is not a renewal of the previous one, as was the last 
budget, but reflects the Assembly's true needs at a specific time in its history when its enlargement 
involves an intensification of its work to allow it to be tuned into major world political events and to 
draw the consequences with a view to attaining the intrinsic aims of Western European Union. A 
detailed analysis of these needs is given hereafter. 
2. Restructuring the Office of the Clerk 
4. An increase of almost a quarter in the number of the members of the Assembly will lead to a pro-
portional increase in the tasks assigned to its secretariat. Everyone knows that parliamentarians must 
be able to rely on the assistance of the Office of the Clerk for obtaining information on various basic or 
procedural matters, preparing speeches in plenary sitting, in committee or at colloquies, organising 
press conferences or gathering information necessary for preparing articles. The number of official lan-
guages of member states in which speeches may be made in plenary sitting and in committee and for 
which simultaneous interpretation and translation facilities have to be provided by the Office of the 
Clerk under its Rules of Procedure is to be increased from five to seven. Meetings and visits will be 
organised regularly in two new member countries. Finally, Portuguese and Spanish trainees will hence-
forth have to be recruited and guided in their work on the same basis as trainees from other member 
countries. 
5. At present, however, there are gaps in the structure of the Office of the Clerk which, if they 
persist after enlargement, would jeopardise the smooth running of the Assembly services. 
(a) The Clerk Assistant responsible for political questions assists and deputises for the Clerk in 
areas within his purview. His duties require, on the one hand, that he direct the committee 
services and ensure co-ordination of the work of the committee secretaries whom he advises 
on the preparation of reports and, on the other, that he help to prepare written and oral par-
liamentary interventions and organise the Assembly's participation in various seminars, col-
loquies, conferences and committees. 
These are clearly the tasks of a full-time official. The enlargement of WEU will make it 
unfeasible for one and the same official, already overburdened, to fulfil the duties of Clerk 
Assistant and titular Secretary of the General Affairs Committee. These two separate duties 
should be covered by two posts in the budget, each held by a different official. 
(b) The absence of a post of Secretary to the Committee on Rules of Procedure compels the 
Clerk to ensure the secretariat of that committee personally or to be replaced when he cannot 
be present. 
(c) During sessions, the Clerk cannot spend all his time with the sittings service and remain per-
manently at the side of the President of the Assembly or the Vice-President taking the chair. 
Nor can he be replaced by one of his assistants since they are fully taken up by their own 
duties. Assisting the President in the conduct of debates or in solving procedural problems is 
therefore left to temporary staff more familiar with procedure in their own parliaments than 
with that of the WEU Assembly. As in the Council of Europe, the Clerk should be able to rely 
on a permanent official with a thorough knowledge of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly, procedural practice and the complex organisation of the sittings service. 
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(d) The tasks of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, now knowh as the Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Relations, have increased significantly. Its public relations 
work has developed considerably. It has therefore been decided to change its mandate and 
give it the status of a permanent Assembly committee. The tasks of the Secretary of the com-
mittee have therefore also increased and will increase still further with the enlargement of 
WEU. The official concerned should be relieved of his present responsibility for the research 
office. 
(e) The efficiency of the research office is at present limited because it is not computerised. 
Whoever takes over that office will have to ensure that Assembly documentation is 
computerised and that the Office of the Clerk has access to the computerised documentation 
of parliaments and various research centres. 
(f) The Assembly will have to develop its relations with the government authorities and parlia-
ments of the two new member countries. For this purpose, it will require the services of the 
linguistic section. It should be added that the linguistic section is responsible for revising 
texts drafted in the two working languages, English and French, by officials of whom they are 
not the mother tongue. The arrival in the Office of the Clerk of officials from the two new 
countries will necessarily increase the burden of work on the linguistic section. 
(g) The absence of a chauffeur/messenger often means using taxis which llife often difficult to 
find. Exceptionally, a member of the staff of the reproduction service might be good enough 
to help, although driving the Assembly's official car is not one of their dldies, but this service 
is often very busy. The Office of the Clerk is therefore either unable to help the President or 
rapporteur or has to recruit a chauffeur on a temporary basis. It is str~nge that the parlia-
mentary Assembly of WEU cannot have a permanent chauffeur at its disposal to drive the 
official car. 
6. To alleviate the abovementioned shortcomings, two posts for senior officials should be 
created, i.e.: 
(a) one grade A5 post of Secretary of the General Affairs Committee; 
(b) one grade A4 post of head of the rules of procedure and research service whose duties would 
include the secretariat of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, organising 
and directing the sittings service and various related services and directing the new 
computerised research office. Because of his duties, this official will come directly under the 
Clerk whom he will also assist in some of his tasks, including the secretariat of the Presi-
dential Committee. 
7. Creation of these posts would also allow a wider breakdown of posts between the various nation-
alities. At present, the six most senior officials (from A6 to A4) under the authority of the Clerk are 
each of a different nationality. It is indeed essential for the Assembly, in its relations with each member 
country, to be able to draw upon the reliable knowledge of an official of the Offi<::e of the Clerk con-
cerning the institutions of each of those countries. After the enlargement of WEU, it would therefore be 
unthinkable for the Assembly not to be able to recruit a senior official of Portuguese or Spanish nation-
ality, just as there can be no question of removing from the Office of the Clerk ll!IlY of the six senior 
officials (Belgian, British, Dutch, French, German and Italian) who fulfil their dutids with praiseworthy 
efficiency and loyalty. 
1 
8. One grade L2/3 post of translator/interpreter should also be created. Nevertheless, it is not pro-
posed to recruit an official solely as a translator but to carry out the twofold duties of translator and 
interpreter, as is the case in the ministerial organs. The official concerned would also be responsible for 
assisting the President, committee chairmen and rapporteurs as an interpreter (from French into 
English or vice versa) and acting as an interpreter at committee meetings. It would thus be possible to 
economise F 110 000 under Sub-Head 7. This post, which exists in the ministerial organs, might pos-
sibly be transferred to the Office of the Clerk, which would make an overall saving in the budget of the 
organisation. 
9. Both the Secretary of the General Affairs Committee and the head of the rules of procedure and 
research service will have to have grade B3 assistants. However, for reasons of economy the head ofthe 
rules of procedure and research service and the translator/interpreter when acting as translator might 
be assisted by staff with other duties too, which would avoid creating one post of assistant. Only the 
Secretary of the General Affairs Committee would have a full-time assistant, which means creating one 
grade B3 post. 
10. Conversely, a second grade B3 post should be created for the archives and mail office. One B4 
official now ensures the filing and distribution of mail and documents, keeping files up to date and 
running the library and archives. She already has a heavy work-load because of the reactivation of 
WEU and this will increase with enlargement. Delay in carrying out these tasks would be a major 
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impediment to the work of the entire Office of the Clerk, and the official concerned is normally 
replaced when absent by one of the committee assistants, thus making it difficult to carry out the work 
of the committee concerned. 
11. It should be underlined that the creation of these two grade B3 posts would mean resorting less 
often to temporary staff when assistants are on leave for long periods. A saving might thus be made 
under Sub-Head 8 of the budget. 
12. Finally, a grade C3 post of chauffeur should be created. The Assembly has proposed creating this 
post in many previous budgets. However, the probable abolition of one of the two posts of chauffeur in 
the Paris ministerial organs might perhaps encourage the Council to transfer this post to the Office of 
the Clerk, which would constitute an overall saving in the cost of recruiting a chauffeur and often in 
hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President. 
13. With the creation or transfer of the abovementioned six new posts, the total number of staff in 
the Office of the Clerk would rise from 31 to 37, as shown at Appendix I. Appendix 11 shows the new 
organogram of the Office of the Clerk in which these six new posts have been included. 
14. This change in the organogram would mean an increase of about F 2 637 000 in Head I and a 
decrease of about F 215 000 in other sub-heads of the budget, as follows: 
- Sub-Head 6.1: F 30 000, made possible by abolishing the temporary post of Sergeant-at-Arms 
whose duties will be taken over by the head of the rules of procedure and research service. It should be 
underlined that, in view of the conclusions drawn in the study on reorganising the sittings service, it is 
difficult to express an opinion on a possible subsequent saving in temporary staff since only experience 
will show what economies are possible in this connection, particularly as the new official will certainly 
need a " running-in " period which will probably coincide with the inevitable difficulties pursuant to 
the enlargement of WEU to include two new delegations. This question will therefore be taken up again 
in the context of the budget for the financial year 1991. 
- Sub-Head 7: F 110 000, since the creation of a post of linguist will allow the number of inter-
preters recruited for meetings of the various Assembly organs to be reduced from six to five. 
- Sub-Head 22: F 75 000, since the creation of a post of chauffeur will mean that a chauffeur-
driven car no longer has to be hired for the President of the Assembly. 
3. Operating budget 
15. Apart from Head I, which includes the sums necessary for creating the six new posts, the other 
heads of the budget are also affected by enlargement and the increased work of the Assembly and its 
organs, as set out below. 
16. First, there is the decision taken by the Presidential Committee at its meeting on 13th July 1989 
to hold an ordinary session of the Assembly away from the seat in 1990 and to make the necessary pro-
vision for this in the budget for the financial year 1990, which affects several sub-heads: 
(a) Sub-Head 6" Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly", since most of the temporary staff 
in the various sittings services will have to travel to the appointed place, whereas, normally, 
many of them are recruited in Paris. A comparison between Tables 1.1 and 1.2 at Appendix 
Ill shows that a further F 337 000 will be needed under this sub-head. To this is added 
expenditure for interpreters, estimated at F 41 000 on a basis of work which may vary con-
siderably depending on whether interpreters with the required linquistic combinations are 
available on the spot. 
(b) Sub-Head 12 "Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions", for which there is 
an estimate ofF 525 000. This corresponds to the amount normally spent when two sessions 
are held in Paris but may be higher or lower depending on whether the host country is able to 
make the necessary premises and equipment available to the Assembly free of charge, as was 
the case at the last two extraordinary sessions held in Rome and Luxembourg. 
(c) Sub-Head 13 " Various services for the organisation of sessions ", since the hire of a lorry to 
transport documents and equipment makes it necessary to include an additional sum of 
F 50 000 under this sub-head. 
(d) Sub-Head 27 "Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk" which will cover 
extraordinary expenditure relating to the movement of staff of the Office of the Clerk. This is 
estimated at F 280 000. 
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17. There is no increase in estimates under Sub-Head 7 " Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
work between sessions " compared with the supplementary budget for 1989 since the creation of a post 
of linguist proposed in the context of the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk win allow the number 
of interpreters normally recruited for the two teams to be reduced from six to five. The estimated 
saving of F 110 000 will offset the cost of increasing the interpretation teams to cover seven official 
languages instead of five. If the creation of this post is not authorised, this sum will obviously have to 
be added to the estimate under this sub-head. 
18. Estimates under Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 are analysed in detail in Appendix IV. It should be 
noted that the equipment modernisation programme provides only for the replacement of the five 
oldest word processors, the cost of which will be fully amortised at the end of 1989. In any event, the 
total estimate for the hire and maintenance of the word-processing system is lower than that in the 
budget for the financial year 1989. The purchase of a calculating machine (F 2 000) and the purchase 
and repair of office furniture (F 35 000) are also included in the abovementioned programme. 
19. Generally speaking, estimates under the various sub-heads of Head IV" General administrative 
costs", apart from Sub-Head 22 "Official cars", renew sums for the previous financial year subject to 
minor adjustments due to the expected rise in consumer prices. The estimate under Sub-Head 22 takes 
account, on the one hand, of the replacement of the official car which is already nine years' old and no 
longer running well, with the resulting higher cost of repairs (expected cost: F 100 000), and, on the 
other hand, of a saving of about F 7 5 000 due to the fact that the creation of a post! of chauffeur would 
dispense with the need to hire a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the A~sembly. 
20. Estimates under Head V "Other expenditure", apart from the exceptional increase under 
Sub-Head 27 to cover the cost of holding a session away from the seat (see paragraph 15 above), are 
little different from the previous financial year, except for Sub-Head 29 "Expenditure on infor-
mation ", which includes the cost of implementing the second stage of the programme based on the 
proposal for a general communications strategy aimed at improving the circulation of information 
between WEU and public opinion. This stage provides for the purchase of a second Macintosh per-
sonal computer (estimated cost: F 45 000) and designing a logo for the Assembly (estimated cost: 
F 45 000) for the reasons set out below: 
(a) Personal computer 
For the last year, the Information Service of the Office of the Clerk has had an Apple Macintosh 
personal computer and a laser printer. Initially purchased for managing the mailing list for press 
communiques, it quickly became useful for other purposes and is now used for: 
- managing the mailing list of journalists to whom press communiques are sent (almost 1 300 
names broken down into different mailing groups according to their specialisation and geo-
graphical location); 
- the automatic printing of self-adhesive labels for mailing these communiques; 
- managing the mailing list of official services, defence institutes, universi~ies, politicians and 
military personnel receiving Assembly documents; 
- the automatic printing of self-adhesive labels for mailing these documents; 
- drafting and producing press communiques and articles; 
- all the correspondence of the Information Service; 
- the drafting, layout and production of prints for Assembly information letters; 
- regular searches for references to WEU in the central computers of the major press agencies. 
It is therefore clear that this is too much for a single computer. The purchase of a second should 
allow: 
- more information to be stored; 
- the two computers and the printer to be connected to allow the two computers to commu-
nicate with each other; 
- the hardware of one computer to be used to protect the other; 
- a better division of work between the Press Counsellor and his assistant. 
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(b) Assembly logo 
Unlike the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly and the European Parliament, the 
WEU Assembly does not have a logo. However, in any modern communications policy, a logo is one of 
the essential basic means of creating an image. 
The Presidential Committee therefore instructed the Press Counsellor to study the creation of a 
logo to enhance the Assembly's graphic identity. 
This logo would be used mainly on: 
- all kinds of paper: letters, internal administrative forms, committee reports, proceedings of 
sessions, information booklets, press communiques, press files, volumes of proceedings; 
- identity badges for staff and parliamentarians; 
- possible souvenir items for special occasions. 
Designing and introducing a logo requires special ability in graphic creation. It is therefore 
essential to have this kind of work done by professionals in graphic communication. 
Another solution, which would have the merit of making young people in member countries 
aware of European security questions (and which would thus be in line with recommendations made 
time and again by the Secretariat-General and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations) 
would be to organise a competition open to students from graphic arts colleges in the nine member 
countries. Such students would be invited to submit designs for a logo, one of which would be chosen 
by the Assembly. However, for professional ethical reasons, the prize in such a competition could not 
be less than the fee normally payable to a communications agency. 
21. The increase of 20% in Sub-Head 30" Expenses for political groups" corresponds to the increase 
in the number of members of the Assembly following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. 
22. In the operating budget, it should be underlined that estimated expenditure under Sub-Head 10 
" Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises" and some of that under Sub-Head 18 relating to 
telephone charges are based on the old formula for sharing such expenditure, under which the 
Assembly paid 30% and the Paris ministerial organs 70%, the latter having hitherto been responsible 
for this service. However, this formula is no longer realistic and the study on restructuring the minis-
terial organs seems to indicate that they will be replaced by an institute for advanced security studies 
and that the Assembly will be made responsible for joint services. This transfer of responsibility will 
obviously involve transferring staff specifically assigned to these services to the Office of the Clerk. 
Consequently, the abovementioned estimates under Sub-Heads 10 and 18 are included in this draft 
budget on a provisional basis and will have to be revised as soon as the Council takes decisions on the 
matter. 
23. Finally, receipts in the operating budget in this draft budget are lower than in 1989 because bank 
interest, which had improved significantly in 1988 (F 60 523 in 1987 and F 148 669 in 1988), has 
fallen again in 1989 to a far lower level (estimate: F 60 000) because of the reduction in the total sum 
paid into the bank for the WEU Paris organs as a whole and the negative effects of certain states' delay 
in paying their contributions. 
24. As shown in the tables in Appendices V and VI, at F 25 168 500 the net operating budget of the 
Assembly is F 4 642 900 higher than the revised 1989 budget, i.e. a growth rate of 22.6%. This is a con-
siderable increase but it must be borne in mind that the comparison is not really significant since esti-
mates for the financial year 1990 are based on the active, full participation of parliamentarians from 
nine member countries while estimates for the financial year 1989 were only slightly affected by the 
enlargement of WEU (except for extraordinary expenditure). The governments of member countries 
will certainly grasp the exceptional nature of the factors taken into account in preparing this budget 
and the vital necessity of giving the Assembly the wherewithal to work efficiently. 
4. Pensions budget 
25. It is not expected that any new pensions will become payable in 1990. Estimates in this section 
of the budget therefore represent total pensions payable to thirteen former officials (eleven retirement 
pensions, one invalidity pension and one survivor's pension) adjusted, as for present staff, in 
accordance with a 6.28% increase in salary scales. 
26. Receipts take into account the contributions of the six new officials, amounting to about 
F 108 000. These estimates would therefore have to be revised if the creation of the new posts is not 
authorised. 
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5. Summary of the Assembly's operating and pensions budgets 
27. As shown in the table at Appendix V, the net grand total of estimates in the Assembly's draft 
budget for 1990 (operating budget plus pensions budget less receipts) is F 27 667 500, i.e., compared 
with the net grand total of the revised budget for 1989, a growth rate of 20.1 %. It is certainly not 
without importance to note that this growth rate is the same as the percentage increase in the number 
of members of the Assembly following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts 
for the financial year 1990 
Details Expenditure 
PART 1: Operating budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Permanent staff 15 421 000 
Head I!: Temporary staff 4045 000 
Head Ill: Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 1 546 000 
Head IV: General administrative costs 2 085 500 
Head V.· Other expenditure 2 181 000 
Section B: Receipts 
25 278 500 
NET TOTAL 
25 278 500 
PART 11: Pensions budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Pensions, allowances and social 
charges 3 151 000 
Section B: Receipts 
3 151 000 
NET TOTAL 
3 151 000 
NET TOTAL BUDGET 
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Receipts 
110 000 
110 000 
25 168 500 
25 278 500 
652 000 
652 000 
2 499 000 
3 151 000 
27 667 500 
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Budget estimates 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Permanent staff 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for 1989 expenditure expenditure 
1990 (revised) in 1989 in 1988 
Sub-Head 1 - Basic salaries 10 531 000 8 320 000 8 272 000 7 436 867 
Sub-Head 2- Allowances: 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 1 080 000 
2.2. Household allowance 477 000 
2.3. Allowance for children and 
other dependent persons 611 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 85 000 
2.5. Education allowance 60000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2000 
2. 7. Overtime 59000 
2.8. Home leave 61000 
2 435 000 1 899 000 1 831 000 1 650 241 
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges: 
3.1. Social security 1 410 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 471 000 
3.3. Provident fund 167 000 
2 048 000 1 630 000 1 629 000 1 419 102 
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and departure of permanent 
officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi-
dates for vacant posts 17 000 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of permanent 
officials and their families 31000 
4.3. Removal expenses 200000 
4.4. Installation allowance 147 000 
395 000 70000 33 000 121 408 
Sub-Head 5- Medical examination 12 000 9000 9000 8 693 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 15 421 000 11 928 000 11 774 000 10 636 311 
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Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to 
permanent staff in accordance with Chapter Ill of the Staff Rules of the Office of thie Clerk of the WEU 
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st 
July 1988 1, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4.2% as from 1st July 1989 and 4% as 
from 1st July 1990. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 873 000. 
Estimates take account of the financial implications of the creation of six new posts, amounting 
to F 2 240 000. 
The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and 
the organogram at Appendix 11. 
Sub-Head 3 
Estimated expenditure for " Social charges " is based on commitments stemming from: 
- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the 
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1) 2; 
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2) 3; 
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the 
Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension 
scheme (Sub-Head 3.3). 
Sub-Head 4 
No officials are expected to leave in 1990. Estimates under this sub-head relate to the new posts 
included in the organogram of the Office of the Clerk. 
Sub-Head 5 
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff 
must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried 
out at the OECD medical centre. 
l. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU 
Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). 
2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception Qf family allowances and 
old-age pensions. 
3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent 
disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the benefici-
aries he has named. 
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Head II- Temporary staff 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for 1989 expenditure expenditure 
1990 (revised) in 1989 in 1988 
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions of the 
Assembly 
6.1. Sittings service 1 575 000 
6.2. Interpretation service 685 000 
6.3. Translation service 915 000 
6.4. Other services 42000 
3217000 2 285 000 2 437 000 2 133 937 
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for 
Assembly work between sessions 640000 640000 630 000 549 471 
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of 
the Clerk 15 000 15 000 36 000 53 428 
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff 
other than interpreters 16 000 
9.2. Provident fund for inter-
preters 150 000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 7 000 
173 000 165 000 135 000 104 527 
TOTAL OF HEAD 11 4 045 000 3 405 000 3 238 000 2 841 363 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 6 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to: 
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the 
reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation 
and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at 
Appendix Ill. 
Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1988 in the co-ordinated 
organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the 
same way as for permanent staff, the adjustment amounting to F 143 064. 
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the Interna-
tional Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the 
basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6%. 
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post 
office technician, typewriter mechanic, etc.). 
Sub-Head 7 
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at 
meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, 
travelling time and travelling expenses). 
Estimates are based on the recruitment of five interpreters for each meeting (216 working days, 
of which 100 in Paris), the sixth interpreter being the permanent official it is proposed to recruit. Sal-
aries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head 6). 
Their salary adjustment for 1990 amounts to F 43 000. 
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Sub-Head 8 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of alll grades which the 
Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1990. This is an overall sum covering salaries, possible trav-
elling expenses and insurance. 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges: 
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 
Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against 
the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 
40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premium as from May 
1988. 
Provident fund for interpreters 
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU 
has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a con-
tribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters. 
Insurance for interpreters 
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wtightson in London, 
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them 
from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between tM Office of the Clerk 
(0. 7%) and the interpreters (0.4%). 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for 1989 expenditure expenditure 
1990 (revised) in 1989 in 1988 
Sub-Head 10 - Share of joint expenditure on 
the Paris premises 400000 406 000 360 000 330 035 
Sub-Head 11 - Hire of committee rooms 10000 5 000 23 400 -
Sub-Head 12 - Technical and other installa-
tions for Assembly sessions 525 000 721 600 720000 376 930 
Sub-Head 13 - Various services for the organ-
isation of sessions 100 000 47 000 44000 48 506 
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenance of the premises of 
the Office of the Clerk 13 000 13 000 9000 15 795 
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture 35 000 50000 40000 136 460 
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and 
other office equipment 2000 - - 150 640 
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance of 
reproduction and other equip-
ment 461 000 435 000 440 000 403 147 
ToTAL oF HEAD Ill 1 546 000 1 677 600 1 636 400 1 461 513 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 10 
Until the financial year 1989, sums requested under this sub-head covered the Assembly's 30% 
share of joint expenditure, which was managed by the WEU ministerial organs in Paris. The planned 
creation of an institute for advanced security studies in place of the agencies will, inter alia, mean 
reorganising this service, reassigning responsibilities and adopting another formula for sharing expend-
iture. The same estimate is therefore given as in the previous financial year subject to any adjustments 
which prove necessary in the context of the reorganisation of the joint services. 
Sub-Head 11 
For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous 
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in 
certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation 
equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to 
cover such expenditure if necessary. 
Sub-Head 12 
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous 
interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telex, screens and other installations in the premises of the 
Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions. 
Estimates no longer cover, as in the past, the installation of two metal-detecting doors necessary 
for improving security measures, since these will be replaced by the fixed security installations 
included in the supplementary budget for 1989. 
Sub-Head 13 
Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during 
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, etc.). 
Sub-Head 14 
The same sum is requested as for the previous financial year to allow minor repairs to be carried 
out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk. 
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance pro-
gramme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget. 
Head IV - General administrative costs 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for 1989 expenditure expenditure 
1990 (revised) in 1989 in 1988 
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telex and 
transport of documents 480000 500000 430 000 393 794 
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed 
writing paper and other office 
supplies 280000 270 000 250 000 270 998 
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of 
documents 1 120 000 1 077 500 1 000 000 825 626 
Sub-Head 21 - Purchase of documents 65 000 63 000 60000 73 396 
Sub-Head 22 - Official cars 140 000 115 000 116 000 98 333 
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges 500 500 200 -
TOTAL OF HEAD IV 2 085 500 2 026 000 1 856 200 1 662 147 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 18 
Estimates under this sub-head are lower than in the previous financial year since the Assembly's 
share of telephone expenditure for WEU in Paris as a whole (joint expenditure) has fallen, probably 
due to the reduction in the staff of the agencies. Conversely, for other categories of expenditure 
(postage, telex, etc.), expenditure is tending to rise due to intensification of the work of the Assembly, 
particularly its Press Service. Every step has been taken to contain the cost of mailing documents as far 
as possible. 
Sub-Head 19 
In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the larger number of staff in the 
Office of the Clerk, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1989 is slight and is due solely to the 
foreseeable variation of prices in this sector (4%). 
Sub-Head 20 
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in dosts (4%). 
Sub-Head 21 
There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with 1989 due to the 
need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of studies and reports. 
Sub-Head 22 
Priority has to be given to replacing the official car of the Office of the Clerk, first registered in 
1981, because of its poor condition. In recent years, it has often had to be repaired at considerable cost. 
Estimates under this sub-head therefore include the cost of a new car of the same category as the 
present one, i.e. F 100 000, plus running expenses (garage, petrol, servicing, etc.), amounting to about 
F 15 000, and the cost of hiring a chauffeur-driven car occasionally (about F 25 000). 
Sub-Head 23 
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged. 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual Sub-Heads for for 1989 
1990 (revised) expenditure expenditure 
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence 
allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, 
Chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs 190 000 160 000 180 000 165 709 
Sub-Head 25 - Expenses for representation 280000 220000 313 000 277 975 
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions 5 000 5000 - -
Sub-Head 27 - Official journeys of members 
of the Office of the Clerk 730000 400000 578 000 465 167 
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the 
auditor 40000 70000 78000 135 608 
Sub-Head 29 - Expenditure on information 500000 410 000 491 000 484 213 
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups 403 000 336 000 336 000 327 000 
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other 
expenditure not elsewhere pro-
vided for 3000 3000 1000 892 
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes 30000 20000 25 000 22 669 
ToTAL OF HEAD V 2 181 000 1 624 000 2 002 000 1 879 233 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 24 
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and 
committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries as are those of members of the 
Bureau and Presidential Committee. 
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President 
of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these visits are con-
nected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen 
and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee. 
Estimates take account of the increase in the Assembly's work. 
Sub-Head 25 
The increase compared with the 1989 budget stems mainly from the increase in the Assembly's 
work due inter alia to the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. It should be pointed out that 
expenditure in 1989 is expected to be much higher than appropriations under this sub-head because of 
extraordinary expenditure incurred for the visit of a delegation from the Supreme Soviet to the WEU 
Assembly. 
Sub-Head 26 
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As 
these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year. 
Sub-Head 27 
There are two aspects to the estimates under this sub-head, which take into account the increase 
in per diem allowances provided for in the 248th report of the Co-ordinating Committee: 
- F 450 000 is earmarked for travel by members of the Office of the Clerk on Assembly 
business. The increase of F 50 000 compared with the previous financial year is based on 
experience, justified by the increase in such work; 
- F 280 000 relates to travel by members of the Office of the Clerk necessarily involved in 
holding an ordinary Assembly session away from the seat. 
Sub-Head 28 
Estimates for 1990 are lower than in the previous financial year because the auditor who will 
verify the accounts as from the financial year 1989 lives in Paris. 
Sub-Head 29 
The increase of F 90 000 is requested mainly to allow the Press Service to improve its methods 
of work, as explained in the explanatory- memorandum. 
Sub-Head 30 
The estimate under this sub-head is 20% higher than in the previous financial year because of the 
increase in the number of parliamentarians following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. By 
decision of the Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in pro-
portion to the number of members listed. Also by decision of the Presidential Committee, as from the 
financial year 1987, the political groups have had to submit balance sheets at the close of the financial 
year. All these balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently 
subject to verification by the auditor. 
Sub-Head 31 
The same amount is requested as for 1989. 
Sub-Head 32 
The increase in the estimate under this sub-head is necessary to cover non-reimbursable VAT 
payments. 
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PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
for for 1989 receipts receipts 
1990 (revised) in 1989 in 1988 
1. Sales of publications 30000 25 000 30000 42 169 
2. Bank interest 60000 100000 60000 148 669 
3. Social security reimbursements 20000 10000 53000 14 886 
TOTAL RECEIPTS 110 000 135 000 143 000 205 724 
Explanations 
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based 
on experience. 
PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I- Pensions, allowances and social charges 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for 1989 expenditure expenditure 
1990 (authorised) in 1989 in 1988 
Sub-Head 1 - Pensions and leaving 
allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 2 582 000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 239 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 54000 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' 
pensions -
1.5. Leaving allowances -
2 875 000 2 746 000 2 875 000 2 477 015 
Sub-Head 2 - Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 116 000 
2.2. Children's and other 
dependants' allowances 42000 
2.3. Education allowances 35 000 
193 000 191 000 181 000 176 895 
Sub-Head 3- Supplementary insurance 83 000 73000 79 000 65 844 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 3 151 000 3 010000 3 135 000 2 719 745 
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Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
In 1990, the Assembly will be paying thirteen pensions, as follows: 
- eleven old-age pensions; 
- one invalidity pension; 
- one survivor's pension. 
Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the pension scheme rules. 
Sub-Head 3 
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19bis of the col-
lective convention in force. 
Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid 
by the Assembly. 
PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
for for receipts receipts 
1990 1989 in 1989 in 1988 
Contributions by permanent officials 652000 504000 497 000 442 688 
Explanations 
Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the 
thirty-five permanent staff members of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) 
affiliated to the pension scheme. 
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Grade 
H.C. 
A6 
A5 
A4 
L2/3 
A2 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B3 
B3 
B3 
C6 
C4 
C3 
APPENDIX I 
Table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk 
of the Assembly for 1990 
Duties 1990 budget 
Clerk 1 
Clerk Assistants 2 
Counsellors 5 
First secretaries 3 
Translator-interpreter 1 
Controller; Head of private office 2 
Translators ; Documentalist 3 
Chief accountant 1 
Qualified assistants 7 
Accountant 1 
Bilingual shorthand-typists 6 
Switchboard operator 1 
Head of documents reproduction service 1 
Assistants in documents reproduction service 2 
Chauffeur 1 
37 
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1989 budget +or-
1 -
2 -
4 + 1 
2 + 1 
- + 1 
2 -
3 -
1 -
7 -
1 -
4 +2 
1 -
1 -
2 -
- + 1 
31 +6 
Pres1denhal Comm1ttee Office of the Clerk Pnvate Office of the Pres1dent 
Clerk (HC) 
Clerk (HC) Clerk AssJstant (A6) Head of pnvate office (A2) 
(Pohhcal AfTaus) 
ASSIStant (84) 3 Clerk Ass1stant (A6) (Adm and Fmance) Assistant (83/4) 
-Assistant (84) 
-\0 
I I 00 
---------------------------------------------------
J I I I 
Comm1ttee Servtce Press and External Admm1stratton and Translation and Rules and 
Relat1ons Serv1ce Fmance Servtce Pubhcattons Service Research Serv1ce 
- Head of Service (A6) I 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions 
1. Sittings senice 
1.1. Session outside Paris 
No. of Daily Duties Number days remu- Total Total 
neration 
F* F F 
Counsellors to the President of Assembly ....... 2b 9 1 632 29 376 29 376 
Heads of sections ............................. 3b 5 1 498 22 470 
1b 5 1 913 9 565 32 035 
Parliamentary secretaries ....................... 4b 5 1 342 26 840 26 840 
Precis writers ................................. 6b 5 1 342 40260 40260 
Verbatim reporters ............................ 3a 4 665 7 980 
6b 5 1 778 53 340 
16 b 5 1 342 107 360 168 680 
Assistants ..................................... 2a 4 402 3 216 
2b 9 769 13 842 
38 b 5 769 146 110 
6b 5 831 24 930 188 098 
Head usher ................................... 1 a 5 723 3 615 
Ushers: 
Security control 
Sittings office ............................... 12 a 4 334 16 032 
Messengers ................................. 2a 5 334 3 340 
Cloakroom attendant ........................ 1 a 4 334 1 336 
Offset-assemblers .............................. 14 a 5 334 23 380 47 703 
120 532 992 
Adjustment for 1990 ...................................................... 22 386 
555 378 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 400000 
955 378 
Rounded up to 956 000 
• In accordance with scales in force on I st July 1988. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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1.2. Session in Paris 
No. of Daily Duties Number days remu- Total Total 
neration 
F* F F 
Counsellors to the President of Assembly ....... 1 a 8 955 7 640 
1 b 9 1 611 14 499 22 139 
Heads of sections ............................. 1 a 4 821 3 284 
2b 5 1477 14 770 
1 a 4 1 236 4944 22 998 
Parliamentary secretaries ....................... 2a 4 665 5 320 
2b 5 1 321 13 210 18 530 
Precis writers ................................. 3a 4 665 7 980 
3b 5 1 321 19 815 27 795 
Verbatim reporters ............................ 6a 4 1 101 26424 
19 b 5 1 321 125 495 151 919 
Assistants ..................................... 13 a 4 402 20904 
1 a 8 402 3 216 
1 b 9 757 6 813 
27b 5 757 102 195 
6b 5 819 24 570 157 698 
Head usher ................................... 1 b 5 723 3 615 
Installations usher ............................. 1 a 12 368 4 416 
Ushers: 
Security control ............................. 8a 4 334 10 688 
Sittings office ............................... 4b 5 689 13 780 
Messengers ................................. 4a 5 334 6 680 
Cloakroom attendant ........................ 1 a 4 334 1 336 
Offset-assemblers .............................. 13 a 5 334 21 710 
Mechanic ............................... 1 a 4 334 1 336 63 561 
123 464 640 
Adjustment for 1990 ...................................................... 29 179 
493 819 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 125 000 
618 819 
Rounded up to 619 000 
* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1988. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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2. Interpretation service 
2.1. Session outside Paris 
Duties Number No. of days Total 
F 
Interpreters ................................. lOa 4 107 920 
12 b 5 192 000 
22 299 920 
Adjustment for 1990 (4.2%) ................................................ 12 597 
312517 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 50000 
362 517 
Rounded up to 363 000 
2.2. Session in Paris 
Duties Number No. of days Total 
F 
Interpreters ................................. 13a 4 140 296 
9b 5 144 974 
22 285 270 
Adjustment for 1990 (6.28%) ............................................... 17 915 
303 185 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 19 000 
322 185 
Rounded up to 322 000 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
N.B. On lst July 1988, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 698. In addition, interpreters recruited outside 
Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) cor-
responding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses. 
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3. TIWISlation service 
Duties Number Daily Estimates 1 Total 
remuneration 
F F 
Revisers .................... 5a 1092 136 500 
4b 1 748 174 800 311 300 
Translators ................. 5a 862 107 750 
5b 1 518 189 750 297 500 
Assistants ................... 5a 402 60300 
2a 464 27 840 
4b 757 90 840 
2b 819 49140 228 120 
32 836 920 
Adjustment for 1990 ....................................................... 52 558 
889 478 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 25000 
914 478 
Rounded up to 915000 
l. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 30 days for assistants. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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Ref. 
No. 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
3 
3.I 
3.2 
3.3 
4 
4.1. 
4.2. 
4.3. 
5 
5.1. 
5.2. 
5.3. 
APPENDIX IV 
Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment 
of the Office of the Clerk 
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices) 
Modernisation and Budgets Equipment 
equipment programme 1990 1991 1992 
A. Reproduction 
equipment 
Photocopiers 
1 RX 1065 Hire (rate blocked). 57 600 74000 74000 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 28000 28000 28 000 
1 RX 3107 Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 2 800 2 800 2 800 
1 Gestetner 2200 Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 800 800 800 
Offset machines 
1 Gestetner311(1984) Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 8 350 8 350 8 350 
1 Gestetner 329 (1985) Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 5 700 5 700 5 700 
1 Gestetner 339 (I986) Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 6 700 6 700 6 700 
Electrostatic stereotypers 
1 Gestetner PM/9 ( 1980) Property of the Assembly. 
Reserved for sessions. 
1 GestetnerDT 1 (1985) Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 1 450 1450 1450 
1 Gestetner 1 OOPM 
(1986) Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 2 950 2 950 2 950 
Binding machines 
I Gestetner 100 Purchased in 1978, this machine 
is in good condition. Normal 
maintenance by the staff con-
cerned is enough to keep it in 
good working order. 
1 Orpo Planax Property of the Assembly. 
Normal maintenance by the staff 
concerned is enough to keep it in 
good working order. 
1 Orpo Thermatic Property of the Assembly. 
Normal maintenance by the staff 
concerned is enough to keep it in 
good working order. 
Miscellaneous 
equipment 
1 Logabax-Ordina Purchased in 1977, this machine 
7630 assembling is serviced when required, since 
machine with stapler the cost of a maintenance con-
tract is exorbitant. The estimate 
is based on experience. 6000 6000 6000 
1 AM International Property of the Assembly. 
5000 addressograph Maintenance contract (indexed). 3 800 3 800 3 800 
1 Fortematic 655 paper- This machine is serviced when 
cutting machine required. A single annual service 
is enough to keep it in good 
working order. 750 750 750 
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1993 1994 
74000 74000 
28000 28000 
2 800 2 800 
800 800 
8 350 8 350 
5 700 5 700 
6700 6700 
I 450 1 450 
2 950 2 950 
6000 6000 
3 800 3 800 
750 750 
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Ref. 
No. Equipment 
B. Typewriters 
and calculators 
6 Office of the Clerk 
6.1 8 Olivetti 121 electro-
nic typewriters 
6.2 1 Olivetti 221 typewriter 
6.3 1 OlympiaSGE 51 long-
carriage electronic 
typewriter (French 
keyboard) 
6.4 3 Olivetti calculators 
6.5 1 calculator 
7 For use during sessions 
7.1 6 Olympia SGE 51 
electric typewriters 
- 2 English keyboards 
- 4 French keyboards 
7.2 4 RX 6015 electronic 
typewriters (English 
keyboards) 
7.3 1 IBM electric type-
writer (French key-
board) 
7.4 2 ET 109 typewriters 
(Italian keyboards) 
7.5 1 Editor electric type-
writer (Italian key-
board) 
7.6 21 Olympia mechanical 
typewriters 
- 19 English keyboards 
- 2 French keyboards 
7. 7 Electronic typewriters 
Modernisation and 
equipment programme 
Purchased between 1981 and 
1983, these typewriters are in 
good condition. 
Purchased in 1983, this type-
writer is in good condition. 
This machine is part of the old 
stock and will remain in service 
as long as possible. 
These machines are in good 
working order. 
To be purchased for the accounts 
section. 
These machines are part of the 
old stock and are assigned to 
national delegations and one 
political group. 
These machines were purchased 
in 1986 and are assigned to 
session services. 
Assigned to a political group. 
Assigned to the Italian Dele-
gation and the Italian summary 
reporters. 
Assigned to the Italian summary 
reporters. 
Purchased between 1966 and 
1979, these typewriters are used 
only occasionally because they 
are old models and the staff are 
no longer used to working on 
such machines. It is planned to 
keep them in reserve in case of 
electricity cuts. 
To meet the requirements of the 
various services during Assembly 
sessions, and subject to the pos-
sible purchase of other type-
writers, the following hire pro-
gramme is envisaged for each 
session: 
- 13 machines with English key-
boards 
- 15 machines with French key-
boards 
- 2 machines with Spanish key-
boards 
- 1 machine with a Portuguese 
keyboard 
All typewriters and calculators 
are serviced twice a year, before 
each session, by a mechanic 
recruited for the purpose, but a 
lump sum should be earmarked 
for possible repairs at other times. 
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Budgets 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
2000 
35000 35000 35000 35000 35 000 
8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 
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Ref. Modernisation and Budgets 
No. Equipment equipment programme 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
C. Miscellaneous 
equipment 
9 Dictaphones 
9.1 2 Uher 5000 Purchased in 1971, th~y will 
have to be replaced m the 
coming years. 12 000 12000 
9.2 1 Sony BM 80 Purchased in 1987, it is in very 
good working order. 
9.3 11 Grundig Stenorettes Purchased between 1963 and 
1987, they should be replaced 
gradually as from 1991. 12000 12 000 12000 12000 
9.4 1 stenotyping machine Purchased in 1974, this machine 
Grand jean is in good working order. 
Provision for an overall sum in 
the budget for possible repairs to 
equipment in this category. 4000 
D. Hford processors 
and computers 
10 
10.1 9 Olivetti ETS 2010 These have been hired on a 
word processors five-year leasing basis. The three 
1 Olivetti M 24 contracts expire in December 
1989, September 1991 and 
March 1993 respectively. A 
study is being conducted on 
replacing 5 word processors by 
more modern machines, corn-
patible with the ETS 2010 
system, when the first contract 
expires. Estimates take account 
of this replacement programme. 
The maintenance contract will 
have to be renegotiated. 
Cost of hire. 224000 202000 142 000 128 000 102000 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 59000 89000 89000 89000 89000 
10.2 1 Olivetti ETS 2010 Purchased in 1988. 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 
10.3 1 Macintosh Purchased in 1988, it is con-
sidered sufficient to service it 
when required. - 2 500 5000 5000 5000 
E. Office furniture 
11 Office of the Clerk Purchase or replacement of 
various items of furniture. 35 000 35000 35 000 35000 35000 
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Breakdown by budget classification 
Budget classification Ref. No. Budgets 
Head Sub-Head in programme 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Ill 15. Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture 11 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 -
Ill 16. Purchase of reproduction and 
other office equipment 6.5 2000 - - - -
9.1 - 12 000 12 000 - -
9.3 - 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000 
2000 24000 24000 12 000 12 000 
Ill 17. Hire and maintenance of 
reproduction and other office 
equipment 1.1 85 600 102 000 102 000 102 000 102 000 
1.2 2 800 2 800 2 800 2 800 2 800 
1.3 800 800 800 800 800 
2.1 8 350 8 350 8 350 8 350 8 350 
2.2 5 700 5 700 5 700 5 700 5 700 
2.3 6 700 6 700 6 700 6 700 6 700 
3.2 1 450 1 450 1 450 1 450 1 450 
3.3 2 950 2 950 2 950 2 950 2 950 
5.1 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 
5.2 3 800 3 800 3 800 3 800 3 800 
5.3 750 750 750 750 750 
7.7 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 
8 8000 8000 8000 8 000 8000 
9.5 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 
10.1 283 000 291 000 231 000 217 000 191 000 
10.2 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 
10.3 - 2 500 5 000 5 000 5 000 
460 400 487 300 429 800 415 800 389 800 
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APPENDIX V 
Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1989 to 1990 
1989 1989* '* b- a 1990 %c-b revised oa b 
a b c 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. Permanent staff 11 928 000 11 928 000 - 15 421 000 29.28 
Head 11. Temporary staff 3 000000 3 405 000 13.5 4 045 000 18.79 
Head Ill. Expenditure on premises 
and equipment 1 356 000 1 677 600 23.72 1 546 000 -7.84 
Head IV. General administrative 
costs 2 026 000 2 026 000 - 2 085 500 2.94 
Head V. Other expenditure 1 624 000 1 624 000 - 2 181 000 34.30 
Total expenditure 19 934 000 20 660 600 3.64 25 278 500 22.35 
Receipts 135 000 135 000 - 110 000 - 18.52 
Net Total 19799000 20 525 600 3.67 25 168 500 22.62 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and leaving allowances 3 010000 3 010 000 - 3 151 000 4.68 
Receipts 504000 504000 - 652 000 29.37 
Net Total 2 506 000 2 506 000 - 2 499 000 -0.3 
GENERAL NET TOTAL (A+ B) 22 305 500 23 031 600 3.26 27 667 500 20.12 
* Section A.2. "Extraordinary expenditure", totalling F 9 188 335, has not been taken into account. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budget for 1989 (revised) and 1990 
Revised budget for 1989 1990 
%of %of 
Amount Amount 
A 8 A 8 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. - Permanent staff 11 928 000 57.73 58.11 15 421 000 61.00 61.27 
Head 11. - Temporary staff 3 405 000 16.48 16.59 4045 000 16.00 16.07 
Head Ill. - Premises and equipment 1 677 600 8.12 8.17 1 546 000 6.12 6.14 
Head IV. - General administrative 
costs 2 026 000 9.80 9.87 2 085 500 8.25 8.29 
Head V. - Other expenditure 1 624 000 7.86 7.91 2 181 000 8.63 8.66 
ToTAL A (expenditure) 20 660 600 100.00 100.65 25 278 500 100.00 100.43 
Receipts 135 000 0.65 110 000 0.43 
ToTAL B (net) 20 525 600 100.00 25 168 500 100.00 
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Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 1 
Opinion of the Council 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
APPENDICES 
4th December 1989 
I. Recommendation of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee (Doc-
ument C-B (89) 24) 
11. Opinion of the Council (letter Xl.39 dated 29th November 1989) 
Ill. Table showing changes made to the initial draft budget in the light of the 
Council's opinion 
Explanatory Memorandum 
1. The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1990, transmitted to the 
Council for its prior opinion in accordance with Rule 48.3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, 
was examined attentively by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee at its ~eeting in Paris on 
16th November 1989. 
At the close of this examination, the following decisions were taken: 
(a) Only one new post was accepted, that of translator/interpreter, the committee reserving the right 
to reconsider the other five posts proposed by the Assembly on the basis of a management survey. This 
should show how the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly could be organised efficiently and a new 
organogram would be proposed. Estimates under Head I were therefore reduced by F 2 159 000. 
(b) On the proposal of the Assembly, sums required for holding the June ses~ion outside Paris 
(F 708 000) were frozen. It was agreed that in February 1990 the Assembly might ask for these sums to 
be released if the state of work made it unlikely that it would be completed by 1 Sth May 1990. 
(c) A sum of F 30 000 was added to Head Ill for the hire of a screening door during sessions since 
the installation of a security system in the entrance hall included in the supplementary budget for 1989 
had been refused. 
(d) An overall reduction ofF 159 000 was made in Head V, the Assembly being free to decide which 
sub-heads of this head would be affected by reduction. 
(e) Income under the pensions budget was reduced by F 80 000 since the creation of five new posts 
in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly had been refused. 
2. The draft budget of the Assembly for 1990 was thus reduced from F 27 667 500 to F 25 459 500. 
At its meeting on 28th November 1989, the Council expressed a favourable opinion on the budget as 
amended. 
3. The revised budget estimates are set out in the tables at appendix hereto. In regard to Head V, a 
breakdown of the overall reduction of F 159 000 is shown. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
Members of the committee: Mr. K/ejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone (Alternate: Bowden), Lagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) 
(Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Durand (Alternate: Jeambrun), Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Greco, 
Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. Masseret, Morris, Niege/, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond, Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), 
Trig/ia, N ... (Alternate: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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APPENDIX I 
Secretary-General's Note 
WEU Assembly budget for 1990 
1. The WEU Assembly draft budget for 1990 (Assembly Document 1198) was circulated to the 
Budget and Organisation Committee on 13th October 1989 under reference B(89)20, and was 
examined during the committee's meeting on 16th and 17th November 1989 (BR(89)2 to be circu-
lated). 
2. The net total of the proposed draft budget was: 
(a) Operating budget .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. F 25 168 500 
(b) Pensions budget .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. F 2 499 000 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 27 667 500 
These figures represent an increase on 20.1% over the net total of the revised budget for 1989. 
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee's conclusions and recommendations are summarised 
as follows: 
Head I 
After discussing the proposed restructuring of the Office of the Clerk, the committee agreed that 
the additional translator/interpreter, grade L2/L3 was needed as a direct result of the adhesion of Por-
tugal and Spain. 
The committee was of the opinion that before any of the other proposals to increase or upgrade 
the staff could be considered, a management review should first be carried out to assess, inter alia, the 
position on staffing. Indeed, a proposal was made that a similar management review should also be 
carried out for the Secretariat-General. 
Thus, with the exception of the provision for the one translator/interpreter the committee pro-
posed that the credits for the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk be withdrawn from the budget; a 
new appraisal should be made after the proposed management review. The committee recommended 
that Head I should be reduced by F 2 159 000. As a direct consequence, the estimated income of the 
pensions budget would be reduced by F 80 000 in respect of the contributions (7% of basic salary) 
foreseen for the additional staff. 
Head II- V 
The committee formed the view that the proposal to include additional credits to enable the 
Assembly to convene a session outside Paris was premature. They considered that the additional 
credits would not be needed if the building work in connection with the reorganisation of the seat of 
the Assembly were completed as intended, in good time for the June session. 
The committee recommended that these additional credits should be frozen pending the presen-
tation of a report on the progress of the work for decision by the Council in due course. 
Head II 
Credits proposed under Sub-Head 6, (staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly), included 
amounts in respect of the proposed session outside Paris. Consequently, an amount ofF 378 000 was 
frozen. 
Head Ill 
In its special supplementary budget for 1989, the Assembly had proposed a number of additional 
security measures which would have led to a small economy in Head Ill, Sub-Head 12. However, the 
economy would not now be realised, because the Budget Committee did not approve the additional 
measures. To compensate for this, the committee approved an additional F 30 000, under Head Ill, 
Sub-Head 12. 
The Committee considered that the expenditure foreseen under Head Ill, Sub-Head 13 (services 
for the organisation of the sessions) was too high and included an amount relating to the session 
outside Paris. An amount of F 50 000 was frozen. 
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Head IV 
The committee did not agree the proposals concerning the restructuring of the Office of the 
Clerk, which included the cost of employing a chauffeur for the service car (see Head I). Consequently, 
the amount for the cost of hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly needed to be 
greater than that provided under Sub-Head 22. However, because the committee did not reduce the 
total of Head IV, they considered that any additional cost for hiring a chauffeur-driven car could be 
found within the total provision for the head. 
Head V 
The increase in the provision for this head, compared with 1989, was considered to be far too 
high. The total was reduced by F 159 000 leaving it to the discretion of the Assembly where to effect 
the reduction within the head. 
Moreover, in Sub-Head 27, (travel expenses for members of the Office of the Clerk), an amount 
of F 280 000 was frozen; this related to the proposed session of the Assembly outside Paris. 
4. The committee recommended the following amended budget for 1990: 
(a) Operating budget 
Head 
I ........................... 
11 ........................... 
Ill ........................... 
IV ........................... 
V ........................... 
Income ...................... 
Net total operating budget .... 
(b) Pensions budget 
Expenditure .................. 
Income ...................... 
Net total pensions budget ..... 
(c) 
Net total budget .............. 
* of which F 378 000 frozen 
** of which F 50 000 frozen 
*** of which F 280 000 frozen 
Credits Amendments proposed 
F F 
15 421 000 2 159 000 
4 045 000 -
1 546 000 + 30 000 
2 085 500 -
2 181 000 159 000 
25 278 500 -2 288 000 
110 000 -
25 168 500 -2 288 000 
3 151 000 -
652 000 80000 
2 499 000 80000 
27 667 500 -2 208 000 
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Credits 
recommended 
F 
13 262 000 
4 045 000* 
1 576 000** 
2 085 500 
2 022 000*** 
22 990 500 
110 000 
22 880 500 
3 151 000 
572 000 
2 579 000 
25 459 500 
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5. The following contributions would be required provisionally (CR(88)19,III,I and 
CR(89)1,VIII,2) from the seven member states to cover the total ofF 25 459 500: 
600ths F 
Belgium ................................ 59.00 2 503 517.50 
France ................................. 120.00 5 091 900.00 
Germany ............................... 120.00 5 091 900.00 
Italy ................................... 120.00 5 091 900.00 
Luxembourg ............................ 2.00 84 865.00 
Netherlands ............................ 59.00 2 503 517.50 
United Kingdom ........................ 120.00 5 091 900.00 
25 459 500.00 
6. The committee recommends the Council to give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's draft 
budget for 1990, as amended. 
7. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting on 22nd November 1989. It is recalled 
that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 4th 
December 1989. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly 
25th November 1989 
I have the honour to inform you that, at its meeting today, the Council examined the draft 
budget of the Assembly for 1990 and, in accordance with procedure in force, expressed a favourable 
opinion on this amended budget as given in document C-B(89)24. 
I enclose copies of this document. 
Mr. G. MouLIAS, 
Clerk of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, 
43, avenue du President-Wilson, 
7 5 77 5 Paris Cedex 16 
Willem V AN EEKELEN 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Table showing changes made to the initial draft budget 
in the light of the Council's opinion 
Heads and sub-heads 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
1 - Basic salaries ........................ . 
2 - Allowances .......................... . 
3 - Social charges ....................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
departure of permanent officials ...... . 
5 - Medical examination ................. . 
TOTAL ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
HEAD 11- TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assem-
bly work between sessions ............ . 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the 
Draft budget 
for 1990 
10 531 000 
2 435 000 
2 048 000 
395 000 
12 000 
15 421 000 
3 217 000 
640000 
Breakdown of 
changes made 
by the B.O.C 
-1142000 
- 408 000 
- 212 000 
- 395 000 
2000 
-2 159 000 
APPENDIX Ill 
Amended 
draft budget 
9 389 000 
2 027 000 
1 836 000 
10 000 
13 262 000 
3 217 0001 
640000 
Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 000 - 15 000 
9 - Social charges ........................ r---1_7..:.3....:0:....:0c...:.O_+---------t--=-1 7....:3:.....:..00.::....0=---1 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 045 000 - 4 045 000 
l. Of which 378 000 F frozen. 
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Heads and sub-heads 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES 
AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head: 
l 0 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises ............................ . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............ . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of 
sessions ............................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Clerk 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture ... 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment .......................... . 
l 7 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction 
Draft budget 
for 1990 
400000 
10000 
525 000 
lOO 000 
l3 000 
35 000 
2000 
DOCUMENT 1198 ADDENDUM 
Breakdown of 
changes made 
by the B.O.C 
+ 30000 
Amended 
draft budget 
400000 
10000 
555 000 
lOO 000 I 
13 000 
35 000 
2000 
and other office equipment ............ 1----46_1 _0_00_-+---------+--4_6_1_0_0_0_-1 
TOTAL • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l 546 000 + 30 000 l 576 000 
HEAD IV- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents .......................... . 480000 480 000 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
and other office supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 000 - 280 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents . l 120 000 - l 120 000 
21 - Purchase of documents................ 65 000 - 65 000 
22 - Official cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 000 - 140 000 
23 - Bank charges ......................... 1-----5_0_0_+----------+----5_0_0---1 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 085 500 - 2 085 500 
l. Of which F 50 000 frozen. 
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Draft budget Breakdown of Amended Heads and sub-heads changes made for 1990 by the B.O.C draft budget 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances 
and insurance for the President of the 
Assembly, chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs ............ : .............. 190 000 - 190 000 
25 - Expenses for representation ............ 280000 - 50000 230000 
26 - Committee study missions ............. 5 000 - 5 000 
27 - Official journeys of members of the 
Office of the Clerk ................... 730 000 - 50000 680000 I 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor .... 40000 - 10000 30000 
29 - Expenditure on information ........... 500000 - 45000 455 000 
30 - Expenses for political groups .......... 403 000 - 403 000 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
elsewhere provided for ................ 3000 - 3000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ................. 30000 - 4000 26000 
TOTAL ............................... 2 181 000 - 159 000 2 022 000 
Operating Budget ............................ 25 278 500 - 22 990 500 
Receipts ........................... 110000 - 110000 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET ................... 25 168 500 -2 288 000 22 880 500 
Pensions expenditure ......................... 3 151 000 - 3 151 000 
Receipts ..................................... 652 000 - 80000 572 000 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET .................... 2 499 000 + 80000 2 579 000 
NET GRAND TOTAL ............................. 27 667 500 -2 208 000 25 459 500 
1. Of which F 280 000 frozen. 
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Document 1199 5th October 1989 
Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 2 
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAIT DECISION 
on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter 
DRAIT DECISION 
on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur 
APPENDICES 
I. Memorandum from Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, on changing the title of the General Affairs Committee 
11. Memorandum from Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations, on the reconsideration of the title and terms 
of reference of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (Chairman); MM. Thompson (Alternate: Hardy), Maris (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Andre, Antretter, Bohl, Caccia (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Collette, De Rycke, Dimmer, Eicher, Filetti (Alternate: Stegagnini), 
Jessel, Lord Kirkhill, Pasquino, Pistre, Scheer, von Schmude, Stoffelen (Alternate: de Kwaadsteniet), Taramelli, Unland. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Decision 
on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter 
The Assembly 
DECIDES 
To amend Articles VII and XI as follows: 
1. Article VII 
In paragraph (a), amend the titles of the committees to read as follows: 
1. Defence Committee; 
2. Political Committee; 
3. Technological and Aerospace Committee; 
4. Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration; 
5. Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges; 
6. Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
2. Article XI 
In paragraph (b), after" committees", add "or any other body created by the Assembly". 
In paragraph (c), replace " and the three agencies for security questions" by "and with the 
person responsible for any subsidiary body created by the Council ". 
In the French text only, replace" Greffe de l'Assemblee" by" Secretariat de l'Assemblee" and 
" Greffier " by " Secretaire general de l' Assemblee ". 
The English text remains unchanged. 
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Draft Decision 
on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
The Assembly 
DECIDES 
To amend Rules 38, 42 and 47 as follows: 
1. Rule 38 
In paragraph 1, amend the titles of the committees to read as follows: 
(i) Defence Committee; 
(ii) Political Committee; 
(iii) Technological and Aerospace Committee; 
(iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration; 
(v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, 
and add: 
(vi) Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
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Leave out paragraph 2 and insert: "The first and second of the permanent committees shall be 
composed of 34 members divided as follows: Belgium 3, France 5, Federal Republic of Germany 5, 
Italy 5, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 3, Portugal 3, Spain 4, the United Kingdom 5. The third, 
fourth, fifth and sixth permanent committees shall be composed of 26 members divided as follows: 
Belgium 2, France 4, the Federal Republic of Germany 4, Italy 4, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 2, 
Portugal 2, Spain 3, the United Kingdom 4. The Presidential Committee may, during the periods 
between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees 
with representatives or substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the 
Assembly. The secretaries of national delegations shall take part in meetings of the Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations without the right to vote. " 
2. Rule 42 
Delete Rule 42 and renumber subsequent rules accordingly. 
3. Rule 47 
In paragraph 5, replace " and the three agencies for security questions " by " ~nd with the person 
responsible for any subsidiary body created by the Council ". 
In the French text only, replace" Greffe de l'Assemblee" by" Secretariat de l'Assemblee" and 
" Greffier " by " Secretaire general de 1' Assemblee ". 
The English text remains unchanged. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. The Presidential Committee instructed 
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges to submit a report to the Assembly on the 
titles of committees with a view to making them 
correspond more closely to the committees' 
activities. 
2. The committee was also asked to consider 
a proposal by the Chairman of the Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Relations that that 
committee, which now has a special status, 
should be made a permanent committee of the 
Assembly. 
I. Titles of committees 
3. The committees were asked to give their 
views on their own titles. 
4. In the memorandum at Appendix I, Mr. 
Ahrens, Chairman of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, set out the reasons why his committee 
wished to be known as the Political Committee. 
The purpose is to give the committee a simple, 
clear title more in line with its activities. This 
proposal was agreed to unanimously by the com-
mittee. 
5. The Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments opted for the brief title of 
Defence Committee, since the word defence 
includes armaments concepts, as there can be no 
defence without armaments, and disarmament, 
since efficient defence is also sought in negoti-
ating agreements on balanced, verified arms 
reductions. 
6. The Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions also wished to 
be given the shorter title of Technological and 
Aerospace Committee to take account of the fact 
that the committee does not deal with purely sci-
entific matters. 
7. It is not proposed to amend the titles of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration or the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
8. The proposal to change the French title of 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations to " Commission pour les relations 
parlementaires et publiques " is in order. 
11. Status of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations 
9. Mr. Pontillon's memorandum at 
Appendix 11 sets out very clearly the reasons 
why the Committee for Parliamentary and 
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Public Relations should be made a permanent 
WEU committee. 
10. Initially, the committee was merely a 
working group formed to draw the attention of 
the parliaments of member countries to the 
activities of the WEU Assembly. Each dele-
gation was therefore represented equally by two 
members and two alternates. 
11. This working group was made into a com-
mittee whose status is set out in Rule 42 of the 
Rules of Procedure. It was authorised to submit 
draft orders to the Assembly or resolutions 
addressed to the parliaments. However, it may 
not adopt draft recommendations since it has no 
mandate to handle relations with the Council. 
12. The mandate of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations was extended to 
public relations shortly before the Council 
decided to be more active in public relations. 
Moreover, in spring 1989 the United Kingdom 
presidency of the Council organised a seminar 
on changes in public perceptions of European 
defence. 
13. The committee was therefore instructed 
by the Presidential Committee to consider the 
sections of the Council's annual report relating 
to the public relations activities of the Council 
and its presidency. However, the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations cannot 
carry out its task if it is not empowered, like the 
other committees, to submit to the Assembly 
draft recommendations in reply to the Council. 
14. For it to be able to do so, its composition 
has to be changed. The number of titular and 
alternate members of the Assembly's permanent 
committees, who have to vote on texts that form 
part of the Assembly's dialogue with the 
Council, is laid down in the Rules of Procedure 
and is in proportion to the number of members 
on each delegation. 
15. It is therefore proposed to give the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
the same composition as the other 26-member 
committees, i.e.: 
- four titular members and four alter-
nates for the largest delegations; 
- three titular members and three alter-
nates for Spain; 
- two titular members and two alternates 
for Belgium, the Netherlands and Por-
tugal; 
- one titular member and one alternate 
for Luxembourg. 
16. Finally, the secretaries of national delega-
tions would continue to have the right to take 
part in the work of the committee but not to vote. 
1 7. The amendments thus proposed mean 
that Article VII of the Charter would have to be 
amended in order to change the titles of certain 
Assembly committees and add a sixth per-
manent committee, the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations. 
18. In parallel with the amendment of Article 
VII, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules 
of Procedure on the appointment of committees 
would have to be amended to take account of 
the amended Article VII and to show the com-
position of the new permanent committee as 
indicated above. 
Ill. Article XI of the Charter 
19. On the occasion of this revision of the 
Charter and Rules of Procedure, the opportunity 
should be taken to update Article XI of the 
Charter, paragraph (c) of which states that "the 
Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the 
Secretary-General of Western European Union 
and the three agencies for security questions". It 
is believed that these agencies are to be wound 
down and replaced by an institute in accordance 
with the Assembly's wishes. However this may 
be, the words " and the three agencies for 
security questions " should be replaced by " and 
with the person responsible for any subsidiary 
body created by the Council". Paragraph (b) of 
this article referring to the Clerk's commitments 
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to the Assembly should also be completed by 
adding after " committees " the words " or any 
other body created by the Assembly ". 
20. Finally, it is proposed to amend the 
French text of Article XI because of the misun-
derstanding caused by us~ of the words 
"Greffe" and "Greffier" . .Paul Robert's dic-
tionary of the French language defines them as 
follows: Greffe: office in which the minutes of 
proceedings are kept; Greffier: public official in 
charge of that office (of a civil court or justice of 
the peace). It is understandable that, in his 
relations with certain authorities, the Clerk 
(Greffier) has some difficulty in making it under-
stood that he is not the officifil in charge of the 
Assembly's archives. 
21. It should be pointed out that in Belgium 
the title of Greffier hitherto applied to the Secre-
taries-General of the Chamqer of Representa-
tives and Senate has been replaced by that of 
" Secretaire general de la Chambre des 
Representants (or Senat) ". It is therefore pro-
posed to amend the French t~xt only to replace 
" Greffe " by " Secretariat . de l' Assemblee " 
and " Greffier " by " Secretaire general de 
1' Assemblee ". 
22. The English text of Article XI of the 
Charter and Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Procedure 
would remain unchanged since the word 
" Clerk " does not give rise to the same con-
fusion with a public official in charge of filing 
court orders. 
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APPENDIX I 
Memorandum from Mr. Ahrens, 
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, on 
changing the title of the General Affairs Committee 
APPENDIX I 
At the meeting of the Presidential Committee on 4th April 1989, a request was made to change 
the title of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I took the opportunity of pointing 
out that the title of the General Affairs Committee, too, seemed inappropriate since its meaning was 
already obscure in French and became incomprehensible when translated into other languages. I pro-
posed that henceforth the committee be known as the Political Committee, which seemed clear and 
unambiguous in all languages and corresponded exactly to the mandate of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. The change of title should allow the press to report on the work ofthe committee more easily. 
As we know, when WEU was first set up, the Council, anxious not to imply that it was dupli-
cating the work of the political bodies of other organisations, formed a General Affairs Division, so 
that it was natural for the Assembly to give the same title to its committee that handled the same ques-
tions. However, since the reform of the WEU ministerial organs in 1985, the General Affairs Division 
has disappeared from the Council's organogram and secretariat and has been replaced by a Political 
Affairs Division. It therefore seems logical for the Assembly to adopt the same title for the committee 
more particularly responsible for following the work of that division of the Council. 
For these two reasons, the General Affairs Committee asks to be known henceforth as the 
Political Committee. 
Since the Presidential Committee has asked the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges to report to it on the titles of the committees, I reserve the right to transmit this text to the Presi-
dential Committee if the committee agrees to it. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Memorandum from Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Relations, on the 
reconsideration of the title and terms of reference of 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
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At its meeting on 4th April 1989, the Presidential Committee was informed of proposals to 
change the titles of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which henceforth wishes to 
be known simply as the Defence Committee, and of the General Affairs Committee, which now wishes 
to be called the Political Committee. After a discussion, it was agreed to ask the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure to consider the titles of all the committees on the basis of proposals by the committees con-
cerned. 
I took the opportunity of pointing out that the study proposed should not exclude examination 
of the terms of reference of certain committees, including the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations. 
I received the following letter from the Clerk of the Assembly dated 3rd May: 
" The Presidential Committee has instructed the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges to examine committee titles after consulting the committees concerned. 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg would therefore be particularly grateful if you would notify him before 
31st July of any suggestions the committee of which you are Chairman might wish to make con-
cerning its title. He has asked me to point out that, if he receives no answey from you, he pro-
poses to consider that your committee does not wish its title to be changed. " 
If the committee agrees, I propose answering Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman of the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure, in the following sense: 
"Clearly, the title of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is fairly cum-
bersome, particularly in French. The title of the corresponding committee of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe - the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations - is 
shorter in French, and this title - Commission des relations parlementaires et publiques - might 
be adopted for our own committee. " 
However, the committee considers that its main problem is not its title but the limit on its status 
and powers which restricts its activities in an area of growing importance. 
For some time, the committee has been instructed by the Presidential Committee to examine 
sections of the annual report of the Council relating to its public relations activities, with particular 
regard to informing the public and the press. It was also invited to participate in the seminar organised 
by the United Kingdom Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council on changes in public perceptions of 
European defence. 
The committee's work in this area can serve no useful purpose if it is not authorised to transmit 
its conclusions to the Council in the form of a text voted upon in committee. 
In view of the growing importance of strengthening the dialogue with the parliaments and public 
in Europe and also in the New World, it would seem fully justified for the committee to be given the 
status of permanent committee within the meaning of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly. 
This new status would not prevent the secretaries of national delegations continuing to take part 
in the committee's work. Their participation is useful and should be continued. 
It is therefore proposed that: 
- the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations be added to the five present per-
manent committees; 
- the breakdown of members of the committee among member countries be determined; 
- it should be specified that the secretaries of national delegations are entitled to participate in 
meetings of the committee on a consultative basis; 
- Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly be deleted. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Reddemann 
4th December 1989 
1. In paragraph 2 of the draft decision on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter, leave 
out the third and fourth sentences. 
2. In paragraph 3 of the draft decision on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, leave out the second and third sentences. 
I. See 7th sitting, 4th December 1989 (amendments withdrawn). 
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Signed: Reddemann 
Document 1200 13th October 1989 
First part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council 
to the Assembly of Western European Union 
(1st January - 30th June 1989) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 
I. Activities of the Permanent Council 
II. Activities of the Special Working Group (SWG) 
Ill. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) 
IV. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group 
V. The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space 
VI. The Institutional Working Group 
VII. Relations with the Assembly 
VIII. Public Relations 
Introduction 
l. The first half of 1989 was a highly 
eventful period as far as East-West relations 
affecting security were concerned. The adoption 
on 15th January of the final document of the 
Vienna follow-up meeting to the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 
opening on 6th March of the Vienna negotia-
tions on conventional forces in Europe - part of 
the CSCE process- the parallel 35-nation nego-
tiations on confidence- and security-building 
measures, and the Atlantic Alliance summit held 
in Brussels on 29th and 30th May were all note-
worthy events directly connected with WEU 
activities. It is against this dynamic, and poten-
tially promising, background that the organ-
isation has continued its activities, pursuing its 
consideration of problems affecting European 
security. 
2. Also of note are the positions adopted by 
the new United States administration, which 
openly declared itself in favour of the devel-
opment of a European security identity, and the 
backing given by President Bush to greater 
co-operation within WEU. Such declarations 
will undoubtedly inspire the member states to 
continue in their endeavours. Other European 
states have also shown a sustained interest in 
WEU activities. 
3. Discussions ranged over all the main 
current issues concerning European security. At 
their meeting on 3rd and 4th April, ministers 
had an in-depth exchange of views on all such 
matters, in anticipation of the alliance summit 
on 29th and 30th May. The question of 
modernising SNF was discussed on that 
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occasion, highlighting the need for a common 
position, such as was adopted at the Brussels 
summit. In that light also, the ministers 
examined the question of conventional arms 
control that they considered to be the keystone 
of European security. They welcomed the con-
structive atmosphere in which those negotia-
tions had begun on the basis of the western pro-
posals prepared jointly by the allies, with the 
active participation of WEU member states. 
4. With regard to developments in Eastern 
Europe and in the USSR, ministers noted at 
their meeting of 3rd and 4th April that there 
should be a favourable response to the desire 
expressed by those countries, and in particular 
by President Gorbachev, to maintain close and 
co-operative relations with Western Europe as a 
whole and with the member states of the 
European Community. Ministers welcomed 
these developments which they considered fun-
damental for Europe and its future. They were, 
however, of the opinion ~hat some caution 
should prevail regarding these developments. 
Accordingly, while on the one hand encouraging 
Eastern Europe to show more and more 
openness, one should on the other hand 
maintain an effective defence capability 
including an adequate lev~ of deterrence to 
guarantee the security of Western Europe. Min-
isters took the view that such deterrence was the 
best means of directing developments towards 
greater stability in the longer term. 
5. Ministers welcomed the successful 
outcome of the Paris Conference on the Prohi-
bition of Chemical Weapons and stressed the 
need to overcome quickly the remaining 
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problem concerning the setting-up of a con-
vention on the worldwide ban of these weapons 
at an early date. 
6. In view of the fact that the co-ordination 
of member states' naval activities in the Gulf 
had come to a successful conclusion with 
"Operation Cleansweep ", ministers noted that 
this experience and the lessons to be learnt 
regarding concertation on an out-of-Europe 
crisis were valuable both for the member states 
and the organisation itself. 
7. Ministers took note of the fact that both 
Turkey and Greece wished to accede to WEU. 
Ministerial level consultation procedures had 
been initiated with the two countries. 
8. With regard to institutional matters, the 
Ministerial Council indicated that it was pre-
pared to meet Assembly requirements ensuing 
directly from enlargement. It requested the Per-
manent Council to continue to seek a solution 
that would satisfy the Assembly and that could 
be financed from the resources available for this 
purpose. Furthermore, the Ministerial Council 
requested the Permanent Council to continue 
examining the question of setting up an institute 
for strategic studies and the related matter of the 
WEU Paris ministerial organs with a view to 
discussions at its next meeting. 
9. Lastly, the Ministerial Council took note 
of the departure of Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-
General of WEU. It paid tribute to him for his 
outstanding service on behalf of the organ-
isation. Dr. Willem van Eekelen was appointed 
Secretary-General for five years with effect from 
15th May. 
10. Assembly representatives were informed 
of the outcome of the ministerial meeting held 
on 4th April by the ministers representing the 
United Kingdom presidency, namely Sir 
Geoffrey Howe and Mr. George Younger. 
I. Activities of the Permanent Council 
1. During the period under review, the Per-
manent Council, both at its regular meetings 
and at " enlarged " sessions, continued to follow 
all the activities of the WEU intergovernmental 
organs. 
2. The Council studied the applications for 
accession by Turkey and Greece; it prepared 
ministerial decisions on the subject and kept a 
close watch on developments, particularly the 
initiation of the ministerial-level consultation 
procedure with the two countries. 
3. The Council addressed all matters related 
to WEU enlargement to include Portugal and 
Spain following the signing of the protocol of 
accession on 14th November 1988. It followed 
progress in the national ratification procedures. 
By 30th June 1989, four member states had rat-
ified the protocol of accession. 
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4. The Permanent Council had initial 
exchanges of views on the review of the provi-
sions of the treaty and its protocols. It will con-
sider this matter in greater depth at the appro-
priate time, taking due account in its 
deliberations of the views of the Assembly, such 
as those expressed in the van der Sanden report 
and Recommendation 4 72. 
5. The Council has closely followed matters 
relating to Assembly requirements directly 
ensuing from enlargement. For that purpose, 
numerous contacts have been made with the 
Assembly. 
In order to make a detailed analysis of the 
financial implications, the Council decided to 
obtain the opinion of a second architect on the 
work required. 
The Council was insistent that the 
reorganisation should in no way hinder the 
normal functioning of the Paris ministerial 
organs. 
6. The Council looked at the whole range of 
institutional matters. Following the Ministerial 
Council in April 1989, and taking account of 
Recommendation 467 of the Presidential Com-
mittee of the Assembly on the setting up of an 
institute for advanced defence studies, the 
Council decided to establish an institutional 
working group (see VI below) to prepare a 
solution to the organisation's institutional 
problems for submission at the ministerial 
meeting in November 1989. 
7. The Council dealt with a large number of 
topical issues in the politico-military field. They 
included: 
- the situation in the Mediterranean and 
in the Gulf; 
- the Anglo-German summit held in 
Frankfurt on 20th and 21st February; 
- Mr. Gorbachev's visit to London (6th 
and 7th April); 
- the modernisation of short-range 
nuclear missiles in Europe; 
- the Franco-German Security and 
Defence Council; 
- the alliance summit and the meeting of 
the North Atlantic Assembly. 
11. Activities of the Special Working Group 
1. Following the ministerial meeting of 14th 
November 1988, the Special Working Group 
decided that it should concentrate in the first 
half of 1989 on topical politico-military ques-
tions and on specific studies requested by the 
Council. 
2. The main topical questions studied by the 
SWG in the first six months of 1989 were: 
- the conclusion of the Vienna Con-
ference on CSCE follow-up; 
- the Paris Conference, the problems of 
verification and European disarm-
ament interests as regards chemical 
weapons; 
- the negotiations on conventional forces 
in Europe and the attitude that member 
states should adopt; 
- the consequences for WEU countries of 
the NATO summit. 
3. As part of the implementation of the 
platform and on the basis of mandates approved 
by the Ministerial Council, the SWG has under-
taken to study two significant items, one on 
Europe's possible role in the space field and the 
other on the defence implications of the single 
market after 1992. 
4. As far as space is concerned, the SWG 
examined, on the basis of national contribu-
tions, the prospects offered by the application of 
space technology to verification requirements. 
Subsequently, it defined the terms of ref-
erence for a study to be conducted by a sub-
group on space with a view to submitting to 
ministers at their meeting in November 1989 an 
interim report, describing the value and 
potential of co-operation in space (see IV 
below). 
5. With regard to 1992 and its possible 
implications in terms of security, it was con-
sidered useful to study to what extent the pros-
pects of the opening-up of Community frontiers, 
the free movement and establishment of persons 
and the opening-up of public contracts, were 
likely to affect the organisation of our countries' 
defence. 
This process of reflection, now in 
progress, should also take account of work on 
the same topics being carried out within other 
fora, such as the European Community or the 
IEPG. 
6. Further progress in the process of 
European construction and the conclusion of the 
CFE negotiations will mean a profound change 
in the conditions of our security in Western 
Europe. 
Accordingly, the SWG has undertaken to 
reflect on European security requirements in the 
medium term, i.e., 1992-1995. 
7. The SWG has also been considering the 
question of the "out-of-Europe" activities of 
WEU member states. 
There was an exchange of information on 
the member states' security-related programmes 
of assistance to third world countries, and on the 
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assessment of regional situations likely to affect 
vital European security interests. 
8. Lastly, the SWG is also considering the 
possible implications of a CFE agreement, in 
particular its verification regime, for the security 
of WEU member states. 
Ill. Activities of the Defence 
Representatives Group (DRG) 
1. During this period, the DRG has met 
approximately once a month, twice at high level. 
Whereas the SWG studies the whole range of 
politico-military questions, the DRG has con-
firmed its role as a forum within which defence 
ministry representatives can address those 
aspects more specifically concerned with 
defence. The joint meetings now taking place 
between the SWG and the DRG provide a useful 
mechanism for maintaining cohesion in the 
work at all levels. 
2. The DRG has begun its consideration of 
the potential for intensifying co-operation in 
future, inter alia, by improving the use of 
training facilities, the joint use and development 
- wherever possible - of simulators, and by 
exchange programmes for units and personnel. 
A detailed report containing practical recom-
mendations for co-operation in the field of 
instruction and training will be submitted to the 
ministerial meeting in November 1989. 
3. The group has also begun to consider the 
practical military conseque111ces of verification 
and inspection measures which might ensue 
from a CFE agreement. It was agreed that, 
although verification was a national responsi-
bility, the member states would consider 
studying, as far as was possible, those areas of 
verification in which WEU countries might use-
fully co-operate and co-ordinate their activities. 
There was also a preliminary discussion of the 
impact which any conventional force reductions 
agreed in CFE might have on defence planning 
by the ministries concerned in the member 
countries. 
4. The DRG is keeping on its agenda a 
number of longer-term issues such as the study 
of operational concepts and requirements and 
the demographic problems in Western Europe. 
Another topic addressed by the DRG was 
the public perception of defence, a topic which 
provided the subject for a seminar organised by 
the United Kingdom (see VIII below). 
IV. Activities of the Medit~rranean Sub-Group 
of the Special Working Group 
In accordance with ministers' instruc-
tions, the sub-group continued its work, concen-
trating on an analysis of the' situation in two spe-
cific areas. 
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1. Developments in Yugoslavia 
and their repercussions in the Balkans 
The sub-group noted that the power of the 
executive continued to weaken to the advantage 
of the Republics. At federal level, there was a 
strong determination to maintain continuity in 
foreign and defence policies against an unfa-
vourable economic background. 
Yugoslavia, whilst attaching importance 
to its role as leader of the non-aligned 
movement, is becoming more interested in 
co-operation with Western Europe and in 
regional problems in the Balkans and the Medi-
terranean. 
Albania continues to pursue its policy of 
cautious openness towards Western Europe, and 
appears particularly keen to avoid any wors-
ening of the situation in Kosovo. 
2. Developments in the Maghreb 
In this region, threats to stability are not 
essentially of a military nature, but derive from 
the political, social, demographic and, above all, 
economic factors apt to produce change in 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The unpredicta-
bility of crises constitutes an additional element 
of uncertainty. On the other hand, the creation 
of the Arab Maghreb Union is an important 
stabilising factor in the region. 
The group is currently studying the role of 
naval units in the region. 
V. The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space 
At their meeting of 3rd-4th April 1989, 
ministers discussed the implications for 
European security of current or planned national 
space programmes. 
They asked the Permanent Council to 
draw up guidelines for an in-depth study of three 
specific aspects: the possible use of space tech-
nology in connection with arms control verifi-
cation, the monitoring of political crises and 
civilian missions concerning the environment. 
to: 
An ad hoc sub-group on space was set up 
- review partners' activities in the field of 
space technology; 
- consider areas where member states 
might see a need for co-ordinated activ-
ities; 
- identify the technical means available 
and/or required for such activities; 
- report to ministers. 
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The sub-group met for the first time on 
14th June to discuss the initial national contri-
butions on co-operation in the space field and to 
decide on its working methods and work pro-
gramme. 
VI. The Institutional Working Group 
1. The question of the possible estab-
lishment under WEU auspices of a European 
institute for advanced defence studies has been 
discussed frequently by the Council since the 
reactivation of WEU. The Presidential Com-
mittee of the Assembly recalled as much when, 
on 16th March 1989, it adopted Recommen-
dation 467. 
2. On 3rd April 1989, the Ministerial 
Council ofWEU" ( ... )instructed the Permanent 
Council to review the question of an institute for 
strategic studies and the related question of the 
WEU Agency with a view to further discussion 
at its next meeting ( ... ) ". 
3. On the basis of this mandate, the Per-
manent Council agreed to convene its Institu-
tional Working Group (IWG). Following an 
initial exchange of views on 1st June 1989, the 
IWG decided that the possible establishment of 
such an institute could be considered from three 
angles: 
- the contribution of such an institute in 
the context of strengthening the 
European security identity; 
- the tasks it should perform; 
- its method of operation. 
4. The Assembly will be informed of the 
outcome of ministers' discussions on the subject 
when the Belgian presidency of the Council 
meets the Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly in Brussels on 14th November, fol-
lowing the ministerial meeting. 
VII. Relations with the Assembly 
1. The dialogue between the Council and the 
Assembly of WEU has continued construc-
tively. 
The concern of both the presidency and 
the Council to keep the Assembly informed of 
the state of WEU dossiers has found expression 
in the " formal " meetings held before - and 
after - the Ministerial Council and in the 
informal contacts between representatives of the 
current presidency, either alone or accompanied 
by representatives of the previous and future 
presidencies (the "troika"), and representatives 
of the Assembly. 
2. The United Kingdom Chairman-in-
Office, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Secretary, 
and Mr. George Younger, Secretary of State for 
Defence, in the presence of the Secretary-
General, met: 
- on 16th March, in London, representa-
tives of the Presidential Committee of 
the Assembly; 
- on 4th April, at the end of the London 
Ministerial Council, representatives of 
the Presidential Committee, the General 
Affairs Committee and the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments 
of the Assembly. 
The two representatives of the incoming 
presidency of the Council, the Belgian Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Leo Tindemans, and Defence 
Minister, Mr. Guy Coeme, were also present at 
the second meeting. 
3. The Secretary-General continued to send 
to the Assembly, approximately every two 
months, an information letter on the activities 
of the intergovernmental organs. 
The Assembly will continue to receive 
such information letters at suitable intervals, 
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depending on the pace and substance of the 
Council's activities. 
VIII. Public Relations 
The public relations activities of the 
organisation continued to increase. During the 
period under review, the Secretary-General 
made strenuous efforts to publicise the work of 
WEU and to promote greater European public 
awareness and understanding of European 
security issues. In addition, the United 
Kingdom presidency organised a seminar on 
" Changes in Public Perceptions of European 
Defence ", from 6th-7th March at Lancaster 
House, London. Among the participants from 
the nine WEU member countries were civil ser-
vants from the foreign and defence ministries, 
academics, journalists and representatives from 
the WEU Assembly. At their meeting in April, 
ministers took note of this seminar and 
instructed the Permanent Council to suggest 
ways of improving the organisation's public rela-
tions effort. The Secretariat is currently working 
on proposals to submit to the Council in this 
respect. 
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(i) Considering that the Single European Act is in harmony with the principles and aims set out in 
the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in its preamble and Articles I and 11, and considering that 
the respective responsibilities of WEU and the European Community are complementary; 
(ii) Considering that the creation of a single European market raises problems of security for the 
WEU member countries to which they will have to find concerted solutions; 
(iii) Noting that the European Commission has set up a service to deal with security and defence 
questions but that the prospect of the development of relations between the European Community and 
several neutral countries or non-members of the Atlantic Alliance should deter th~ Community from 
handling such matters which, in any case, fall within the competence of WEU under the modified 
Brussels Treaty which has not been superseded and which are of greater importance because of recent 
political developments in Europe; 
(iv) Considering that the Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of European security but that the role 
played by Europe in the alliance should be re-examined, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Instruct a working group to conduct, in consultation with the European Commission, a detailed 
study of the problems that will arise for the security of member states when frontier controls are abol-
ished and report to the Assembly on its conclusions; 
2. Study carefully the disparities that will arise in the single European market due to the present 
difference between the burdens imposed on member states by their defence policies with a view to 
finding a remedy; 
3. With the European Commission, set up a joint working group to prepare a list of products and 
technologies which, if released to third countries, might jeopardise world peace, the aim being to ban 
any such action by member countries, and endeavour to promote the same rules among other exporting 
countries; 
4. Seek better methods so that, wherever possible, specifications and requirements may be 
harmonised and agreed in joint programmes, thus facilitating an effective co-ordinated European 
approach; 
5. Examine procedures in the various member countries for placing orders fCJ>r the armed forces 
with industrial firms with a view to achieving a unified approach; 
6. In the same context, examine the obligations of staff employed by industries manufacturing 
partly or solely for defence purposes. 
11 
Furthermore, the Assembly, 
(i) Considering with regret that the Council does not make sufficient use of its statutory means of 
pursuing a dialogue with the Assembly; 
(ii) Considering in particular the delay in replying to Recommendation 467; 
(iii) Noting with satisfaction that, in its reply to Recommendation 472, the Council renewed its 
undertaking to report to the Assembly on all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
even when this is done in other forums, but noting that it has given no information about the activities 
of the European Commission in defence matters; 
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(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Secretary-General's address in Brussels on 21st September 1989 pro-
vided interesting information on the state of the reactivation ofWEU, but regretting that the Assembly 
has not yet received an official communication of the same standard; 
(v) Considering that the Council's requirements in respect of the management of the Assembly's 
supplementary budget would, if carried into effect, be detrimental to the principle of the Assembly's 
budgetary autonomy and the responsibilities of the President of the Assembly as defined in the 
Financial Regulations; 
(vi) Welcoming the steps taken by the Council in 1989 to allow more in-depth thinking by the 
administration of member countries on keeping the public informed and on artificial intelligence and 
the pursuit of European sessions of defence studies, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Use its statutory means to give the Assembly precise, full information on its structures, work and 
plans so as to allow a true dialogue; 
2. Give priority to the Assembly when communicating such information; 
3. Enable the Assembly to take part in its thinking on the tasks to be attributed to the future 
institute; 
4. Take no measures that may involve relations between the new institute and the Assembly 
without securing the latter's prior agreement; 
5. Respect the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy in the conditions that the Council 
itself laid down in 1987; 
6. Inform the Assembly of the measures taken in the European Community to allow the European 
Commission to study security and defence questions; 
7. Continue to associate the Assembly with the seminars and colloquies that it organises; 
8. Examine in what conditions and in which framework a European centre for preventing military 
risks might be set up and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of its study. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When the working paper that was to serve 
as a basis for the present report was first con-
sidered on 5th October 1989, some members of 
the General Affairs Committee said they 
believed it should be strongly reaffirmed that the 
Atlantic Alliance was the essential basis of 
Europe's defence. Your Rapporteur willingly 
accepts this fact. However, since the subject 
with which he has to deal relates to the 1993 
deadline, he felt that the main reason for his 
report was the introduction, on that date, of the 
single European market. He reserves the right to 
ask for a report to be included in the agenda of 
the next part-session in June 1990 on relations 
between WEU and NATO in the new circum-
stances, a subject which he considers to be of 
very special importance. He has not been able to 
conduct that study and the one for which he is 
more particularly responsible at one and the 
same time. 
2. Started in July 1987, implementation of 
the Single European Act, signed and ratified by 
the present twelve member countries of the 
European Community, is to be continued until 
31st December 1992, on which date there 
should no longer be any economic frontiers 
between those countries. This may be seen as a 
major step towards the establishment of a united 
Europe even if it should prove that from certain 
points of view the abolition of these frontiers 
could not be complete on that date. It is indeed 
very probable that the drive of the single market 
will lead to an early solution being found to eco-
nomic problems not settled beforehand. 
3. It is clear the disappearance of remaining 
barriers to total freedom in exchanges of goods 
and persons will raise questions for the states 
concerned, the importance of which cannot yet 
be fully assessed in terms of internal legislation 
and external and defence policy. In the first 
area, for instance, there are considerable differ-
ences between member countries of the Com-
munity in allowing foreigners the right to vote 
and these differences have repercussions on the 
application of the right of establishment, now in 
principle guaranteed for all citizens of Com-
munity countries. The aim of the present report 
is to consider the implications of this emerging 
European economic entity for the external and 
defence policies of the WEU member countries 
and, perhaps too, what limits security-related 
considerations must impose on the opening of 
frontiers. 
4. Since the single act was signed, it has been 
apparent that these matters have been tackled in 
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two different ways. Some, considering the Com-
munity to be the first step towards the future 
United States of Europe, infer that it should 
quickly take on global nesponsibilities far 
exceeding its responsibilities under the various 
founding treaties. They therefore believe the 
European Community to be closed to all coun-
tries which do not accept at one and the same 
time all the founding treaties and also a certain 
view of their future. This was, for instance, the 
attitude adopted by Mr. Del~rs, President of the 
Commission of the Community, in his speech to 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe on 26th September 1989. It should, 
however, be said that, speaking in Bonn on 5th 
October 1989, Mr. Delors said" Europe and its 
unity cannot be dissociated ~rom your own. The 
movement towards it may succeed with the 
Community ... the movement can only succeed 
with it ". He encouraged the Community to go 
out to meet the wishes of Eastern Europe, 
asserting that " it never intends to subordinate 
fundamental working rights to economic effi-
ciency". If this really is h~s view, he should 
adjust his action in security and defence matters 
accordingly. 
5. Others, on the contrary, believing the 
treaties should be strictly respected, consider 
that the Community has responsibilities only in 
areas assigned to it under the treaties and that, 
in those where it has none, it is for other interna-
tional bodies to co-ordinate the policies of 
member states of the Corpmunity, including 
NATO and WEU in security matters. This 
concept, presented to the Assembly at its last 
session by Mr. Younger, U~ited Kingdom Sec-
retary of State for Defence, is to be found in the 
" Plan for Europe " referred to by Mr. Genscher, 
the Federal German Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, on 1st October 198!9 in a interview on 
the Deutsche Rundfunk. In view of the very 
rapid pace of events in Eastern Europe, Mr. 
Genscher proposed making use of the European 
Economic Community to organise close 
co-operation between Eastern European coun-
tries choosing the path of radical reforms and 
Western Europe, and of the Council of Europe 
to set the framework for a " European juridical 
area ". He believed this meant that those two 
organisations should avoid tackling security and 
defence questions which should remain a matter 
for the Atlantic Alliance and WEU, in 
accordance with the treaties in force. Without 
settling the question clearly, the text of the single 
act nevertheless refers security and defence 
matters to these two organisations. In other 
words, it does not question the application of 
Articles 223 and 234 of the Rome Treaty. 
DOCUMENT 1201 
6. Moreover, the development of detente in 
the last four years has significantly changed the 
facts of the matter. The Soviet Union has shown 
clearly that it is tackling the problem of its rela-
tions with Western Europe from two very dif-
ferent standpoints. For the development of eco-
nomic relations between Eastern and Western 
Europe, it has agreed that the European Com-
munity is a legitimate partner. It has fully 
recognised the existence of the Community and 
is simply afraid, like the United States and most 
third countries, that it may be protectionist. It 
has established diplomatic relations with it and 
made it plain that it had no objection to neutral 
countries, or even member countries of the 
Warsaw Pact, organising their relations with the 
Community as they saw fit, even considering 
accession. Conversely, Soviet diplomacy has 
made it plain that this attitude is closely linked 
with the fact that the Community is not and 
does not intend to be a military bloc. In other 
words, it is not troubled by the treaties gov-
erning the European Community and it feels 
they provide the framework for a European 
entity with which the Soviet Union is prepared 
to develop relations. They should also allow its 
allies to organise their own relations as they 
please. It considers, however, that neutral coun-
tries, or member countries of the Warsaw Pact, 
could not legitimately find a place in a European 
system of military alliance without jeopardising 
balance and peace, which is, after all, quite 
logical. 
7. However, early in 1989, Austria, whose 
neutrality is defined in an act of the Austrian 
state, compatible with the 1955 state treaty of 
which the Soviet Union is a signatory, as are the 
1945 western allies, made it plain that it intends 
to apply for membership of the Community. 
Hungary, a Warsaw Pact member country, has 
also indicated that it hoped to develop economic 
relations with the European Community and 
that it too was thinking of applying for mem-
bership. 
8. The Community is therefore going to 
have to emerge from the mist in which it has so 
far shrouded its relations with defence Europe. 
In the probably quite near future, it will have to 
decide whether it alone is a precursor of the 
future United States of Europe, consisting solely 
of countries having chosen the western liberal 
and democratic way of life, or whether it must 
give up this view of its future and opt for the 
prospect of East-West detente, entente and 
co-operation, i.e., in the more or less long term, 
the reunification of Eastern and Western Europe 
in accordance with its own principles but at the 
cost of giving up any claim in the areas of 
security and defence. As long as the Soviet 
Union seemed to be a very direct threat and per-
sisted in running its economy in a way that sepa-
rated it radically from parts of the world that it 
did not control, the prospects of detente 
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appeared to be merely a device to thwart the 
West's unifying aims. It was then perfectly 
logical not to take account of the prospects of a 
then problematic evolution of East-West rela-
tions when organising the present and future of 
a highly integrated Western Europe. This 
changed once Europe was faced with a choice 
between two future prospects, neither of which 
it could discard: reunification of a Europe which 
had been fragmented by two world wars and the 
closest possible union of Europe. Before 
Austria's candidature has even been presented, 
it brings the Western European countries to 
grips with this unpleasant option that it has been 
trying to avoid for forty years. 
9. Die Welt of 30th August 1989 reported a 
statement by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-
General of WEU, as follows: 
" WEU is the appropriate instrument for 
adding the security policy dimension to 
the economic and political dimensions of 
the European union. He said it would thus 
be a mistake to admit neutral states such 
as Austria to the European Community. If 
it were admitted, Europe would be pow-
erless and unable to play any role in the 
world. He recommended concluding 
special co-operation agreements, mainly 
economically-oriented, with interested 
neutral countries such as Austria rather 
than to admit them to the Community." 
10. The Assembly, by calling for many years 
for a political Secretary-General to be 
appointed, persevered with the idea that a poli-
tician would be best placed to act with authority, 
and it can but welcome the fact that, after Mr. 
Alfred Cahen, Mr. van Eekelen is asserting 
himself as a Secretary-General who says what he 
thinks in public, without bothering to obtain the 
prior approval of the Council. The Assembly 
regrets that he was unable to do so when he was 
invited to address its Soviet guests on 11th July 
1989. However, this does not mean that it 
endorses his views nor that it wishes to associate 
itself with his comment on the European Par-
liament, reproaching it for intervening in a 
matter which does not directly concern it. It is 
not for our Assembly to give its views on the 
enlargement of the Community. 
11. The modified Brussels Treaty probably 
provides the only means of moving towards the 
twofold aim of union and detente without too 
much difficulty. On the one hand, it created a 
defensive alliance between its members and, on 
the other, its preamble stresses the will of its 
signatories to develop their economic, social and 
cultural links, " to promote the unity and 
to encourage the progressive integration of 
Europe " and " to associate progressively in the 
pursuance of these aims other states inspired 
by the same ideals and animated by the like 
determination ". Article I lays down that 
co-operation in WEU " shall not involve any 
duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other 
economic organisations in which the high 
contracting parties are or may be represented 
but shall on the contrary assist the work of 
those organisations ", while Article 11 makes 
" specialised agencies " responsible for ensuring 
economic and social co-operation between the 
WEU member countries. There is nothing to 
prevent such co-operation being extended to 
include countries that are not members ofWEU, 
be this in the framework of the Council of 
Europe, the Community or co-operation with 
Eastern European countries. 
12. If, therefore, the Community chooses a 
path that prevents it from assuming responsi-
bility for Europe's defence policy, WEU is the 
instrument by which those of its members who 
so wish can develop co-operation in this area. 
The two organisations are complementary and, 
with the decisions it will have to take when 
Austria applies for membership, it is the Com-
munity that will have to fix the boundaries of 
what it is able to undertake. Conversely, it will 
then be for WEU to examine the implications 
for the joint organisation of the security of WEU 
member countries of decisions taken by 
members of the Community. 
13. Everything indicates that this was the 
point of view of the governments of the seven 
WEU countries and of Portugal and Spain, who 
declared, in subscribing to the platform of The 
Hague:" We are convinced that the construction 
of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete 
as long as it does not include security and 
defence. An important means to this end is the 
modified Brussels Treaty." This text corre-
sponds perfectly with the single act, in which it 
is stated that " closer co-operation on questions 
of European security would contribute in an 
essential way to the development of a European 
identity in external policy matters ". 
14. There is moreover every reason to be grat-
ified that the President of the European Com-
mission has instructed some of his counsellors to 
examine the problems that the security and 
defence of Europe raise for the Community 
since there inevitably are problems and there 
will be even more as from 1993. It is equally 
normal for the ministers of defence of the Com-
munity member countries not to meet in the 
twelve-power framework and that, in their 
political consultations, the ministers for foreign 
affairs avoid matters relating to joint defence. 
15. However, there is a school of thought that 
assimilates a future European union, whose 
structures and shape are far from fixed, wholly 
and immediately within a European Com-
munity based on the accession of certain coun-
tries to very precise contractual texts. As 
defenders of that interpretation note that the 
twelve governments concerned consider unani-
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mously that their commitments are limited 
strictly to application of the treaties they signed, 
they are tempted to use the European Par-
liament to force the governments' hands. For 
instance, they speak of" constituent " initiatives 
that that parliamentary assembly might take and 
ask that it deal directly with security and 
defence questions. This is, for instance, the 
sense of a resolution adopted by the Union of 
European Federalists on 9th A.pril 1989. As they 
foresee that such an initiative might be refused 
by representatives of countries whose defence 
policy does not coincide with that pursued by 
others in NATO, some are asking for the delega-
tions of the seven (soon nine) WEU member 
countries to the European Parliament to replace 
the delegations from those ' countries to the 
Council of Europe for forming the WEU 
Assembly. To some extent, the European Par-
liament echoed these views, first by having 
security matters dealt with in the reports of its 
Political Committee, then by giving that com-
mittee a security and disarmament sub-
committee and, finally, by asking for Article IX 
of the modified Brussels Treaty to be revised so 
as to have our Assembly foqned at least partly 
from members of the European Parliament. 
16. There is no need to re-examine this 
matter here since the Assembly gave its point of 
view on 5th June 1989 when it adopted Recom-
mendation 4 72 on a report by Mr. van der 
Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. Inter alia, it recommended that the 
Council " maintain the provision in Article IX 
for the Assembly to be composed of delegations 
from the national parliaments of member coun-
tries " on the occasion of the forthcoming 
revision of the treaty and " ensure that an 
incorrect interpretation of the Rome Treaty and 
the Single European Act does not affect the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty ". 
These points in a recommendation that also 
related to other WEU activities were tanta-
mount to recalling the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. 
1 7. It is therefore most surprising that some 
observers, including the director of the press 
agency whose task is to infol!m the world about 
what is going on in Europe, should have inter-
preted our Assembly's vote as '' starting a war 
against the European Parliament ". Contrary to 
what is stated in the editorial in the Europe 
Bulletin of 15th June 1989, the WEU Assembly 
did not " choose the time at which important 
political tensions are emerging within the Com-
munity on vital problems, in order to bring up 
an old argument which, over and above the 
classic inter-institutional conflicts, looks more 
like a war declared against the system based on 
European political integration ". On the one 
hand, the Assembly did not choose to adopt this 
recommendation just when there was tension in 
the Community, of which it was moreover 
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unaware. It answered a European Parliament 
text that concerned the application of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty and not at all the Rome 
Treaty. Hence it is the European Parliament 
which chose the moment to attack WEU and not 
the reverse. Furthermore, nothing in the recom-
mendation adopted by our Assembly, in Mr. van 
der Sanden's explanatory memorandum or the 
debates on 4th and 5th June can be construed as 
a criticism of " the system based on European 
political integration ". Respect for the treaties 
and responsibilities of each institution was the 
sole preoccupation of the members of our 
Assembly. 
18. It might be added that neither the interest 
shown by the European Parliament when it was 
invited to take part in the colloquy organised by 
the General Affairs Committee in Florence in 
April 1989, nor the place given to defence ques-
tions during the electoral campaign of the 
various lists taking part in the European elec-
tions in June 1989, nor the rate of participation 
in those elections give it special authority to deal 
with the future of European security. 
19. On the contrary, the WEU Assembly is 
remaining strictly within the framework of its 
responsibilities by attempting to consider in as 
much detail as possible the consequences of the 
implementation of the Single European Act for 
Europe's security and wondering how the WEU 
Council will be able to answer the questions thus 
raised. 
20. In so doing, it is perfectly in harmony 
with the Council, which again voiced the fol-
lowing opinion on 6th June 1989 through the 
representative of the presidency, Mr. Younger, 
the United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Defence, in answer to a question put by our col-
league, Mr. Stegagnini: 
" ... But it is most important to preserve 
the clear definition that the European 
Community, with all its enormous respon-
sibilities, does not have responsibility for 
defence. That is not in any way to devalue 
the importance of the EC to every aspect 
of our lives. It is to make the essential 
point that defence is different, for two 
reasons. First, the Treaty of Rome did not 
set out to involve the European Com-
munity in defence matters, and defence is 
of such great complexity that there is a 
strong argument for having a different 
forum to deal with it. The second reason 
is a practical one: the membership of the 
European Community is different from 
that ofWEU, and not all its members are 
prepared to be involved in defence. One 
member of the EC is a neutral country. 
We must respect that. 
All the suggestions that are flying about of 
amalgamating roles, exchanging parlia-
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mentarians or having parliamentarians 
perform both roles are wide of the mark. 
Defence is different. It requires different 
people with different skills, but at the 
same time keeping in close contact with 
the community that it serves. That line is 
simple and easy to understand, and we 
should maintain it. " 
II. Defence in the Single European Act 1 
21. Contrary to what many people think, 
defence Europe preceded economic Europe. The 
Schuman plan, which gave birth to the European 
Coal and Steel Community, dates back to 9th 
May 1950, whereas the Brussels Treaty, by 
which five European countries grouped their 
armed forces to ensure their common defence, 
was signed on 17th March 1948. This remark is 
not merely of historical interest. It points to the 
fact that the first concern of those who wanted 
to build Europe was to ensure the survival and 
security of Europeans. It was largely the outside 
threat that helped to federate Europe. 
22. This is not without importance when the 
Single European Act is examined. Security and 
defence matters are not given much space, far 
less than economic decisions, and the act pro-
poses no spectacular European progress in that 
area. However, it is plain that its authors were 
well aware that no decisive progress could be 
made towards European union without a firm 
foundation of joint security concepts. 
23. However, in the last thirty years, defence 
Europe has made little progress. It took sixteen 
years after the failure of the EDC and of two 
successive versions of the Fouchet plan for the 
then six members of the European Community 
to reach agreement and, in Luxembourg in 1970, 
adopt a report by their ministers for foreign 
affairs laying the foundations of European 
political consultations. The Six then set them-
selves the aim of promoting, through the devel-
opment of political co-operation, the progressive 
establishment of a European identity vis-a-vis 
the outside world. 
24. Since then, these political consultations 
have been extended to include the new members 
of the European Community, but the alms are 
still principally those set in 1970. They are set 
out in the single act. The main bases are still 
harmonisation of viewpoints, the rap-
prochement of policies leading, if possible, to 
l. This chapter owes much to the two colloquies organised 
by the European Institute of Public Administration under 
the direction of Mr. Pan os Tsakaloyannis whose proceedings 
were published under the titles " The reactivation of the 
Western European Union: the effects on the EC and its insti-
tutions", Maastricht 1985, and" Western European security 
in a changing world: from the reactivation of the WEU to the 
Single European Act", Maastricht 1988, and in particular to 
the paper in the latter on " European political co-operation 
and the Single European Act ". 
JOmt action, and the use of non-constraining, 
purely intergovernmental procedures. The need 
to develop these consultations was strongly 
emphasised at the summit meetings in Copen-
hagen in 1973, Paris in 1974 and London in 
1981, in the 1983 Stuttgart declaration and at 
the summit meeting in Milan in 1985; they 
made no great changes in these guidelines and 
have hardly improved upon the procedures, 
which are defined in Title Ill of the Single 
European Act. It describes what exists more 
than it innovates. 
25. Thus, the single act classifies the bodies 
designed for political co-operation: European 
Council, meetings of ministers for foreign 
affairs, Political Committee, European Corre-
spondents' Group and groups of experts on each 
topic. At each meeting, whatever decisions are 
reached are taken unanimously: the govern-
ments have never agreed to majority voting and 
this certainly limits Europe's ability to take deci-
sions in this area. 
26. The only novelty in the single act in 
regard to political co-operation is the creation of 
a permanent secretariat to assist the presidency 
in preparing and holding consultations but it has 
no powers of initiative or implementation. It is 
the presidency that was given very limited 
powers of initiative and to represent the Twelve 
as a whole when a joint decision has to be imple-
mented. 
27. It should be added straight away, 
however, that paragraph 6 of Article 30 of the 
single act reduces the scope of European 
political consultations still further where 
defence is concerned, although the member 
states indicate in that paragraph that they " con-
sider that closer co-operation on questions of 
European security would contribute in an 
essential way to the development of a European 
identity in external policy matters " and that 
they " are ready to co-ordinate their positions 
more closely on the political and economic 
aspects of security ". This therefore excludes 
military aspects which the single act does not 
include among the responsibilities, even 
potential, of the Twelve. 
28. In the same paragraph, the signatory 
states say they " are determined to maintain the 
technological and industrial conditions nec-
essary for their security. They shall work to that 
end both at national level and, where appro-
priate, within the framework of the competent 
institutions and bodies ", which is plainly non-
committal. Furthermore, the same paragraph 
concludes with the remark that the provisions of 
the single act must not " impede closer 
co-operation in the field of security between 
certain of the high contracting parties within the 
framework of the Western European Union or 
the Atlantic Alliance ". 
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29. It may therefore be wondered why the 
single act is so restrictive in all defence-related 
questions when it admits - ~s Europeans have 
always proclaimed - that the aim of joint 
defence is an essential basis of the European 
union which, since 1972, the Nine promised to 
set up and the principle of which has, to varying 
degrees, been accepted by the Twelve. 
30. Admittedly, the presence among the 
Twelve of Ireland, which does not wish to relin-
quish its policy of neutrality and be part of the 
Atlantic Alliance, is a major obstacle to the 
pursuit of a joint defence policy. Similarly, in 
recent years, uncertainty about the effective par-
ticipation of Denmark and Greece in the 
defence effort orchestrated by NATO helped to 
prevent European political consultations ven-
turing into this field. 
31. However, there are other reasons for this 
paralysis: for instance, certain governments do 
not wish to weaken Atlantic solidarity by pro-
moting a European nucleus in the alliance that 
might give the Americans an excuse to reduce 
their military presence in Europe. Nor do they 
want countries which are loyal members of 
NATO, such as Norway and Turkey, but which 
do not take part in political consultations or the 
European Community, to be left out of the prep-
aration of a European security policy. Con-
versely, other governments do not wish political 
and military integration in NATO to be replaced 
by another form of integration as they fear this 
might mean a return to dependence from which 
they had partly freed themselves. It is not neces-
sarily the idea of European defence that they 
reject, but the link between that defence and a 
Community with a supranational vocation. 
32. However, in the Council's declaration on 
the programme of work of the Spanish presi-
dency, presented to the European Parliament on 
17th January 1989, the Spanish Government 
stated: 
" Spanish membership of the WEU is the 
result of a dichotomy recognised in the 
single act itself and one which my country 
would like to see resolved. In the 
meantime, we must not avoid an 
extremely important debate to which, I 
am pleased to note, the Parliament is 
giving all the attention it deserves. " 
33. It should be noted, moreover, to what 
extent the political co-operation defined in the 
single act resembles what th~ seven governments 
have established in WEU. The reactivation 
which took place between 1984 and 1987 first 
consisted of an increase in intergovernmental 
activities at various levels that, apart from the 
level of heads of state or of government, which 
does not exist in WEU, or not yet, corresponds 
exactly to the scheme worked out for the 
Twelve, with the one noteworthy difference that 
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the ministers of defence or their representatives 
at an appropriate level take part in joint activ-
ities. Moreover, as in the case of European 
political co-operation, the Secretariat-General 
which, in the case of WEU, existed ever since 
the organisation was set up, has been deprived 
of most of its powers of political initiative and 
execution to the benefit of the presidency, at the 
same time as the Permanent Council, presided 
by the Secretary-General, had its work reduced 
to the administration ofWEU. To overcome the 
drawbacks of too fast a rotation among the 
countries exercising the presidency of WEU, the 
term of office of the presidency has even been 
extended to a year and, in both institutions, the 
so-called troika system has been introduced, 
which, for certain matters, groups the 
Chairman-in-Office with his predecessor and his 
successor. 
34. This fact was probably not very apparent 
to the Assembly because ofthe personality of the 
then Secretary-General, Alfred Cahen, who 
managed to use the margin of initiative left to 
him by the Council to give the Assembly, the 
press and the audiences at his many lectures 
information and comments for which the 
Council never wished to accept responsibility, 
even in its half-yearly reports to the Assembly or 
replies to recommendations. It is to be hoped 
that the new Secretary-General, Mr. van 
Eekelen, intends to use - and on occasion 
misuse- the possibility the Council leaves him 
to assert himself as the "political Secretary-
General " that the Assembly has always wanted 
to see in that post. 
35. In any event, it would appear that in the 
framework of the Seven, for defence, as in that 
of the Twelve, for the other aspects of foreign 
policy, the governments have, in the last five 
years, had quite a clear, coherent concept of 
what they wanted. Being prepared to accept sig-
nificant limits on their sovereignty in the eco-
nomic field, they have shown much good will in 
co-operating both politically and militarily, pro-
vided they retained full freedom of decision and 
action in those areas. 
36. This parallelism between the two institu-
tions, that of the Twelve and that of the Seven, 
was clearly indicated in the communique on 
which the Seven agreed in The Hague on 27th 
April 1988 announcing their decision to invite 
Portugal and Spain to join WEU. They based 
their decision on the two countries' acceptance 
of the modified Brussels Treaty and the 
platform on European security interests that 
they had adopted in The Hague on 27th October 
1987, and on the determined commitment of 
Portugal and Spain to the building of Europe, 
i.e. among the Twelve. They thus confirmed that 
co-operation in security matters in WEU and 
economic integration in the framework of the 
Community were two aspects of a same 
approach. 
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37. In so doing, the seven governments clearly 
indicated the role they intended to assign to 
WEU and European political consultations: 
both help to promote the same cause, the 
building of a European union. This is done by 
endeavouring to harmonise the views of 
member countries with a view to subsequent 
action, whether joint or co-ordinated, but 
without encroaching on state sovereignty, which 
remains intact in both external policy and 
defence. 
38. This fact gives a better picture of the kind 
of Europe whose shape was fixed in the single 
act: side by side with economic Europe, whose 
Community nature is stressed, political Europe 
and defence Europe are being built by other 
means, other procedures and other institutions. 
They are a matter for states. 
39. The Single European Act therefore dem-
onstrates the need for Europe to co-operate in 
security matters and the fact that the Twelve are 
at present incapable of meeting this need. The 
role it acknowledges for WEU is to allow Europe 
to overcome the deadlock that occurs in the 
Communities whenever defence questions arise 
and move towards better co-ordination of 
member countries' security policy. 
40. Thus, although the Single European Act 
emanates from Community Europe and is 
intended for Community Europe, it defines 
WEU's place: the organisation is to complete the 
system it is setting up, just as the organisation of 
the single European market will considerably 
strengthen the security system based on the 
modified Brussels Treaty. The fact that the 
platform on European security interests was 
adopted by the Seven at a time when the Twelve 
had just agreed to adopt the single act is not 
without significance: it shows that the govern-
ments were able to agree on a concept of Europe 
which admittedly does not satisfy those advo-
cating the early construction of a united Europe 
round the Community, but which is logical in 
the context of what Europeans are prepared to 
do today. 
Ill. Subsequent developments 
41. A number of events that have occurred 
since the adoption of the Single European Act 
show how the governments of the Community 
and WEU countries are approaching the 
deadline of 1993. They have clearly not reached 
agreement on any clear doctrine on a twelve-, 
seven- or nine-power basis but the decisions 
they have taken, or avoided taking, in several 
areas provide useful indications of the guide-
lines that may govern the implementation of the 
single act. 
(a) In WEU 
42. Your Rapporteur does not wish to go back 
over the measures taken in WEU since the 
Assembly has already examined them on several 
occasions, most recently in the report presented 
by Mr. van der San den on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee in June 1989 (Document 
1185). Suffice it to recall the definition of the 
joint views of the seven WEU member countries 
on security in Europe as set out in the platform 
adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987, 
the acceptance of Portugal and Spain's applica-
tions for membership ofWEU and the signing of 
the act of accession of those countries to the 
modified Brussels Treaty and the platform in 
December 1988, the co-ordination of member 
countries' efforts to safeguard freedom of navi-
gation in the Gulf during the war between Iran 
and Iraq by a mine-sweeping operation (since 
July 1987), the absence of meetings of the WEU 
Standing Armaments Committee since October 
1985 and the accompanying development of the 
activities of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group, which set up a permanent secre-
tariat in March 1989, consideration of the 
French proposal to set up a European institute 
for security or defence studies on which a 
decision should be taken at the ministerial 
meeting in autumn 1989, the abolition of the 
agencies set up in 1985 and the growth in inter-
governmental activities aimed at adapting 
Europe to its new security conditions, with par-
ticular regard to sharing responsibility for and 
the burden of joint security between the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and the devel-
opment of Europe's observation satellite capa-
bility. 
43. The Council which, in many of these 
cases, followed Assembly recommendations 
(removal of limitations on conventional arma-
ments, definition of European security prin-
ciples, enlargement of WEU, creation of an 
institute for defence studies, observation satel-
lites) thus demonstrated by its action how it was 
considering exercising the role of European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, an expression 
which it also usefully took from Assembly rec-
ommendations. The plan emerging from the 
Council's decisions may be summed up as 
follows: 
(i) to bring together all member coun-
tries of the European Community 
who so desire and who fulfil the con-
ditions necessary for their accession 
to the modified Brussels Treaty not 
to lessen the impact of this treaty of 
alliance; 
(ii) to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, in 
particular through improved burden-
and responsibility-sharing between 
its European and American members; 
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Assembly, indicate that the Soviet Union for its 
part considers that WEU represents Western 
Europe well when it is a matter of discussing dis-
armament and the organisation of world peace. 
These testimonies show that the adoption of the 
Single European Act by all the WEU member 
countries, far from meaning, as some would like 
it to be thought, that the European Community 
is soon to extend its security and defence 
activities, enchances the authority of our 
organisation within the framework of its respon-
sibilities. 
(b) In the Community 
45. The evolution of the European Com-
munity itself since the single act was ratified also 
helps to draw the boundaries between the two 
institutions' areas of activity. The development 
of European political co-operation was 
important but it has never led to decisions 
relating to the defence of Europe or its military 
activities outside the NATO area or to positions 
in regard to arms limitation or burden-sharing 
in the alliance. It is admittedly very difficult to 
define which matters are the responsibility of 
the Twelve and which are that of the Nine. In 
the end, it is the presence of ministers of defence 
or their representatives and of chiefs of staff or 
their deputies in the WEU Council or inter-
governmental bodies deriving from it that gives 
WEU its own specific character. Thus, the Leb-
anese question has been the subject of political 
consultations between the Twelve in recent 
months and declarations were made, but no con-
sideration was given to deploying European 
forces. The deployment of French warships off 
Lebanon in September 1989 does not seem to 
have been examined in that forum. Conversely, 
the deployment of warships from five member 
countries in the Gulf in 1988 was examined and 
followed in WEU. 
46. The question nevertheless arises as to 
what extent the Commission of the Community 
considers defence questions are outside its 
purview. Following the divulgation of certain 
information, our colleague, Sir Dudley Smith, 
put the following question to the United 
Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence on 25th 
July 1989: 
"To ask the Secretary of State for 
Defence what briefing and assistance he is 
giving the defence advisory team set up by 
Mr. Delors, the European Commis-
sioner." 
Mr. Sainsbury, Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, answered: 
" We are not aware of the existence of such a 
team." 
4 7. Your Rapporteur is nevertheless now sure 
that this group (with the title plans and fore-
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casts) exists in the Secretariat-General of the 
Commission, but it is just as if the Commission 
was doing its utmost to conceal its real activities 
from the public or even from certain govern-
ments. It is surprising that the European Com-
munity which, in other areas, is careful to 
proceed with a degree of openness that is a for-
tunate departure from national diplomatic 
practice, should in this connection be so 
secretive. The absence of public information 
prevents your Rapporteur going further into this 
matter in the present report. 
48. Your Rapporteur found an excellent 
summary of the conclusions that he himself 
reached in a report by the North Atlantic 
Assembly Sub-Committee on Defence Co-
operation 2 indicating that " it is in the economic 
sphere, via trade and industrial policy, that the 
EC finds potentially broader, if more indirect, 
room for manreuvre in the defence arena". He 
can but stress the words " potentially " and 
"indirect" as they give a good idea of the situ-
ation in the Community which, although not 
having the essential legal basis or the govern-
ments' agreement, is really active in this area 
thanks to the large financial resources available 
to it which WEU does not have. But this activity 
is very liable to be fruitless as long as the twelve 
governments do not endorse it. In the circum-
stances, it therefore seems vain to compare it 
with what may emerge, albeit in a rather unsatis-
factory form, from nine-power consultations in 
WEU. It would seem infinitely more reasonable 
to seek a basis for agreement and above all for 
communication between the two European 
organisations than to try, through more or less 
clandestine channels, to force the hands of the 
governments, several of which do not seem at all 
prepared to concur. Clandestinity does not seem 
to be the best means of attaining this aim. 
IV. The single market and security problems 
49. The existence of a single market in which 
frontier controls will have disappeared, persons 
and goods will be able to circulate freely, compe-
tition between firms will be free, direct and 
indirect state assistance to producers and 
exporters will be banned and individual citizens 
will be able to settle wherever they wish and be 
free to compete for any job will inevitably raise 
many problems for countries where the public 
authorities control vast sectors of the national 
economy in areas which are not always the 
same, moreover. However, in all countries 
whatever their share of the collective security 
effort may be, the military administration is the 
2. North Atlantic Assembly - Sub-Committee on Defence 
Co-operation - Supplementary document to the draft report 
on burden-sharing by MM. Jose Lello and Bill Richardson 
Co-Rapporteurs, May 1989. ' 
one on which states keep the tightest rein and 
which are the most inclined to view their 
problems in national terms. There is certainly a 
NATO strategy and efforts have been made to 
make weapons interoperable, unify nomencla-
tures and ensure equivalent duties, ranks and 
titles among the NATO countries. Although the 
very scope of military responsibility differs from 
one country to another, since in some countries 
the military carry out police work or part of the 
armaments industry is run by the ministry of 
defence, in all countries the army is considered 
to be an essential part of the life of the nation. 
This is due just as much to its traditions and 
national past as to its present tasks in a col-
lective defence system. Moreover, some Western 
European armies still have important duties 
outside this system, whereas others, such as the 
Bundeswehr, are wholly committed to NATO. 
There is no provision in the single act for 
changes in these areas, but the maintenance of 
certain present practices may create disparities 
that might be detrimental to the smooth running 
of the single market. 
(a) Problems of the defence economy 
50. For many years, the United States has 
been raising the question of the unequal share of 
European and American members in the 
burdens of the Atlantic Alliance and asking for a 
fairer division. The same inequality is to be 
found among the European members of the 
alliance. The proportion of GNP earmarked for 
defence varies considerably, from about 1% in 
Luxembourg to 5.2% in the United Kingdom 
(4% in France, 3% in the Federal Republic and 
the Netherlands and 2.5% in Belgium and Italy). 
This disparity obviously affects the fiscal effort 
required of individuals and firms in each of 
these countries and hence the conditions for 
competition in a single market. 
51. There is another disparity, which relates 
to employment: the proportion of the active 
population employed by the armed forces varies 
from 0.9% in Luxembourg to 3% in France (2% 
in the United Kingdom, 2.3% in the Nether-
lands, 2.4% in the Federal Republic, 2.5% in 
Italy and 2.9% in Belgium). The fact that there is 
no conscription in Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom also means life in these countries is 
affected differently by the defence effort. At a 
time when there is not full employment in most 
European countries, the degree of pressure exer-
cised by the army on employment is obviously 
not liable to be a vital factor of imbalance within 
a single market. It may, however, affect certain 
sectors where there is a shortage of qualified 
staff. Above all, it may become so if a change in 
the economic situation, likely if the single 
market achieves the anticipated results, brings 
about almost full employment in certain coun-
tries. Furthermore, this inequality may lead 
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nationals of countries with heavier military 
commitments to take advantage of freedom of 
establishment to settle in countries where com-
mitments are lighter or non-existent. 
52. Another question will inevitably be raised 
by the principle of equality between firms when 
contracts are awarded. The Rpme Treaty admit-
tedly excludes the armaments industries from 
Community responsibilities and leaves states 
free to procure military equipment. The single 
act does not change this provision. However, 
with the growing complexity of modern 
weapons, ever more firms are required to 
produce for defence purposes, and this allows 
states, the only procurers of weapons, to favour 
firms in their own countries by placing orders 
with them rather than with ~oreign competitors 
which, for one reason or another, do not have a 
"captive market". Industries thus favoured on 
the arms market would clearly be able to cut 
profit margins on their products for the civil 
market. 
53. As long as defence is considered to be a 
national matter for a national army subject to 
national regulations, the public authorities can 
hardly be expected not to give preference syste-
matically to national firms and, where appro-
priate, state firms over which the ministries of 
defence can exercise strict control, particularly 
in regard to secrecy. But they are thus likely to 
jeopardise the free play of market forces, even 
for products not directly defence-related, 
whatever Community provisions there may be. 
54. Generally speaking, the arms industry and 
trade are outside the Community framework 
and the indications are that this sector is not 
subject to the conditions already covering the 
industrial sectors that are adapting themselves 
to the single market, nor will it be after 1993. 
The report on " The armaments industry in the 
WEU member countries ", prepared by the 
WEU Standing Armaments Committee in 
October 1985, set out in detail the problems that 
your Rapporteur is referring to here and made a 
number of suggestions for solving them, particu-
larly in regard to the juridical measures Europe 
might take to ensure the existence of a single 
arms market. The Council has never really con-
sidered this document and has failed in the task 
it set itself when it instructed the SAC to prepare 
the report. 
55. The WEU countries as a whole have an 
arms production capability superior to their 
requirements. This surplus production capa-
bility will probably increase further in the period 
of disarmament and cuts in defence budgets 
towards which the world now seems to be 
moving. To various degrees, the WEU govern-
ments therefore have to consider restructuring 
the arms sector of their economies and well 
know that their present surplus capability is too 
great a burden on their defence budgets and con-
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sequently on Europe's security. This restruc-
turing is necessary, but the question is whether 
the WEU countries wish to carry it out in a 
purely national framework, as some have started 
to do with a series of mergers of firms, in a 
European framework or even in a transatlantic 
context. Several forms of co-operation have 
been used in the latter two cases although pro-
ducer firms have rarely committed themselves 
permanently. At most, there have recently been 
changes in the status of arms-producing firms 
such as GIA T in France to make them less 
dependent on the public administration and to 
facilitate their participation in international 
projects. 
56. Some committee members rightly under-
lined that the problem of standardisation and 
interoperability of armaments in Europe would 
be solved only if the European arms industries 
wished to reorganise of their own accord. This 
would be the logical consequence of the single 
market and there is no doubt that the United 
States fears this restructuring of firms which 
might become dangerous competitors for their 
own firms. 
57. Furthermore, implementation of the 
Euclid programme, comparable, because of its 
flexibility, to the Eureka programme which con-
cerns civil technology, should allow the joint 
development of research and " exploratory 
development " in new weapons technology to be 
conducted outside Community jurisdiction. 
However, since this programme was launched 
by the IEPG only at its ministerial meeting in 
Lisbon on 29th June 1989, it is still too early to 
assess its efficiency, which will depend largely 
on states' will to co-operate at European level. It 
is believed to cover such areas as radar, micro-
electronics, composite materials, avionics, 
optronics, simulators, underwater acoustics, 
space observation and stealth technology, but 
not development at the industrial level. In other 
words, it will not be a direct answer to the ques-
tions raised by the single market. 
58. Finally, there are certain sectors of the 
economy that are so important for the survival 
of the nation that the state has often tried to 
control them by setting up state firms, 
nationalisation, buying shares in private firms 
or through regulations. This is the case in par-
ticular of a number of transport-related activ-
ities and energy production, not to speak, of 
course, of armaments. While certain countries 
have long relied on market forces for trade in oil 
and its derivatives, almost all the larger 
European countries have at one time or another 
pursued an oil policy. Almost everywhere, the 
production of nuclear energy is closely con-
trolled by the states. Community legislation can 
naturally impose respect for certain standards, 
including equality of treatment for all clients of 
transport firms or energy producers and distrib-
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utors, since these matters are not directly 
defence-related. But when the state is the main 
supplier of such services and, a fortiori, when it 
has a monopoly, one may wonder whether it will 
really respect these principles, possibly arguing 
that its control over such sectors is essential for 
its security. 
(b) Problems linked with international trade 
59. The existence of a single market will 
clearly mean full freedom to exchange tech-
nology within the Community, including the 
acquisition and sale of patents. In this case, too, 
it will be extremely difficult, as it was for the 
application of Cocom rules, to distinguish 
between purely military technology that is not 
subject to Community regulations and civil 
technology, particularly in the case of com-
puters, laser equipment, optronics, nuclear and 
space technology, etc. Furthermore, it will be 
difficult not to make technology imported from 
third countries, including the United States, 
subject to the general rule. However, the 
problem will also arise for exports of products or 
technology to third countries, whether to safe-
guard European technology or to take account of 
the political and military aspects of arms sales. 
This has already occurred with the delivery to 
Libya of chemical products and industrial 
equipment which, together, could be used to 
produce chemical weapons. In Council Regu-
lation 428/89 of 20th February 1989, the Com-
munity listed chemical products whose sale 
outside the Common Market was henceforth 
subject to prior authorisation, it being agreed 
that authorisation would be given by the appro-
priate authorities of member states and not by 
the Community itself. Moreover, each member 
country has special relations with certain 
outside countries and is particularly sensitive to 
certain problems. The war between Iraq and 
Iran showed that not all members of the Com-
munity had the same political and military 
options. The attitude of the Federal Republic 
towards arms sales to Middle East countries is 
not the same as that of France, which grants 
several African countries military assistance. In 
this case, arms deliveries are part of a global 
policy from which it would be very difficult to 
separate them. 
60. In fact, the arms trade raises specific eco-
nomic and political problems, but it cannot be 
entirely separated from other commercial trans-
actions. The explosion in August 1989 in the 
military industrial centre at AI Hilal in Iraq 
attracted the attention of the western press to 
the methods used by that country to acquire -
by procuring in Western Europe equipment and 
technology much of which is in the civil sector 
and sending trainees to work in mainly 
European industries - material, industrial 
equipment, high-technology products and 
know-how allowing it to develop, in some cases 
in co-operation with Egypt and Argentina, 
highly sophisticated weapons that might upset 
the balance of forces in the Middle East. Thus, 
Iraq is reported to have managed to develop the 
Condor missile, with a range of 1 200 km, from 
ageing missiles procured in the Soviet Union. 
These results are believed to have been obtained 
by good co-ordination of industries, research, 
development and external trade thanks to a 
specialised network without the latter neces-
sarily having to infringe any of the supplier 
countries' legislation restricting exports of sen-
sitive products. It is even believed to have had 
most of these operations financed by the 
American subsidiary of a major Italian bank. 
We are not concerned here with whether or not 
the seller or creditor firms consciously or oth-
erwise were party to this diversion of trade; what 
is clear is that the absence of European regula-
tions and European control of the arms trade 
can lead to an outside country endangering 
Europe's security, indirectly at least, with 
money, goods and technology supplied by 
Europe 3• 
61. From the purely economic point of view, 
the arms trade also raises special problems 
which are not covered by Community regula-
tions but which might seriously upset the oper-
ation of a single market. The main problem is 
due to the significant spread of " offset " prac-
tices in recent years. Industrial countries pro-
curing weapons have acquired the habit of 
insisting that their suppliers manufacture in the 
procuring country a sometimes very large part of 
the equipment sold, so that the procuring 
country thus benefits from what it has procured 
and from the seller's technological know-how. 
This obviously thwarts the principles of a free 
market and, although politically it is not so 
serious when the trade is within the European 
Community, it is liable to be more serious in the 
case of sales to countries in the process of setting 
up an armaments industry, particularly in Latin 
America and the Middle East, which become the 
rivals of the selling industries. But other coun-
tries have started to insist on compensation that 
sometimes equals or even exceeds the cost of 
what it is importing by forcing the seller to pur-
chase goods of all kinds, including oil, agricul-
tural produce or even, in the case of Greece's 
procurement of Mirage 2000s, the marketing of 
tourist travel in that country. Many arms-
exporting firms have had to set up subsidiaries 
specialising in reselling and distributing on their 
national market goods thus acquired as " com-
pensation " that they did not know what to do 
with. Competition is so ferocious on the arms 
market that it seems essential for anyone 
3. Information in this paragraph was taken mainly from the 
Financial Times of 9th, 13th and 20th September 1989. 
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wishing to export to comply with such practices. 
They are clearly liable to distort the overall 
market seriously, for instance when a manufac-
turer of aircraft engines has to organise promo-
tional sales in supermarkets of cheese, fruit 
and vegetables he has had to take as 
compensation 4• 
62. It would be easy to say that these practices 
must be stopped. Yet they are so well anchored 
and used by countries outside the Community 
that to eliminate them purely and simply would 
exclude European production from the world 
arms market and ruin the industries concerned. 
The European states are hardly likely to follow 
this course since they are not obliged to do so 
under either the Rome Treaty or the single act. 
The most that can be hoped is that, among 
themselves, they will seek an identical solution 
to the problems thus raised and try to promote it 
among all the arms-exporting countries. WEU 
would be the natural framework for member 
governments to exchange views on this matter. 
63. In short, it seems impossible for a single 
market Europe to ignore the problems raised by 
international trade in regard to technology or 
products which might be used for military pur-
poses. It has managed to agree on regulations for 
exports of chemical products, probably more 
theoretical than effective, and probably will be 
able to do likewise for other products or technol-
ogies with essentially civil applications. 
However, while it is left to member states to 
decide whether there are reasons to believe that 
the products in question will be used to develop 
or manufacture weapons (chemical weapons in 
the regulation of 20th February 1989) and verify 
application of the decisions taken, in the long 
run it is these states that will remain in control, 
as in the past. Relevant Community regulations 
are not at all supranational and differ little from 
what the governments might resolve to do in 
another institution. The advantage of the Com-
munity is thus merely to extend to twelve coun-
tries a measure which would concern only nine if 
it had been determined by the WEU Council. 
64. Hence, it is apparently desirable, where 
everything economic is concerned, for the 
European Community to extend its field of 
activity as far as possible and, consequently, for 
WEU, which is fully competent in this area 
under Articles I and 11 of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, to deal with them only in the event of 
the Community not havillJg been able or not 
having wished to do so. However, since many 
essential measures are specifically military, par-
ticularly assessing the dangers involved in the 
sale of certain products or transferring certain 
4. The facts reported in this paragraph were taken from an 
article by Philippe Douroux in the Tribune de !'Expansion, 
15th June 1989. 
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technologies, it would seem normal for the WEU 
Council to tackle these matters at the appro-
priate level of representatives of defence minis-
tries or chiefs of staff so as to make appropriate 
recommendations to the Community. 
(c) Removal of frontier controls 
65. For the time being, state security is 
ensured by the national authorities within each 
country's frontiers. Although there is some 
co-operation between police forces, this is done 
solely by means of rather cumbersome pro-
cedure and in specific cases requires, inter alia, 
the legal definition of offences and crimes com-
mitted to be the same in the countries involved. 
The fact that national legislation and practice 
differ considerably had only limited disadvan-
tages as long as people entering and leaving were 
controlled at each state's frontier. It was for 
national police to stop deserters or spies leaving 
the country and to prevent any foreigner who 
might be a danger to the state entering: agitators, 
spreaders of subversive propaganda, terrorists, 
intelligence agents. With the removal of internal 
frontier controls, such persons might take refuge 
on the territory of another member country, 
perhaps even continuing unhindered with their 
subversive activities, and then easily penetrate 
the territory of the state that its police force 
should protect. This probably does not apply to 
common law criminals or known terrorists, 
against whom action in one member country 
might be followed up on a reciprocal basis 
throughout the Community. There is no reason 
to think that the same would be true for more 
military or political delinquencies, unless spe-
cific agreements spelled out reciprocal commit-
ments in those areas. The single act makes no 
reference to new European Community respon-
sibilities in this connection, hence there is no 
possibility of Community law replacing national 
decisions. 
66. Application of the Schengen agreement by 
which France, the Federal Republic and the 
Benelux countries undertook to apply the same 
measures in respect of visas and the entry of 
nationals of third countries already seems to be 
raising difficulties because a country which 
needs to protect itself against a specific risk 
finds it hard to make its partners endorse its 
point of view. 
(d) Freedom of establishment 
67. Each Community member country is 
working out measures to ensure the freedom of 
establishment of Community nationals. Natu-
rally, this principle does not apply to certain 
sectors of the public administration or the 
armed forces. However, one may wonder how it 
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will be respected wherever security, defence and 
armaments are involved. It is for each state to 
determine the security clearance of staff 
recruited by firms working wholly or partly in 
such sectors. Each has its own investigative and 
decision-taking criteria, which allow it to 
exclude certain persons from so-called sensitive 
firms, even if the latter work only partly for the 
state. One may wonder whether the national 
authorities will use this right to safeguard 
employment in their countries and, in any 
event, how will they determine the security 
clearance of foreign citizens since their national 
services will not be empowered to conduct 
inquiries in neighbouring countries. 
68. Your Rapporteur does not claim to have 
given an exhaustive list of the questions that the 
existence of a single market will raise for those 
responsible for security in member countries. 
He merely wishes to say that he considers it 
impossible to find solutions to such problems in 
a purely national framework. Naturally, they 
would be solved if the European union were on 
the point of coming into existence, but, as long 
as that is not the case, he thinks it is essential for 
these problems to be the subject of consultations 
and of specific agreements between the govern-
ments concerned, and WEU seems to be the 
framework in which representatives of national 
security authorities might meet each other and 
draw up such agreements. He does not feel that 
the absence of Ireland, Greece and Denmark is a 
serious obstacle, on the one hand because they 
are probably less inclined than the Nine to 
commit themselves in this area and, on the other 
hand, because there is nothing to prevent each 
one subscribing to the provisions it wishes to 
adopt. 
V. The political activities of the WEU Council 
69. The first part of the thirty-fifth annual 
report of the Council was received by the 
Assembly on 11th October 1989. Your 
Rapporteur also has as a basis for examining this 
question the replies to certain Assembly recom-
mendations, in particular Recommendation 
472, received on 7th September, statements by 
ministers or the Secretary-General in various 
forums and the letter addressed to the Assembly 
by the Secretary-General on 18th September 
1989. 
70. Your Rapporteur was especially inter-
ested in the text of the Secretary-General's 
address to the Institut royal superieur de defense 
in Brussels on 21st September 1989 because it 
provided many important details on the working 
of WEU that the Council has not so far seen fit 
to communicate to the Assembly or that were 
only briefly or vaguely mentioned in the annual 
report. While welcoming the fact that the Secre-
tary-General has thus made public much infor-
mation whose concealment was quite unjus-
tified, he wishes to express his regret that the 
Assembly was not the first to receive this infor-
mation. 
71. For these reasons, your Rapporteur will 
therefore quote three important passages from 
this address. 
72. (a) On the structure of the Council, the 
Secretary-General said: 
"WEU now works at four levels, i.e.: 
- groups of experts; 
- the Special Working Group and/or the 
Defence Representatives Group; 
- the Permanent Council, which 
co-ordinates the work of the working 
groups and approves reports submitted 
to the Council enlarged to include 
political directors; and, finally; 
- the Council of Ministers. " 
In spite of its requests, the Assembly has never 
been given such a clear description of the hier-
archy of the institutions covered by the word 
" Council ". One may wonder why. 
73. (b) On the work of the Council, the Secre-
tary-General said: 
" Under the authority of the Permanent 
Council, the WEU working groups carry 
out remarkable preparatory work in six 
main areas in which member states intend 
together to assume their full responsibil-
ities: 
1. Defence at the frontiers, which covers 
two kinds of problem: the stationing of 
forces in the Federal Republic and the 
availability of reserve forces; consider-
ation of the repercussions of a future 
CFE agreement on the deployment of 
forces of member countries and of the 
United States and Canada in Europe. 
2. Improving consultations, particularly 
on defence planning. The long-term 
aim is to harmonise strategic con-
cepts. 
3. The growing involvement of chiefs-of 
staff in our deliberations and in the 
implementation of the WEU ministers' 
decisions on force structures and 
training. 
4. The definition of European criteria for 
assessing each member state's contri-
bution to the common defence and 
forces' equipment requirements. 
5. Assessing the human and material 
resources needed for a credible defence 
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of Europe in the last decade of this 
century and with a view to the forth-
coming conclusion of an agreement on 
conventional forces in Europe. 
6. Finally, continued consultations on 
areas of instability outside the area 
covered by the Brussels Treaty that 
started at the time of the crisis caused 
by attacks on freedom of navigation in 
the Gulf in 1987. 
The Council's working groups are also a 
forum for constant thinking on the extent, 
meaning and conditions of implementing 
western positions on the control of 
nuclear, chemical and conventional 
weapons. Exchanges of views on current 
negotiations are essential to guarantee 
that the European countries' specific 
security interests are effectively taken into 
consideration at each stage of progress 
towards an agreement. " 
Here, too, the Secretary-General's description is 
far clearer and more precise than that of the 
Council. Is it because the Secretariat-General 
did not give the Council a suitable draft of the 
half-yearly report or because it did not adopt the 
text prepared by the Secretariat-General? 
74. (c) On the scope of matters handled by the 
Council, the Secretary-General said: 
" ... I wish to refer briefly to three specific 
aspects of our present work which seem to 
me to illustrate clearly the reality of the 
reactivation of the organisation: 
- the impact of 1992 and changes in 
the European countries' security envi-
ronment on our defence in the years 
1993-95; 
- Europe's stake in verifying force 
reduction agreements now being nego-
tiated; 
- the expediency and areas of application 
of the security aspects of European 
space co-operation. 
The probability that a CFE agreement will 
be concluded early in, the next decade and 
the creation of a single European market 
in 1992 mean that we must take imme-
diate steps to look ahead at the future 
requirements of our joint defence. This 
thinking must be based on the principles 
set out in the platform adopted in The 
Hague and, more particularly, the mainte-
nance of defensive deterrence, and in the 
global concept of arms control and dis-
armament adopted b!Y the North Atlantic 
Council in Brussels on 30th May 1989. 
Many complex questions have arisen. I 
will quote only a few of them which seem 
to me worthy of continuing discussion in 
WEU political consultations. 
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- What will be the rhythm of progress in 
the arms control negotiations: will there 
be a START treaty and what will be the 
resulting prospects? 
- What will be the content of the con-
vention on chemical weapons? 
- How will a possible CFE agreement be 
followed up? 
- What future will there be for short-
range nuclear weapons in the context of 
the proliferation of ballistic missiles, 
particularly in the Near and Middle 
East? 
- How will the defence burden be shared 
in WEU? 
- How should joint armaments pro-
grammes be developed? 
- What course are armaments industries 
to follow in the prospect of the single 
European market? 
The second major topic now central to 
WEU's work and that will be on the 
agenda for all Europeans for a long time 
to come: what is at stake in the verifi-
cation of disarmament agreements. 
The negotiations on conventional forces 
in Europe succeed the successful negotia-
tions on confidence-building measures. In 
view of the political evolution of our con-
tinent, everything relating to openness, 
exchanges of information on the military 
environment in the widest meaning of the 
term, budgets as indicators of states' mil-
itary approach and, finally, the verifi-
cation of agreements concluded, is of 
great interest. The new confidence-
building measures, negotiated on a thirty-
five-power basis, must bolster stabilis-
ation measures negotiated on a twenty-
three-power basis. 
Europeans' specific interests in regard to 
the control of the production of arma-
ments subject to limits and the movement 
towards and round the area of application 
of the future agreement on equipment 
subject to limits require joint thinking on 
the non-circumvention of the agreement 
on ways and means of verifying it. Let 
there be no mistake: while verification is 
theoretically a national responsibility, 
close co-operation or even a division of 
tasks among Europeans will be essential if 
our countries are to play their full rOle in 
this area. For instance, consideration 
might be given to setting up joint teams of 
inspectors and joint training programmes, 
inter alia linguistic. Specialisation would 
allow optimum benefit to be obtained 
from various existing proficiencies; verifi-
cation of a CFE agreement will require 
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considerable investment that should be 
assessed so that we have the means nec-
essary for implementing it available in 
time. There are significant economic 
interests at stake. Finally, we must not 
lose sight of the political stake. Now that 
the readjustment of rOle-, risk- and 
responsibility-sharing is on the alliance's 
agenda, Europe must not, through care-
lessness and lack of foresight, become 
dependent on the United States which 
wishes, on the contrary, to be able to 
depend on sound, reliable partners. 
After verification, I turn to the urgency of 
an in-depth discussion of the possible 
security applications of space technology. 
Here, there is a direct link with the verifi-
cation of disarmament agreements by 
observation satellites. 
Europe has built up a remarkable techno-
logical potential in space matters as tes-
tified by the success of the Ariane 
launchers. Apart from the limited case of 
co-operation between France, Italy and 
Spain in the Helios programme, this 
potential has not been made to serve our 
joint security. Because of its polyvalence, 
satellite observation is a particularly 
flexible tool which is acknowledged to 
meet the needs of verifying disarmament 
agreements. Together, therefore, Euro-
peans must explore the possibilities of this 
instrument so as to take it into account 
when working out their proposals for veri-
fying a future CFE agreement. Satellites, 
by adding to our overall observation 
potential, will help Europe to be inde-
pendent for verification purposes. A joint · 
technological and industrial effort will 
create new synergies while allowing large-
scale economies. Moreover, satellite 
means of observation might also play a 
role in preventing and managing both 
political and ecological crises. 
Because of the subjects it tackles and the 
synergy between the expert knowledge 
and concerns of the foreign affairs experts 
and their military counterparts, WEU 
fulfils to the utmost its role of political 
co-operation in security matters by being 
the forum for basic thinking on Europe's 
strategic stakes by means of a twofold 
concrete, forward-looking approach. 
For a long time to come, WEU will 
probably be the only instrument for 
rationalising the means and harmonising 
the fundamental concepts of our joint 
defence. To this end, we must not relax 
our efforts, in particular our efforts at 
clarification and explanation vis-a-vis 
public opinion and those responsible for 
the economy because defence is not an 
attractive subject now that detente is 
again so attractive. WEU will strive to do 
this by promoting the adjustment that 
needs to be made at security level in a 
world that is in full transformation and 
may consequently become increasingly 
unstable ... " 
75. If we now attempt to review the state of 
progress in the Council's work, we can see that: 
76. (i) On the revision of the treaty, the 
Council confirms that it is continuing to 
examine the matter and takes note of Recom-
mendation 4 72, but does not specify how it will 
follow it up. Paragraph I.4 of the annual report 
gives useful details on this point: 
" The Permanent Council had initial 
exchanges of views on the review of the 
provisions of the treaty and its protocols. 
It will consider this matter in greater 
depth at the appropriate time, taking due 
account in its deliberations of the views of 
the Assembly, such as those expressed in 
the van der Sanden report and Recom-
mendation 472." 
This shows that the Council has not seriously 
examined the matter, and that the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments thus retains all its 
prerogatives under the modified Brussels Treaty 
and cannot be abolished in present circum-
stances. 
77. (ii) On enlargement, the French Prime 
Minister, Mr. Rocard, said in his address at the 
forty-second session of the French Institut des 
hautes etudes de defense nationale that this had 
become a fact in 1988 for Portugal and Spain. 
This is particularly surprising since France is 
one of the five countries which had not, at the 
time of writing, ratified the 1988 act of 
accession. Conversely, the Council has, as the 
Assembly requested, deferred examination of 
the candidatures of Greece and Turkey. The 
Assembly should, however, be given more sub-
stantial information than has been given in the 
half-yearly report on the nature of the " consul-
tation procedure " with those two countries that 
is to be initiated by the Permanent Council. 
78. The Secretary-General's address on 21st 
September gave a new definition of the condi-
tions for future accessions to WEU: 
" ... Three conditions must be fulfilled for 
a state to accede to WEU: 
- candidate countries must be aware of 
all the political and military implica-
tions of their accession; 
- they must confirm their determination 
to make a full contribution to the joint 
defence effort; 
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- finally, they must say how they intend 
to contribute to attaining all the aims 
set out in the platform and to the devel-
opment of a European security 
identity. 
For the time being, WEU must give pri-
ority to ensuring the successful integration 
of Portugal and Spain. Further 
enlargement seems neither expedient nor 
practical in the short term ... ". 
79. It should be noted that these conditions 
differ considerably from those previously 
described by the former Secretary-General, par-
ticularly in that they no longer refer to mem-
bership of the EEC which, in present circum-
stances, seems logical. However, we need to 
know to what extent the Secretary-General's 
remarks effectively commit the Council. 
80. (iii) On the consequences of enlargement 
for the Assembly, the reply to Recommendation 
4 72 indicates how the Council intends to follow 
up enlargement where the Assembly is con-
cerned, at least in regard to the alterations to the 
WEU building in Paris, since it makes no ref-
erence at all to staff matters. It should be noted 
that the Council has " requested the WEU 
administration in Paris to issue the necessary 
invitations to tender". This statement is to say 
the least surprising since it was the Assembly 
that, at the request of the Council, included in 
its supplementary budget for 1989 sums nec-
essary for carrying out the work planned and, 
within its purview, took all• the administrative 
steps relating to calls for tenders for work on the 
building in consultation with the French Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs, for installing simulta-
neous interpretation equipment in the two new 
conference rooms in consultation inter alia with 
the Technical Committee of the International 
Association of Conference Interpreters, and for 
installing new simultaneC~>us interpretation 
equipment in the chamber of the Economic and 
Social Council. The WEU administration in 
Paris was associated with the contacts with the 
architect only in regard to the reorganisation of 
the building so as to be able to uphold the Coun-
cil's views on the matter. If the statement in the 
reply to Recommendation ,4 72 expressed the 
Council's decision to attribute to its Paris 
administrative organs direct responsibility for 
the conduct of the work, which comes under the 
Assembly's budget management, this would be 
an attempt to take over from the Assembly and a 
serious infringement of the principle of the 
Assembly's budgetary autonomy recognised by 
the Council of Ministers on 28th April 1987. 
81. However, the Secretary-General's letter 
makes an interesting point which indicates that 
the Council effectively does not intend to take 
account of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy: 
" With regard to the problems of the 
Assembly, it (the Permanent Council) was 
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at pains to expedite consultations with the 
architects with regard to the alterations to 
the Palais d'Iena required in the wake of 
WEU enlargement to include Portugal 
and Spain. Substantial funds have been 
released, therefore, to enable invitations 
to tender to be issued so that work can 
begin as soon as the second part of the 
35th ordinary session of the Assembly has 
ended. To deal with problems as they 
arise, the Council will be represented by a 
'troika' with members from Belgium, 
France and the United Kingdom, whose 
responsibility it will be to oversee the pro-
ceedings in close collaboration with the 
Office of the Clerk. " 
82. It is thus clear that: 
(a) The Permanent Council has no accurate 
knowledge of the facts and the administrative 
work accomplished, as summarised above. 
(b) It has instructed three of its members (and 
not the Secretariat-General) to oversee the work 
" in close collaboration with the Office of the 
Clerk", certainly, but has chosen the interloc-
utors that suited it alongside the Assembly with 
no thought that the Presidential Committee, the 
Assembly's steering body, might have something 
to say about it since it is the President of the 
Assembly alone who is responsible for imple-
menting the Assembly's budget once the Council 
has agreed to it. This means quite plainly that 
the Council has decided to take the matter in 
hand, which is a flagrant violation of the prin-
ciple of budgetary autonomy. Subsequent 
exchanges of correspondence clearly show that 
the Council, after asking the Assembly to 
include in a supplementary budget expenditure 
relating to the work on the WEU building in 
Paris and after asking for a reduction in the esti-
mates, at the expense inter alia of an increase in 
the space reserved for national delegations, per-
sists in refusing to apply the principle of budg-
etary autonomy and in terms which are in fact 
an insult to the Assembly and its President. It is 
just as if, a priori, the Council suspected the 
Assembly, or its President, or the Office of the 
Clerk, of concealing their true intentions and 
wishing to use sums earmarked for the work for 
other purposes. 
We must be perfectly clear on this point. 
If the Council has any grievances whatsoever 
about the Assembly's budgetary management, it 
should say so in order that the Assembly may 
take the necessary steps to correct any mistakes 
it may have made. If not, in view of the Coun-
cil's communications, it would seem that its sole 
aim is to go back on the budgetary autonomy it 
granted the Assembly, which would be intol-
erable. If the Council had wished to take 
account of the fact that WEU's Paris premises 
belong to WEU as a whole, and not to the 
Assembly alone, and impose joint management 
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of the budget for the work to be undertaken, it 
should have foreseen a budgetary procedure 
commensurate with these views. It can have no 
such claims to the Assembly's budget. Relations 
between the Council and the Assembly must 
have clear juridical bases. In words full of innu-
endos, the Council is continually calling in 
question what it asserts as a matter of principle. 
The Assembly cannot accept such an attitude, 
but this does not mean that it is not prepared to 
take the greatest account of the Council's views, 
particularly on the use the future institute might 
make of WEU's Paris premises, but the Council 
must first inform the Assembly of what the insti-
tute's tasks and statute will be 5• 
83. (iv) On the creation of an institute, it must 
be noted that the documents your Rapporteur 
has seen are extremely woolly and contradictory. 
The very title of the institute is said by Mr. 
Rocard to be " European institute for advanced 
security studies ", but the reply to Recommen-
dation 472 gives it as "Institute for Strategic 
Studies ". These two titles clearly suggest very 
different orientations. 
84. The Council says nothing of the role of 
the institute and the Secretary-General's letter is 
not very explicit: 
" There is undoubtedly a role for such an 
institute as part of the strengthening of a 
reactivated WEU in the area of both 
security research co-ordination in a spe-
cifically European context, and the pro-
motion of public awareness of a European 
security identity in the member states. " 
However, a few days earlier, the French Prime 
Minister described this role rather differently: 
" It should fulfil three aims: 
- establish links between national and 
WEU parliamentarians; 
- encourage contacts between those 
responsible for security at European 
level and research workers in existing 
institutes: the purpose is not to compete 
with the latter but to make their work 
more accessible; 
- finally, promote meetings between 
institutes of East and West so that the 
new East-West detente is better inte-
grated into our European deliberations: 
this would be the outcome of my pro-
posal for an openness centre. 
One of the first matters that might be con-
sidered is the institutional landscape of 
our security between now and the 
5. Remarks by Mr. Eyskens, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, offer hope that he will be prepared to consider 
means that do not endanger the Assembly's autonomy in 
managing its budget. 
year 2000. This obviously means giving 
thought to the Atlantic dimension of 
security. " 
85. The second point made above meets a 
concern already expressed by Mr. Genscher in 
December 1984 and repeated several times 
since. Although the Assembly is not opposed to 
this plan, it was sceptical about the possibility of 
a body dependent on the Council co-operating 
with institutes, many of which have a 
university-type statute. Nevertheless, Mr. 
Rocard's suggestions are aimed at meeting most 
of the objections to such co-operation and might 
perhaps allow the institute to do useful work. 
86. Conversely, none of the earlier proposals 
is to be found in the first point, in particular the 
one made by the French Prime Minister in 
1988: 
" The institute would have a training and 
teaching role in propagating a spirit of 
joint defence and making public opinion 
aware of the notion of collective European 
security." 
This proposal obviously corresponded to an idea 
which had been ripening for several years, at 
least in France, i.e. that Western Europe would 
be allowed to benefit from, while adapting, the 
IHEDN's useful experience. To tell the truth, it 
is very hard to understand what role might be 
played by an institute dependent on the WEU 
Council in establishing links between national 
parliamentarians and an Assembly composed of 
delegations from the same parliaments. The 
Assembly is entitled to be kept informed of what 
the Council has started to do in this area before 
the ministerial meeting at which it is to approve 
the establishment of the institute, as Mr. Rocard 
announced. 
87. The third point hardly corresponds to Mr. 
Rocard's proposal on 15th November 1988 to 
create an " openness centre ... to gather, circulate 
and explain information ". This had little in 
common with " meetings between institutes of 
East and West " and the Assembly is also 
entitled to know, before the Council of Ministers 
takes a decision, what it intends to do. It also 
has a special reason for wanting this information 
since the way in which the premises in which it 
has its seat can be used will depend largely on 
the status and needs of the new institute with 
which it will have to cohabit in conditions that 
have yet to be specified. 
88. The reply to Recommendation 4 72 gives 
few details on these points and is also 
ambiguous about the way the Council is oper-
ating in this connection since it announces that: 
" Ministers also tasked the Permanent Council 
to re-examine the question of setting up an 
institute ... together with the related issue of the 
WEU Agency ", without saying whether it 
means the Agency for the Control of Arma-
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ments, which can be transformed only by 
revising the treaty, or what is left of the agencies 
set up in 1985, that are apparently in the process 
of being completely liquidated, although the 
Assembly has not been informed of the Coun-
cil's decisions on the matter. However, this reply 
also says that: "The Institutional Working 
Group has been instructed to prepare proposals 
for submission at the forthcoming ministerial 
meeting. " In this case, it is hard to determine 
the role of the Permanent Cquncil in this matter 
and at what point it intervenes. 
89. The Assembly's position towards the 
institute was expressed in Recommendations 
442, 463, 467 and 472, in which lessons were 
drawn from the experien~~ of the agencies set up 
in 1985. This showed that an organ closely 
dependent on the Council, itself subject to the 
system of unanimous decisions, could not make 
a worthwhile contribution. Experience with the 
ACA and the SAC, on the contrary, showed that 
there could be " subsidiary organs " of the 
Council that were not subordinate to it and con-
sequently had considerable freedom of action 
within the framework of a permanent task, 
defined by the Assembly in Recommendation 
467 as being "to promote a, European spirit in 
matters of defence ". It proposed certain 
methods of achieving this and ensuring that it 
had the necessary autonomy and, in Recommen-
dation 4 72, asked the Council to submit a draft 
statute to the Assembly for joint examination. 
The fact that the Council haJs not yet replied to 
Recommendation 467 and that the procedure 
referred to in the reply to Recommendation 472 
with a view to the Council of Ministers adopting 
a decision to allow the planned institute to be set 
up indicates that the Council has no intention of 
consulting the Assembly before the Ministers 
take a decision. This probably means it is not 
really prepared to follow the Assembly's pro-
posals on the role and structure of the institute 
or on the organisation of its relations with the 
Assembly. This conclusion is confirmed in 
paragraph VI.4 of the half-yearly report, which 
announces that the Assembly " will be 
informed... following the ministerial meeting " 
which is to take the decisions now being pre-
pared. 
90. This supposition seems particularly well 
founded since the letter from the Secretary-
General to the Assembly is dated 18th Sep-
tember and reached the Assembly only on 22nd 
September although it was sent by rapid means. 
It mentions meetings of the Institutional 
Working Group on 1st June and 3rd July, but 
your Rapporteur has learned that the group also 
met on 18th September. He therefore thinks the 
letter, prepared before 18th September, was not 
sent at once because everyone was expecting the 
institutional group to agree on the question of 
the institute. The absence of agreement probably 
then induced the Secretary-General to send the 
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letter posthaste as drafted prior to that meeting 
so as not to have to report on a setback, thus 
concealing it from the Assembly. Your 
Rapporteur would be most surprised if this sup-
position were denied. 
91. (v) It was solely in the press 6 that your 
Rapporteur learned of an interesting initiative 
by the Belgian Government to set up, in WEU, _a 
European crisis management centre. Thts 
probably means" for averting military ris~s ". It 
is believed that, on 5th July 1989, followmg the 
crash of a MiG-23 aircraft on Belgian territory 
on 4th July, from which the pilot had ejected 
himself over Polish territory, Mr. Coeme, 
Belgian Minister of Defence, after the fashion of 
centres for nuclear accidents in the United 
States and the Soviet Union, made this proposal 
to the" meeting ofWEU experts", i.e. probably 
the Special Working Group. The procedure is 
interesting in itself since the Special Working 
Group would thus for the first time have had a 
matter placed before it directly by the 
Chairmanship-in-Office and not by other 
Council instances, which confirms the view that 
the Special Working Group should be con-
sidered as an embodiment of the Council. 
According to the same sources, this proposal was 
well received provided naval matters were 
excluded from the centre's responsibilities, and, 
on 8th July, the Soviet Union is reported to have 
announced that it was in favour of the creation 
of such a centre on a twofold basis, in WEU and 
the Warsaw Pact. The final decision on this 
matter should be taken by the Council of Min-
isters at its meeting in November. While the 
Belgian initiative seems very welcome, it has to 
be noted that, once again, neither the Council 
nor the Secretary-General in his letter of 18th 
September saw fit to inform the Assembly, 
although this is an important question which 
might have a significant effect on WEU's 
future. 
92. (vi) The Assembly will be gratified that the 
Council confirms its intention to " provide the 
Assembly with accurate, up-to-date information 
on all aspects of the implementation of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty and on the activities of 
WEU bodies ", but in practice this intention has 
not been followed up, at least in the areas 
referred to here. Consideration of the reply to 
Recommendation 4 72, like that to Recommen-
dation 468, to be examined by the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for the 
June 1990 session, give the impression that the 
Council does not take the Assembly's recom-
mendations at all seriously and seeks to accede 
to its wishes formally without thought for the 
content of its communications or even 
attempting to respect the principle of non-
contradiction. Such perfunctory documents 
6. Eurostrategie, No. 27, September 1989; De Defensa, 
Volume 5, No. 2, 25th September 1989. 
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cannot be part of a dialogue between the 
Council and the Assembly. 
93. (vii) Furthermore, the Assembly can but 
welcome the creation of an ad hoc Sub-Group 
on Space, which corresponds to its requests. It 
emphasises the political importance for Europe 
of having technical means of taking part in. th_e 
verification of future agreements on the hmt-
tation of conventional weapons. Without these 
means, it cannot hope to occupy its due place in 
the current negotiations and would thus have to 
put up with decisions taken without its partici-
pation. It will thus find the programme of the 
sub-group as described in Chapter V of the 
Council's report too modest since Europe has 
little time left it wishes to occupy that place. 
94. (viii) The Assembly will notice that, for 
the first time, the half-yearly report of the 
Council uses the word " formal " to describe the 
meetings between the Presidential Committee or 
other Assembly committees and the 
Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council. It will 
welcome this insofar as the Council had hitherto 
underlined the " informal " nature of such 
meetings which made it difficult for a parlia-
mentary assembly that cannot delegate its 
powers to pursue a satisfactory dialogue w~th t_he 
Council. It remains to be seen what th1s hn-
guistic innovation conceals, but the Cou!lcil 
must realise that the Assembly can constder 
itself properly informed only through written or 
oral communications to all its members, 
although this does not mean that it rejects other 
forms of communication. 
VI. Conclusions 
95. The transformations now under way in 
Europe will inevitably have significant conse-
quences for the West and, in particular, for the 
European Community. However, these chan~es 
are still incomplete, ambiguous and uncertam, 
making it difficult today to determine their 
extent and possible effects. There could be 
nothing more dangerous than to ant~cipate 
events when it is not known when they wtll take 
place, thus jeopardising the running of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the organisation of Com-
munity Europe in order to work out assessments 
of the future of defence. It is in the light of its 
own needs that the West must tackle the 
problems that in any event arise: burden- and 
responsibility-sharing in the alliance and imple-
mentation of the Single European Act. However, 
it must do so in such a way that any meas~res it 
takes do not hold up the arms limitation process 
or the development of co-operation between the 
two halves of Europe and the removal of what is 
known as the iron curtain. 
96. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that 
now is not the time to link the European Com-
munity too closely with a European security and 
defence policy. He wonders whether the 
European Parliament or even the Commission 
are not at present going too far in this direction 
and whether their haste in moving towards the 
European union that is everyone's aim may not 
cause cracks in the European edifice the day it is 
necessary to make a choice which many find dif-
ficult between the reunification of Europe and 
advancing towards the United States of Europe. 
Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that, 
keeping to the provisions of the Rome Treaty 
and the programme set out in the single act, the 
Western European countries continue, for as 
long as necessary, to separate security Europe 
from economic Europe, i.e. that they keep to the 
treaties and institutions now in force in each 
area. 
97. More than any other country, the Federal 
Republic of Germany is naturally aware of the 
danger for detente of the Community taking 
over defence matters. Thus, its Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Genscher, said in Sep-
tember 1989: 
" We should be ready if Central and 
Eastern European states want closer co-
operation with the European Community 
and we should even be prepared to 
welcome new members if they fulfil the 
necessary conditions. It is therefore 
important for the European Community 
to concentrate on joint external policy, 
joint economic policy, ecological and 
technological policy and cultural 
co-operation. But military questions 
which concern the Western European 
countries must be kept apart and dealt 
with in Western European Union. Oth-
erwise, in spite of the formal opening of 
the European Community, the accession 
of neutral states and above all of other 
Central and Eastern European states 
would be precluded. The European Com-
munity must be open to all European 
countries wishing to become members 
and fulfilling the conditions. The 
European Community should, moreover, 
develop more open structures such as the 
Eureka programme, which is also open to 
states that are not members of the 
European Community. " 7 
Mr. Mitterrand's words in Caracas on lOth 
October can apparently be interpreted as 
endorsing this viewpoint. After confirming his 
attachment to the cause of German reunifi-
cation, to be effected " peacefully and democrat-
ically", he added: 
" The building of the European Com-
munity can contribute to, and even 
answer in part the German problems that 
7. Interview with Mr. Genscher in the Spiegel, 25th Sep-
tember 1989, page 26. 
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will arise in the event of reunification. No 
time must therefore be lost in giving the 
European Community the structure it 
needs. " 
Finally, on 16th October 1989, M~. An~reotti 
granted an interview to Die Welt m whtch he 
endorsed the view expressed by Mr. Genscher as 
follows: 
" I think that, independently of the 
methods of co-operation now being 
developed in the light of each country's 
means and needs, it is particularly 
important that military matters should 
not be touched upon. Military questions 
should continue to be handled in the 
framework of the increasingly close rela-
tions between the pacts and alliances and 
at the level of the Helsinki agreements. " 
98. This does not mean WEU and the Com-
munity must ignore each other. Your 
Rapporteur has tried to pinpoint various ques-
tions towards which the prospect of 1992 should 
guide the work of the WEU Council and, at the 
same time, a number of aspects of European 
security, in particular in the industrial and com-
mercial field, that the Community organs should 
examine. A line should be drawn between the 
areas of responsibility of the two organisations 
on the basis of a strict application of the treaties 
in force, while introducing all the necessary 
means of communication between them so that 
each one may at any time take account of what 
the other is doing. The corollary to the principle 
that everything that can be done in the wider 
framework, that of the Community, should be 
done there is that WEU has a complementary 
role to play, because of its specific responsibil-
ities, in preparing the future European union in 
areas in which the Community is not at present 
able to do so. Far from giving the Community a 
grip on defence questions, the single act, in con-
formity with the modified Brussels Treaty, 
paves the way for closer co-operation between 
the two organisations. 
99. On 5th December 1988, the former Secre-
tary-General of WEU, Mr. Alfred Cahen, 
answered a question put by our colleague, Mr. 
Hill, on relations between the Community and 
WEU as follows: 
" . . . We should logically therefore work 
together. This is why I endeavour to cul-
tivate close co-operative relations with 
the Commission - i.e' with Mr. Delors 
and the other commissioners. Unfortu-
nately, we cannot push that co-operation 
beyond certain limits because in _the Co?I-
munities there are three countnes whtch 
cannot at present accept the security 
dimension, and two of them do not wish 
to have too close relations with WEU. The 
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building of Europe is not a logical 
process ... 
Mr. van Eekelen spoke in similar terms in his 
Brussels address. 
100. It remains for the governments to grant 
WEU the institutional wherewithal for it effec-
tively to play the role they set for it when WEU 
was reactivated, concomitant, it should be 
recalled, with the drawing up of the single act. 
This reactivation seems to have become a reality 
at the level of intergovernmental practice as the 
Secretary-General's letter of 18th September 
usefully recalls. But it has been accompanied by 
the destruction of the organisation's structures. 
While the Secretary-General is now a politician 
who can express his own views without having 
to obtain the prior agreement of the Council, the 
Secretariat-General as an institution has lost all 
initiative, to the extent that, in affairs of minor 
political importance such as refurbishing the 
building in which the Assembly has its seat the 
Council has set up a troika to oversee the work. 
Similarly, everything indicates that the intro-
duction of the WEU-Com network has resulted 
in all communications being transmitted from 
the Chairmanship-in-Office and member gov-
ernments to the Assembly without the inter-
vention of the Secretariat-General. Yet often in 
the past the Secretariat-General, considering 
that it was not only a Council secretariat but a 
body responsible for applying the modified 
140 
Brussels Treaty, including Article IX, managed 
to intervene to ensure that governments fulfilled 
their commitments. It no longer seems to have 
this possibility. The present winding down of 
the agencies is further helping to diminish the 
institution, and the Council's apparent will to 
consider the future institute as an organ wholly 
subordinate to it, which was not the case of the 
ACA or the SAC, confirms this tendency. 
101. All this would be acceptable if the govern-
ments did not shroud European security activ-
ities in an ever thicker mist. This is so for the 
European Commission's action in security 
matters and intergovernmental exchanges in 
WEU. The Council's annual reports are increas-
ingly devoid of content. Replies to Assembly 
recommendations are increasingly vague and 
remote from reality. Neither public opinion nor 
the Assembly is correctly informed of what is 
going on in reactivated WEU, so that there is, 
probably mistakenly, no longer much belief in 
the reality of reactivation. 
102. Let the governments make no mistake, 
twenty-first century Europe will not come into 
being without the wholehearted backing of 
public opinion, strongly in favour of close 
European co-operation but increasingly sceptical 
about what is being done. If the governments 
fail to remedy this situation, in particular in the 
framework of WEU, they will quickly see their 
most auspicious initiatives fail. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European security and events in the Near and Middle East 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 349 and 403; 
(ii) Considering that Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty gives the WEU 
Council competence to examine threats to international peace in the Near and Middle East; 
(iii) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 472 which reaffirms its intention to report 
on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is carried out in a framework other 
than WEU, in accordance with Article 11 of the treaty; 
(iv) Recalling the action taken by WEU in 1988 to restore freedom of navigation in the Gulf; 
(v) Expressing its satisfaction at: 
(a) the continuation of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq; 
(b) the suspension of fighting in Beirut; 
(vi) Aware of the important consequences of the meeting of sixty-two members of the Lebanese Par-
liament on the initiative of the committee formed by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia to: 
(a) work out a political and institutional solution allowing the various communities to cohabit 
peacefully; 
(b) assert the integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese state, freed of interference 
and foreign military presence; 
(vii) Condemning the taking of hostages, their detention and terrorism in all its forms; 
(viii) Expressing the strongest concern that no general peace process has yet been started in the Middle 
East in spite of the action that the international community has been taking for a long time through: 
(a) United Nations resolutions; 
(b) recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; 
(c) European Community declarations; 
(d) diplomatic action by the superpowers; , 
(e) the good will shown by the Arab countries at their recent summit meeting in Casablanca; 
(ix) Strongly disapproving the new impetus given to the arms race by states in the region, particularly 
in regard to long-range aircraft, medium-range missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons: 
(a) by firms, banks and experts from European Community countries; 
(b) by agreements with and arms deliveries and military assistance from certain Western 
European countries, the Soviet Union, the United States and China, 
which are obviously contrary to the search for peaceful solutions to the conflicts causing bloodshed in 
the region; 
(x) Gratified that the European Council has taken a major step to prevent its members contributing 
to the production of chemical weapons by countries in the region but regretting that the Western 
European countries have taken no collective steps to avoid the proliferation of other types of arma-
ments such as medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear weapons; 
(xi) Endorsing unreservedly the United Nations' decision to convene an international conference on 
peace in the Middle East; 
(xii) Considering that, to ensure peace and stability in the region, it is essential to seek a solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that guarantees the security of the state oflsrael and the right of the Pal-
estinian people to a homeland and to self-determination in the Gaza Strip and West Bank; 
(xiii) Recognising the will of the Palestinian people who for two years have been demonstrating, with 
the intifada movement, their refusal to accept the prolongation of the Israeli military occupation that 
started in 1967, 
and condemning repression, attacks and any action that violates human rights and international 
conventions; 
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(xiv) Considering that the start of a general peace process, and hence the convocation of an interna-
tional conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations, calls for a dia-
logue between the parties involved as a first step, 
and assessing positively: 
(a) the decisions taken by the Palestinian National Council in Algiers; 
(b) the rejection of terrorism by the PLO; 
(c) the PLO's explicit recognition of the state of Israel; 
(d) the decisions taken at the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca; 
(xv) Considering further that the Israeli Government's plan for elections in the occupied territories, if 
accompanied by the necessary international guarantees and negotiated between all the parties 
involved, might provide an opportunity to start a dialogue which cannot be held without the PLO, 
which manifestly has the sympathy and support of the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
and expressing its disappointment at the Israeli Government's rejection of the ten points com-
pleting the Shamir plan presented by Mr. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt; 
(xvi) Wishing constructive negotiations to be started without delay between a representative and 
credible Palestinian delegation and the Israeli Government, 
1. 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I 
Confirm that it is fully prepared: 
(a) to respond to any request aimed at encouraging the consolidation of the military truce, the 
resumption of civilian life and normal air and sea traffic in Lebanon; 
(b) to support the action taken by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia; 
(c) to support current efforts in Lebanon to: 
- restore peaceful cohabitation among the communities; 
- reform the institutions; 
- re-establish state authority; 
- enable all foreign troops to be withdrawn; 
- guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon; 
2. Take immediate steps to halt the arms race in the Middle East, particularly in regard to chemical 
and nuclear weapons, missiles and long-range aircraft and to this end: 
(a) stop the implementation of contracts for supplies of arms and take various measures, 
co-ordinated between governments, to prevent firms, banks and research centres from 
evading control, as has already been the case; 
(b) propose that all states, in particular the Soviet Union, China, the United States, South Africa 
and Brazil, adopt a similar approach; 
(c) exert pressure on the Arab states and Israel to accept a freeze on and verification of their mil-
itary potential and the progressive elimination of chemical and nuclear weapons with a view 
to the international conference on peace in the Middle East which will have to consider 
special negotiations on the reduction of armaments following the political agreements 
reached and as an essential guarantee of the security of all states in the region; 
3. Draw up a list of products and technologies which member countries would undertake not to 
deliver to any Near or Middle East country and seek the endorsement of the other arms exporting 
countries for such a decision; 
4. Ensure in particular that member states do not authorise the export to any coUilltry in the region of: 
(a) chemical products on the list given in the European Council regulation of 20th February 
1989; 
(b) technology necessary for the development of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface mis-
siles; 
143 
DOCUMENT 1202 
5. Reaffirm its resolve to preserve freedom of navigation on all seas; 
6. Announce here and now that member countries are prepared to co-ordinate the action of their 
armed forces: 
(a) for humanitarian operations and international police duties at the request of the United 
Nations; 
(b) with the agreement of the parties directly concerned, for guaranteeing the implementation of 
bi- or multilateral agreements concluded by the international conference on peace in the 
Middle East, or even earlier through direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict; 
11 
Urge member states to take action in the European Council to ensure acceptance of United 
Nations resolutions on Palestine and Lebanon and: 
(a) Intensify diplomatic action to promote peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq based on the 
full acceptance of United Nations Resolution 598; 
(b) Follow up the Assembly's earlier recommendation to give substantial assistance to Kurdish ref-
ugees and insist on respect for human rights and recognition of the cultural and administrative inde-
pendence of the Kurdish people in the various states in which they live; 
(c) Recommend that member states increase, directly or in the framework of the European Com-
munity, their humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people of the Gaza Strip and West Bank 
whose living conditions are deteriorating from day to day; 
(d) Persevere with approaches to each state capable of exercising influence to bring about the release 
of all the hostages taken on Lebanese territory and the international fight against all forms of terrorism; 
(e) In any event, promote the meeting of the international conference on peace in the Middle East 
which only Israel and Iran are now refusing and, to this end: 
(i) ask the Soviet Union to renew normal diplomatic relations with Israel; 
(ii) ask the United States to raise the level of their contacts with the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation; 
(iii) ask the United Nations General Assembly to stop equating Zionism with racism as 
approved in one of its resolutions; 
(iv) ask the United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution in favour of the Palestinians' 
right to self-determination; 
(f) Ask the Israeli Government: 
(i) to stop its repressive action in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which has already caused 
several hundred deaths; 
(ii) to abandon all practices that are prejudicial to human rights; 
(iii) to respect the property of the population of the occupied territories; 
(iv) to allow Palestinian universities to be reopened; 
(g) Ask the Israeli Government to agree to a dialogue with the PLO and negotiations with a credible 
and representative Palestinian delegation with a view to holding free elections in the occupied terri-
tories; 
(h) Ask Israel's neighbouring Arab states and the PLO to exercise their influence and vigilance in 
halting infiltrations of armed groups into Israeli territory; 
(i) Together with the Council of Europe and the European Community - which can place at the 
service of peace in the Middle East its great economic potential and vast wealth of supranational expe-
rience- take the necessary steps to define a truly Western European peace initiative with a view to: 
(i) backing up the diplomatic effort by the United States and the Soviet Union; 
(ii) helping to terminate the present dangerous status quo; 
(iii) fostering an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the 
United Nations. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When he starts to recount his campaign in 
Palestine and Syria in his famous book " The 
seven pillars of wisdom", T.E. Lawrence gives a 
very evocative picture of the human geography 
of the region at the beginning of the century. He 
describes a mosaic of communities, each with its 
own ethnic group, language and religion, some 
of which controlled only a small group of vil-
lages and whose difficult cohabitation was 
ensured only through the far-off domination of 
the Ottoman rulers. Some were the heirs to local 
civilisations with a history dating back several 
thousand years; others were the result of recent 
immigrations such as those of the Circassians, 
the Cherkesses and the Armenians who had fled 
Turkish persecution. Although prepared to take 
part, each on its own behalf, in a revolt against 
the Ottoman Empire, they were hardly prepared 
to form a state or states. 
2. Since that time, there have been other 
migrations, the three main ones being the arrival 
of Armenians during the first world war, Jews as 
from the beginning of the century, but particu-
larly in the aftermath of the second world war, 
then after the decolonisation of the Arab coun-
tries, and finally the Palestinians, chased out by 
the extension of the state of Israel since 194 7. 
However, the unequal economic development in 
the countries in the region led to other, less 
massive migrations. 
3. The formation of new national states after 
the second world war, the expiry of the 
European powers' mandates and completion of 
the decolonisatien process did not solve the 
problems involved in the cohabitation of such 
different communities throughout the region. 
The dream of Arab unity, contested moreover 
by many communities, had already failed even 
before the death of Nasser, who was its apostle 
and builder. This situation must be borne in 
mind in attempting to understand the drama 
which has been tearing the Middle East apart for 
fifty years, including the most recent events. 
II. Recent developments in the Middle East 
4. While a political solution has been found, 
or is in the process of being found, to the various 
regional conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, allowing a relaxation of tension and an 
improvement in international relations, the situ-
ation in the Near and Middle East is becoming 
increasingly explosive and dangerous. 
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5. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan was definitely a positive, dynamic 
factor in improving the international situation. 
However, the civil war is continuing in that 
country and the military situation is deadlocked. 
There is still no sign of a political solution and 
the United States and Pakistan are continuing to 
provide military assistance to the guerrillas and 
the Soviet Union to the government in Kabul. 
6. The cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, 
achieved through special efforts by the United 
Nations, has been respected and, a year later, it 
may be said that the truce has been consoli-
dated. However, there has been no progress at 
all with negotiations for a peace treaty, only a 
few hundred prisoners have been exchanged and 
there are tens of thousands of Iraqi and Iranian 
soldiers in prison camps. Since the countries are 
no longer at war, talks are being conducted with 
the Soviet Union, France, Italy, Spain and other 
eastern and western countries for resuming sup-
plies of military equipment. Iraq and Iran are 
still at grips with each other through direct or 
indirect intervention in the Lebanese civil 
war. 
7. When your Rapporteur visited Israel from 
17th to 20th September 1989, the many analysts 
that he met stressed their concern at Iraq's 
dynamism in the region since the end of the war 
with Iran. In particular, they underlined the pos-
sible risk of military co-operation between Iraq 
and Jordan. 
8. The Kurdish problem has not been solved 
and even seems to have worsened since the end 
of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, with 
repression tantamount to genocide with the use 
of weapons of mass destruction, political assassi-
nations, the provocation of new waves of 
political refugees and the migration of terrified, 
defenceless civilians from one country to the 
other. Yet a political solution to the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq implies an undertaking to 
grant cultural and administrative autonomy 
allowing the Kurdish people to live in peace and 
receive immediate and larger-scale humanita-
rian assistance through international organ-
isations without changing the shape of existing 
frontiers. 
9. Fundamentally, the two positive aims so 
keenly sought by international diplomacy (the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end 
of the state of war in the Persian Gulf) have not 
initiated a general process of peace throughout 
the region. 
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10. The Lebanese civil war and the Pales-
tinian question, which are interdependent, are 
still in the centre of the world stage and the 
present report will therefore be concerned 
mainly with these two specific aspects. 
Ill. Lebanon 
11. The Syrian-supported militia's shelling of 
the Christian sector of Beirut, which started in 
summer 1989, has already killed about 1 000 
people and wounded 3 000 other civilians, 
crowded into cellars and makeshift shelters in 
intolerably dangerous conditions, with practi-
cally no possibility of obtaining supplies of food 
and water, their hygiene and hospital services 
being inaccessible or no longer operating. It has 
again aroused the horror of the entire world at 
the tragedy of the Lebanese civil war that has 
lasted for fourteen years and made it imperative 
for the international community to make a 
further attempt to end it. 
12. Since 1975, there has been an intolerable 
number of victims for a country which at one 
time had three million inhabitants plus about 
400 000 Palestinian refugees. According to 
recent estimates, between 800 000 and a million 
Lebanese have been forced to leave their 
country. The first stage of the war alone, which 
lasted from 1975 to 1978, was responsible for 
about 50 000 killed, 100 000 wounded and hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees. The period from 
1978 (first Israeli invasion) and 1982 (second 
Israeli invasion) was rife with attacks, clashes 
between various armed factions and abortive 
attempts to restore the unity of the state and lay 
the foundations of a new national pact. The 
Peace in Galilee operation, which brought 
Israeli troops right to Beirut, caused a further 
18 000 dead and 50 000 wounded. Just as the 
arrival of Syrian troops in 1976 was symbolised 
by the massacre of the Palestinian refugee camp 
at Tal Al Zaatar, the arrival of the Israeli army 
in 1982 was symbolised by massacres at the Pal-
estinian camps of Sabra and Chatila. 
13. Since then, all state institutions have com-
pletely collapsed. All the ethnic and religious 
communities and their various factions have 
formed or strengthened their armed militia 
forces. The civil war has become a war between 
all parties (armed skirmishes between pro-
Syrian Palestinians and those loyal to Mr. 
Arafat, between Lebanese Christian Falangist 
forces and Christian brigades from the army, 
battles between Amal Shiite militia forces and 
Hezbollah forces, also Shiite, etc.), each com-
munity wishing to show its followers its 
supremacy in the war waged against the others. 
Alliances between internal forces and with states 
in the region have constantly shifted according 
to the interests of the moment. 
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14. The Lebanese economy, which had with-
stood the first stage of the civil war, collapsed 
after 1982, suffering also from strong Israeli 
competition, in particular in the consumer 
goods and tourist sectors. 
15. Lebanese constitutional practice was 
based on a subtle attribution of government 
posts between the various communities. The 
President of the Republic had to be a Maronite 
and the Prime Minister a Sunnite. It did not 
survive the civil war and, today, Lebanon has no 
President since parliament, which should elect 
him, has been unable to meet and there are two 
opposing governments: one presided by Mr. 
Selin Hoss, a Sunnite Moslem, and the other, in 
East Beirut, under General Michel Aoun, leader 
of the Maronite Christian brigades of the Leb-
anese army, who proclaimed a "war of liber-
ation" against the Syrian invasion by receiving 
military supplies from Iraq and starting what is 
known as the " war of the Lebanese ports ". 
16. The Lebanese civil war had endogenous 
causes which have become increasingly mingled 
with the Israeli-Arab conflict, the struggle 
between Arab and Moslem states for supremacy 
in the region and the interests of the super-
powers. 
17. The 1943 national pact, drawn up jointly 
by leading Christians and Moslems under the 
patronage of France, a mandatory power, was 
based on a compromise by which Lebanon was 
to be part of the Arab world but with a pre-
eminence of Christians in the state. On this 
basis, Lebanon took part in the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war, and the pact was confirmed after the 
first split in 1958, when President Chamoun, a 
Maronite Christian, considering the time ripe 
for changing the balance of internal forces, 
called the United States marines to Beirut, the 
United States, following the Iraqi revolution, 
having proclaimed, in the Eisenhower doctrine, 
its vital interest in the Near and Middle East. 
18. Economic development in subsequent 
years, which accentuated social imbalances to 
the detriment of the poorer section of the popu-
lation, demographic growth, in particular among 
the Shiites, the proportion of whom among the 
total population rose from 20% to 40%, and the 
arrival of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian 
refugees emphasised the frailty of the national 
pact. The 1943 compromise had kept the Shiites 
on the sidelines and excluded the many other 
ethnic and religious communities - first and 
foremost the Druze community, which was to 
play a major role throughout the civil war -
from the principal institutional posts and, 
hence, from all forms of protection and social 
promotion. The Maronite Christian right wing 
initiated the civil war in 1975, but the Moslem 
social and political left wing felt strong enough 
to take up the challenge. For a whole year Mr. 
Arafat managed to keep most Palestinians 
outside the confrontation. They became 
involved only when their refugee camps were 
attacked in 1976. Their intervention upset the 
facts of the conflict by provoking the arrival of 
30 000 Syrian troops, called in by the President 
of the Lebanese Republic to put an end to the 
first stage of the civil war. The Syrian army then 
stayed on in Lebanon as an Arab deterrent force 
with a mandate from the Arab League. It 
withdrew from Beirut a number of times and 
then returned to the Lebanese capital at the 
request of one or other of the parties to the con-
flict following clashes between armed militia 
forces from the various Lebanese communities 
and between Palestinians. 
19. Syria's interest in Lebanon is clear, both 
for strategic as well as for historical and geo-
graphical reasons. Following its loss of the 
Golan Heights during the war against Israel in 
1967, Syria has considered the Lebanese Bekaa 
Valley to be an essential base for defending its 
national territory. 
20. In view of the Palestinian presence, 
Lebanon has also been the setting for complex 
politico-military relations between Syria and the 
PLO under Arafat, who has had to safeguard the 
political unity and independence of his 
organisation. 
21. In the often changing context of the 
various factions, Syria has allies among both 
Moslems and Christians in Lebanon and uses 
them in accordance with its political views by 
exercising something of a protectorate that it 
claims to be legitimate under its mandate from 
the Arab League. 
22. Speaking of Syrian interests in Lebanon to 
a delegation from the Council of Europe, the 
President of the Syrian Parliament said: 
" Syria considers Lebanon should be inde-
pendent, unified and part of the Arab 
world. Peace will be restored in Lebanon 
when foreign interference stops. The Leb-
anese are a single people and Syria will 
not allow a single religious faith to assume 
the right to govern. " 
One of the most likely reasons for the military 
intervention in Lebanon in 1976 is the fear that 
a victory by the Moslem left wing in the civil 
war might lead Israel to occupy Lebanon and 
involve Syria in the conflict. It is certain that 
Syria and Israel, both present in Lebanon, have 
carefully avoided any contact between their two 
armies during their main deployments: Syria in 
1976 and Israel in 1978. Similarly, in 1982, 
when the two armies came into contact they 
managed to avoid the inevitable clashes degen-
erating into all-out war between the two coun-
tries. 
23. The Israeli leaders have never concealed 
the fact that they considered it in their interest 
to have a separate Christian entity close to the 
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frontiers of the Jewish state :~ts a possible ally to 
prevent encirclement by the Moslem world. The 
wish to have Israel as a prote~tor was not foreign 
to the Maronite groups who Started the civil war 
in 197 5 when they felt threatened by the 
presence of Palestinians who, in 1969, received 
from the Arab League, with' the consent of the 
Lebanese Government, the night to station and 
train their military units in Lebanon. Relations 
between Israel and the Maronite Christian right 
wing have always been, and still are, quite close. 
Since 1985, the "Lebanese forces" have had an 
office in Jerusalem. Since 1978, Israel has con-
trolled Southern Lebanon either directly or 
through the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) 
formed by Major Haddad, a deserter from the 
Lebanese army, and which, since the latter's 
death, has been commanded by Colonel Antoine 
Lahad, also a Maronite Christian. The SLA owes 
its existence, and this is still the case, to the 
financial and military support of Israel. With its 
invasion in 1982, Israel's intention was not only 
to hit the Palestinian camps and eliminate the 
bases from which attacks were launched on 
Israeli territory, it was also to establish a real 
protectorate over Lebanon. This was the 
meaning of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement 
drawn up under the aegis of Mr. Philip Habib, 
President Reagan's special envoy to the Middle 
East, which was first signed and then denounced 
by President Amin Gemaye1 of Lebanon. Disa-
vowal of the agreement was the only decision 
taken jointly by the heads of the Lebanese fac-
tions at the two national reconciliation confer-
ences held in Geneva and Lausanne in autumn 
1983 and spring 1984 under the aegis of Syria 
and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, fighting 
continued in Beirut. On withdrawing from the 
Chuf mountain, the Israeli army undertook to 
rearm both the Maronite Christians and their 
Druze enemies. Only in 1985 did Israeli troops 
withdraw partially from Southern Lebanon, 
almost three years after United Nations Reso-
lution 475 calling for an immediate, total with-
drawal. Thus, the PLO had to leave Beirut and 
all territory south of the Lebanese capital, but 
the ensuing vacuum was filled by Shiite militias, 
first those of Amal and then the Hezbollah. A 
third foreign involvement thus emerged and 
developed: that of Iran. 
24. A few months after itl was proclaimed, it 
already became clear that the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, led by Imam Khomeini, was intent on 
exporting the Islamic revolution to the rest of 
the Moslem world and introducing unheard-of 
conduct in international diplomacy. An example 
of this concept of international relations was 
when the staff of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran was taken hostage. Those who planned 
and carried out this action were covered by 
Khomeini and subsequently put in charge of the 
principal sectors of the state and Islamic 
organisations responsible for propaganda and 
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action abroad. Overall, it cannot be said that 
Khomeini's international strategy was suc-
cessful, but it gained a foothold and found a way 
to express itself to some extent in the compli-
cated tangle of the Lebanese civil war and the 
international context of which that war is a part. 
25. After the end of the war between Iran and 
Iraq and the death of Khomeini, what is hap-
pening in the Islamic Republic is not essentially 
a struggle for power. Hojatolislam Rafsanjani 
indeed took his place without too much diffi-
culty as the senior political leader and then 
became President of the Republic. It is rather a 
clash between tendencies which differ mainly in 
their approach to international policy. While it 
was probably not too difficult to normalise rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, this was not at all 
true for relations with the western countries and 
more particularly the United States. Rafsan-
jani's pragmatic leanings are now being put to 
the test with the negotiations to free the western 
hostages (eight American, four British, two 
German, one Italian and one Irish) held by the 
Lebanese Hezbollah. Differing, discordant 
voices have been raised among the fundamen-
talists, both Iranian and Lebanese. The question 
of hostages is an important factor in the compli-
cated, confused situation in Lebanon. For 
humanitarian reasons first, but also to avoid 
further dangerous outbursts, international 
diplomacy is therefore striving to solve this 
matter. Arab countries (including Syria), 
European Community countries and the Soviet 
Union have all made efforts in this sense. 
26. The situation in Lebanon was examined 
at the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca in 
May 1989. According to the final communique: 
" The conference requested all Lebanese 
parties to respect the cease-fire immedi-
ately and permanently ... and urged (them) 
to co-operate in an effort to reach global 
national reconciliation and concord 
whereby a definitive end could be put to 
the Lebanese crisis in all its aspects ... The 
conference rejected all attempts at par-
tition and renewed the assurance of its 
undertaking to support the rebuilding of 
Lebanon and its national economy 1• The 
conference decided to set up a committee 
comprising H.M. King Hassan 11 of 
Morocco, the Custodian of the Haramein, 
King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and H.E. Pres-
ident Chadli Benjedid, President of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Algeria. 
This committee was given full and 
illimited prerogatives to achieve the goals 
set by the conference... This committee 
I. The words underlined in this quotation were in the 
official French text of the communique received from the 
Arab League, but not in the English text. 
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will have for a task to carry out what con-
tacts and measures are deemed appro-
priate with a view to securing a favourable 
climate for the members of the Lebanese 
Parliament to meet and discuss the doc-
ument of political reforms, hold presi-
dential elections and form a government 
of national unity within a period not 
exceeding six months. The conference 
also expressed its readiness to meet 
again... in order to assess... what other 
developments will have occurred. " 
After a first working session that closed in July 
with negative conclusions, the committee set up 
by Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Algeria again 
took the initiative in Lebanon in mid-
September. It first managed to ensure a truce in 
the fighting in Beirut. Then it managed to bring 
together sixty-two Lebanese members of par-
liament (half Christian, half Moslem) in Taif in 
Saudi Arabia. Unofficial sources have reported 
that the Lebanese Parliament reached agreement 
on the principle of parity between Christians 
and Moslems in the future national parliament 
and a new balance of power among state leaders. 
The partial stage-by-stage withdrawal of Syrian 
troops was also agreed upon. General Aoun 
expressed his disagreement with the Taif 
decision and several Moslem factions (Amal and 
Hezbollah), for opposite reasons, shared this dis-
agreement. It is to be hoped that the Christians 
and Moslems who drew up the Taif agreement 
will be capable of controlling the situation in 
Beirut with the backing of Arab mediators and 
international diplomacy. 
27. The United States, following harsh crit-
icism and hostile demonstrations by followers of 
General Aoun, who had called for its support 
against Syria, has shut its embassy in Beirut for 
security reasons, thus confirming its low profile 
on the Lebanese question. France, which has 
the presidency of the European Community, 
decided, after the deployment of a fleet in Leb-
anese waters had given rise to a good deal of dis-
cussion and opposition, to convene a meeting of 
European political co-operation in Paris and 
made a special effort to bring humanitarian 
assistance to the Lebanese civilian population, 
as agreed by the European Community. The 
Soviet Union, Pope John-Paul 11 and the con-
ference of non-aligned countries have also taken 
steps to try to restore peace. 
28. The main elements for restoring peace in 
Lebanon are a cease-fire, reconstituting constitu-
tional organs, revising the national pact, dis-
arming the militias, asserting the authority of 
the Lebanese state throughout national territory, 
the withdrawal of all foreign troops and an end 
to all interference by other countries. 
29. All this obviously requires the partici-
pation and consensus of all the Lebanese parties 
but, even if they are capable of making such an 
effort after fourteen years of civil war, they have 
no means of imposing a global, lasting solution. 
It is not just a question of the Syrian military 
presence. There is also mention of some 4 000 
Iranians and, above all, one must not forget the 
Israeli military occupation of part of the south 
of the country. It is very difficult to imagine any 
of these countries withdrawing. Both the Syrians 
and the Israelis consider their presence in 
Lebanon to be essential for their security. This 
makes the departure of foreign soldiers from 
Lebanon possible only once the process of peace 
in the region has reached an advanced stage. 
A final solution to the Lebanese crisis must 
therefore now be sought in the framework 
of a global peace agreement on the " fertile 
crescent". Originally, the Lebanese war was 
basically a civil war between Lebanese factions, 
but it has become far more than that: it is now 
part of the Arab-Israeli conflict and must be 
considered as such if it is to be ended. 
IV. The Palestinian question 
30. What has hitherto prevented and ren-
dered more difficult any solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is not just the admittedly 
considerable problem of finding enough space to 
ensure the security of two opposing sover-
eignties in a fairly small territory to which both 
Jews and Palestinians have undeniable his-
torical, religious, cultural, economic and com-
munity claims. The Arab countries were stunned 
by the plan for the partition of Palestine set out 
in United Nations Resolution 181 and in the 
last forty years they have refused to recognise 
the existence of the state of Israel. Equally unde-
niable is the fact that in that time Israel has 
sought to widen its frontiers by conducting a 
policy of expansion to the detriment of its Arab 
neighbours. It should also be added that the Pal-
estinian problem has often been used as a 
pretext for policies of hegemony and strength by 
various countries in the region (Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq, Jordan) and, in general, in the Arab and 
Islamic world: Israel has been able to count on 
these divisions for refusing to implement United 
Nations decisions relating to the West Bank and 
Gaza, occupied since the 1967 war, and to shirk 
its commitments, albeit limited, under the 
Camp David agreements. During this period, 
moreover, the Near and Middle East have been 
a particularly sensitive, important point in the 
worldwide confrontation between the two super-
powers and, because of their proximity to the 
European continent of which they are the prin-
cipal supplier of energy, they have played a sig-
nificant role in both the East-West and North-
South balance. 
31. This is not the place to describe the stages 
in the conflict that has been steeping the Near 
and Middle East in blood for more than forty 
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years through five wars, numerous invasions, 
many massacres and biblic~il migrations whose 
principal victim has been the Arab population of 
Palestine. Consideration will merely be given to 
events in the last two years which now allow 
international diplomacy to attempt, with some 
chance of success, to find a lasting political 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It 
should not be forgotten ~hat, following the 
denunciation of the Jordanian-Palestinian 
agreement, the failure of the Hussein plan and 
the PLO's persistent crisis after its break with 
Syria, the situation seemed to be deadlocked in 
mid-1987. In examining subsequent events, 
which offered new possibilities and prospects, 
the major changes at international level 
(East-West detente) and regional level (the end 
of the war between Iran and Iraq helped to bring 
the Palestinian problem back into the limelight) 
must not be forgotten. 
32. What has helped the most to change pros-
pects in the Middle East is the wide-ranging, 
unarmed struggle by the Palestinian population 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupied by 
Israeli armed forces, which combines strikes, 
demonstrations and various forms of civil diso-
bedience. The intifada has lasted for two years 
and is showing no signs of abating, in spite of 
brutal Israeli repression. 
33. According to early 1989 figures, more 
than 700 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli 
troops and 43 000 wounded, including 5 800 
who will be permanently handicapped, and 
there have been 2 500 miscarriages and cases of 
impotence due to the use of toxic gas in built-up 
areas. There have been 48 military and civilian 
dead on the Israeli side. Israeli sources also 
speak of 100 Palestinians killed since they were 
suspected of collaborating with Israel. Israel has 
taken expulsion measures against sixty Pales-
tinians. 806 homes belonging to Palestinians 
suspected of taking part in the revolt have been 
destroyed, leaving 8 000 persons homeless, 
while thousands of political prisoners are kept in 
improvised quarters in disastrous hygienic con-
ditions. Israel has just incr~ased the period of 
administrative detention without trial from six 
months to a year. Palestinian schools of all kinds 
and every level, which were closed in December 
1987, have been reopened on a temporary basis 
by decision of the Israeli military authorities. 
The universities, on the contrary, are still closed. 
Your Rapporteur met Palestinian university 
professors in Jerusalem who. underlined the tre-
mendous repercussions the closing of Pales-
tinian universities would have on the future of 
their community. The third university year was 
about to start and those who had obtained their 
school-leaving certificates could not continue 
their studies. Even professors were not allowed 
access to offices and laborat()ries. A matter that 
has been widely commented upon throughout 
the world is the confiscation of the property of 
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citizens of the town of Beit-Sahour whose 
Christian Palestinian population is refusing to 
pay taxes to the Israeli Government which uses 
them to continue the military occupation. In 
Jerusalem, your Rapporteur was given a report 
entitled " Reporting harassment: Israeli restric-
tions of press freedom in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip" published by the Jerusalem Media 
and Communication Centre. The list of zones 
and towns which the military authorities have 
closed to the press is impressive. Between 9th 
December 1987 and 15th August 1989, ninety-
eight Palestinian journalists were arrested and 
imprisoned. Most recently, the number of Pales-
tinian demonstrations and deaths each day has 
risen considerably. Deteriorating living condi-
tions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank call 
for an increase in our countries' humanitarian 
assistance to the Palestinian people. 
34. Repression of the intifada has caused 
Israel to be criticised by world public opinion, 
governments and international organisations. 
Even the United States administration, a tradi-
tional ally of Israel, denounced the behaviour of 
forces of repression in the annual report on 
human rights violations in the world published 
by the State Department. On 6th October 1989, 
the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
yet another resolution condemning Israeli 
repression in the occupied territories. 
35. The intifada has already had considerable 
political repercussions which it will be difficult 
to reverse (quite apart from the results it 
achieves) in international diplomacy and the sit-
uation in Israel. For the first time it has made 
the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied terri-
tories the principal protagonist and not merely, 
as hitherto, the victim of the Middle East con-
flict. While it has shown Israel that there are no 
negotiating partners other than the PLO, it has 
also proved the vanity of attempts by the Arab 
camp, or part of it, to dominate the Palestinian 
movement and to speak in its name. It is cer-
tainly not by chance that, a few months after the 
intifada started, King Hussein gave up his 
administrative mandate and all responsibility 
for the West Bank and Egypt did likewise for the 
Gaza Strip. 
36. The intifada, a unified movement by the 
Palestinian people, capable of using relatively 
non-violent instruments in a major, prolonged 
mass struggle, carried decisive weight in solving 
the crisis in the Palestine Liberation Organ-
isation by shifting the balance in favour of the 
views long held by President Yasser Arafat for 
seeking a political solution to be negotiated with 
Israel in the framework and with the assistance 
of the Soviet Union, the United States, Europe 
and international diplomacy. 
37. The Palestinian National Council, which 
met in Algiers on 15th November 1988, con-
firmed a historic turning point in PLO policy 
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when it decided, by 83% of the votes (but also 
with an undertaking by those against to respect 
the decisions of the majority unless there were 
absolutely no political results), to proclaim a 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza ter-
ritories, with Jerusalem as capital, while 
accepting United Nations Resolutions 181 of 
194 7 (which, as Mr. Arafat said, was the birth 
certificate of both Israel and Palestine), 242 of 
1967 and 338 of 1973, confirming the condem-
nation of terrorism already proclaimed by 
Arafat in Cairo in October 1985 and accepting 
the Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation as a 
free, autonomous decision of the future Pales-
tinian state. 
38. In the meantime, the PLO has taken 
further steps towards detente with Mr. Arafat's 
speech at the United Nations special session in 
December 1988 and his press conference in 
Geneva on the same occasion. In Paris, on 3rd 
May 1989, he said the sections of the Palestinian 
National Charter approved in 1968 concerning 
the destruction of the state of Israel were null 
and void. Although critical, the PLO subse-
quently expressed no opposition of principle 
to the plan by the Israeli Prime Minister, 
Mr. Shamir, to hold elections in the occupied 
territories. By asking for explanations and 
changes, it showed that it was prepared to nego-
tiate, even on the limited, vague proposal made 
by the Israeli Government. 
39. The PLO's new policy was officially sanc-
tioned and unconditionally endorsed at the 
recent extraordinary Arab summit meeting in 
Casablanca from 23rd to 26th May 1989. Even 
countries like Syria, which had expressed reser-
vations and hostility in the past, admitted that 
the green light should be shown as soon as pos-
sible for the process leading to the convocation 
of an international conference on peace in the 
Near and Middle East, under the aegis of the 
United Nations Security Council. This summit 
meeting was a historic event of great importance 
with the return, as a full member, of Egypt, 
which had been expelled from the Arab League 
following the signing of the Camp David agree-
ments in 1979. Contemporary Egypt is a factor 
of stability and moderation in the Middle East. 
Together with the Soviet Union, the United 
States and a few European countries, Egypt has, 
in recent years, exercised a strong influence in 
the process leading to the PLO's recognition of 
the existence of the state of Israel through its 
acceptance of United Nations resolutions. The 
Arab summit meeting in Casablanca completed 
the political circle that started with the intifada 
and continued with the Palestinian National 
Council meeting in Algiers for honest, serious 
negotiations on the entire Arab-Israeli conflict. 
40. The intifada and its repression have had 
profound repercussions in Israel itself, and also 
on that country's image in the world, by 
arousing more widespread reactions and pro-
tests that may carry greater weight than those 
raised at the time by the Peace in Galilee oper-
ation that led to the invasion of Lebanon in 
1982. What is being questioned, not only in 
Israel but also in the communities of the 
diaspora and among American Jews, who have 
constantly been the main defenders of the state 
of Israel, is in fact its character as a democratic 
state based on respect for universally recognised 
and affirmed human rights thanks to the sac-
rifice of millions of Jews during the second 
world war. A dangerous process of radicalisation 
is under way in the country, both to the left and 
through the strengthening of the extreme right, 
determined to act on its own against the Pales-
tinians and prepared to accuse of treason politi-
cians and rulers showing signs of a minimum of 
willingness to negotiate. 
41. For the time being, there is no sign of a 
real opening in official Israeli positions. The 
moderation of the PLO and its condemnation of 
terrorism are seen as a ruse, hence the refusal to 
deal with " terrorists ". It is also said that Israel 
is not at war only with the Palestinians but with 
all the Arab countries which, except for Egypt, 
have never recognised it. Israel holds that the 
time is not yet ripe for the international peace 
conference and prefers direct talks. But with 
whom? The Jordanian option no longer exists 
since King Hussein closed that door. 
42. The legislative elections held in Israel in 
November 1988 reflected this situation. Great 
uncertainty now seems to prevail about the 
future prospects, as well as paralysis in face of 
current Arab-Palestinian deployment and pres-
sure from international diplomacy. Many agree 
that there is no military solution to the intifada 
but it is obviously hoped that it will die a natural 
death or degenerate in such a way as to arouse 
horror among world public opinion and justify 
more repressive, decisive interventions. The 
idea of Israel annexing the occupied territories is 
rejected since it would change the demographic 
balance between Arabs and Jews and hence the 
nature of the state, and it is realised that the 
international community would reject this idea, 
just as it would not accept the solution 
envisaged by the extreme Likud wing whereby 
Palestinians would be expelled from Gaza and 
the West Bank towards neighbouring Arab 
states. The main parties forming the fragile gov-
ernment coalition seem divided, not only among 
themselves (the Labour Party being more willing 
than the Likud to hold negotiations and make 
territorial concessions) but also within the 
parties, between the more moderate and more 
extreme wings. On the Palestinian question, the 
agreement in the Shamir-Peres government is 
based solely on the idea of elections in the 
occupied territories. Consequently, when the 
Israeli Prime Minister agreed to change his plan 
radically to meet the wishes of the right wing 
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of the Likud, the Labour Party threatened to 
bring about a government crisis. The fall of the 
ministry was avoided only because, bearing in 
mind pressure from the United States, too, 
Mr. Shamir confirmed the plan to hold elec-
tions in Gaza and the WeSt Bank. 
43. Your Rapporteur had many talks with 
parliamentarians from various Israeli parties in 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. He also had talks at the 
International Centre for peace in the Middle 
East, headed by Mr. Abba Eban, and the Jaffee 
Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of 
Tel Aviv and with leaders of the Palestinian 
movement in the occupied territories. Your 
Rapporteur wishes to point out two problems he 
considers important and which are part of the 
Israeli-Palestinian dispute. They will probably 
be of very great importance in the future negoti-
ations and probably require mutual concessions, 
a strong spirit of understanding between the 
negotiators and, above all, many international 
guarantees. 
44. The first question concerns the limit to 
the territorial concessions that those most in 
favour of negotiating with the Palestinians are 
prepared to make (and this does not include the 
Likud, which is now against the " land for 
peace " formula). Various Labour parliamen-
tarians, for instance, stressed the need, for a long 
time at least, for the strategic parts of the Pales-
tinian territories necessary for Israel's security 
to remain in Israeli hands. A better idea will be 
obtained of real intentions during the negotia-
tions. 
45. The second question concerns the right of 
Palestinians of the diaspora to return to Pal-
estine. Israel wants the PLO to renounce this 
claim. Your Rapporteur noted that the Israelis 
he spoke to had forgotten that this right was 
recognised in the Camp D~vid agreements for 
Palestinians who left the Gaza Strip or West 
Bank after the 1967 war. The Camp David 
agreements obviously do not imply a right to 
return for all those who fled after 1948 and took 
refuge in the territory attributed to Israel in 
United Nations Resolution 181. It therefore 
seems clear that, if the Palestinians are to be 
given a homeland and the existence and security 
of the state of Israel are to be safeguarded, equi-
table compromises will have to be sought in the 
context of the peace process. 
46. Your Rapporteur also wishes to point out 
the interest of the report published by the study 
group of the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies 
of the University of Tel Aviv entitled "Israel, 
the West Bank and Gaza: towards a solution". 
This report, which was also discussed at a 
special hearing of the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee of the United States Jfouse of Represen-
tatives, considers six options: 1. the status quo; 
2. the independence of the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank; 3. annexation of the <J>ccupied territories; 
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4. the Palestinian state; 5. withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip; 6. Jordano-Palestinian federation. 
The report concludes that none of these options 
is practicable or even desirable for Israel, but 
underlines that the worst imaginable situation is 
the continuation of the status quo and that Israel 
must accept a dialogue with the PLO to start 
serious negotiations. 
4 7. Israel is also being pushed into negotia-
tions by its ally and historic protector: the 
United States of America. With the Shultz plan, 
American attempts to solve the Middle East 
problem were resumed, although with great 
caution and circumspection. Now, as in the past, 
this initiative is decisive. After the failure of the 
Reagan plan in 1982 and Lebanon's refusal to 
ratify the separate treaty between Israel and 
Lebanon, drawn up jointly with the United 
States mediator, Philip Habib, there was a long 
period of stagnation in American policy in the 
Middle East, perhaps too because of the negative 
effects in the Arab world of the military opera-
tions against Libya and the Irangate revelations. 
The Middle East has not been discussed at the 
frequent summit meetings with the Soviet 
Union that were a feature of President Reagan's 
second term of office, although the foundations 
were laid for a solution to many other regional 
issues. The United States initiative was resumed 
in March 1988 with what is known as the Shultz 
plan (in reality, it was a letter from the Secretary 
of State to Mr. Shamir, Israeli Prime Minister, 
and the leaders of the Arab countries) that many 
consider to be a direct consequence of the 
intifada. 
48. The Shultz plan, rejected by Mr. Shamir, 
while providing for the opening of negotiations 
between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian dele-
gation with United States participation, on the 
basis of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 
338, set the talks in the context of an interna-
tional conference with the participation of all 
the parties concerned, the PLO being neither 
included nor excluded. The United States has 
thus started to lift its earlier, long-standing reser-
vations about the convocation of an interna-
tional conference, while voting against United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 431176. 
Following Mr. Shamir's refusal, the United 
States shelved the Shultz plan. Discussion is 
now concentrated on the Israeli May 1989 plan 
for holding elections in Gaza and the West 
Bank. 
49. Other positions are to be adopted by Pres-
ident Bush and Secretary of State Baker in the 
course of the year, particularly regarding inter-
national guarantees for the elections in the 
occupied territories, reopening Palestinian 
schools, opposing the expulsion of Palestinians 
and bringing to a halt Israeli colonisation in 
Gaza and the West Bank. The most significant 
innovation in American Middle East policy is 
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the resumption of official relations with the 
PLO that had been suspended in 1973 and the 
undertaking to hold substantial talks with it. 
Although, for the time being, the Tunis talks 
between the two parties have produced no 
visible results, there is nevertheless a new 
balance in relations that is necessary for the 
success of the United States initiative in the 
Middle East. 
50. It is significant that relations between the 
United States and the PLO were restored thanks 
to mediation involving the Swedish Gov-
ernment, President Mubarak of Egypt and a 
large American Jewish delegation linked with 
the International Centre for Peace in the Middle 
East founded by Mr. Abba Eban in TelA viv. As 
a result of the intifada and its repression, shown 
in televised news programmes in American 
homes, the Jewish community in the United 
States, the most powerful in the. world, 
underwent a process of polarisation similar to 
that which occurred in Israel and Jewish 
organisations in the United States have brought 
pressure to bear on the Israeli Government to 
accept the Shultz plan. 
51. When forming an opinion on the United 
States' attitude towards Israel, account must 
also be taken of the reasons for the friction that 
occurred, first of all when the Likud wished to 
bury the Shamir plan for elections in the 
occupied territories and then when the United 
States felt that the kidnapping of Sheik Obeid by 
the Israelis was endangering the lives of the 
American hostages held by Lebanese Islamic 
extremists. American criticism of the Israeli 
Government has not, for the time being at least, 
had any great impact on the United States' 
firmly-based privileged relationship with 
Israel. 
52. In regard to the future of American policy 
in the Middle East, account also has to be taken 
of the growing influence on American public 
opinion of organisations grouping American 
nationals of Arab Palestinian origin and, in par-
ticular, the role played in American universities 
by professors and intellectuals belonging to 
those organisations. It is certainly not by chance 
that the PLO proposed including in its dele-
gation to discuss the matter of elections in the 
occupied territories a few American citizens of 
Palestinian origin who are members of its 
National Council. Although this community, 
which might form a new lobby, has for the time 
being little influence on United States foreign 
policy, what may, conversely, have major reper-
cussions is the cohesion with the PLO that was 
shown at the Arab summit meeting in Casa-
blanca and the increasing activity of moderate 
Arab countries such as Egypt. United States 
policy in the Middle East will also have to take 
account of Soviet diplomatic action in the 
region. 
53. Having freed itself of the handicap of its 
military invasion of Afghanistan, which had lost 
it the sympathy and support of the Islamic world 
and reduced it to a marginal role among the 
Arab countries in that area, the Soviet Union 
has started to make its presence felt in the 
Middle East. Already, by pursuing, under the 
leadership of President Gorbachev, a policy 
showing more respect for human rights for its 
citizens and hence for Soviet Jews, the Soviet 
Government has drawn closer to the state of 
Israel in recent years. This has not yet led to the 
restoration of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries, broken off by the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war. The Israeli Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Arens, recently deplored the fact 
that the normalisation of relations between the 
two countries was not advancing at the nec-
essary rate. For the time being, the Soviet Union 
apparently links any further progress in this 
direction with Israel's acceptance of the interna-
tional peace conference and the start of a dia-
logue with the PLO. It is possible, however, that 
this condition will be lifted to correspond with 
the raising of the level of talks between the 
United States and the PLO or even indepen-
dently of that. 
54. Since the beginning of 1989, Soviet 
diplomacy has been actively proposing mod-
erate compromise aims in the problem of the 
hostages and that of Lebanon, by exercising dis-
creet pressure on both Syria, its traditional ally 
in the region, and Iran, with which relations 
returned to normal following President Rafsan-
jani's visit to Moscow. The Soviet Union seems 
particularly concerned at the militarisation of 
the Middle East. Deputy Soviet Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs travel frequently in the region 
and the visit by the Soviet Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to Damascus, Amman and Cairo in Feb-
ruary 1989, when he also met the Israeli Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arens, was of par-
ticular importance. 
55. Mr. Shevardnadze's speech to the 
Egyptian Parliament on 23rd February is con-
sidered in many diplomatic circles to have been 
the fullest expression of the " pragmatic turning 
point" in Soviet Middle East policy. The Soviet 
Union is counting mainly on the role of the 
international peace conference and the medi-
ation of the United Nations Security Council 
which it has asked to appoint a special envoy to 
the Middle East. 
56. Particularly significant was Mr. Shevard-
nadze's statement that: 
" We welcome the development of the 
Middle East's states' contacts with the 
European Community and with the 
United States of America. In these ques-
tions the Soviet Union stands for elimi-
nating any competition among the great 
powers. It is necessary to renounce the 
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policy of ousting one another from the 
area, and to switch over to constructive 
co-operation in the J!:lame of peace and 
tranquillity in the Middle East. " 
57. In the 1980 Venice declaration, referring 
to common interests and tmditional links with 
the Middle East, the European Community 
placed its peace-keeping action in the region on 
a basis of sound principles. The then nine 
member countries of the Community were the 
first in the western world to assert that the Pales-
tinian problem was not just one of refugees and 
that, in accordance with an appropriate process 
defined in the framework of a global peace set-
tlement, the Palestinian people must be placed 
in a position where they can exercise in full their 
right to self-determination and the PLO must be 
associated with the negotiations. The nine 
European Community countries considered 
that: 
" The time has come to promote recog-
nition and implementation of the two 
principles universally accepted by the 
international community: the right to 
existence and security of all the states in 
the region, including Israel, and justice for 
all the peoples, which implies the recog-
nition of the legitimatt rights of the Pales-
tinian people. " 
The importance and novelty of the Venice decla-
ration were not denied by Mr. Arafat's state-
ments in subsequent years that the Venice decla-
ration was certainly an important approach but 
not yet an initiative. Like the United States, the 
European Community missed a favourable 
opportunity -the Arab summit meeting in Fez 
in 1982 which produced the Fahd plan in which, 
although indirectly, the Arab countries for the 
first time recognised, in an official text, the state 
of Israel's right to exist. 
58. However, that very year the European 
Community seemed particularly involved in the 
Lebanese affair, with the presence of troops 
from three member countriies in the multina-
tional buffer force which was intended to stop 
the occupation of the country. Community 
summit meetings and political co-operation 
meetings (which have greater authority since the 
Single European Act started to be implemented) 
have since expressed the European Commu-
nity's positions and proposals on specific devel-
opments in the Middle East, while remaining in 
contact with all the parties concerned. The 
recent Paris meeting took humanitarian initia-
tives in favour of the Lebanese population and 
gave full support to the tripartite committee 
which the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca 
instructed to promote an immediate cease-fire 
and draw up a new national pact for Lebanon. 
At the recent summit meeting of heads of state 
or of government of the twelve European Com-
munity countries in Madrid, a declaration was 
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approved on the Middle East which updated the 
principles laid down in Venice and added con-
siderable detail to the European Community's 
position. 
59. After noting the positive trend of the 
PLO's position and the importance of the Arab 
summit meeting in Casablanca and calling for 
the human rights of the population of the 
occupied territories to be respected, the nec-
essary guarantees for holding free elections in 
Gaza and the West Bank were described. 
V. The international conference on peace 
in the Near and Middle East 
called for by the United Nations 
General Assembly 
60. The European Community attaches very 
great importance to the creation of favourable 
conditions for holding an international peace 
conference under the aegis of the United 
Nations, the appropriate forum for direct nego-
tiations between the parties concerned with a 
view to a global, fair and lasting settlement. In 
regard to the international conference on peace 
in the Middle East, it should be pointed out 
immediately that the need to convene it in the 
near future is now recognised by international 
diplomacy as a whole and by all the countries in 
the region except Israel and Iran. 
61. The idea of convening an international 
conference on peace in the Middle East has 
existed for a long time. It was decided on first by 
the United Nations, which attributed the chair-
manship to the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The United States Secretary of State and 
the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs were to 
meet in Geneva and had even decided on the 
date of their meeting. The Camp David agree-
ments, signed a month earlier than expected, 
and then the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan and the period of the " new cold 
war" lasting until the mid-1980s brought all 
negotiations to a halt. 
62. It was the President of the French Repu-
blic, Fran<;ois Mitterrand, who subsequently 
revived this proposal and soon obtained the 
support of the Soviet Union. For some time 
further, the idea was opposed by Israel, several 
Arab countries, including Libya and Syria, and 
cold-shouldered by the United States. In 1988, 
the situation altered due to the positive change 
in the atmosphere between the superpowers, the 
start of the intifada and pressure from many 
international diplomatic circles. On 4th March 
1988, in a letter to the Israeli Prime Minister, 
Mr. Shultz, the United States Secretary of State, 
after proposing negotiations between Israel and 
a Jordano-Palestinian delegation, wrote: "Two 
weeks before the opening of negotiations, an 
international conference will be held. The Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations will be asked 
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to issue invitations to the parties involved in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the five permanent 
members of the United Nations Security 
Council. All participants in the conference must 
accept United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338, and renounce violence and 
terrorism. The parties to each bilateral negoti-
ation may refer reports on the status of their 
negotiations to the conference, in a manner to 
be agreed. The conference will not be able to 
impose solutions or veto agreements reached. " 
63. On 15th December 1988, with its Reso-
lution 431176, the United Nations General 
Assembly decided to convene the international 
conference on peace in the Middle East with the 
participation of all the parties concerned and the 
five permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council. Since then, there have been a 
very large number of statements favourable to 
the conference from international and regional 
organisations: the European Council of the 
European Community, the European Par-
liament, the Council of Europe, the summit 
meeting of non-aligned countries and the Inter-
national Co-ordinating Committee of Non-
Governmental Organisations. The fact that the 
extraordinary Arab summit meeting held in 
Casablanca on 26th May 1989 subscribed to the 
international peace conference is of particular 
significance since it marked the end of all oppo-
sition to the conference among the Arab 
states. 
64. In Bangkok in October 1987, the Inter-
Parliamentary Union set up an ad hoc com-
mittee in support of the international conference 
and launched a campaign for its convocation 
which was subscribed to by the parliaments of 
almost all the countries of the world. Iran and 
Israel were exceptions. The national group of the 
parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
wrote:" All recent attempts to convene an inter-
national conference on peace in the Middle East 
aimed at reconciling all the parties concerned 
and Israel have the same aim: the security and 
stability of Israel. " For its part, the Israeli 
interparliamentary group held that: " Everyone 
knows these Arab states are deluding themselves 
that an international conference will, on the one 
hand, solve the problem they would have in 
sitting at the same table as Israel and treating it 
as an equal and, on the other hand, offer them 
an imposed settlement which will satisfy their 
every wish. " 
65. Nevertheless, the letter from the Israeli 
interparliamentary group went on to assert: " It 
is one thing to hold a conference to ratify agree-
ments reached during negotiations, but it is 
another thing to use a conference as a stick for 
obtaining what one would never have obtained 
otherwise. " Your Rapporteur was told many 
times during his visit to Israel that, since Israel 
must sign peace agreements with the Arab coun-
tries with which it is still at war, its government 
does not wish the content of these agreements to 
be imposed on it by the permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council. However, 
between the simple ratification of agreements 
already concluded and the imposition of a 
solution, there are many other possibilities. 
66. It is not an idea of imposition that 
emerges from Mr. Shultz's letter referred to 
above. Moreover, in his speech in Cairo - as can 
be clearly seen from the extracts given at 
appendix to this report - Mr. Shevardnadze pro-
posed a very flexible structure for the interna-
tional conference, with a clause allowing the 
bilateral stages and multilateral stages of the 
negotiations in the framework of the conference 
itself to alternate so as to ensure the success of 
the whole. Your Rapporteur has ascertained that 
Israel has taken note of these proposals but 
remains hostile. 
67. It is therefore necessary to increase inter-
national pressure, but also for ideas on the way 
the international conference should proceed to 
be made clear so as to overcome fears. Ideo-
logical opposition in countries whose active, 
constructive participation in the conference is 
essential must also be overcome. The interna-
tional conference on peace in the Middle East 
could not start without Israel, which must first 
start a dialogue with the Palestinians and their 
representative, the PLO. 
VI. Present prospects of the Shamir plan 
and President Mubarak's ten points 
68. An opportunity for a dialogue may result 
from the Israeli Government's plan for elections 
in the occupied territories if it agrees to nego-
tiate with the Palestinians. This is the aim of the 
Egyptian President's ten points. During your 
Rapporteur's visit to Israel, there were very 
interesting developments in President Mubarak's 
initiative. The Egyptian President specified that 
his ten points were not a new plan but an 
integral part of the Israeli initiative to hold elec-
tions in Gaza and the West Bank. He invited the 
Israeli Minister of Defence, Mr. Rabin, to Cairo, 
and Mr. Rabin agreed to President Mubarak's 
proposals. They both agreed that the Palestinian 
delegation which should take part in the negotia-
tions on the purpose and methods of the elec-
tions would also include politicians now outside 
the occupied territories. 
69. These facts had an immediate impact in 
the Israeli Government and Parliament. The 
Ma'arach Labour Party was reunited in 
approving Mr. Rabin's position. The reaction of 
Mr. Shamir and his Likud Party was negative. 
They rejected three of President Mubarak's ten 
points, i.e. the participation in the negotiations 
of Palestinians from outside, the participation of 
Arabs from Jerusalem in the vote and the land 
for peace formula. 
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70. The Palestinian views your Rapporteur 
heard contained criticism df the Mubarak plan, 
not for what it contained but for what was 
missing, i.e. the Palestinians' right to self-
determination. Above all, your Rapporteur had 
the impression that they were awaiting an 
official PLO position on the matter. But the two 
persons he spoke to with the most prestige inside 
or outside the Palestinian territories were in 
favour of the PLO going to! Cairo for talks with 
the Israeli Government, as President Mubarak 
had asked. They believed that it was decisive for 
a dialogue to be started, even if the starting 
points were somewhat incompatible. The rest 
would follow. 
71. Your Rapporteur endorses this opinion. 
There will never be an international conference 
on peace in the Middle East or an acceptable 
solution to the conflict if the Israelis and the Pal-
estinians do not start to speak to each other. It 
would really be a pity if the opportunity that 
now exists were to be lost. Time is not on the 
side of peace since the situation is deteriorating 
both in Israel and in the West Bank and 
Gaza. 
72. Unfortunately, after the talks between the 
United States and Egypt in Washington and 
New York on the occasion of the annual session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, the 
Israeli Government rejected President 
Mubarak's ten points. DisaJ>pointment was very 
great throughout the world and particularly in 
Western Europe. Our governments and parlia-
ments had readily endorsed President Mubarak's 
ten points. The most moderate leaders among 
the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip have rejected the Israeli Government's 
claim to decide the compqsition of the Pales-
tinian delegation and to exclude the PLO from 
the talks on elections. 
73. The United States Secretary of State has 
made new proposals: 1. Israel must give its 
agreement to negotiating with the Palestinians; 
2. Egypt must consult the Palestinians before 
they form their delegation to the talks; 3. Israel 
will take part only if it is satisfied with the com-
position of the Palestinian delegation; 4. the 
talks will concern elections in the occupied terri-
tories; 5. Israel will submit its plan for the elec-
tions but the Palestinians may raise any matter 
at all linked with the peace process. The United 
States would be the guarantors of this process, 
which should start with the formation of three 
working groups, Egyptian, Palestinian and 
Israeli respectively. Mr. Sharon, Mr. Modai and 
Mr. Levy, who form the right wing of the Likud, 
have announced that they will ask the party's 
central committee to reject Mr. Baker's pro-
posals. Furthermore, Mr. Baker's proposals were 
rejected by the Central Council of the PLO, 
meeting in Baghdad. After an exchange of decla-
rations by Mr. Shamir that were highly critical 
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of the United States and American answers 
intended to reassure its ally, consultations are 
now under way between the Israeli Government 
and the United States administration. 
74. The Labour Party intends to support 
Mr. Baker's proposals just as it had expressed its 
agreement with President Mubarak's ten points. 
It is not for us to interfere in Israel's internal 
policy or to anticipate developments pointing to 
a cabinet crisis and further elections of which 
there is, moreover, much talk in Israel. Our 
duty, which we must not shirk, is to say clearly 
that West ern Europe urges Israel to abandon the 
policy of refusal and at last show itself open to 
negotiations with the Palestinians and dialogue 
with the PLO. Your Rapporteur considers it 
would be useful at the same time to ask the PLO 
and Israel's neighbouring Arab states to exercise 
their influence and vigilance in halting infiltra-
tions of armed groups into Israeli territory. 
VII. The Middle East and European security 
75. Everyone acknowledges that the explosive 
situation in the Near and Middle East, in par-
ticular in the Mediterranean area, is a direct 
threat to European security. The final document 
of the conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe, issued in Vienna on 19th February 
1989, sets out this concept very clearly: 
" (The participating states) reiterate their 
conviction that security in Europe is to be 
considered in the broader context of 
world security and is closely linked with 
security in the Mediterranean area as a 
whole, and that accordingly the process of 
improving security should not be con-
fined to Europe but should extend to 
other parts of the world, and in particular 
to the Mediterranean area. " 
76. Over the years, fighting in the Near and 
Middle East have had serious, dramatic reper-
cussions on the security of the Western 
European countries and their citizens. The 
danger was first perceived to relate to the 
security, regularity and continuity of oil supplies 
from the Middle East, vital for the economies of 
the Western European countries. But in this 
respect Europe's security has never been seri-
ously threatened. Conversely, other threats have 
emerged. As from 1967, the European capitals 
became the theatre for action and intrigue by 
Near and Middle Eastern secret services, with 
political assassinations and the first terrorist 
operations. These became particularly serious 
fifteen years later with attacks on the security of 
shipping and aircraft, massacres in airports, the 
hijacking of aircraft and ships and the taking of 
hostages. Although it cannot now be said that 
such phenomena have completely disappeared, 
they are nevertheless clearly on the decline. 
However, faced with a worsening of the situ-
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ation in Lebanon and in the absence of a 
solution to the Palestinian problem, they may 
re-emerge on a large scale. The warning by Pres-
ident Mubarak of Egypt should be taken very 
seriously. At a meeting with the group for 
contact with the Near and Middle East of the 
Political Committee of the Council of Europe, 
he described the future risk as follows: " Should 
the courageous plan of Arafat and the moderates 
fail, the PLO would break up into terrorist 
groups which would fight against American and 
Israeli interests, particularly in Europe. " 
77. Lebanon, whose territory, because of 
clashes between opposing militias and terrorist 
groups, has also become a sort of world super-
market for weapons of all kinds, is also one of 
the main routes for drugs on their way to 
Western Europe. The exchange of arms for 
drugs, the swarm of traffickers of all kinds and 
the increasingly close link, because of this 
traffic, between terrorist groups and organised 
crime in Western European countries is 
becoming more and more clear. 
78. Particularly since the proclamation of the 
Islamic Republic in Iran, Western European 
public opinion has perceived the risk of the 
Islamic revolution being exported throughout 
the Near and Middle East, with repercussions 
for Europe itself, and the spread of fundamen-
talism. In Israel, too, this phenomenon is 
evident in terms of greater activism and elec-
toral influence by extremist religious groups. 
The condemnation to death of the Anglo-Indian 
writer Salman Rushdie was particularly startling 
because it was pronounced by the heads of a 
state. This must not make us forget a series of 
other facts involving protagonists other than 
Iranian exponents of the export of the Islamic 
revolution and which have led to bloodshed in 
Arab and Moslem countries. Attacks on military 
establishments in Syria and Egypt, the assassi-
nation of Sadat, the overthrow of Numeiry, 
repeated episodes in the armed struggle against 
the Syrian regime, bloody skirmishes in Mecca 
and systematic attacks on symbols of western 
luxury and corruption are all facts that can fit 
into a vast strategic plan by Moslem fundamen-
talist groups to gain power, although it is not out 
of the question that, in turn, other mutually 
hostile factions or states may have used such 
methods, which is fairly easy in the complex 
religious and ethnic mosaic of the Near and 
Middle East. 
79. Attention should be paid to the fact that 
the underlying reason for revolts and popular 
uprisings (recently in Algeria and Jordan) is to 
be found in the conditions and intolerably low 
standard of living of large sectors of the popu-
lation. 
80. This economic situation is growing worse 
throughout the region, with the apparent 
exception of Syria, which derived some advan-
tages from its relations with Iran during the Gulf 
war. The economic situation has deteriorated in 
the occupied territories and Israel because of the 
intifada and its repression. (According to a 
member of the Israeli Government, the cost of 
the intifada in 1988, including the cost of mil-
itary mobilisation and the fall in tourism, is esti-
mated at $666 million.) 
81. In Egypt, too, there seems to be a risk of 
popular uprisings similar to those which have 
occurred in Algeria and Jordan. According to 
SIPRI's 1987 report, the economy there failed to 
achieve positive results, the overall GDP 
dropping by 1.5%. Iraq's foreign debt is esti-
mated at $70 000 million. 
82. Increasing demographic pressure has 
revealed that disastrous forecasts of the pros-
pects of the developed countries should the 
trend of economic relations between the 
northern and southern halves of the world not 
be reversed concern first and foremost Western 
Europe. The Near and Middle East and Africa 
are the parts of the so-called South that are 
closest to Europe and steady flows of migrants, 
both legal and clandestine, are already streaming 
into our countries. Looking ahead, the deterio-
rating living conditions of millions of people in 
the Near and Middle East is the most serious 
danger for Western European security. 
VIII. Overarmament in the Middle East, 
European security and the role of WEU 
83. The question of European security must 
henceforth also be measured against the 
imposing military systems that exist in the Near 
and Middle East, which appear increasingly out 
of proportion and threatening as the arms 
control and reduction agreements between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact progress in Europe. 
Furthermore, the situation in the Near and 
Middle East and the concentration of arms in 
the region might stand in the way of the process 
of disarmament and international detente. The 
first signs that difficulties relating to the Near 
and Middle East are arising and affecting the 
disarmament agreements, already so compli-
cated and difficult, emerged at the international 
conference on banning the production of 
chemical weapons held in Paris early in 1989. 
84. Iran accused Iraq of using chemical 
weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabja, 
causing 10 000 civilian casualties, but, according 
to United Nations sources, the Iranians, too, 
used toxic gas during the war. Israel asserts that 
there are chemical arms production plants in 
Damascus and Samarra (Iraq), and Kuwait has 
accused the Israeli army of using toxic gas 
against Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
Iraq seems hostile to the signing of a further 
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chemical arms treaty, while many Arab coun-
tries apparently connect a ban on such weapons 
with the simultaneous destruction of Israel's 
nuclear potential. 
85. Everyone knows the United States' 
concern about the reported use of chemical 
weapons in the Middle East. In a speech to the 
Washington Institute for the Middle East at Wye 
Plantation, Maryland, on 16th September 1988, 
published by the State Department under the 
title " The administration's approach to Middle 
East peace making ", the former Secretary of 
State, Mr. Shultz, recalled that ballistic missiles 
and chemical weapons were still proliferating. 
The use of chemical weapons by both parties to 
the Gulf war and by Iraq against the Kurds 
shows the danger of these arms for the conduct 
of international relations. The United States has 
also denounced the probable building of a 
chemical weapons factory in Libya. 
86. In his speech in Cairo, Mr. Shevardnadze, 
Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, also 
denounced the arrival in the Near and Middle 
East of weapons that NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact are in the process of banning, and he gave a 
few impressive figures relating to a military 
potential quite out of proportion with the eco-
nomic and demographic importance of that 
region: military expenditure of $59 000 million 
in 19 8 7, $600 000 million in the last ten years, 
25 000 battle tanks, 4 000 fighter aircraft, 5 mil-
lion men in the armed forces and 2 million 
reservists. 
87. If these figures are compared with the pro-
posals for arms reductions made by NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact at the current Vienna con-
ference, it can be seen that the military potential 
in that part of the world will in many respects be 
superior (number of men in the armed forces), 
almost equal (fighter aircraft, excluding heli-
copters) or not greatly inferior (battle tanks) to 
that of Europe from the Atlantic to the U rals if a 
similar process is not initiated in the Middle 
East. 
88. The magnitude of the arms race in the 
region is also confirmed by very diverse sources. 
In the book " The Middle East Military Balance 
1987-1988 ", published by the Jerusalem Post 
and the West View press, an analysis is made of 
the imposing military means deployed in the 
Middle East. During your Rapporteur's visit to 
Israel, experts on armaments questions men-
tioned recent progress in the range of Israeli mis-
siles and those of the Arab states, be they of 
western, Soviet or Chinese origin. According to 
press estimates, the 1988 report of the Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London will show, on the 
one hand, strategic parity between the two mil-
itary blocs and the diminishing material possi-
bility of a suprise attack in Europe and, on the 
other, the fact that surface-to-surface missiles 
and chemical weapons are in the process of 
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filling the arsenals of " hot spots " such as the 
Middle East. 
89. The arms race is continuing and even 
accelerating in the Middle East in spite of the 
cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and the fall in 
income from oil sales, certain countries' 
~no~ous. international debts, galloping 
mflat10n m others, economic recession in still 
others and the fall in the standard of living of 
the people almost everywhere in the region. It is 
therefore very important to repeat here the 
exhortation to the third-world countries to use 
their meagre resources for essential civil invest-
ments and not overarmament, making the 
adoption of such conduct one ofthe factors to be 
considered when granting debt relief and devel-
opment assistance and also to promote 
democracy in the third-world countries so as to 
ensure respect for human rights and sound 
social and environmental policies, thus helping 
to avoid militarisation 2• 
90. Recent revelations about the activities of 
an American subsidiary of an Italian bank and 
about the important role western firms and tech-
nicians are playing in pursuing the plan by 
Argentina, Egypt and Iraq to develop the 
Condor 11 missile with a range of about 800 km 
increase our concern in spite of the fact that the 
State Department of the United States recently 
announced that Egypt had withdrawn from this 
project. Furthermore, SIPRI's 1988 report refers 
to Israeli progress in developing the Jericho 11 
missile with a range of about 1 200 km. The 
missile was apparently tested successfully at the 
beginning of September 1989. 
91. At the beginning of the present session of 
!he United Nations General Assembly, the Pres-
Ident of the United States, Mr. Bush and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet 
Union, Mr. Shevardnadze, announced their will-
ingness to renounce chemical weapons unilat-
erally to facilitate the early conclusion of negoti-
ations on banning this type of weapon 
!hr~ughout the ~orld. It will be necessary to 
ms1st on .the new. mternational treaty containing 
very stnct, venfiable standards to avoid a 
number of countries circumscribing the diffi-
culty as was the case with the treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact that 
Israel has nuclear weapons worries the Arab 
countries, increases their participation in the 
arms race, particularly in chemical weapons, 
and affects the Palestinians in the occupied ter-
ritories. At the Paris conference on chemical 
weapons, the Syrian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Farouk al Shara, proposed the cre-
ation of a zone in the Near and Middle East that 
would be free of weapons of mass destruction. In 
2. Cf. Resolution 92.8 on the arms trade and human rights 
adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe on 27th September 1983 on a report by our col-
league, Mr. Speed. 
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this connection, one may endorse the opinion 
expressed in the 1988 SIPRI report published in 
Stockholm that the establishment of a nuclear-
weapon-free zone in the Middle East had been 
proposed many times in recent years but could 
be achieved only in the framework of a general 
political settlement in the Middle East and the 
ensuing significant reduction in all categories of 
weapons. However, your Rapporteur considers 
that even the start of a process of reducing arms 
must be part of the proposal for a political set-
tlement of Middle East problems and that WEU 
has a significant role to play, particularly for this 
task. 
92. On several occasions, the Assembly has 
asked the Council to extend its consultations to 
cover arms exports. The scandal which broke 
out at the beginning of September 1989 when it 
was realised that Iraq had set up an 
organisation, largely financed by European 
b~nks, to purchase, through special agreements 
with Western European countries or firms, the 
components and technology it needed to manu-
facture sophisticated weapons - alone or in 
co-operation with other countries in the region 
such as Egypt, or Latin American countries such 
as Argentina - including medium-range missiles 
that could carry conventional, chemical or even 
nuclear warheads, should draw the governments' 
attention to the danger of the incoherent deci-
sions ta~en by each of them in military 
co-operat10n matters. If it proves impossible to 
reach global understanding as the Community 
managed to do in February 1989 in regard to 
chemical substances that could be used to 
produce weapons, it is essential for there to be 
consultations to ensure that Europe does not 
become responsible for a further build-up of 
armaments by the Near and Middle Eastern 
countries. 
93. According to information that your 
~ap~orteur obta~ned from Israeli sources during 
h1s VISit, the Soviet Union recently sold modern 
aircraft to Syria and Libya and the United States 
did likewise to Saudi Arabia. It should be added 
th.at the .1! nited States provides the Israeli army 
with m1htary technology and financial assis-
tance, Israel being in turn an arms producer and 
exporter. But, since the two great powers can 
now clearly see that transfers of arms and mil-
itary techno~ogy in the region are constituting 
the ~!lost senous threat to world peace, it seems 
possible for WEU to discuss with the United 
States and the Soviet Union the possibility of an 
agreement designed first and foremost to freeze 
the militarisation of the region. WEU should 
als~ approach all the governments in the region 
~skmg them to agree to freeze their present mil-
Itary potential with a view to a political set-
tle!llent of the conflicts causing bloodshed in the 
Middle East and to the international peace con-
ference decided upon by the United Nations 
General Assembly. 
94. Within WEU's specific field, European 
action to promote the restoration of peace in the 
Middle East might be envisaged if the nine gov-
ernments consented, as they did when freedom 
of navigation in the Gulf had to be safeguarded, 
to concert their policies in the region, i.e. to sac-
rifice a few immediate benefits to a more rea-
sonable view of Europe's true interests which, in 
the long run, are also theirs. 
95. Secondly, Europe as an entity seems 
better placed than any individual European 
country to be present militarily to facilitate the 
application of United Nations decisions or 
cease-fire agreements or, again, to allow human-
itarian operations for the benefit of the civilian 
population, because Europe cannot be suspected 
of having ulterior motives in regard to certain 
countries in the region. It is therefore important 
for the WEU Council to be duly informed of any 
initiatives its members may have to take in this 
respect. 
IX. Western Europe's role in seeking a solution 
to the conflict in the Near and Middle East 
96. The fact that the Council's reply to Rec-
ommendation 4 72 recognises the Assembly's 
right to call for reports on the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is 
done outside the framework of WEU, and that 
the modified Brussels Treaty makes the WEU 
Council responsible for examining threats to 
international peace in the Near and Middle East 
gives your Rapporteur an opportunity to express 
a few views on action that might be taken by the 
European institutions as a whole to promote 
peace in the Middle East. 
97. At the present time, the Assembly is the 
last of the European parliamentary assemblies to 
express its opinion on the Middle East. On 12th 
October, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution on the Middle East, the spirit and 
concrete proposals of which your Rapporteur 
approves. On 22nd September, the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
adopted Resolution 923 on a report by our col-
league, Mr. Fourre. This report was prepared 
with a visit by the Political Committee of the 
Council of Europe to all the Middle East capitals 
and an enlarged meeting of the same committee 
attended by representatives of Israel, the PLO, 
several Arab countries and the Soviet Union. 
This important work was followed directly and 
indirectly by your Rapporteur who thus 
gathered many useful ideas for his own work. 
On the whole, it can be said that a common view 
emerges from the three assemblies of the situ-
ation in the Middle East and the role that can be 
played there by Western Europe. Our govern-
ments, which belong to WEU, the Council of 
Europe and the European Community, can find 
some useful pointers there for their action. 
159 
DOCUMENT 1202 
98. Western Europe can now play an increas-
ingly incisive, independent role because the con-
flict in the Near and Middle East is becoming 
less of an East-West conffrontation and the 
position of the Palestinians and the Arab coun-
tries is evolving towards recognition of Israel 
and direct multilateral negotiations in the 
framework of an international conference under 
the aegis of the United Nations. It can assume 
greater responsibility in seeking a fair and 
lasting solution to the Near and Middle East 
conflict by helping, together with the United 
States and the Soviet U niom, to offer the nec-
essary military, economic, social and legal guar-
antees to all the parties concerned and to 
strengthen the role and prestige of the United 
Nations. 
99. Thanks to the positions it has adopted 
over the years, and again recently in regard to 
the tragic events in Beirut, and also to the 
attention it has paid to any chance, however 
slight, of evolution between the parties to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Western Europe and 
its institutions can act as a mediator, listened to 
increasingly by the factions involved, the 
various ethnic and religious communities, the 
people and states in the Near and Middle East. 
100. While it seems impossible to ask the Pal-
estinians and Arabs to make further concessions 
in view of Israel's refusal to start a dialogue and 
hold negotiations, it seems clear that the 
European Community's main effort must be 
directed towards helping Israel to overcome its 
fears and contradictions now that its failure to 
repress the revolt by the Palestinian people is 
clearly proving that security sought by occu-
pying other people's territories is a myth. 
101. To smooth the path for the international 
conference on peace in the· Middle East, the 
United Nations General Assembly should be 
asked no longer to equate Zionism with racism 
as in one of its resolutions a few years ago. At 
the same time, the United Nations Security 
Council might be asked to adopt a resolution on 
the Palestinians' right to self-determination 
which has been affirmed several times by the 
General Assembly but never by the Security 
Council. 
102. The declaration issued after the recent 
Madrid summit meeting indicates that the Com-
munity countries are quite prepared, at every 
stage, to take any steps that prove necessary to 
initiate, implement and verify any agreements 
concluded, acting in the framework and under 
the responsibility of the United Nations. 
Western Europe can thus help all the member 
countries of the United Nations to guarantee 
that security is ensured in all states of the region, 
including Israel and the state that will emerge 
when the Palestinians exercise their right to self-
determination. 
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103. The very existence of the European Com-
munity, the originality of its institutions, the 
current process of transforming it into a real 
European union, its prestige and its economic 
potential, mean that, once peace has been 
restored in the Near and Middle East, it can 
expect to make a specific contribution to 
security extending well beyond military security. 
104. The Italian Chamber of Deputies recently 
adopted, almost unanimously, a resolution 
urging the government " to explore with its 
European partners the possibility of the EEC 
playing a more active role in solving the conflict, 
subject to the principle of it being possible sub-
sequently to enlarge the EEC to include the 
states of Israel and Palestine in forms and in 
conditions acceptable to all the parties con-
cerned and to offer its good offices for 
organising the region on a permanent basis, also 
by opening up the Community in the 
abovementioned direction". Nor must it be for-
gotten that there are already association and 
trade treaties between the EEC and Israel and 
between the EEC and several Arab countries in 
the region. 
105. Political observers in other European 
Community countries have borne in mind the 
need for a sort of Marshall plan, initiated by 
Western Europe, to rebuild Lebanon and for 
Palestine and Israel. In Israel, too, consideration 
is being given to various forms of integration 
between countries so as to attenuate the possible 
effects of the emergence of new sovereignties 
along its frontiers. 
106. In this effort, the European Community, 
which already has means of co-operation with 
Israel and the Arab countries in various areas, 
can take into consideration the bodies for 
co-operation already existing in the region, i.e. 
the Maghreb Union (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya), the Gulf Co-operation Council and the 
new association between Iraq, Jordan, North 
Yemen and Egypt. As can be seen, Israel and 
Syria (which is nevertheless a member of the 
Arab League) are not included in any regional 
co-operation framework. Efforts by Western 
European countries should try to help these two 
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countries to emerge from their isolation in the 
Middle East. 
107. Of course, none of the abovementioned 
hypotheses represents a solution, but this is the 
ground on which we can and must work for 
Western Europe to make an economic, legal and 
Community contribution to its own security and 
to that of the Near and Middle East. 
108. As has already been said several times, 
Western Europe has managed to adopt fair and 
courageous political positions from the time of 
the V en ice Declaration to the present day. It has 
unswervingly followed developments in the 
Middle East and intervened in specific well-
defined cases. Quite recently, for instance, the 
European Community's political co-operation 
again voiced member states' concern at the Pal-
estinian universities remaining closed and 
launched a solemn appeal to the Israeli Gov-
ernment to refrain in future from any measures 
liable to jeopardise the teaching system in the 
occupied territories. The Western European 
countries also endorsed President Mubarak's 
attempts to mediate. 
109. Nevertheless, Western Europe has never 
launched an initiative of its own to promote 
peace in the Middle East. Now is perhaps the 
time to do so. Faced with the obvious risk of a 
serious deterioration in the situation in the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank and the repeated negative 
answers of the Israeli Government to any 
request for moderation and peace, it is perhaps 
necessary to place on the Middle East scales the 
full weight of Western Europe's political 
prestige, economic potential and diplomatic 
ability. 
110. To this end, the Council should be urged 
to promote, together with the European Com-
munity and the Council of Europe, the contacts 
and consultations necessary for working out a 
truly Western European initiative for peace in 
the Middle East that can boost the diplomatic 
effort of the United States and the Soviet Union, 
help to unblock the present dangerous status quo 
and encourage the convocation of the interna-
tional conference on peace in the Middle East 
proposed by the United Nations. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur) 
Since his report was adopted by the 
General Affairs Committee, your Rapporteur 
visited Tunis to meet leaders of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation and Stockholm to 
exchange views with officials of the Swedish 
Ministry for External Affairs. Both talks were of 
great interest and are summarised at appendix 
to the present document which gives infor-
mation on the most recent events. In November, 
the Middle East was the scene of tragic events 
and the subject of major efforts by international 
diplomacy, and in particular of several govern-
ments, to mediate and bring about peace. 
1. The whole world was pained and horrified 
at the attack by dynamite that cost the life of the 
President of the Lebanese Republic and twenty 
other persons. Rent! Moawad, a Maronite 
Christian, had been elected President of the 
Republic seventeen days before his death during 
the first stage of the application of the Taif 
agreements which deeply divided the Christian 
community, some of whom were in favour of the 
agreements. The most senior religious personage 
of Lebanese catholicism, the Patriarch of the 
Maronite Church, Monsignor Sfeir, supported 
the Taif agreements, calling them the least of 
two ills. As a result, he had to leave Beirut in the 
teeth of insults from supporters of General 
Aoun. The Lebanese Front, a coalition of 
Christian parties and fighting forces led by Dany 
Chamoun, called for Christian unity and 
exhorted all leaders to make good use of the pos-
itive aspects of the agreements and pass over 
those which were negative with a view to ending 
all foreign occupation of Lebanon and thwart 
the Syrian attempt to take control of Lebanon's 
future. Mr. Samir Gagea's powerful Lebanese 
Forces adopted a different position. According 
to a communique issued on 16th November, the 
Lebanese Forces were trying to reconcile Mr. 
Michel Aoun with Mr. Rene Moawad because 
unity was the main aim now that the Christian 
community had so many problems to cope with. 
Mr. Samir Gagea's aim is therefore to draw 
Christians closer together in order to find a way 
out of this difficult situation. Even on the other 
side, there are considerable differences between 
those who approve the Taif agreements (the 
Sunnite Moslems) and those who accept them 
without approving them (Mr. Jumblatt's 
Druzes). The greatest rift is among the Shiites. 
The Amalleader, Mr. Nabih Berri, is a member 
of the new government. The Hezbollah has 
threatened to retaliate against members of par-
liament helping to implement the Taif agree-
ments, and General Michel Aoun has issued 
similar threats against Christian members of 
parliament. 
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On 24th November, the Lebanese Par-
liament, which has lost some of its repre-
sentativity because it has not been renewed for 
more than fifteen years, and some of its inde-
pendence, to the point that it has to meet under 
Syrian protection because of threats from 
General Aoun, elected Elias Hraoui, a Maronite 
Christian, President of the Republic. Selim 
Hoss, a Sunni Moslem, was again asked to form 
a government. The situation in Lebanon is still 
difficult and the outcome has become more 
uncertain. International diplomacy must 
therefore continue to support the Arab League's 
peace initiative. Your Rapporteur considers it 
particularly significant that, on 18th November, 
the United Nations Security Council, by a unan-
imous vote, welcomed Mr. Moawad's election, 
in the framework of the Arab League's peace 
plan, and urged the Lebanese people and armed 
forces to support the President. This exhortation 
gains added weight following the tragic death of 
President Moawad. 
2. In the Israeli-occupied territories, the 
intifada is continuing and is still being 
repressed; Palestinians are being killed and 
arrested by the occupying troops and Arabs 
accused of collaborating with Israel are being 
assassinated by their compatriots. The armed 
ambush in which one Israeli soldier lost his life 
and another was wounded was described as an 
isolated incident contrary to the orders given by 
the intifada's clandestine command. 
In Israel, elections in the single trade 
union, Histadrut, which were to give pointers to 
the countries' political tendencies, did not 
change the situation. The Likud progressed and 
the Labour Party regressed, but the latter 
retained an absolute majority. 
There has been very intense activity in 
international diplomacy involving many protag-
onists: the United States, the Soviet Union, the 
troika of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
European Community, Sweden, Israel, the PLO, 
Egypt and others, too. It has been concentrated 
on the five points proposed by Mr. Baker, 
United States Secretary of State, intended to 
allow a preliminary meeting between Israelis 
and Palestinians, in the presence of the United 
States and Egypt, about the elections in the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank. A few comforting events 
have been reported: the Israeli Government's 
restricted cabinet accepted Mr. Baker's five 
points by 9 votes to 3, while confirming its 
refusal to hold talks with a Palestinian dele-
gation that was not composed solely of people 
from the occupied territories and its refusal to 
extend the talks to include aspects of the peace 
process other than its plan for elections. Simi-
larly, the PLO which had rejected Mr. Baker's 
five points at the meeting of its Central Council 
in Baghdad confirming the overtures and condi-
tions agreed upon at the meeting of its National 
Council in Algiers, subsequently accepted them. 
The PLO put a few questions to the United 
States on the composition of the Palestinian del-
egation and the possibility of discussing pro-
posals on the overall peace process in Palestine 
and the Middle East in addition to the Shamir 
plan for elections in the occupied territories. 
Israeli reservations and the questions put 
by the Palestinians must of course not be under-
estimated. However, a result has been achieved 
and United States mediation can now be con-
tinued, although many difficulties still remain. 
These difficulties were not overcome by 
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the recent visit by the Israeli Prime Minister to 
the United States nor by his meetings with Pres-
ident George Bush and Mr. Baker. During his 
subsequent visits to Paris and Rome, Mr. 
Shamir discussed prospects of peace in the 
Middle East with President Mitterrand, the 
European Community troika, the Italian Gov-
ernment and all the Italian political parties. The 
Israeli Prime Minister stressed his disap-
pointment at the European position. The 
Western European political leaders asked him to 
drop his reservations about Mr. Baker's five 
points and to accept a dialogue with the PLO. 
This dialogue is impatiently awaited by the 
international community, which considers it to 
be a first step on the path that Israel, the Pales-
tinians and the Middle East in general have to 
follow in order to build peace and ensure mutual 
security. 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary record of the Rapporteur's meeting with 
Mr. Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the Political Department 
of the PLO Executive Committee in Tunis on 30th October 1989 
(Extract) 
We met Farouk KADDOUMI at the PLO 
Headquarters in Tunis on 30th October 1989. 
During our talks, we asked for general explana-
tions of current PLO policy and comments on 
certain issues drawn to our attention during our 
visit to Israel. These are matters of some signifi-
cance to the political debate which enjoy 
extensive coverage by the Western European 
press. 
A. Right of the Palestinians of the diaspora to 
return to their homeland 
We can in no way disclaim the right to 
return to one's own homeland, as it is not only a 
common right but also applicable to any indi-
vidual. 
It is significant that we have accepted the 
existence of two states in Palestine and, 
therefore, the right to existence of the state of 
Israel. The return of Palestinians is a problem to 
be discussed between the two states. There are 
800 000 Palestinians in Israel and one cannot 
rule out the possibility for Jewish people to 
remain in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
once the Palestinian state is established. 
We have recognised Israel, but has Israel 
recognised us? Why does Israel always demand 
concessions on our rights without ever con-
ceding anything? Europe had been asking us for 
a long time to recognise Israel and we did: why 
does Israel not do likewise with us? 
B. Interpretation of the recent AI Fatah Con-
ference 
The Likud Steering Committee has set 
four qualifications on the electoral plans of 
Israel's Government: no recognition of the PLO, 
no self-determination in the occupied territories, 
no withdrawal of Israeli troops, no Palestinian 
state. Though the Likud is the main government 
party, faced with Labour protest Shamir has 
stated that the aforementioned decisions are not 
binding for the government. If I were to give an 
easy answer I could say that the Al Fatah Con-
ference is not binding for the PLO either, but 
actually no extremist decisions were taken at the 
conference. 
The Americans have raised just one 
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objection with us for the contemptuous words 
used with reference to Israel. The British have 
expressed their gratitude for our decisions at the 
conference. 
C. Killing of "collaborationists " in the 
occupied territories 
It is true that this has happened in some 
cases, but we hope to put an end to it. 
In any society under normal circum-
stances murders and revenge are possible. There 
are instances where pretexts are found to kill 
people, in particular in exceptional situations. In 
the occupied territories people fear for their own 
and everybody's lives and experience terrible 
times: 900 people killed, mainly youngsters and 
children, 35 000 injured or maimed, 40-45 000 
imprisoned; while some are released, others are 
put in jail. According to Amnesty International, 
30% of the Palestinians in the occupied terri-
tories have been in jail some time or another, 
not to mention the destruction of houses, seizure 
of assets and deportations. 
However, we have decided to prevent all 
killing. In case of betrayal a decision must be 
taken unanimously at three different levels of 
responsibility, and even then authorisation must 
be granted from abroad. In no case have we or 
the national leadership of intifada released such 
an authorisation. 
D. Episodes of extremism and Islamic funda-
mentalism in the occupied territories 
The phenomenon of fundamentalism 
exists and is something new to us. There were 
raids in shops selling wines and spirits when the 
movement started, as well as fits of extremism. 
Now, however, the situation is under our 
control. The Israelis tries to exploit the Hamas 
movement, but when Hamas started to show a 
greater sense of responsibility its leaders were 
arrested. 
Should the situation remain at a stalemate 
with no prospects of positive political develop-
ments, more extremism will emerge. We believe 
there is greater danger in political radicalism 
than in fundamentalism. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Summary record of the Rapporteur's meeting at 
the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
in Stockholm on 13th November 1989 
In Stockholm on 13th November, your 
Rapporteur met Mr. Pierre Shori, Secretary-
General of the Swedish Ministry for External 
Affairs, and his colleagues, Mr. Anders B. 
Jurner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Mr. 
Mathias Massberg, Director of the Political 
Department. It was of great interest to have 
first-hand information on the position of a 
neutral European country which has always 
played a mediating role in the Middle East. 
Everyone knows that eminent Swedes have 
played an important part in events in Palestine: 
Mr. Enul Sandstrom, Vice-Chairman of the 
United Nations Special Committee on Pal-
estine, proposed the partition plan adopted by 
the General Assembly in 194 7 in Resolution 
181; Mr. Folke Bernadotte, killed in 1948, was 
the United Nations mediator in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict; Mr. Gunnar Jarring represented the 
United Nations Secretary-General in the Middle 
East after the 1967 war. Throughout the various 
stages of the long Middle East conflict, thou-
sands of Swedish soldiers have been, and still 
are, members of the United Nations peace-
keeping observer force. For forty years, Sweden 
has supported the state of Israel's right to exist 
and now, as a friend of the Palestinian people, it 
is supporting their right to self-determination. 
Swedish diplomacy worked with the PLO for a 
long time to induce it to recognise the state of 
Israel's right to exist and to condemn all forms 
of terrorism. When the PLO took these deci-
sions, Sweden was able to play a major role in its 
rapprochement with the United States. The 
meeting between President Arafat and the dele-
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gation of American Jews was held in Stockholm 
with the active participation of the Swedish 
Government and this initiative made it possible 
for contacts and talks between the United States 
and the PLO to be resumed. The United States 
and the PLO subsequently asked Sweden to con-
tinue its mediating action, even after 14th 
December 1988. 
Swedish diplomacy has been very active 
in obtaining the consensus of the parties con-
cerned by President Mubar~k's ten points and 
Mr. Baker's five points. Your Rapporteur was 
told that it was possible that an Israeli-
Palestinian dialogue could be started on these 
bases and that the Middle East peace process 
had entered a decisive stage. Believing it to be 
important that half the Israeli Government (the 
Labour Party) had opted for negotiations with 
the Palestinians, Swedish officials considered it 
to be the duty of the other half (the Likud) to 
initiate a dialogue to guarantee the future of 
Israel and its survival as a democratic Jewish 
state. If efforts to restore peace fail, the situation 
might become dangerous in the very near future 
because of the growth of extremist forces on 
both sides and increased violence. On 21st 
October, the Swedish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Sten Andersson, said that, in these 
circumstances, the Swedish Government urged 
all the forces interested in a peace process pro-
ducing results to make the maximum effort to 
overcome outstanding differences and that the 
responsibility for a possible failure would lie 
with those who were opposed to a dialogue. 
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Introductory Note 
Principal persons met by the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments or by the Rapporteur 
Your Rapporteur wishes to thank all the persons met before, during and after the visit by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong 
from 12th to 22nd May 1989 and who received the committee or helped in the organisation ofthe visit 
and to obtain the information necessary for the preparation of this report. 
Beijing 
Mr. Han Nianlong, President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. He Guanhui, First Vice-Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring Economic 
Systems; 
Mr. Zhou Nan, Vice Foreign Minister; 
Mr. Xu Xin, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, General in the People's Liberation Army; 
Mr. Ye Fei, Vice-President of the Chinese People's Assembly. 
Tianjing 
Xi' an 
Colonel Yang Jun, Divisional Commander, Division 196 of the PLA; 
Colonel Zhu Fujin, Deputy Divisional Commander. 
Mr. Mao Shengxian, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of Shaanxi Province. 
Shanghai 
Rear-Admiral Liu Ji Pan, Commandant of the Shanghai Naval Base; 
Captain Zhou Ting Zhong, Chief-of-Staff; 
Commanders Qiu Yan Peng, Guoyong Dong and Ho Qing Hua; 
Lieutenant-Commander Xie Orizhou; 
Mr. Liang Yu Fan, President of the Shanghai Institute of International Strategic Studies; 
Mr. Shu Qi, President of the Shanghai Chapter of the People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. 
Guangzhou (Canton) 
Mr. Luo Keming, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of 
Guangdong Province. 
Throughout the visit to the People's Republic of China 
Members of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, including: 
Mrs. Jin Shuzhang, Head of the European Division; 
Mrs. Shen Yiyuan; Miss Ma Jia; Messrs Liu Yadong, Chai Haipo, Liu Huijie and Huong 
Chengye. 
Hong Kong 
Sir David Wilson, Governor of Hong Kong; 
Miss Tracey Chan of the Governor's Office; 
Brigadier Giles Amold, Deputy Commander, British forces in Hong Kong, and Colonels Brian 
Daly and Douglas Fox; 
teers). 
Captain Peter Dalrymple-Smith, Royal Navy, Captain-in-Charge Hong Kong, HMS Tamar; 
Commander Tim Burne, Royal Navy; 
Lieutenant Commander Cy Beattie, Royal Navy; 
Brigadier Miles Hunt-Davis, Brigadier, Brigade of Gurkhas; 
Brigadier Vernon Beauchamp, Commander, 48 Gurkha Infantry Brigade; 
Colonel Nick Worthington, Commanding Officer, Training Depot, Brigade of Gurkhas; 
Lieutenant Colonel Chris Patey, Commanding Officer, Royal Hong Kong Regiment (The Volun-
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London 
H.E. Mr. Ji Chaozhu, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic 
of China to the United Kingdom; 
Messrs Tony Millington, Alan Paul, Andrew Seaton, Mrs. Claire Smith and Mr. Rod Wye of the 
Far Eastern Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; 
Messrs Mike Perrett and Steven Pollard and Lieutenant Commander John Topp, Royal Navy, of 
the Ministry of Defence; · 
Mr. David Chan of the Hong Kong Government Office. 
Paris 
H.E. Mr. Zhou Jue, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of 
China to the French Republic; 
Mr. Xu Weiquin, Counsellor; 
Mr. Mu Wen, First Secretary; 
Colonel Teng Dinglie, Assistant Defence Attache. 
The committee also had the benefit of the assistance of Their Excellencies the Ambassadors of 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Portugal in Beijing, and especially H.E. Sir Alan 
Donald, CMG, Ambassador of the United Kingdom, the country assuring the Chairmanship-in-Office 
of the WEU Council, and of Miss Alyson Bailes, Counsellor and Consul-General, Colonel Colin Lees, 
Defence Attache, and Commander Mike Farr, Royal Navy, Naval Attache, of his staff, to whom the 
Rapporteur expresses particular gratitude. 
Both the committee and the Rapporteur would like to thank the secretariat of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments for their help during the preparation of this report, and especially 
Mr. Colin Cameron, Defence Counsellor in the Assembly and Secretary of the committee, for his 
"quiet diplomacy" throughout the visit to China in May. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on Western European security: defence implications of the 
People's Republic of China's e-volving geopolitical situation 
(i) Noting the inalienable right of the Chinese Government and people to conduct their own 
internal affairs but nevertheless considerably shocked and saddened by the events in Beijing and other 
major cities in May and June 1989, as well as by subsequent violations of human rights; 
(ii) Noting the role played by China in maintaining a world balance and contributing to peaceful 
international relations; 
(iii) Considering that, insofar as the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many 
areas, they should therefore continue to be developed independently of ideological and institutional 
differences, provided human rights are respected; 
(iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government is still the country's economic 
and social development; 
(v) Welcoming the development of the Chinese economy and of exchanges of all kinds between 
China and Western Europe, while regretting the absence of a parallel improvement in the political situ-
ation; 
(vi) Welcoming the convergence between diplomatic action by Western European countries and by 
China to seek a solution to ensure Cambodian independence; 
(vii) Noting that events in China have caused concern among the residents of Hong Kong and Macau 
about their future, and noting also that the Chinese Government has undertaken to guarantee their 
rights and safety; 
(viii) Noting that for many years the Chinese have occupied Tibet and denied the Tibetan people their 
human rights, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that member countries continue firmly to express their disapproval of the measures of 
repression and restriction of freedom taken by China in 1989, possibly resuming regular consultations 
with the Government of the People's Republic of China on matters relating to the maintenance of 
world peace; 
2. Invite member governments, in time, given the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, to proceed 
to develop political, technological, economic, commercial and cultural relations with the People's 
Republic of China; 
3. Take the necessary initiatives to seek a convergence of views between member countries and the 
People's Republic of China on arms control and disarmament, particularly by ensuring that the negoti-
ations on arms limitations in Europe do not lead to an increase in forces and arms deployed in Asia; 
4. Pursue among member governments the possibility of concerting a policy designed to lay the 
foundations for lasting peace in Eastern Asia in order to maintain the independence of Cambodia. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In early 1988, the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments received an invi-
tation from the Chinese People's Institute for 
Foreign Affairs to visit the People's Republic of 
China the following year. At that stage, of 
course, nobody could presage the momentous 
events which were to take place in May and June 
1989. As the time for the visit (12th to 20th 
May) drew closer, it was announced that a his-
toric Sino-Soviet summit was planned for the 
same date, with Mr. Gorbachev scheduled to be 
in both Beijing and Shanghai at the same time as 
the committee. 
2. The Defence Committee's visit proved 
fascinating from every point of view: the people 
met, the sights seen, the discussions at all levels 
- the whole against a background of perpetual 
movement, most of all for " democratic " 
change. Whether it was at the official meetings 
with ministers, during talks in the Great Hall of 
the People or, in the evenings after dinner, con-
versations with crowds of students in 
Tiananmen Square, members of the committee 
were tremendously impressed with the optimism 
expressed by all - optimism for peaceful change. 
At no stage whatsoever was there any hint that 
force might be used, on one side or the other, 
nor any evidence of the violence which was to 
come. In addition to Beijing, the committee 
visited Xi'an, Shanghai and Canton and the 
above remarks apply throughout. 
3. As we are now only too vividly aware, the 
situation took a frightful change for the worse 
shortly after the end of the committee's visit and 
with that change occurred a setback in China's 
progress which is likely to take years to remedy. 
The consequence of the events in Beijing and 
many other major cities is that your Rapporteur 
has felt constrained to attempt an analysis of the 
internal affairs which so influence present 
external attitudes- the original "raison d'etre" 
for producing this report. 
4. This is the fifth report presented to the 
Assembly over the past quarter of a century 
dealing with some aspect of the relationship 
between European security and China. 
5. The first in 1966, " The Chinese 
Problem " (Document 394, Rapporteur: Colonel 
Bourgoin), was produced for the Assembly by 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments as a reaction after China had tested 
its first nuclear weapons and demonstrated an 
ability to deliver an intercontinental ballistic 
missile. The headlines at the time talked of 
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"continuing revolution", the" need for nuclear 
education ", " the Chinese threat " and the 
"Moscow-Peking" conflict. One of the conclu-
sions was: 
" 98. China is thus at the present time 
both frightened and frightening: 
frightened because its organisation is still 
precarious and fragile, frightening because 
it is a power of the future which causes 
world anxiety by its violent declarations 
and also because it is liable to attract 
many third countries. " 1 
6. Times have changed since Colonel 
Bourgoin produced his report and the pro-
gression of that change is obvious in the suc-
ceeding reports of the Assembly, all produced by 
the General Affairs Committee: 
1978: " China and European security" 
(Document 770, Rapporteur: Sir 
Frederic Bennett) 
1983: " China and European security " 
(Document 945, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Caro) 
1985: " Developments in China and 
European security " (Document 
1035, Rapporteurs: Mr. Michel and 
Mr. van der Werft). 
The 1983 and 1985 reports resulted from visits 
by members of the Assembly to China at the 
invitation of the Chinese authorities: evidence 
that the Chinese considered it worthwhile to 
establish a link with Western European Union 
as part of a growing global awareness. 
7. In the present report, your Rapporteur 
has tried to be as objective as possible, in spite 
of the natural emotion which has accompanied 
recent events. He trusts that the reader, both in 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and in the Assembly generally, but 
more particularly those readers whose country is 
the subject of the report, will accept what is 
intended as constructive criticism and will con-
tinue the Sino-WEU dialogue in the future. 
(a) Immediate defence implications 
8. The events in Tiananmen Square which 
resulted in the action by the People's Liberation 
Army (the PLA) to regain government control 
have obviously had a far-reaching consequence 
1. Document 394. 
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for the relationship of most countries with 
China. The majority of western nations immedi-
ately banned all trade in the defence sector and 
cancelled official visits (indeed the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments' visit was 
the last one by a western organisation to fulfil its 
programme as originally planned). 
9. As will be examined later in this report, 
these developments will obviously affect the 
modernisation programme of the Chinese 
armed forces, but will probably not impact 
much on China's growing arms export trade. 
The events themselves showed the PLA to be 
generally unprepared and inappropriately 
trained and equipped for internal security oper-
ations. (Reportedly, there were at the time only 
a dozen vehicles in the whole of China capable 
of mounting water cannon, and Beijing's total 
stock of tear gas was supposedly exhausted in 
one evening.) 
10. Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Beijing may not 
have proved quite the historic Sino-Soviet 
summit the authorities originally envisaged but 
it does demonstrate the extent of rapprochement 
between the two countries and, together with the 
announced withdrawals and reductions of 
Soviet forces in Mongolia and the continuing 
negotiations on issues affecting the common 
border, may perhaps allow further reductions 
and more rapid progress with the reorganisation 
of the PLA. 
11. After having to endure years of manpower 
reductions, a shrinking defence budget and less-
ening political influence, the PLA achieved con-
siderable prominence as the result of the events 
of May and early June. The defence estab-
lishment had made up its reduced means by 
large-scale arms exports, particularly to Iran and 
other Middle Eastern states, in recent years (see 
Chapter V), but, in the wake of the internal 
problems encountered, it would appear probable 
that the defence budget will increase once 
again. 
11. Factors in the internal crisis 
12. In reality, the Chinese leaders are faced 
with a twofold social and political crisis, as 
amply demonstrated by dismissals within the 
party. 
(a) Main causes of the democratic sedition 
13. It is widely thought that the purges - par-
ticularly the exclusion of the reformers Hu 
Yaobang in 1987 (who has since died) and Zhao 
Ziyang - which marked a step backwards, were 
the direct cause of the uprising in spring 1989. 
The movement in Tiananmen Square started 
with Hu Yaobang's funeral, the students having 
asked that he be posthumously rehabilitated as a 
symbolic gesture. 
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14. This is probably not untrue but the distur-
bances probably had deeper roots stemming from 
two factors. A first analysis would indicate that 
the reforms undertaken since 1978 created a dif-
ferent ideological context in accordance with a 
Marxist principle that methods of production 
have an influence on social, cultural and political 
phenomena. Unlike what is now happening in 
certain eastern countries, modernisation in China 
does not involve pluralism. An attempt was made 
to introduce capitalism progressively, to open the 
country to the world economy and abandon col-
lective ownership without, however, renouncing 
communist dirigism, but privatisation apparently 
exacerbated the contradiction between the forms 
of production and superstructures of Mao's days 
and directly encouraged claims for political 
democracy. From this point of view, the system of 
domination could therefore not resist economic 
modernisation or cultural opening and seemed to 
be threatened inexorably. But the Chinese leaders 
turned a deaf ear; there was still no question of 
political reforms. Two arguments were invoked: 
- First, Chinese culture had no demo-
cratic tradition and therefore could not 
adapt itself to a democratic system. 
- Second, economic development did not 
necessarily need a democratic system. 
A dictatorial policy combined with a 
free economy would suit the country 
perfectly. 
The leaders therefore chose to maintain order 
(in passing, shooting part of China's younger 
generation), even if this meant sacrificing reuni-
fication with Hong Kong and Macau albeit 
essential to the industrial and financial revival 
of the empire. 
15. A second analysis brings out another 
factor. Although it seems that in the more or less 
long term the communist system is, if it 
undergoes no changes, condemned to disappear, 
it is not the system as such that was called in 
question by the demonstrators but its corol-
laries: corruption and autocracy. The students in 
Tiananmen Square and elsewhere took the 
" Internationale " as their theme song (indeed 
several colleagues on the committee joined in 
the singing in Tiananmen Square) and at no 
stage was there any hint that the student 
movement was " anti-communist " as such. The 
uprising apparently originated in growing hos-
tility towards the party leaders who had grown 
rich at the expense of investment, particularly in 
infrastructure, and there was no longer any sym-
pathy for the Chinese nomenclature, far more 
prosperous than their Soviet counterparts, with 
their luxurious villas, air-conditioned cars and 
children's education in Europe and the United 
States. Young people were finding it difficult to 
continue to live in university slums with no hot 
water, where in winter the ice had to be broken 
in order to wash ... 
(b) The impact of the crisis 
(i) At social and political level 
16. To start with, it may be said that the crisis 
had a very limited impact; it is an exaggeration 
to say, as was often the case, that the whole of 
China was in a state of crisis: 
- First, more than 80% of rural Chinese 
were not affected by events, although 
they must have witnessed them on tele-
vision in their areas. 
- Second, the political crisis was not as 
profound as it was depicted. Oppo-
sition at the top of the political hier-
archy was insignificant and there were 
no plans for political reform. 
- Third, the People's Liberation Army 
remained loyal to the regime. While 
there was some evidence indicating a 
difference in approach to the task 
between forces based around Beijing 
and those brought in from other mil-
itary districts, media reports of a pos-
sible disintegration of the PLA into 
contending factions now appear to have 
been greatly exaggerated. 
(ii) At economic level 
17. China temporarily suspended its 
modernisation programme but it is to be 
expected that the economic sanctions swiftly 
applied by the international economic com-
munity in reaction to the repression will be felt 
when the regime tries to reactivate this pro-
gramme. Trade sanctions were adopted soon 
after the western states unanimously announced 
a freeze on their high-level diplomatic relations. 
The European Economic Community, which 
managed to adopt a joint position, announced 
that it was suspending the economic and com-
mercial co-operation agreement concluded with 
China in 1985. 
18. The United States' sanctions were taken 
in two stages: 
- In the first stage, the United States 
announced a freeze on military contacts 
and decided to ban the sale of 
American arms to China. It should be 
pointed out in passing that, between 
1984 and 1987, China procured $590 
million worth of armaments from the 
United States in the specific framework 
of Foreign Military Sales. The Chinese 
armed forces, particularly the air force, 
had concluded several joint venture 
agreements with American industry, 
which are now being questioned, 
including the most important Sino-
American defence contract, Shenyang 
F-8, an anti-aircraft defence pro-
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gramme. This contract, concluded with 
the Grumman Corporation, amounted 
to about $550 million. This sanction is 
therefore prejudicial to the moder-
nisation of the Chinese army and might 
also jeopardise the interests of the firm 
should it not continue its programme of 
modernising F-7M6 fighter aircraft. 
This is not covered by the ban since it is 
a trade agreement to which the rules 
governing sales of arms abroad (Foreign 
Military Sales) do not apply. 
- In the second stage, the United States 
announced the suspension of diplo-
matic relations. Simultaneously, its Sec-
retary of State announced economic 
sanctions, including the United States' 
intention to defer consideration of 
Chinese requests for credit from major 
international organisations, especially 
the World Bank. The World Bank has 
already lent China $8 000 million, a 
sum which helps to illustrate the coun-
try's economic difficulties. 
19. Although the consequences of economic 
sanctions will soon be felt on the Chinese 
economy, their scale must not be exaggerated. 
Investors, businessmen and industrialists have 
no real interest in breaking off relations with 
China. Trade is beneficial to them as well as to 
the Chinese and hence to the United States, 
since trade is of course basep on a balance of 
mutual advantages. Similarly; in the context of 
international competition, no one is really 
willing to lose the Chinese market. In an 
interview granted to a French journalist shortly 
after the events, Li Peng said he was unper-
turbed about the prospects of economic 
co-operation since economic circles were more 
reasonable than certain politicians. Not all 
co-operation has been suspended, particularly 
with French and British partners; for instance, 
their co-operation in nuclear matters at Dahia 
Bay did not stop for a single day. Similarly, 
negotiations with the French firm Citroen on 
proposed co-operation in car manufacturing 
proceeded without interruption. At first sight, 
therefore, economic exchanges have not been 
deeply affected by the crisis. 
Ill. Geopolitical trends 
20. These are worth analysing since Chinese 
defence policy will be based partly on the threat 
from outside. Identification of possible threats 
guides military leaders in the choice of strategic 
stances to be adopted (conventional war, pos-
sible use of nuclear weapons, etc.). Only partly, 
however, because the choice of means of defence 
is of course limited by other considerations 
which will be examined below (e.g. technological 
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and financial considerations, economic prior-
ities, etc.) These factors, resulting largely from 
China's relations with its Soviet neighbour, have 
changed shape in the last few years. 
(a) Sino-Soviet relations since 1949 
(i) Stages preceding the 1989 reconciliation 
21. Three stages may be distinguished: 
- From 1949 to 1954, China took the 
Soviet Union as a model for 
reorganising its society. It received eco-
nomic assistance and advice from 
Moscow. 
- From 1956 to 1979, there was an ideo-
logical and strategic break with the 
Soviet Union, which became effective 
in 1960 with the withdrawal of Soviet 
advisers from China. Khrushchev's 
destalinisation clashed with Mao's per-
sonality cult. Furthermore, frontier 
incidents and differences over the 
Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian con-
flict led to a break between the Chinese 
and Soviet Communist Parties. China 
was also opposed to the Moscow partial 
test ban treaty between the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union and tested its first nuclear 
bomb two months after the treaty was 
signed, on 16th October 1964. 
In March 1969, incidents along the 
Sino-Soviet frontier caused scores of 
deaths on both sides. 
In 1979, China abrogated the 1950 
treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union 
but nevertheless proposed holding 
negotiations on normalising their rela-
tions. However, in January 1980, fol-
lowing the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, China announced that 
these negotiations were to be frozen. 
- 1982 to 1989 was a period of reconcili-
ation. A normalisation process began in 
1982 and took concrete shape with 
visits by officials from both sides. 
However, China pointed out that there 
were three obstacles to normalisation: 
the presence of Soviet troops in Afghan-
istan, Soviet support for Vietnam and 
the concentration of troops on the 
Chinese frontier. 
In May 1989, the Sino-Soviet meeting 
officially terminated the thirty-year 
feud. Mr. Gorbachev took several initi-
atives at this summit meeting, 
including the withdrawal of troops 
from the Chinese frontier. 
(ii) Outstanding problems 
22. There is still disagreement over Cambodia 
although in the last few months the positions of 
the two communist powers have drawn signifi-
cantly closer together, particularly on the search 
for a negotiated solution, the departure of 
foreign troops, procedure for control and super-
vision, holding an international conference and 
the non-return to power of the Khmer Rouge. 
However, there is still one major difference 
relating to the kind of administration to be set 
up before organising general elections to provide 
the future state of Cambodia with western-type 
democratic foundations. Whereas China wishes 
Prince Sihanouk, present leader of the anti-
Vietnamese resistance movement, to head a 
four-party interim government, (including the 
Khmer Rouge), the Soviet Union would prefer 
to see the former monarch at the head of a sort 
of national reconciliation council in which all 
the Khmer factions involved would be repre-
sented. There are therefore differences about the 
role to be attributed to Prince Sihanouk and the 
Khmer Rouge. Meeting in Paris in July, the four 
Khmer factions found no satisfactory solution to 
this problem. 
(b) Consequences for the West 
of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement 
(i) Background of Sino- Western relations 
23. While 1949 marked the start of a period 
of co-operation between China and the Soviet 
Union, and the ideological war was continuing 
in Indochina, Malaysia and Korea, relations 
with the West were non-existent or even hostile. 
China was considered more of a threat, as can be 
seen from what Colonel Bourgoin wrote in 1966 
in his report on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments 2: " •• • by 
converting itself to Marxist-Leninist com-
munism, the country has assumed a new mission 
which goes beyond the narrow confines of its 
territory to stretch into the world as a whole. 
Consequently ... China is ... an element of dis-
order, trouble and subversion ... war appears for 
China to be a means among others of achieving 
its ends." 
24. The Vietnam war did not help to improve 
the relations between China and the United 
States. They started to improve in the early sev-
enties when President Nixon embarked upon a 
policy of reconciliation with China. He tried to 
remove the obstacles that separated it from the 
United States and to take account of its legit-
imate national interests. 
25. Relations between China and Western 
Europe also improved. In the report he sub-
mitted on behalf of the General Affairs Corn-
2. The Chinese problem, Document 394, December 1966. 
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mittee in 1978 3, Sir Frederic Bennett wrote: " ... 
China now adopts a consistently favourable 
attitude towards the European Community, to 
which it has accredited an ambassador. It con-
siders the Community has a rOle to play in the 
potential resistance of European states to the 
Soviet Union." At that time, indeed, the Soviet 
Union was still "their only serious, aggressive, 
potential enemy". Today, circumstances have 
changed considerably, since the two great com-
munist countries have officially terminated their 
thirty-year estrangement. 
(ii) Economic and strategic consequences for 
Western Europe 
26. From an economic and strategic stand-
point, there has been regular economic and com-
mercial co-operation between China and several 
Western European countries for about ten years. 
While trade relations between China and the 
West may in the short term be perturbed, this is 
a western initiative. Especially strategically 
speaking, the West can clearly not be offended 
by the Sino-Soviet rapprochement. There is no 
reason why China should modify its external 
policy which, for elementary reasons of internal 
stability and because of its economy, is a 
peaceful one. 
(iii) Consequences for the United States 
27. The thirty-year estrangement was clearly 
favourable to American affairs in Asia. From 
the strategic standpoint, the United States was 
on the same side in defending the region against 
the Soviet threat. The Philippines, faced with a 
communist guerrilla movement or the South 
Koreans and still troubled by Kim Sung, had 
little inclination to call in question the string of 
American bases in the Pacific. When President 
Bush visited Beijing, he stressed that the United 
States intended to remain a Pacific power. 
However, from a strategic point of view, the 
" comrades' " rapprochement may mean the 
maps having to be redrawn in this part of the 
world. Soviet-Chinese detente and their eco-
nomic reform policies to catch up their backlog 
make the two countries a far greater source of 
concern in the Pacific; the United States may 
become less and less indispensable there. Fur-
thermore, the work of American diplomats in 
Asia has been complicated by Mr. Gorbachev 
who has appointed experienced ambassadors, 
inter alia to Beijing, Tokyo and Manilla, and is 
pushing for denuclearising the Pacific. For 
instance, in Vladivostok in July 1986, Mr. 
Gorbachev proposed a conference on the 
security of the Pacific nations and in September 
1988 he launched the idea of evacuating Cam 
Ranh Bay (the Soviet Union's vast base in 
Vietnam) if the Americans abandoned their 
bases in the Philippines. This proposal seriously 
3. China and European security, Document 770, May 1978. 
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complicated the United States' negotiations 
with Mrs. Aquino on renewing the United States 
forces' leases in the archipelago. 
28. Conversely, from an economic point of 
view, there seems little reason why China should 
change its policy. Its economic relations with the 
United States- and to a large extent with Hong 
Kong and Japan - and tble Pacific economic 
markets are far more usefQl to it than its eco-
nomic links with the Soviet Union. Its trade 
with the Soviet Union amounts to less than 5% 
of its total trade, whereas that with the United 
States, Japan and the Pacific countries amounts 
to more than two-thirds. Japan and the United 
States had hitherto been its major source of 
assistance, investment and technology. China 
therefore has no interest in depriving itself of 
these links which are so valuable for its 
economy. It remains to be seen whether the 
sanctions planned by the United States will 
change these facts. 
IV. Strategic doctrine 
and geostrategic and tee/lnological facts 
29. Several aspects of military geography and 
Chinese strategic doctrine should be con-
sidered. 
(a) Impact of geostJY4tegic facts 
on the doctrine of Chinese strategists 
30. Because of. its perpetual tension with 
Vietnam, its rivalry with India and, above all, its 
long frontier with the Soviet Union, almost the 
whole of its gigantic frontier is a matter of vital 
concern for China. Strategist~ realise their country 
must be able to meet limit~d attacks aimed at 
occupying frontier areas. Until now, the Soviet 
threat has been the main concern of Chinese strat-
egists. The nature of the threat (deployment of 
highly-mechanised troops with nuclear weapons 
along China's northern frontier) was comparable 
to the situation in which the. Maoist strategy of a 
people's war was to be used; this is why that tradi-
tional strategy still has suppbrters at PLA head-
quarters, but it has had to be adapted. 
31. In February 1979, Deng Xiaoping wished 
to bring his Vietnamese " vassal " to heel after 
its intervention against China's allies, the 
Khmer Rouge, who were in power in Cambodia. 
However, the PLA, ill-prepared and probably 
not well led, soon had to withdraw. Mediocre 
performances underlined th~ need to modernise 
the army and revise strategic concepts. 
(b) Present strategic doctrine 
32. At operational level, the traditional doc-
trine described by Mao in J 965 in " The long 
war" retains its full force, i.e. to beat and anni-
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hi1ate the aggressor while taking advantage of 
the country's numerical superiority and geo-
strategic depth. Annihilation of the· aggressor 
and China's victory would be obtained at the 
end of a prolonged war in which the enemy 
would be stifled in depth and drowned in a sea 
of guerrillas. A Sino-Soviet conflict would be 
prolonged and defensive and take place on 
Chinese territory. Strategy and support tactics 
would be implemented in the framework of 
active defence. These tactics would be applied 
over vast areas of Chinese territory and require 
the rapid movement of defence forces to block a 
Soviet invasion of frontier areas such as Xinjian 
and Manchuria. In order to succeed, defence of 
this type should also be capable of preventing a 
surprise attack or the use of better technology 
and disorganise the enemy army's control and 
command. 
33. However, this doctrine has been partly 
abandoned by Chinese strategists, or in any 
event adapted. The last revision of the people's 
war doctrine concentrated mainly on the interest 
of static wars and the need to defend industrial 
bases. 
(i) The PLA is not capable of waging the 
kind of mobile war with rapid move-
ments as close as possible to the fron-
tiers advocated in the people's war 
doctrine. To compensate for the 
PLA's limited mobility and inferiority 
in armaments, the Chinese have to 
organise a defensive stategic war, at 
least in the first stage, the aim at this 
point being to stabilise defence, thus 
forcing the enemy into a prolonged 
war. In a second stage, Chinese forces, 
with the assistance of mobile and 
guerrilla units, might effectively coun-
ter-attack with the support of a 
logistic base situated in safe rear posi-
tions. An air mobile force (a mini 
"Force d'Action Rapide" similar to 
the British air mobile brigade) is now 
being trained. 
(ii) Defence of the industrial bases which 
the PLA expects to afford logistic 
support is also an integral part of the 
people's war. However, implementing 
this new doctrinal approach requires 
sophisticated modem military 
equipment, modem logistics and well-
trained men, otherwise the PLA 
would be reduced to a strategy corre-
sponding more to the traditional defi-
nition of a people's war and this might 
lead to the loss of vital industrial 
areas. 
34. The people's war concept is now 
embedded in a new military doctrine: the peo-
ple's war must be conducted in accordance with 
modem fighting concepts. This is a radical 
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change. It takes into account foreign experience 
in contemporary wars (Soviet Union/ 
Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq) and means transforming 
the armed forces into a regular, modernised 
army and promoting the development of science 
and military technology. Thus, in place of the 
mass army in which people's militias would play 
an important role in the event of national ter-
ritory being invaded, China is introducing a 
regular army in which crack parachute or 
marine units now have an increasing part to 
play. 
35. The ways and means of effecting this 
modernisation will be considered in the next 
chapter and are also illustrated at appendix. 
V. Chinese military policy 
36. The new defence policy was drawn up by 
the party's Military Commission, the National 
Defence Scientific and Technical Committee 
and PLA headquarters staff. 
(a) Modernisation of the military system 
37. The modem fighting concepts referred to 
above imply a complete overhaul of the military 
system. Although modernisation of defence is at 
the bottom of the list of four modemisations, 
the first three - agriculture, industry and partic-
ularly science and technology - clearly play a 
large part in the modernisation of the Chinese 
military system. There are several aspects to 
modernisation: 
(i) Renovation 
38. Renovating the old system and incorpo-
rating sophisticated equipment: China has pur-
chased a large quantity of machine tools 4 in 
order to mass-produce spare parts and even new 
engines for MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighter aircraft. 
It is also renovating its old Soviet T-34 and T-39 
tanks and giving them sights and turrets of a 
new type. 
(ii) Rationalisation 
39. Rationalising the operation of the armed 
forces to make up for an inadequate defence 
budget which in 1988 amounted to 21.8 billion 
yuan ($5.86 billion), i.e. 8.17% of the state 
budget, although forecast to rise in 1989 to 
24.55 billion yuan ($6.60 billion). These figures 
represent only some 0.4% of total world mil-
itary expenditure and, for a country with 20% 
of the world's population, this is very little. It 
4. In this context reference should be made to the con-
current report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions on " Co-ordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) ", Rapporteur: Mr. 
Atkinson. 
may be wondered how such a large country as 
China can run its army with such a low level of 
military expenditure. 
40. There have been several changes in the 
way the army is serviced in order to compensate 
for the shortage of military funds: 
- Consumption turned towards pro-
duction. The PLA's service units are 
trying to increase production and 
reduce the burden on the state, consid-
ering this to be a strategic task. As from 
1985, various hospitals were opened to 
the public, as well as depots, aero-
dromes, ports, factories producing mil-
itary supplies, repair, fuel and other ser-
vices hitherto reserved for the military. 
For instance, 20 million civilian 
patients are treated each year and 1 
million civilians taken into military 
hospitals. Similarly, factories producing 
for the military have manufactured 
several thousand items for civilian use. 
The Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments was invited to visit a 
factory producing shoe polish and 
which employs the wives and daughters 
of officers of the 196th Division and a 
Coca Cola plant being run by the navy 
in Shanghai. The military supply ser-
vices are helping to develop the coun-
try's infrastructure as well, with units of 
engineers, for example, helping to con-
struct railways and roads for local com-
munities (which also has a spin-off in 
reinforcing civil-military relation-
ships). 
- Development of co-operation. Until 
recently, the PLA service units had 
ideas based on a " natural economy ". A 
system was set up according to which it 
was preferable to be self-sufficient and, 
for instance, be treated in one's own 
hospital or stock one's equipment in 
one's own warehouses. However, the 
principles of a market economy have 
made headway, even in the PLA. 
Today, directors of supply services are 
trying to use appropriations in a prof-
itable manner. For instance, units from 
various branches of the armed forces 
procure equipment for joint use from 
supply services close to their units; 
arms for joint use are repaired in work-
shops close to the units and troops are 
treated in the nearest hospitals. 
- Reorganising the old equipment pro-
curement system. The old system was 
irrational since equipment was supplied 
with no real account being taken of the 
troops' requirements. Officers super-
vised supplies but neglected man-
agement. Service units have very 
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recently introduced market economy 
management methods. For instance, 
petrol suppliers pttactice a system of 
responsibility: they give vouchers to 
units which, if not fully used, may be 
exchanged for cash at a fixed rate. 
- Finally, the number of troops has been 
reduced by about one and a half 
million. A million soldiers demobilised 
since 1985 have been rehabilitated, 
which was not easy because there is a 
catastrophic surplus of staff in the 
administration and state or collective 
firms. However, ex-soldiers are given 
priority for employment. 
(iii) Reorganisation 
41. Re-establishment of ranks and 
appointment of younger officers 
The reintroduction of ranks in September 
1988, twenty-three years after they were abol-
ished prior to the outbreak of the cultural revo-
lution (1966-76), was a spectacular step towards 
modernising the military system. Deng 
Xiaoping decided to reintroduce the rank 
system following the semi-failure of the lesson 
China had tried to inflict on Vietnam in retali-
ation for the invasion of Cambodia, the PLA's 
poor performance in the fighting - the first clash 
with a foreign power since the frontier fighting 
with India in 1962 - underlined the need to 
modernise the army. It is not merely a matter of 
flattering the PLA by restoring ranks and glit-
tering uniforms for its officers. Apart from the 
fact that ranks facilitate the exercise of 
command, they allow a system of compulsory 
retirement depending on ~ge and rank to be 
introduced. The operation has thus allowed 
many military staffs to be thinned down and 
many experienced old leaders who had proved 
their worth during the civil war have been over-
taken by modem developments, removed from 
active service, and replaced by younger officers. 
The process was difficult to implement because 
of questions of personal pr~stige and above all 
the material interests at stake: veterans who are 
removed lose all the privileges associated with 
the exercise of power. Similarly, some officers 
have their promotion blocked - particularly 
because of the new emphasis on education and 
specialisation - and especially those who, since 
1959 and above all 1966, owed their rise solely 
to political activism. 
42. Raising the general level of the army, from 
top to bottom 
- In the higher echelons, for a long time, 
the army has been without trained 
officers capable of conducting opera-
tions. The level 10f certain officers 
responsible for political training and 
logistics is so pitiful that, according to 
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an article in the PLA magazine of 
October 1988, the country might be 
without effective leadership in the 
event of war. Consideration is therefore 
being given to organising regular exami-
nations for officers. Those whose 
results are not satisfactory after several 
tests will be reduced in rank. 
- At the lower end of the scale, the 
physical and even mental abilities of 
applicants are far from satisfactory. 
There is currently a recruitment crisis 
in China, the indirect consequence of 
rural decollectivisation: young people 
stay at home where manpower is 
needed. The government's " one child 
per couple " policy may eventually also 
have a long-term effect on recruiting -
although it does seem a paradox to talk 
of a potential " demographic problem " 
in a country with a population of over 
one thousand million people! The PLA, 
which used to recruit the great majority 
of its troops in the country, now 
recruits mainly in very poor areas. It 
must be said that both the troops and 
their officers are something of misfits of 
modernisation. Raised to a pinnacle 
under Mao, they are now almost at the 
bottom of the social scale. In relative 
terms, their material situation is 
steadily declining: their pay (about six 
yuan per month or ten with various 
allowances) has not been revalued. The 
PLA cannot share in the growing wealth 
that the new economic trends allow 
civilians. For all these reasons, there is 
no longer a rush to join the army. 
- Similarly, there is apparently a crisis, or 
rather a serious problem, to be 
overcome in regard to PLA personnel. 
There is talk of improving selection by 
scrutinising young recruits more closely 
since the PLA is proving to be an 
immense hotbed of delinquents. 
According to a recent inquiry by a mil-
itary tribunal, of some 300 soldiers 
tried in recent years almost 70 % had a 
criminal background before joining the 
army. The Council and the Central Mil-
itary Committee have therefore pro-
posed a system of recruitment which 
engages the responsibility of officers 
responsible for selection in their depart-
ments or units. 
(b) China's external policy 
(i) Arms control and disarmament 
43. The new open foreign policy has theoreti-
cally led China to adopt a positive attitude 
towards arms control and its corollary, disarm-
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ament. China has become an apostle of disarm-
ament (cf. the nine-point disarmament proposal 
made by Zhao Ziyang on 21st March 1986), 
endorsing inter alia a general ban on and the 
complete destruction of existing nuclear 
weapons. Disarmament should mainly concern 
the two superpowers whose nuclear arsenals rep-
resent 97% of the world total. China is therefore 
now praising arms control - a process it had 
consistently denounced as a waste of time or, 
worse, as an act of hegemony - considering it to 
be the start of disarmament. 
44. This new approach is demonstrated by its 
participation in the Geneva disarmament con-
ference under United Nations aegis, its ratifi-
cation of the 1984 outer space treaty and its 
joining, the same year, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). It should be recalled that 
its first major initiative was at the Geneva con-
ference in March 1984 when it proposed 
banning and destroying all chemical weapons. 
These initiatives must be seen as a way of 
recognising that the large nations have responsi-
bility for world peace. When it has wider expe-
rience of multilateral arms control negotiations, 
China will perhaps be encouraged to join the 
superpowers' negotiations. 
45. For the time being, however, its arms 
control theories are purely verbal. In practice, 
China is still refusing to participate in arms 
control with the superpowers because it sees no 
need to do so. There is only a minimum 
deterrent force and no thought of building up 
large stocks of nuclear weapons. This strategic 
doctrine of deploying a minimum deterrent 
force implies a wide range of forces but a small 
number of arms in each category, thus allowing 
the PLA to transfer most of its nuclear arms pro-
duction installations to the civil sector. 
46. As it will continue to have comparatively 
few forces, China has no interest in associating 
itself with an arms control process with the 
superpowers, which have a capability for 
overkill. Its position therefore remains that the 
superpowers must first make large reductions in 
their arsenals before other nuclear powers take 
part in arms control. Only then will China con-
sider reductions in proportion to those of the 
superpowers. (A very similar attitude to that of 
France and the United Kingdom.) 
47. Nor does China take part in the European 
arms control process, since European and 
Chinese security are obviously two quite sep-
arate things. It has certainly often said there was 
a link between the two, particularly in its three-
world theory and it has referred to so-called 
co-operation between the third world and 
Europe. Today, however, its opinion is basically 
that Europe is clearly dominated, in a relatively 
balanced manner, by the two superpowers and 
that the European states still attach importance 
to the policies of the superpowers with which 
they are allied. This leaves little room for action 
by outside powers such as China. However, 
these theories are out of step, not to say in con-
tradiction, with practice, as will be seen from a 
brief glance at Chinese capabilities, nuclear 
included. 
(ii) Chinese nuclear capability 
48. China, which tested its first atomic bomb 
only in 1964, developed nuclear weapons with 
impressive efficiency, producing the hydrogen 
bomb and more than adequate launchers and 
multiple warheads more quickly than nations 
that preceded it. China's nuclear forces have 
avoided the financial cuts imposed on the rest of 
the PLA. China does not seem prepared to 
reduce the growth rate of its nuclear power; on 
the contrary, expenditure on research and devel-
opment have risen steadily since 1978. 
49. There does, however, seem to be a slight 
slowing down in weapon production at present. 
For example, the 60 CSS-1 (medium-range bal-
listic missiles) belonging to the Strategic Rocket 
Forces are no longer operational. First intro-
duced in 1970, with a range of 1 200 km, and 
probably a 20 kiloton warhead, the CSS-1 does 
not have an obvious successor at present. There 
is as yet no sign of the second Xia-class SSBN 
becoming operational, let alone any further 
vessels of a supposedly 4-strong class. (Mr. 
Frank Caducei, when United States Secretary of 
Defence, was reportedly shown the outside of 
the first Xia.) Whether the problem at present is 
one of submarine development or of the missile 
delivery system concerned remains to be deter-
mined. Details of nuclear capability are given at 
appendix to this report. 
(iii) China's arms trade 
50. China, which has been regularly repre-
sented at international exhibitions for several 
years, has a special interest in the arms trade. In 
1984, its exports of defence equipment 
amounted to $1.66 billion, or almost 7% of its 
total exports. The figure has since fallen slightly, 
mainly because of the ending of the Iran-Iraq 
war. According to the cash value of world arms 
exports, China is in fifth place behind the Soviet 
Union, the United States, France and the 
United Kingdom. Because the cost of munitions 
exported by China is very low, it exports far 
more by quantity than countries at the top of the 
list. 
51. China exports a great deal to the third 
world, thus allowing it to increase its influence 
in international affairs. In the early eighties, 
Deng Xiaoping set up an organisation called 
China North Industries Corporation (Norinco) 
to sell arms to the third world in order to bring 
in the currency necessary for importing 
advanced technology equipment. The results 
were soon spectacular. The principal importing 
countries include Albania, North Korea, Egypt, 
179 
DOCUMENT 1203 
Algeria, Zaire, Sudan, Tanzania, some Latin 
American countries, etc. Ohina also exports to 
the Gulf countries, which sparks off reactions, 
particularly in the case of its arms sales to Saudi 
Arabia (to which medium-range CSS-2 missiles 
have been sold). China also exports missile 
launchers to various Middle Eastern countries 
which have the capability of manufacturing 
chemical weapons. 
52. More particularly, from 1981 to 1988, 
China was one of the main supporters of both 
sides in the war between Iran and Iraq, behind 
the Soviet Union and Western Europe. By 1985, 
China had signed a $1 500 million contract with 
Iraq before signing another with Iran, worth 
$1 600 million. This contract covered the sale of 
arms and aircraft for the next two years and 
included twelve F-6 fighter aircraft and 200 
T-59 tanks, as well as rocket-launching anti-tank 
guns and the famous Silkworm anti-shipping 
missiles. The outbreak of peace in the Gulf was 
certainly bad for Chinese business: almost 70 % 
of its arms exports in the last six years were to 
Iran and Iraq. 
VI. China's defence system 
(a) Human resources 
(i) Organisation and structure of the army 
53. All the country's armed forces are inte-
grated within the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA). Government and party control is exer-
cised through two main military commissions, 
both chaired by Deng Xiaoping: the Central Mil-
itary Commission of the National People's Con-
gress and the Military Commission of the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. 
The party committee is the traditional 
instrument for party control of military affairs. 
The Ministry of National Defence controls the 
PLA. A National Defence Science, Technology 
and Industry Commission supervises weapons 
research and development and co-ordination of 
the defence industry with the civilian industrial 
base. 
54. The PLA has three , main departments: 
General Staff, General Logistics and General 
Political. The General Staff in turn controls the 
service arms. The force commands are Air 
Force, Navy, Artillery, Armour, Engineering, 
Communications, Nuclear/Biological Chemical 
and Strategic Rockets (called the Second 
Artillery Corps). The nav~ consists of three 
fleets: East Sea, North Sea and South Sea. 
55. There are three levels of forces in the 
Chinese army. 
- Main forces, under the direct opera-
tional command of the General Staff, 
are capable of intervening in any part of 
the territory. After restructuring, they 
theoretically have some twenty armies 
known as Jituanjun and some fifteen 
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independent divisions. The Jituanjun 
appeared for the first time in 1986. 
Their chain of command varies but 
they have an average of 60 000 men 
each. The divisions (of which there are 
about a hundred in the ground forces) 
have an average of 10 000 men each. 
- Local or regional forces are under 
regional command. They operate only 
within their own military region. They 
have a total of about eighty divisions 
plus about a hundred independent regi-
ments. 
- Ground forces are controlled through 
the country's armed forces which are all 
integrated in the PLA. The Ministry of 
Defence is an essential cog in the 
administration. 
- Operational ground forces are con-
trolled through seven military regions, 
each having responsibility for twenty-
eight provincial-level military districts. 
Until June 1985, there were eleven mil-
itary regions; following the important 
meeting of the Central Military Com-
mission at that time, the former Wuhan 
military region was merged with Jinan, 
Lanzhou with Xinjiang and Chengdu 
with Kunming and Fuzhou. The 
reorganisation, along with the 
reduction in staff officers, was aimed at 
easing centralisation of command. 
- Some armies are now being reorganised 
into group armies and transformed into 
integrated units. These are new inte-
grated, combined-arms units which are 
intended to replace the traditional field 
armies. 
(ii) Composition, inventory 
56. The Chinese army is numerically the 
strongest in the world with 3 200 000 men, of 
which 1 300 000 conscripts. 
57. The army is by far the strongest of the 
three components of the People's Liberation 
Army. It has 2 300 000 men of which about 
1 100 000 conscripts. 
58. There are 300 000 men in the navy 
(including the naval air forces and coast guard) 
and 470 000 in the air force. 
59. China also has 1 200 000 reservists. There 
are 12 million men in the para-military forces, 
including the police. 
60. Military service is by selective con-
scription for men and women between 18 and 
22 years of age and lasts three years for the 
army, five for the navy and four for the air force. 
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(b) Material resources 
61. According to the Military Balance 
( 1989-90), the army has 9 000 heavy tanks, 
2 000 light tanks, 14 500 pieces of artillery and 
2 800 armoured troop carriers. (See 
Appendix.) 
62. The navy reportedly has a new anti-ship, 
supersonic long-range sea-skimming missile of 
Chinese design to be commissioned in 1989. 
The navy still seems confined to a coastal 
defence role although there are rumours of the 
imminent start of work on an aircraft carrier. 
Until that is commissioned, the four Han 
nuclear submarines now in service will remain 
the spearhead of the navy. 
63. New frigates launched recently are 
equipped with Exocet-type ship-to-ship missiles 
and some of the new vessels also boast United 
States-built LM-2500 turbine engines. A few 
destroyers have been issued with Hangqi 
surface-to-surface missiles while selected frigates 
now have the Haiying 4 surface-to-surface 
missile that is an improved version of the Soviet 
Styx. During the tremendous reception laid on 
for the committee by the Chinese Navy near 
Shanghai in May (all ships dressed overall, crews 
smartly turned out and " lining the side ", red 
carpets everywhere), members were able to visit 
one of the latest Luda-class destroyers (the 
" WUHU "), a Romeo-type conventional sub-
marine (the " CHANG CHENG "), an anti-
submarine corvette (the "SUN HANG" ), and 
" Mine-sweeper 082 ". All vessels, even the 
mine-sweeper, are equipped for mine-laying - a 
role which has been largely neglected of late in 
western navies. 
64. All the vessels we saw were very modern 
in construction and their crews appeared to be 
smart, well-trained and with good morale. 
Nevertheless, the very limited space available in 
the operations room and the quality of the 
command, control and communications 
equipment must cast doubt on the effectiveness 
of the surface ships either in modern war opera-
tions or in the possibility of being modernised to 
make them more capable warships. 
65. The air force, with almost half a million 
men ( 4 70 000), has only 9 000 aircraft. The tech-
nology of many of these aircraft dates back to 
the fifties. There is not yet an inflight refuelling 
capability but China is planning to adapt the 
H-6D medium-range bomber (the Chinese 
version of the Badger TU-16) for the inflight 
refuelling of the A-5 Fantan-A attack aircraft. A 
protocol of agreement has been signed with the 
British firm Flight Refuelling. The air force now 
has the ability to make rapid short-term deploy-
ments using medium-range transport aircraft 
and helicopters but long-range deployment is 
still impossible. Furthermore, it can operate 
only in daylight and good weather as it has only 
out-of-date interceptors and ground installa-
tions. Only the F-6 Fantan fighter carries an 
effective radar system. 
66. Currently much attention is being 
devoted to the modernisation of the radar net-
works and communications systems together 
with improvements to the long-range tracking 
stations in Shanxi and Gansu. There is also a 
shortage of anti-tank airborne weapons but the 
120 H-6 (Tupolev 16) bombers are well-
maintained in readiness to carry nuclear bombs 
in their role of deterrent. The air forces are also 
in charge of the major deterrent - the 66 stra-
tegic land-based nuclear missiles. Although the 
Chinese have at long last produced effective 
solid fuel that now powers the Dong Feng (East 
Wind) and carries a megaton warhead over a 
range of 13 000 km, the other missiles still use 
liquid fuel which requires a long time - around 
36 hours - to make them operational. 
VII. Conclusions 
67. This was your Rapporteur's third visit to 
China, but this particular visit, because of the 
magnitude of the events which coincided with 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments' presence, was by far the most fasci-
nating. All members of the committee could not 
fail to be impressed by the tremendous progress 
which has taken place in China in recent years. 
Definite progress in economic and material 
terms, from the obvious prosperity of the " man 
on the Shanghai omnibus " to the very interna-
tional standards of the newly-built hotels 
resulting from various successful joint ventures. 
It was, therefore, very difficult with this sort of 
background to understand the depth of Chinese 
reaction to their students' desire for dialogue 
and change. Except that, on one particular 
occasion during the committee's visit, it was 
very evident that such dialogue is certainly not 
the norm in Chinese society. A seminar on arms 
control held at the Shanghai Institute of Interna-
tional Studies was one of the highlights of the 
visit. The discussion was free-ranging and 
everybody present contributed to the exchange 
of views. The only point, however, which obvi-
ously perplexed our hosts was that on our side 
we certainly did not speak with the one voice 
they expected from one institution - far from it, 
in fact, when the vexed subject of short-range 
nuclear weapons was discussed! 
68. Your Rapporteur's hope for the future 
might be that more such sessions and exchanges 
would be beneficial for mutual understanding. 
Economic change and progress is all very well, 
as we Europeans are especially aware, but a 
dearth of political discussion and awareness, at 
least amongst those in positions of responsi-
bility, is disastrous. 
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69. The draft recommendations formulated at 
the beginning of this report reflect the con-
tinuing realities of the relationship between 
Western Europe and China - a relationship 
which has suffered because of the aftermath of 
the events the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments saw with its own eyes. 
70. We must now take up the links between us 
again, although perhaps keeping more firmly in 
the forefront of our minds the internal events 
which have shaped modem China, such as the 
behaviour by the" Gang of Four" and the Red 
Guards, the " Cultural Revolution " and now 
the massacre all the world, except the Chinese 
Government, believes took place in Tiananmen 
Square last June. 
71. Your Rapporteur is convinced never-
theless that there should be further convergence 
between Western Europe and China when it 
comes to consideration of arms control and dis-
armament on a wider scale 1than the present dis-
cussions in Vienna: there is much more room 
here for agreement and a common position for 
the longer term, as we have similar interests. 
72. In sum our relationship with China must 
develop in spite of the problems. We still need 
to show our own interest in the area of the 
Chinese sphere of interest and in establishing 
contacts at all levels, economic, political, cul-
tural, just as the Chinese themselves have made 
considerable efforts to allow some part of their 
population access to western language and 
culture. Let us hope that they will continue that 
trend now. 
VIII. Postscript 
Hong Kong and. Macau 
73. The preceding analysis of the Western 
European relationship with China would not be 
complete without mention of the special 
interests of the United Kingdom concerning 
Hong Kong and Portugal concerning Macau. 
Both territories are scheduled to be integrated 
into the People's Republic of China - Hong 
Kong in 1997, Macau in 1999. At the end of the 
committee's visit to China, members were 
kindly received by the Governor of Hong Kong 
on the day after one million Hong Kong resi-
dents had marched through the streets to voice 
their concern over events on the Chinese 
mainland. Portuguese parliamentarians, 
observers present with the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, would have 
travelled to Macau for discussions had not a 
typhoon disrupted communications. 
74. There can be no doubt that the commu-
nities of both Hong Kong and Macau have legit-
imate cause for concern and worry as to what 
might befall them in the 21st century. While 
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members of the committee were impressed with 
the attempts of local officials and especially the 
military to ensure that life in Hong Kong is not 
totally disrupted in the intervening period (for 
example because of illegal immigration or 
problems with Vietnamese boat people), your 
Rapporteur must record the committee's serious 
doubts as to whether enough effort is being 
made to reassure the local populations by the 
national capitals concerned. The solution may 
well be to bring the problems before a wider 
audience and seek help from such bodies as the 
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European Community or the Commonwealth, 
particularly for those people who do not wish to 
remain in Hong Kong and Macau after 1997 or 
1999. 
75. The committee is aware of the problems 
also for the governments concerned in negoti-
ating the necessary agreements with the Chinese 
authorities - a particular imperative which 
underlines the central theme of the present 
report: the renewal of links between Western 
Europe and China is essential. 
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APPENDIX 
Military data 
Personnel 
Chairman, Military Commission: Deng Xiaoping 
Vice-Chairman, Military Commission: Ye Jianying 
Vice-Chairman, Military Commission: Xu Xiangqian 
Vice-Chairman, Military Commission: Nie Rongzhen 
Executive Vice-Chairman, Secretary-General, Military Commission: Yang Shangkun 
Vice-Secretary-General, Military Commission and Chief-of-Staff: Yang Dezhi 
Vice-Secretary-General (Minister of National Defence): Zhang Aiping 
Vice-Secretary-General, Chief, General Political Dept.: Yu Qiuli 
Vice-Secretary-General, Head, General Logistics Dept.: Hong Xuezhi 
Commander, PLA Navy: Ma Xinchun 
Commander, PLA Air Force: Wang Hai 
Commander, Second Artillery Corps (Strategic Rocket Force): He Jinheng 
Commander, Beijing Region: Qin Jiwei 
Commander, Chengdu Region: Fu Quanyou 
Commander, Guangzhou Region: You Taizhong 
Commander, Jinan Region: Li Jiulong 
Commander, Lanzhou Region: Zhao Xianshun 
Commander, Nanjing Region: Xiang Shouzhi 
Commander, Shenyang Region: Liu Jingsong 
Ministry of Defence, Beijing 
Total armed forces 
Active: some 3 200 000 (perhaps 1 350 000 conscripts), being reduced 
Reserves: 1 200 000+ including military and militia reserves 
Paramilitary forces 
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These forces comprise three parts: the Militia (Ministry of Defence), Ordinary Militia and 
People's Armed Police Force (Ministry of Security). 
Militia (Ministry of Defence) 
This force is further broken down into three elements: the Basic Militia, composed of some 
4 300 000 personnel; the Armed Militia, composed of men and women aged 18 to 28 years and 
who serve with Regular Forces for 30-40 day periods each year; and a Maritime Militia with its 
own armed trawlers and an air defence component. 
Ordinary Militia 
Some 6 000 000 personnel aged 18 to 35 years. Generally not armed. 
People's Armed Police Force (Ministry of Security) 
Composed of former soldiers and personnel transferred from Local Forces divisions. Comprise 
Internal Defence divisions and 30 independent regiments. Perform border security, patrol and 
internal security duties. 
Available manpower 
291 558 000; 162 738 000 fit for military service (est.). 
Service period 
Selective conscription: 
Army, marines: 3 years; air force: 4 years; navy: 5 years (technical volunteers can serve 8 to 12 
more years to maximum age 35) 
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Annual military expenditure 
1987: $5.64 billion 
1988: $5.86 billion 
APPENDIX 
N.B. The defence expenditure given above is, in all likelihood, grossly understated. This is 
because Chinese budgetary methods are not known in detail in the West and because China does not 
include personnel costs and research and development costs in its official figures. 
Defence budget 
1989: $6.60 billion 
Alliances and organisations 
IACO, IAEA, Seabeds Committee, United Nations and various others. There is a 30-year treaty 
of alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union; a mutual defence agreement with North Korea dating 
from 1961, with an agreement to provide free military aid, and non-aggression pacts with Afghanistan, 
Burma and Cambodia. 
Strategic forces 
Offensive: 
1. Land-based missiles 
These are organised in 6 or 7 divisions, regiments and battalions, by type of missile. 
Equipment: ICBM: Total: 8 - 2 DF-5 (CSS-4) with a 5 megaton warhead and a 12 900 km 
range; 6 DF-4 (CSS-3) with a 3 megaton warhead and a 7 000 km range; . 
IRBM: 60 DF-3 (CSS-2), 2 megaton, 2 700 km range; 
MRBM: 50 DF-2 (CSS-1), 20 kiloton, 1 100 km range (may now be retiring). 
2. Submarines and SLBM 
1 Xia-class SSBN with 12 CSS-N-3 (J-1) with one 2 megaton warhead, estimated range 2 200 
to 3 000 km. 
N.B.: Production of Chinese SSBN is continuing, but extremely slowly. A further 3 Xia-class 
are under construction. 
Defensive: 
(a) Tracking stations: Xinjiang (covers central Asia) and Shanxi (northern border with USSR 
and Mongolia); and some limited anti-ship capability (shipbome). 
(b) Phased-array radar complex. Ballistic missile early warning; and air force air defence system 
of some 4 000 air force and navy fighters, some 100 Honggi-2 HQ-2J (SA-2 type) SAM units 
and more than 16 000 AA guns and a civil defence shelter and evacuation system in the 
capital and other major cities. 
(a) Army battle order 
Manpower 
2 300 000 (perhaps 1 075 000 conscripts) - reductions continue 
Service period 
3 years, conscription 
Organisation 
Main forces: 7 military regions (divided into 28 military districts (MDs)), 3 garrison commands 
22 Integrated Group Armies (GAs), comprising: 
- 80 infantry divisions 
- 10 mechanised armoured divisions 
- 5-6 field and AA artillery divisions 
- some independent artillery, AA regiments 
- 50 independent engineer regiments 
- aviation: helicopter group reported 
- AB (manned by air force): 1 corps of 3 divisions, 1 independent division, support troops 
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Deployment 
The army is believed to be deployed in-country as follows: 
North: Beijing Military Region (MR): 5 GA, 3 armoured, 17 infantry, 1 missile division, 1 air-
borne division 
North-East: Shenyang MR: 4 GA, 4 armoured, 16 infantry, 2 missile divisions 
East: 
South: 
Nanjing MR: 3 GA, 1 armoured, 11 infantry divisions 
Guangzhou MR: 2 GA, 10 infantry divisions 
West: Lanzhou MR: 2 GA, 1 armoured, 9 infantry, 2 missile divisions 
South-West: Chengdu MR: 3 GA, 10 infantry, 1 missile division 
Central: 
Equipment 
MBT (9000): 
Jinan MR: 2 GA, 1 armoured, 7 infantry, 3 airborne divisions 
T-54, 6 000 Type-59, 80 T-69 (mod Type-59); (not including T-69 11, which is export 
only), Type-79/-80 reported 
Light tanks ( 1 200): 
Type-62, 800 Type-63 amphibious 
APC (2 800): 
Type-531 C/-0/-E, Type-85 (YW-531H), Type-55 (BTR-40), -56 (BTR-152), -63, Type-
77-1/-2 (Soviet BTR-50PK amphibious); Type-523 
Towed artillery (14 500): 
SP Artillery: 
MRL (1 250): 
Mortars: 
SSM: 
ATGW: 
RCL: 
RL: 
100 mm: Type-59 (fd/ ATK), Type-86 
122 mm: Type-54, Type-60, Type-83, D-30 
130 mm: Types-59/-59-1 
152 mm: Type-54, Type-66 
122 mm: Type-54-1 (Type-531 chassis), YW-302 
152 mm: Type-83 
107 mm: Types-63 towed /-81 SP (being replaced by 122 mm) 
122 mm: Type-81, Type-81 mine-layer, Type-83, Type-85 
130 mm: Type-63, Type-70 SP, Type-82 
132 mm: BM-13-16 
140 mm: BM-14-16 
273 mm: Type-83 
284 mm: Type-7 4 mine-layer 
320 mm: WSl 
425 mm: Type-762 mine clearance 
82 mm: Type-53, W2-304 SP 
120 mm: Type-55, W-86, WZ-381 SP 
160 mm: Type-56 
launchers: M-9 (range 600 km) 
M-11 (range 120-150 km) (under development- in service c. 1989) 
HJ-73 (Sagger-type), HJ-8 (TOW/Milan-type) 
75 mm: Type-52, 56 
82 mm: Type-65 
90 mm: Type-51 
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ATK guns: 
57 mm: Type-55 
76 mm: Type-54 
100 mm: Type-7 3 
AD guns (15 000): 
SAM: 
Manpower 
12.7 mm: Types-54, -77 
14.5 mm: Types-75, -75-1 towed, Types-56, -58, -80 twin SP 
23 mm: (ZSU-23 type) 
37 mm: Types-55/-65/-74, -63 twin SP 
57 mm: Types-59, -80 SP 
85 mm: Type-56 
100 mm: Type-59 
HN-5, HN-5N-C (SA-7 type) 
HQ-61 twin SP 
(b) Naval battle order 
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260 000 officers and men, including coast defence, marines and naval air (some 35 000 con-
scripts). 
Reserves 
About 177 000 reservists, including navy and marines. 
Service period 
5 years. 
Fleet 
- Submarines (93): 
Strategic submarines: 1 Xia SSBN with CSS-N-3 SLBM 
Tactical submarines (92): 
SSN: 4 Han with 533 mm TT 
SSG: 1 modified Romeo (Type ES5G), with 6 C-801 (YJ-6, Exocet derivative) SSM; 
plus 533 mm TT 
SS (87): 3 improved Ming (Type ES5E) with 533 mm TT 
84 Romeo (Type ES3B) with 533 mm TT 
20 Whiskey with 533 mm and 406 mm TT 
(N.B. probably only about half the older Romeo and Whiskey classes fully opera-
tional) 
Other roles: 1 Golf (SLBM trials) 
-Principal surface combatants (53): 
Destroyers (19): 
- 1 new construction (possibly Wuhan-B) (ASUW) with 8 x C-801 SSM, 1 Z-9A (Fr Dauphin) 
bel (OTHT), 1 x 100 mm gun 
- 16 Luda (Type-051) (ASUW) with 2 x 3 CSS-N-2 (HY-2 Styx derivative Silkworm) SSM, 2 x 2 
130 mm guns; plus 2 x 12 ASW RL ( 1 modernised with 8 x C-80 1 vice C-SSN 2, bel deck vice 
after 2 x 130 mm gun) 
- 2 Anshan (Soviet Gordy) with 2 x 2 CSS-N-2 SSM, 2 x 2 130 mm guns 
Frigates (37): 
26 Jianghu; 4 variants: 
- About 13 Type I, with 4 x ASW RL, plus 2 x 2 CSS-N-2, 2 x 2 100 mm guns 
- About 9 Type 11, with 2 x 5 ASW RL, plus 2 x 2 CSS-N-2, 2 x 2 100 mm guns 
- About 2 Type Ill, with 2 x 3 ASTT, plus 8 x C-801 SSM, 2 x 2 100 mm guns 
- About 2 Type IV, with 1 Z-9A bel, 2 x 5 ASW RL, 2 x CSS-N-2 SSM, 2 x 100 mm guns 
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2 Jiangdong with 2 x ASW RL, 2 x 2 100 mm guns 
5 Jiangnan with 2 x ASW RL, 3 x 100 mm guns 
4 Chengdu with 1 x 2 CSS-N-2 SSM, 3 x 100 mm guns 
-Patrol and coastal combatants (about 915): 
Corvettes: 
about 10 miscellaneous WW2 (and earlier) escorts 
Missile craft (215): 
125 Huangfent/Hola (Soviet Osa-type) with 4 x CSS-N-2 or 8 x C-801 SSM 
90 Hegu/Hema (Komar-Type) with 2 x CSS-N-2 or 4 x C-801 SSM 
Torpedo craft (about 160): 
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100 Huchuan, 60 P-6, 20 P-4 all under 100 tons with 2 x 533 mm TT (more in store) 
Patrol (about 540): 
Coastal (110): 10 Haijui (improved Hainan) 
90 Hainan with 4 x ASW RL 
10 Kronshtadt with 2 x ASW RL 
Inshore (380): 290 Shanghai, about 90 under 100 tons 
Riverine (50): all under 100 tons 
- Mine warfare (56): 
Mine-layers: none dedicated, but Luda, Anshan, Jiangnan and Chengdu class DD/FF and Hainan 
Kronshtadt and Shanghai PC have mine-laying capability 
MCM (56) : 35 Soviet T-43 MSO 
1 new construction MSI Hull No 4422 
20 Fushun MSI; plus about 60 unmanned drone MSI under 100 tons 
- Amphibious (58): 
3 Yukan LST, capacity about 200 tps, 10 tk 
13 Shan LST, capacity about 150 tps, 16 tk 
30 Yuliang, 4 Yuling, 4 Yudao LSM capacity about 100 tps, 3 tk 
6 Qiong Sha LSI, capacity 400 tps 
10 Hua (US LSM-1), capacity 25 tps, 4 tk 
Plus about 400 craft: 320 LCU, 40 LCP, 10 LCT and some hovercraft 
-Support and miscellaneous (104): 
3 Fuqing AOR, 25 support AO, 1 AFS, 8 submarine support, 2 repair, 
11 transport, 35 survey/research/experimental, 2 ice-breakers, 17 ocean tugs 
Coastal regional thfence forces (27 000) 
35 independent artillery and SSM regiments deployed in 25 coastal defence 1regions with forces 
disposed to protect naval bases, offshore islands and other vulnerable points. 
Guns 85 mm, 100 mm, 130 mm 
SSM CSS-N-2 (HY-2) 
Marines (naval infantry) (some 6 000) 
1 brigade 
special reconnaissance units 
Reserves 
On mobilisation to total 8 divisions (24 infantry, 8 tanks, 8 artillery regiments). 
(3 army divisions also have an amphibious role.) 
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Equipment 
MBT: 
Light tanks: 
APC: 
Artillery: 
MRL: 
T-59 
T-60/-63, PT-76 
Type-531, LVT; some Type-77 
how: 122 mm: Type-54 (including -54-1 SP) 
Type-63 
Naval air force (25 000) 
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Some 894 shore-based combat aircraft, 55 armed helicopters; organised in 3 bomber, 6 fighter 
divisions including: 
Bombers: some 50 H-6, some H-6D reported with C-601 anti-ship ALCM 
about 130 H-5 torpedo-carrying light bombers 
FGA: some 100 Q-5 
Fighters: some 600 including J-5/-6/-7 
Reconnaissance: H-5 
MR/ASW: 10 ex-Soviet Be-6 Madge, 4 PS-5 (Y-8 mod) 
Helicopters: 50 Z-5, 12 SA-321 ASW, 1 Z-9A on trial 
Miscellaneous: some 60 light transport aircraft; JJ-5/-6 training aircraft 
ALCM: FL-1/C-601 
Naval fighters are integrated into the national AD system. 
Deployment and bases 
North Sea Fleet: Coastal defence from Korean border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungan; 
equates to Shenyang, Beijing and Jinan Military Regions and seaward. Bases: Quingdao (CinC), Dalian 
(Luda), Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan. 9 coastal defence districts. Forces: 2 submarine, 3 escort, 1 mine 
warfare, 1 amphibious squadron; plus Bohai Gulf training flotillas. About 300 patrol and coastal com-
batants. 
East Sea Fleet: Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan; equates to Nanjing 
Military Region and seaward. Bases: Shanghai (CinC), Wusong, Dinghai, Hangshou. 7 coastal defence 
districts. Forces: 2 submarine, 2 escort, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious squadron. About 250 patrol and 
coastal combatants. Marines: 1 cadre division. Coastal defence regional forces: Nanjing, Fuzhou 
coastal districts. 
South Sea Fleet: Coastal defence from Dongshan to Vietnam border; equates to Guangzhou Mil-
itary Region, and seaward (including Paracels and Spratly Islands). Bases: Zhanjiang (CinC), Shantou, 
Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai, Huangpu; plus outposts on Paracel and Spratly Islands. 9 coastal 
defence districts. Forces: 2 submarine, 2 escort, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious squadron. About 300 
patrol and coastal combatants. Marines: 1 brigade. 
(c) Air force battle order 
Manpower 
470 000 (including strategic forces and 220 000 air defence personnel) (160 000 conscripts). 
Service period 
4 years. 
Organisation 
7 Military Air Regions, HQ Beijing. 
Some 5 000 combat aircraft, no armed helicopters. 
Combat element organised in armies of varying numbers of air divisions (each with 3 regiments 
of 3 squadrons of 3 flights of 4-5 aircraft, 1 maintenance unit, some transport and training aircraft). 
Medium 
bombers: 120 H-6 (some may be nuclear-capable) 
Some carry C-601 msl; some others to be converted to tankers 
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Light bombers: some 250-300 H-5 (some with C-801 msl) 
FGA: 500 Q-5 
Fighters: 4 000 including 400 J-5, some 60 regiments with about 3 000 J~6/B/D/E, 250 J-7 I 
J-7M, 30 J-8 
Reconnaissance: 130 J-5, 90 JZ-6 (J-6 variant), 40 HZ-5 (H-5 variant) aircraft 
Transport: some 420 including 300 Y-5, 20 Y-7, 20 Y-8, Y-11, Y-12, ex-Soviet Li-2, 11-14, 11-18 
(to be retired), 18 BAe, Trident (2-lE, 16-2E) 
Helicopters: 400 including Z-5/-6, Z-9, Alouette Ill, SA-321, 4 Bell 214-ST, 6 AS-332, 24 S-70 
(serviceability uncertain) 
Trainers: (some OCU) including CJ-5/-6 (mod CJ-5), J-2, JJ-2, JJ-4/-5/-6, HJ-5 
Missiles: 
AA artillery: 
Major air bases 
AAM: PL-2/-2A, PL-5B Atoll-type, PL-7 
ASM: (anti-ship): C-601, subsonic ALCM (perhaps HY-2 SSM derivative); C-801 
surface skimmer 
16 divisions: 16 000 57 mm, 85 mm and 100 mm guns 
28 independent AD regiments (100 SAM units with HQ-2, -2J (CSA-1), -61 SAM) 
Canton, Changsha, Chengchiao, Chienchiao, Fuzhou, Hsincheng, Hungchiao, Kwangchan, 
Kunming, Liencheng, Lhassa, Luchiao, Nanhai, Nanking, Peking, Pingtang, Shenyang, Sian, Tenghai, 
Tzaochiao, Wuhan. 
Paramilitarp (some 12 000 000) 
Ministry of Public Security: People's Armed Police ( 1 830 000). 
29 divisions, 1 029 border/mountain/internal defence. 
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Abbreviations used 
AA anti-aircraft 
AD air defence 
AF stores ship(s) with RAS capability 
ALCM air-launched cruise missile(s) 
AO tanker(s) with RAS capability 
AOT tanker(s) without RAS capability 
APC armoured personnel carrier(s) 
AS submarine depot-ship(s) 
ASM air-to-surface missile(s) 
ASTT anti-submarine TT 
A TGW anti-tank guided weapon(s) 
ATK anti-tank 
FGA fighter(s), ground-attack 
GA Chinese Integrated Group Army 
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile(s) 
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile(s) 
LCP landing craft, personnel 
LCT landing craft, tank 
LCVP landing craft, vehicles and personnel 
LCU landing craft, utility 
LSM landing ship(s), mechanised 
LST landing ship(s), tank 
MBT main battle tank(s) 
MCMV mine counter-measures vessel(s) 
MD Military District(s) 
MR maritime reconnaissance (or motor rifle) 
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile(s) 
MRL multiple rocket launcher(s) 
MSC/I/O mine-sweeper(s), coastal/inshore/offshore 
OCU operational conversion unit(s) 
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting 
RAS replenishment at sea 
RCL recoilless launcher(s) 
RL rocket launcher(s) 
SAM surface-to-air missile(s) 
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile(s) 
SP self-propelled 
SS submarine(s) 
SSB ballistic-missile submarine(s) 
SSBN nuclear-fuelled SSB 
SSGN SSN with dedicated non-ballistic missile launchers 
SSM surface-to-surface missile(s) 
SSN nuclear-fuelled submarine(s) 
tk tank(s) 
tps troop(s) 
TT torpedo tube(s) 
Reproduced from: 
IISS Military Balance 1989-90 
Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1987-88 
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE -
President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China 
and members of the State Council 
(April 1989) 
President et Vice-President de la Republique Populaire de Chine 
et Membres du Conseil des Affaires d'Etat 
(A vril 1989) 
APPENDIX 
President de la Republique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y ANG SHANGKUN 
President 
[il ~ liJ .3:. JfC 
Vice-President de la Republique 
Vice-President 
* 
00 ~ F.;t l~~' jJ 
* * * 
Premier Ministre ....................................................... . 
Premier of the State Council 
ltl ~' ~ 
Vice-Premier Ministre .................................................. . 
Vice-Premier of the State Council 
ltl,~, ~ 
Vice-Premier Ministre .................................................. . 
Vice-Premier of the State Council 
ltl,~, jJ 
Vice-Premier Ministre .................................................. . 
Vice-Premier of the State Council 
[il~~.bl 
Conseiller d'Etat ....................................................... . 
State Councillor, State Council 
~ ~ 1~ 
QIN JIWEI, 
·* 
it 
SONG JIAN, 
i~ *~ 
zou JIAHUA, 
~* $ fp1 
CHEN XITONG, 
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LI TIEYING 
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WANG BINGQIAN 
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WANG FANG 
* ·~ LI GUIXIAN 
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CHEN JUNSHENG 
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00 9}-~ ~· 41 * ~* ~ ~ 
SecnStaire General du Conseil des Affaires d'Etat ......................... . CHEN JUNSHENG 
Secretary-General (cumul) 
7}~~~* ~ # 
'* Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres ......................................... . QM.N QICHEN 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
00 Fhfi5~*: ~ £ 111 
Ministre de la Defense Nationale......................................... QIN JIWEI (cumul) 
Minister of National Defence 
President de la Commission d'Etat pour les Sciences et les Techniques...... SONG JIAN (cumul) 
Minister in charge of State Scientific and Technical Commission 
00 * t1- ~ ~;;it J: ~ ~ Yl ~ .3:. 11: 
President de la Commission Scientifique, Technique et Industrielle pour la 
Defense Nationale ..................................................... . 
Minister in charge of National Defence Scientific, Technical and Industry Com-
mission 
M:~f.Dt7CJ:~1ff5~* 
Ministre des Industries Aeronautique et Spatiale 
Minister of Aeronautics 
T ~ ~ 
DING HENGGAO 
* 
-==- ;i!f. /1' 7ft 
LIN ZONGTANG 
~7}~)1FJ'i~~~* ~ =fp" ~ 
Ministre des Relations Economiques et Commerciales avec l'Etranger . . . . . . . ZHENG TUBIN 
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
~~~-$*: #P ~ ~ 
Ministre du Materiel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIU SUINIAN 
Minister of Equipment 
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Amendment 1 
Western European security: defence implications 
of the People's Republic of China's 
evolving geopolitical situation 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Pontillon and others 
4th December 1989 
1. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add " in accordance with the 
objectives fixed at the time of the Paris conference in August 1989 ". 
I. See 12th sitting, 7th December 1989 (amendment agreed to). 
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Signed: Pontillon, Bassinet, Stoffelen 
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Amendments 2, 3 and 4 
Western European security: defence implications 
of the People's Republic of China's 
evolving geopolitical situation 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Bindig and others 
4th December 1989 
2. At the end of paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert " and pointing 
out that all member states of the United Nations, by their membership of that organisation, have sol-
emnly committed themselves before the international community to respect in the conduct of their 
internal affairs the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 
3. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert the following 
new paragraph: 
"(iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government to promote the country's 
economic and social development can be achieved only if civil and political rights are developed 
to the same extent; " 
4. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph: 
" 1. Request the Chinese Government to accede to the two Human Rights Covenants of the 
United Nations, i.e. the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; " 
and renumber the following paragraphs accordingly. 
Signed: Bindig, Stoffelen, Tummers, Antretter, Soell, Blunck, Pfuhl 
I. See 12th sitting, 7th December 1989 (amendments 2 and 4 agreed to; amendment 3 negatived). 
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Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) 
- reply to the annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Steiner, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
RAPPORTEUR'S PREFACE 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
6th November 1989 
on force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential)- reply to 
the annual report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Steiner, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Force comparisons: quantity/quality 
(i) Conventional forces 
(a) Ground forces 
(b) Air forces 
(c) Naval forces 
(d) Regional considerations 
(ii) Chemical weapons 
(iii) Nuclear weapons 
(a) Short- and intermediate-range weapons 
(b) Strategic weapons 
(iv) Level and use of resources 
(a) Population, industrial development, technology 
(b) Expenditure on personnel and equipment 
Ill. Results and prospects of arms limitation policy 
(i) Conventional forces 
(a) Unilateral disarmament measures announced by the Warsaw Pact 
countries and their implementation 
(b) Negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) 
(ii) Nuclear weapons 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Fourre, de Beer (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Bassinet, Cariglia, Cox (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), De Decker (Alternate: Cauwenberghs), 
Derycke, Ewing (Alternate: Lord Newall), Fiandrotti (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Fillon, Fioret (Alternate: Fassino), lrmer, Jung, 
Kittelmann, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Maris, Pecchioli, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck (Alternate: Uyttendaele), 
Sir John Stokes, Mr. Zierer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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(a) Strategic nuclear weapons - the will to negotiate since Reyk-
javik 
(b) INF - state of the INF treaty 
(c) Short-range nuclear weapons (SNF) - pros and cons of negotia-
tions 
IV. Reply to the annual report of the Council 
(a) The committee's remit 
(b) Information received 
(c) The work of the Council 
(d) The activities of the Paris ministerial organs 
(e) The Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(f) Institutional defence tasks of the Council 
(g) Postscript 
V. Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. Strengths of Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces on 1st July 1988 
11. Unilateral reductions in troops and weapons to be effected by the Warsaw 
Pact by the end of 1990 
Ill. NATO and Warsaw Pact CFE proposals 
IV. Communique of the meeting of the Political Consultative ComJ111ittee of 
the Warsaw Treaty states; For a stable and secure Europe free from nuclear 
and chemical weapons for a substantial reduction of armed forces, arma-
ments and military spending - 7th and 8th July 1989 
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Rapporteur's Preface 
In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
Washington, 24th February 1989 
General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Council; 
Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman Senate Armed Forces Committee. 
Brussels (NATO Headquarters), 14th March 1989 
Ambassador Niels Hansen, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany; 
Ambassador Henning Wegener, Assistant Secretary-General, Political Affairs; 
Mr. M. Mattingley, Assistant Secretary-General, Defence Support, Chairman, Conference of 
National Armaments Directors; 
Mr. Holger Pfeiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General and Director for Force Planning; 
Colonel W. Meyer, Plans and Policy, International Military Staff; 
Colonel K. Meletzki, Intelligence, International Military Staff. 
London (International Institute for Strategic Studies), 3rd April 1989 
Colonel John Cross, Deputy Director; 
Colonel Andrew Duncan, Assistant Director for Information. 
Stockholm (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI}, 
12th and 13th September 1989 
Dr. Walther Stiitzle, Director (FRG); 
Mr. Andreas Fiirst (FRG); 
Dr. Richard Kokoski (Canada); 
Dr. Axel Krohn (FRG); 
Dr. Adam Rotfeld (Poland); 
Mrs. Jane Sharp (United Kingdom); 
Dr. Thomas Stock (GDR); 
Dr. Herbert Wulk (FRG). 
The committee as a whole held meetings and was briefed as follows: 
Paris, 6th February 1989 
Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Minister of Defence. 
London, 4th April 1989 
Sir Geoffrey Howe, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Rt. Hon. George Younger, 
MP, Secretary of State for Defence. 
Bonn, 25th and 26th April 1989 
Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, Federal Minister of Defence; 
Mr. Helmut Schafer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Willy Wimmer, Parliamentary State Secretary; 
Mr. Alfred Biehle, Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee; 
Lt. Gen. Jorg Schonbohm, Head of the Planning Staff, Ministry of Defence; 
Captain Wolfgang Enge1mann, Armed Forces Staff. 
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Paris, 12th July 1989 
A delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union: 
Mr. Vladimir Kravets, Vice-President of the Committee for International Affairs of the Supreme 
Soviet; Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Ukraine; 
Mr. Oleg Bogomolov, Member of the Committee for Economic Reform; Director of the Eco-
nomics Institute of the World Socialist System, Soviet Academy of Sciences; 
Mr. Fedor Bourlatski, Chairman of the Sub-Committee for Humanitarian and Cultural Rela-
tions of the Committee for International Affairs; Vice-President of the Soviet Association of Political 
Sciences; · 
General Vladimir Lobov, First Deputy Commander of the unified forces of the Warsaw Pact; 
Member of the Committee for International Affairs of the Supreme Soviet. 
Vienna, 2nd and 3rd October 1989 
Heads of Delegations to the CFE and CSBM talks: 
Their Excellencies Ambassadors Gleissner (Austria); Grinievsky (USSR); Konarski (Poland); 
Coene (Belgium); Plaisant (France); Hartmann (FRG - CFE); Joetze (FRG - CSBM); Pucci di 
Benisichi (Italy - CFE); Traxler (Italy - CSBM); Reuter (Luxembourg); Meesman (Netherlands); 
Queiroz de Barros (Portugal); Sangil (Spain); Edes (United Kingdom); Ledogar (United States). 
Brussels (Ministry of Defence), 17th October 1989 
General Charlier, Chief of the General Staff; 
Colonel Stainier, Head of Allied Relations; 
Colonel Pioge, Head Plans and Programmes. 
Mons (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), 18th October 1989 
General Sir John Akehurst (United Kingdom), Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; 
General John A. Shaud (United States), Chief-of-Staff; 
Minister-Counsellor Don Gelber (United States), Special Assistant for International Affairs; 
Vice-Admiral Fiorenzo Rosso (Italy), Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Support; 
Air-Vice Marshal Anthony Woodford;RAF (United Kingdom), Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Policy; 
Colonel Graham Messervy-Whiting (United Kingdom), SB/COFS; 
Group Captain Johnston, RAF (United Kingdom), Policy Division. 
Brussels (NATO Headquarters), 19th October 1989 
Mr. Manfred Worner (FRG), Secretary-General; 
Mr. W. Robert Pearson (United States), Deputy Assistant Secretary-General and Director, 
Political Directorate; 
Mr. W.A. Young, Director of Information; 
Mr. Y. Buluc (Turkey), Head Plans and Policy Section; 
Admiral Sir Patrick Symons (United Kingdom), Saclant Representative Europe/CinChan Repre-
sentative; 
Mr. Christopher Donnelly (United Kingdom), Sovietologist in Residence. 
The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, ambassadors, officials 
and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questibns. 
The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the com-
mittee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) -
reply to the annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that the signing of the INF treaty in 1987 brought about a change in East-West relations, 
particularly in regard to the arms limitation process, which encourages the adoption of further disarm-
ament measures; 
(ii) Welcoming the fact that the INF agreement generally improved the East-West atmosphere, thus 
making a decisive contribution to establishing confidence between the great powers; 
(iii) Aware that this agreement provides, in the form of inspections, for the most searching and 
extensive verification measures that have ever existed and that experience thus gained might make a 
valuable contribution to the conclusion of future agreements on other types of armaments; 
(iv) Considering that it is essential for the arms limitation and disarmament process to be continued 
step by step in Europe and worldwide; 
(v) Considering that the dynamism generated by the INF treaty should be exploited with determi-
nation to achieve the control of armaments and further reductions; 
(vi) Stressing the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union in the conclusion 
of a convention on a global ban on chemical weapons and of a START agreement providing for a 50% 
reduction in strategic nuclear weapons; 
(vii) Welcoming the announcement by Secretary-General Gorbachev in his speech to the United 
Nations General Assembly on 7th December 1988 that unilateral arms reductions would be made, sub-
sequent to which the other Warsaw Pact countries (with the exception of Romania) also announced 
that they would unilaterally reduce forces and arms in the next two years; 
(viii) Endorsing unreservedly President Bush's disarmament initiative at the NATO summit meeting 
in Brussels on 29th May 1989 which is likely to lead to decisive progress in the conventional disarm-
ament process; 
(ix) Supporting in particular the inclusion of combat aircraft and helicopters in the first series of 
negotiations on conventional disarmament and the West's offer to reduce troop levels significantly; 
(x) Considering that the series of proposals made by the NATO member countries in Vienna on 
22nd September 1989, completing important aspects ofthe western proposals of 13th July 1989, is par-
ticularly likely to foster the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe based on mutual confidence 
and joint security; · 
(xi) Concerned that the problem of short-range (less than 500 km) missiles, particularly important 
for Western Europe because of the deployment, range and numerical superiority of Soviet missiles, is 
not yet the subject of negotiations; 
(xii) Considering that the WEU member countries' security interests can be defended only in the 
framework of the North Atlantic Alliance but that in future they must be harmonised more consist-
ently; 
(xiii) Welcoming the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start 
a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament; 
(xiv) Pleased that the Council in its reply to Recommendation 470 is considering a WEU contribution 
to the CFE verification system, emphasising " the exploitation of European capabilities and the 
pooling of member states' assets", 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Strongly insist on a change in the alliance's priorities as defined by the NATO ministers for 
foreign affairs in Reykjavik in June 1987, i.e. in particular: 
(a) a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons; 
(b) a worldwide ban on chemical weapons; 
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(c) the establishment of a stable global conventional balance through the elimination of inequal-
ities and reductions in troop levels and arms; 
(d) significant, verifiable reductions in United States and Soviet shorter-range land-based 
nuclear forces; 
and to act in this manner whenever possible; 
2. Take up the proposal made by the French Prime Minister on 7th September 1989 and prepare a 
WEU programme for purposeful verification and disarmament co-operation; 
3. Take appropriate initiatives to exert pressure for results to be achieved quickly in the CFE nego-
tiations so as to allow the immediate resumption of the SNP negotiations; 
4. Work out here and now the prior conditions necessary in the conceptual field for SNP negotia-
tions to be resumed without delay after the implementation of the first CFE agreement; 
5. In the framework of the CFE negotiations, take steps to obtain a verified halt in the production 
of new generations of conventional weapons; 
6. In view of the favourable progress in the CFE negotiations, endeavour to halt the development 
and stationing of new nuclear weapons in Europe; 
7. Seek at least a verified ban on chemical weapons in Europe if the agreement proposed by Pres-
ident Bush at the United Nations General Assembly on 25th September 1989 on the conclusion of an 
international treaty banning chemical weapons is not concluded by 1990. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Steiner, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When, ten years ago, the Committee ~:m 
Defence Questions and Armaments, adopted Its 
report on " The balance of force " (Rapporteur 
Mr. Pawelczyk) 1, the most perspicacious. of 
commentators would have had enormous diffi-
culty in predicting today's situation of staggering 
change. The INF treaty ~igned and ~ell on its 
way to full implem~nta~10n; the Un.Ited States 
contemplating reducmg Its presence m Western 
Europe; the Soviet Union an~ouncing i~s o~n 
unilateral and apparently massive reductions m 
tanks and troops in Eastern Europe; talk of the 
reunification of Germany unabated by well over 
forty years of division; a. non-co~~unist Pri~e 
Minister in Poland; ethmc turmOil m the Soviet 
Union and calls for the self-determination of the 
Baltic states (a reference to which, incidentally, 
led to the rejection of the committee's last report 
on threat assessment 2, only 18 months ago). 
2. Each and every one of us is able to 
compile his or her own list of the maj~r changes 
in the political circumstances which affect 
defence and security here in Europe. We place 
our nuances depending on our own stances and 
the points we wish to make and it is obvious that 
such selection is particularly subjective. Nobody 
would expect anything else from politicians. 
3. In 1979, Mr. Pawelczyk's report on the 
balance of force led to the Assembly adopting 
Recommendation 336. The preamble began: 
" Aware that different political assump-
tions used in interpreting information can 
lead to widely differing assessments of 
adversary capabilities and of the balance 
of force;" 
and recommended that the Council: 
" urge member governments: 
To take account of both Soviet and 
western perceptions of objectives, military 
capabilities and resulting threats, and to 
reject worst-case analysis as the only basis 
of assessment; " 
4. Since 1979, fortunately, there has indeed 
been a tendency to "reject worst-case analysis" 
and as a result there is now a much greater and 
closer consensus in western and eastern analyses 
than hitherto. Indeed, within the last year has 
1. Document 809, 22nd May 1979. 
2. Document 1115 revised, 11th April 1988 - Rapporteur: 
the then Mr. Stokes. 
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come the first "official" Warsaw Pact analysis 
of force comparisons with which to confront 
evolving western studies. 
5. The aim of the present report, therefore, 
is to bring together the vari<?us st_rands. in an 
attempt to arrive at a synthesis which will help 
the Assembly determine the various recommen-
dations to the Council and member govern-
ments and in turn, aid the process of arms 
control. Y ~ur Rapporteur has had little diffi-
culty in fulfilling his terms of reference to " take 
account of new information available from both 
western and Soviet sources " and the committee 
as a whole in its meeting in Vienna as recently 
as Octobe;, at the height of the discussions con-
cerning conventional armaments, has had ample 
opportunity to follow progress in the CFE ta~ks 
at first hand. In addition, recent contacts with 
Soviet parliamentarians and arms control nego-
tiators have provided occasions both to hear 
their points of view and to express directly our 
own preoccupations as Western Europeans. 
II. Force comparisons: quantity/quality 
(i) ConPentional forces 
6. To obtain the most up-to-date picture 
possible, both older editions ~nd.1 in parti_c~lar, 
the latest editions of IISS s The military 
balance (1989-1990) ",the British defence white 
paper (1988 and 1989) and the Pentagon pam-
phlet entitled " Soviet military power" ( 1989) 
have been consulted for this comparative 
analysis. The NATO force comparison of 1984, 
the update published by the German Def~nce 
Ministry in 1987 (SKY 87) and the compans<?n 
of conventional forces undertaken by NATO m 
November 1988 have also been considered. 
7. The range of figures obtained from the 
available sources itself indicates the difficulty of 
taking stock of data which is entirely quanti-
tative and which originates almost solely from 
the western defence community. To gain an 
impression of how the two military blocs assess 
each other, the abovementioned western sources 
are compared with eastern figure~ on conve~­
tional forces never previously published on this 
scale. Particular mention must be made in this 
context of the Warsaw Pact's force comparison 
of January 1989 published by the Novosti Press 
Agency publishing house in ~osc~w and 
entitled "Warsaw Treaty Orgamsat10n and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: correlation 
of forces in Europe ". Reference is also made to 
an article by the Soviet Army General Yasov, 
USSR Minister of Defence, which appeared in 
"Neues Deutschland" on lOth February 1988, 
as well as to more recent pronouncements. 
8. It will be seen that the assessments by the 
two sides differ, substantially in some cases. 
This inevitably results in divergent perceptions 
of the threat. This must be emphasised because 
it shows how important the adoption of simple 
common units of calculation is for military and 
political decisions to be taken. These classifi-
cation problems arise primarily from the differ-
ences of degree in assessing the various compo-
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nents of the branches of the armed services, 
which are either overrated or underrated in the 
sources, depending on information available or 
political objectives. Consequently, like is not 
always compared with like in the analyses. This 
problem will therefore be considered separately 
at particularly obvious junctures in the following 
discussion of the figures. To shed light on the 
different analyses in East and West, statistical 
averages, which are not significant in them-
selves, are given for the western sources. All the 
abovementioned sources are listed in the fol-
lowing tables, beginning with ground forces. 
TABLE 1 
Personnel 
Millions PC 1 NATO: WP 
Yasov .......... 3.0 :3.0 1:1 
WP 89 .......... 2.11:1.82 1.2:1 
NATO 84 ....... 2.60:4.00 1:1.5 
SKY 87 ......... 2.80:4.00 1:1.4 
NATO 88 ....... 2.21:3.09 1.1.3 
IISS 86/87 ...... 1.86:2.70 1:1.4 
IISS 87/88 ...... 2.38:2.29 2 1:0.9 
IISS 88/89 ...... 3.19:2.74 1:0.9 
UK-WP 87 ...... 2.40:4.10 1:1.7 
UK-WP 88 ...... - -
US-SMP 87 ..... - -
US-SMP 88 ..... - -
US-SMP 89 ..... - -
Average of western PCs ......... 1:1.35 
1. Power comparison. 
2. Fully strengthened forces. 
(a) Ground forces 
9. In a force comparison published in 
"Neues Deutschland" on lOth February 1988, 
the Soviet Defence Minister Army General 
Dimitri Timofeyevich Yasov puts the Warsaw 
Pact's superiority in tanks at 20 000 - without, 
however, giving any comparative figures. 
Precise figures are included in the force com-
parison published by the Warsaw Pact in 
January 1989: NATO 30 690 battle tanks, 
Warsaw Pact 59 470 (equivalent to a ratio of 
1: 1.9). 
10. This comparison of figures, the first to be 
Battle tanks MICVs 
Thousands PC Thousands PC NATO: WP NATO: WP 
WP 20 more - - -
30.6:59.4 1:1.9 46.9: 70.3 1:1.5 
13.5:26.9 1:2.2 39.5: 94.8 1:1.4 
17.8:32.2 1:1.8 46.2:129.9 1:2.8 
16.4:51.5 1:3.1 39.5: 93.4 1:2.4 
20.3:46.6 1:2.3 - -
22.2:52.2 1:2.4 .,... -
33.6:68.9 1:2.1 - -
15.2:50.9 1:3.3 
-
-
11.5:28.9 1:2.5 - -
19.6:32.0 1:1.6 - -
21.1:32.4 1:1.5 
-
-
16.4:51.5 1:3.1 - -
1:2.31 1:2.2 
tional arms control, also includes the following 
figures on ground forces: NATO 2 115 360 sol-
diers (including airborne troops and air force 
personnel), Warsaw Pact 1 823 500 ( 1.2: 1 ). The 
various figures do not allow for the unilateral 
disarmament measures in this area announced 
by the Warsaw Pact. Details! of these measures 
are based on publicly accessible sources. It 
should also be pointed out that the assessment 
criteria differ from those normally used by 
NATO (see "Explanations 1' on the Warsaw 
Pact's 1989 force comparison in Appendix I), 
this being true for all figures obtained from these 
statistics. 
published by the Warsaw Pact and undertaken 11. In contrast, the previously mentioned 
in view of the Vienna negotiations on conven- western sources contain the following compar-
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TABLE 2 
Artillery Armed helicopters Anti-tank missile 
systems 
Millions PC Millions PC Millions PC NATO: WP NATO:WP NATO:WP 
Yasov .......... - 1:1 - 1.5:1 - 2:1 
WP 89 .......... 57.0:71.5 a 1:1.2 5 270:2 785 b 1:1.9 18.0:11.4 1.6:1 
NATO 84 ....... 11.0:19.9c 1:1.8 560:1 135 d 1:2.0 12.3:18.4 1:1.5 
SKY 87 ......... 14.3:26.9 c 1:1.9 680:2 265 1:3.3 13.3:23.6 1:1.8 
NATO 88 ....... 14.4:43.4 1:3 2 419:3 700 e 1:1.5 18.2:44.2 1:2.4 
IISS 86/87 ...... 9.0:24.4 f 1:2.6 714:2 085 1:2.9 1.8: 3.5 g 1:1.9 
IISS 87/88 ...... 11.1:37.0 h 1:3.3 780:1 630 I 1:2.1 10.1:16.6 k 1:1.6 
IISS 88/89 ...... 17.0:48.7 1:2.8 3 208:2 105 I 1:0.7 28.3:22.4 1:0.8 
UK-WP 87 ...... 8.6:36.2 1:4.2 - - - -
UK-WP 88 ...... 6.5:32.5 1:5 - - - -
US-SMP 87 ..... - - 650: 96Qm 1:1.5 13.4:18.0 1:1.3 
US-SMP 88 ..... 15.3:23.8 c 1:1.5 600:1 000 m 1:1.7 13.2:20.1 1:1.5 
US-SMP 89 ..... 14.6:43.4 1:3.0 2 419:3 700 1:1.5 - -
Average of western PCs ......... 1:2.60 1:1.82 1:1.48 
a: missile launchers, cannon 75 mm and above, mortars 50 mm and above; b: including navy; c: artillery pieces and mortars over 
lOO mm, including multiple rocket launchers; d: attack helicopters, including transport helicopters which can be used for 
offensive purposes; e: total number;! artillery and multiple rocket launchers; g: only those mounted on MICVs and helicopters; 
h: artillery, multiple rocket launchers and anti-tank cannon; i: all for close air support, including anti-tank; k: only land-based; 
1: all armed helicopters; m: excluding all transport helicopters. 
ative figures (unless otherwise stated, only forces 
in being are considered): the most favourable 
estimate of battle tank numbers for NATO is to 
be found in " Soviet military power" (1989) 
(NATO 16 400, Warsaw Pact 51 500 = 1:3.1), 
the least favourable in the British 1987 white 
paper, which refers to a ratio of 1:3.3 (NATO 
15 200, Warsaw Pact 50 900). All available 
western sources produce a statistical average of 
1:2.31 (NATO: Warsaw Pact) for battle tanks, 
the latest Soviet comparison based on the above 
figures, on the other hand, referring to a ratio of 
1:1.9 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). 
assessments in western force comparisons is a 
ratio of 1:1.35 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). 
13. If only NATO and only Warsaw Pact 
ground force figures are compared, the Warsaw 
Pact calculates that it has 500 000 more ground 
force troops itself and that NATO has 1.4 
million more. The Warsaw Pact's force com-
parison thus again refers to equality of troop 
numbers, whereas NATO clearly believes the 
Warsaw Pact to be far superior in this respect. 
This first example already demonstrates how 
necessary a differentiated explanatory definition 
of the criteria is if any worthwhile comparison 
12. In its 1987/88 comparison, the IISS of the figures is to be possible. 
believes ground forces in 1987/88 to have been 14. The ratio of MICVs (including other 
fairly balanced at 2 380 000 and 2 290 000 armoured vehicles) - only the NATO an.d 
(NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent to a ratio of Warsaw Pact comparisons are used since they 
1:0.9. It should be remembered in this context alone make similar classifications and contain 
that the Warsaw Pact figure would rise by about corresponding figures - is put by NATO in its 
500 000 to 700 000 if border troops and security comparison of November 1988 at 1:2.4 (NATO: 
and paramilitary forces were included. The least Warsaw Pact), equivalent in absolute terms to 
balanced assessment is again made in the 1987 39 504 and 93 400 respectively (fully 
British white paper, which refers to a ratio of strengthened forces). This figure also roughly 
1:1.7 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent in reflects the average of NATO's 1984 compar-
absolute terms to 2 400 000 and 4 100 000 sol- isons and its extrapolation by the Federal 
diers respectively. The statistical average of German Defence Ministry in 1987. 
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15. In its force comparison of January 1989, 
on the other hand, the Warsaw Pact presents far 
lower figures for its own forces: 70 330 as 
against NATO's 46 900, equivalent to a ratio of 
1:1.5 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). The MICV cat-
egory again reveals the problem of differenti-
ating criteria: NATO makes a distinction -
quoting its own figures in each case - between 
"MICVs" and "Other armoured vehicles", 
whereas the Warsaw Pact combines these two 
categories under one heading (" Armoured 
infantry vehicles and MICVs ") and gives only 
one figure. 
16. Where artillery is concerned, Yasov 
quotes a ratio of 1: 1, again without any absolute 
figures. According to the latest comparison pub-
lished by the Soviet Union in January 1989, 
NATO has 57 060 artillery weapons and the 
Warsaw Pact 71 560, equivalent to a ratio of 
1: 1.2. It must be pointed out, however, that the 
Warsaw Pact includes anti-tank cannon in its 
own figures and lists only anti-tank missile 
systems (see below) separately. 
17. Western force comparisons estimate the 
ratio in the case of artillery (over 100 mm and 
including multiple rocket launchers) as follows: 
the most favourable recent assessment is made 
by " Soviet military power 1989 ", which puts 
the absolute figures at 14 600 and 43 400 
(NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent to a ratio of 
1:3, the least favourable, at 1:5 (NATO: Warsaw 
Pact) equivalent to 6 500 and 32 500 pieces 
respectively, by the 1988 British white paper. 
The statistical average of assessments in western 
sources is a ratio of 1:2.6 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). 
18. However, the figures on NATO and 
Warsaw Pact artillery are again, strictly 
speaking, of no value. In the West, as implied 
above, artillery pieces are counted upwards of a 
calibre of 100 mm and shown as such, whereas 
the Warsaw Pact adopts a wider base by classi-
fying cannon of 7 5 mm and above and mortars 
of 50 mm and above as artillery. 
19. In the force comparison it published in 
January 1989, the Warsaw Pact maintains that it 
has 2 785 armed helicopters and NATO 5 270 
(including the naval helicopters in both cases), 
equivalent to a ratio of 1:1.9 (Warsaw Pact: 
NATO), whereas Yasov had previously referred 
to a ratio of 1:1.5 (Warsaw Pact: NATO). 
20. The most recent western source, the IISS's 
"The military balance 1988/89 ", again gives 
NATO superiority in armed helicopters, at a 
ratio of 1:0.7 (equivalent to 3 208 and 2 105 in 
absolute terms). A far less favourable recent 
assessment is the 1: 1. 5 shown in " Soviet mil-
itary power 1989 ", this being equivalent to 
2 419 and 3 700 armed helicopters (excluding 
transport helicopters) for NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact respectively. The statistical 
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average of the figures contained in western 
sources is 1:1.82 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). 
21. The situation as regards the final element 
of ground forces, anti-tank missile systems, may 
be described as follows: while Y asov puts the 
ratio at 2:1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact) without 
quoting numbers, the Soviet comparison of 
January 1989 gives a ratio of 1.6:1 (NATO: 
Warsaw Pact), equivalent in absolute terms to 
18 070 and 11 465 respectively. 
22. Western force comp,risons arrive at 
almost the opposite ratio. The IISS's " The mil-
itary balance 1988/1989 ", gives the most 
favourable ratio, 1:0.8 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), 
the NATO comparison of November 1988 the 
least favourable, 1:2.4 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). 
The statistical average of the ratios calculated by 
western force comparisons is 1: 1.48 (NATO: 
Warsaw Pact). The data obtained from the 
various sources on the air anrl naval forces dis-
cussed below are shown in Table 3. 
(b) Air forces 
23. In his abovementioned article, Yasov con-
tends that NATO has 1 400 more combat air-
craft than the Warsaw Pact, without otherwise 
quoting any absolute figures. In their force com-
parison published in January 1989 the Warsaw 
Pact commits itself to morte specific figures. 
According to this source, NATO has 7 130 tac-
tical combat aircraft, the Warsaw Pact 7 876, of 
which 4 075 and 2 783 respectively are attack 
aircraft. This gives a combat aircraft ratio of 
1:1.1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). 
24. Western sources, on the other hand, 
contain the following figures: at 2 245 and 
2 380, the most balanced assessment of attack 
aircraft is that made in the Federal Defence 
Ministry's 1987 force comparison, this being 
equivalent to a ratio of 1:1.1 (NATO: Warsaw 
Pact). "The military balance 1987-1988" con-
tains similar figures. The. least favourable 
analysis for NATO in the latest sources is the 
NATO comparison of Nov11mber 1988, which 
puts the ratio at 1:2.1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), 
equivalent to 3 977 and 8 250 in absolute terms. 
The statistical average of the ratios calculated in 
western comparisons is 1:1.65. However, the 
wide variation of the figures because of the dif-
ferent criteria adopted must be borne in 
mind. 
25. The Warsaw Pact again makes no 
mention of the criteria it applies for designating 
combat aircraft. It also includes naval attack air-
craft in the total figure for such aircraft, 
although the mandate for the CFE negotiations, 
for example, requires that these systems be 
omitted. 
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TABLE 3 
Combat aircraft Large surface vessels Submarines 
Number PC Number PC Number PC NATO:WP NATO:WP NATO:WP 
Yasov .......... NATO - 3:1 - -
1400 more 
WP 89 .......... 7 130:7 876 1:1.1 499:102 b 5:1 200:228 r 1:1.1 
NATO 84 ....... 2 990:7 430c 1:2.5 301:214 1:0.7 197:246 1:1.2 
SKY 87 ......... 2 245:2 380 1:1.1 403:226 1:0.6 208:249 1:1.2 
NATO 88 ....... 3 977:8 250 1:2.1 - - - -
IISS 86/87 ...... 3 243:5 299 c 1:1.6 321:127 1:0.4 - -
IISS 87/88 ...... 2 393:2 594 d 1:1.1 360:128 1:0.4 196:231 1:1.2 
IISS 88/89 ...... 8 245:9 955 1:1.2 503:297 1:0.6 241:271 1:1.1 
UK-WP 87 ...... 3 300:7 700 c 1:2.3 310:230 1:0.7 170:215 1:1.3 
UK-WP 88 ...... 6 750:9 400 1:1.4 - - - -
US-SMP 87 ..... 3 260:6 310 c 1:1.9 343:227 1:0.7 171:214f 1:1.3 
US-SMP 88 ..... 2 200:3 000 1:1.4 343:227 1:0.7 171:214 r 1:1.3 
US-SMP 89 ..... 3 977:8 250 1:2.1 - - - -
Average of western PCs ......... 1:1.65 1:0.68 1:1.21 
a: battleships, cruisers, destroyers, missile frigates, including aircraft carriers; b: including landing craft; c: including fighter air-
craft in offensive (subsidiary) roles; d: bombers and attack aircraft; e: tactical combat aircraft and fighters; f excluding subma-
rines carrying ballistic missiles. 
(c) Naval forces 
26. While Yasov arrived at a ratio of 3:1 in 
NATO's favour in the case of large surface 
vessels (including aircraft carriers) in his article, 
it is put at 5:1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), including 
the landing craft listed separately in NA TO's 
comparisons, by the Warsaw Pact in its force 
comparison of January 1989. 
27. Although the West similarly refers to its 
own superiority in this area, the ratios are not so 
extreme. The lowest, 1:0.4 (NATO: Warsaw 
Pact), equivalent to 360 and 128 respectively, is 
given by IISS in " The military balance 1987-
1988 ". A far more balanced assessment, a ratio 
of 1:0.7 equivalent to 343 and 227 (NATO: 
Warsaw Pact), is made by the latest source, 
" Soviet military power 1988 ". The statistical 
average of the ratios given in western force com-
parisons is 1:0.68 in favour of NATO, whose 
own figures are roughly the same. 
28. In the case of submarines, the Warsaw 
Pact again puts the ratio at 1: 1.1 (NATO: 
Warsaw Pact), equivalent to 200 and 228 respec-
tively (excluding submarines carrying ballistic 
missiles), in its force comparison of January 
1989. The western ratios give a statistical 
average of 1:1.21 (NATO: Warsaw Pact) and are 
almost all close to this ratio. 
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(d) Regional considerations 
29. Given their specific military-geographical 
position in Europe's central region, the conven-
tional forces of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands 
(NATO) and the GDR, Czechoslovakia and 
Poland (Warsaw Pact) are considered separately 
on the basis of a study published by Senator Carl 
Levin in 1988 (" Beyond the bean count. Realis-
tically assessing the conventional military 
balance in Europe "). 
30. According to Levin, who refers to some of 
the abovementioned sources in coming to his 
conclusions, NATO has 12 700 battle tanks, the 
Warsaw Pact 18 000, equivalent to a ratio of 
0.7:1. The figures for MICVs are 3 400 and 
8 000, giving a ratio of 0.4:1 (NATO: Warsaw 
Pact). NATO's 3 600 artillery pieces compare 
with the Warsaw Pact's 9 500 (0.4:1). The 
figures for mortars (120 mm and above) are 
closer: 1 200 for NATO and 2 200 for the 
Warsaw Pact (0.5:1). NATO has, at 6 500, more 
land-based anti-tank missiles than the Warsaw 
Pact (4 500), the ratio being 1.4:1 (NATO: 
Warsaw Pact). The absolute figures for the 
armed helicopter category are, at 550 and 430, 
again in favour of NATO (1.3:1), which has also 
superiority in air forces. In this region, NATO 
has 901 attack aircraft, the Warsaw Pact only 
799 (1.1:1). 
31. In the militarily particularly sensitive 
central region along the line dividing the two 
blocs, the Warsaw Pact's superiority is less pro-
nounced than in the case of total forces from the 
Atlantic to the Urals, and in three categories 
NATO is in fact superior. 
(ii) Chemical weapons 
32. As very little information is available, it is 
difficult to assess the ratio of NATO to the 
Warsaw Pact in the realm of chemical weapons. 
Freely accessible sources do at least enable esti-
mates to be made of the United States' stocks of 
chemical weapons in NATO, but no reliable 
data is available on the USSR's stocks. The 
SIPRI Yearbook of 1989 quotes the following 
figures: 
33. In NA TO's case, France is estimated to 
have " several hundred tons " of chemical 
weapons 3• The United States has over 30 000 
tons, of which up to 7% are said to be stored in 
the Federal Republic (435 tons) and on the 
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific (1 610 tons). 
3. Rapporteur's note: if true, this would be totally contrary 
to both the spirit and the letter of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and at variance with the solemn annual declarations 
to the Council of Western European Union. 
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34. Within the Warsaw Pact, the USSR is 
estimated to have over 50 000 tons of active 
ingredients. It is impossible to assess how these 
ingredients are distributed Within the Warsaw 
Pact. The United States has Cleclared definitely 
that it will start to withdraw the chemical 
weapons stored in the Federal Republic in 1990 
without replacing them and that it will destroy 
these weapons on the Johnston Atoll, 1 000 km 
south-west of Hawaii. 
35. Apart from data of which one is sure, the 
following points are no longer contested in the 
alliance. 
36. There is no longer any possible justifi-
cation for chemical weapons. They have no 
political effect, i.e. they cannot help to maintain 
peace and therefore have no strategic role to 
play. The superpowers ke~p them in their 
arsenals because other states have them and it 
has proved particularly complicated to eliminate 
them. When in the hands of smaller countries, 
they may even endanger peace because they are 
not very expensive and are relatively easy to 
manufacture. The war between Iran and Iraq 
proved this in no uncertain manner. The negoti-
ations on banning chemical weapons have been 
under way for more than twenty years and, 
whereas the superpowers have agreed on certain 
parts of an agreement, not all the verification 
problems have been settled. President Bush's 
TABLE 4 
The United States' INF potential in the 500 to 5 500 km range 
FRG United Netherlands Belgium Italy Europe USA Total 
deployed Kingdom deployed deployed deployed total not deployed deployed deployed Launchers Missiles 
PII 
- launchers . 108 (7/-) 108 (7/-) 51 166 
- missiles .. 108 (12112) 108 (12/12) 115 247 
GLCM 
- launchers . 12 (9/-) 30 (5/-) - 4 (8/-) 24 (7/-) 70 (29/-) 17 116 
- missiles .. 48 (14/-) 114 (5/-) - 16 (4116) 96 (12/-) 274 (35/16) 117 442 
IRM 
- launchers . 120 (16/-) 30 (5/-) - 4 (8/-) 24 (7/-) 178 (36/-) 68 282 
- missiles .. 156 (26/12) 114 (5/-) - 16 (4/16) 96 (12/-) 382 (47/28) 232 689 
SRM: PIA 
- launchers . 0 1 1 
- missiles .. 0 178 178 
I. Figures in accordance with the memorandum of understanding relating to the INF treaty; the corri$endum of 15th January 
1988 has been taken into account. 
2. IRM (=Intermediate-Range Missile): the treaty defines these as missiles with a range of I 000 to 5 500 km. The terms" IRM" 
and "LRINF missile" are identical in substance. LRINF (Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces), SRM (Shorter-
Range Missile): missiles with a range of 500 to I 000 km, i.e. partial potential of the SRINF (Shorter-Range Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces), which comprise weapon systems with a range of 150 to I 000 km. 
3. Figures in parentheses: additional maintenance equipment with a distinction made, in compliance with treaty terminology, 
between " deployed " and " not deployed ". 
4. Of the United Kingdom's GLCM potential, 6 launchers and 18 missiles have been notified as" non-operational". 
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speech at the United Nations on 25th September 
1989 gave fresh hope. He proposed signing a 
treaty with the Soviet Union on banning 
chemical weapons and eliminating them within 
ten years. 
37. President Bush's proposal was hinged on 
three points: 
(i) Within eight years after the agree-
ment is signed, the United States pro-
poses to destroy 98o/o of its stocks of 
chemical weapons if the Soviet 
Union agrees to do likewise. 
(ii) All remaining chemical weapons will 
have to be eliminated within ten 
years of the signing of the agreement 
by all states having such weapons. 
(iii) The United States is prepared to 
proceed immediately with the elimi-
nation of 80o/o of its stocks on con-
dition the Soviet Union does likewise 
and verification is guaranteed. 
It remains to be seen whether President Bush's 
proposals will help to overcome verification 
problems. An agreement banning chemical 
weapons is long overdue. 
TABLE 5 
Tlu USSR's potentilll in tlu 500-5 500 km range 
GDR Czechoslovakia Sov1et Union Europe Soviet Union Total 
Type (Europe) (Total) (As1a) 
deployed not deployed not deployed not deployed not deployed not launchers missiles deployed deployed deployed deployed deployed 
SS-20 
- launchers .... 243 113 243 113 162 5 523 
- missiles ...... 243 240 243 240 162 5 650 
SS-4 
- launchers .... 79 6 79 6 85 
- missiles ...... 65 105 65 105 170 
SS-5 
- launchers .... 0 
- missiles ...... 6 6 6 
IRM 
Total 
- launchers .... 322 119 322 119 162 5 608 
- missiles ...... 308 351 308 351 162 5 826 
SS-12 
- launchers .... 34 24 5 20 63 20 52 135 
- missiles ...... 54 39 9 368 102 368 118 138 726 
SS-23 
- launchers .... 16 42 20 58 20 24 102 
- missiles ...... 53 92 33 145 33 22 200 
SRM 
Total 
-launchers .... 50 24 47 40 121 40 76 237 
- missiles ...... 107 39 101 401 247 401 140 138 926 
1. Figures in accordance with the memorandum of understanding relating to the INF treaty. 
2. IRM (=Intermediate-Range Missile): the treaty defines these as missiles with a range of 1 000 to 5 000 km. The terms" IRM" 
and "LRINF missile" are identical in substance. (LRINF = Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces), SRM (Shorter-
Range Missile): missiles with a range of 500 to 1 000 km, i.e. partial potential of the SRINF (Shorter-Range Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces), which comprise weapon systems with a range of 150 to 1 000 km. 
3. Not listed is the land-based cruise missile SSC-X-4, which is also the subject of the INF treaty. It is undergoing tests and is not 
therefore classified, in compliance with treaty terminology, as either "deployed" or "not deployed". At present, the Soviet 
Union has 84 missiles and 6 launchers of this type, held in a depot in the European part of the Soviet Union. 
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(iii) Nuclear weapons 
(a) Short- and intermediate-range weapons 
38. The INF treaty concluded by the United 
States and the USSR on 8th December 1987 was 
the first agreement on the destruction of existing 
weapons to be reached in the history of arms 
control policy. The missiles covered by this 
treaty are divided into intermediate-range 
(between 1 000 and 5 500 km) and shorter-range 
(500 to 1 000 km) missiles. The treaty requires 
that all the land-based intermediate-range mis-
siles in these two categories listed in the fol-
lowing tables be destroyed after it has entered 
into force, and forbids testing and the manu-
facture of new missiles of these types. 
39. Account being taken of the figures 
referred to in the INF treaty, the Federal 
Defence Ministry's 1987 force comparison indi-
cates that, with this treaty now in force, the 
Warsaw Pact will be left with some 580 missile 
systems (in Europe) with a range of less than 
500 km (Scud 580) which are not counted as 
short-range missiles. NATO, on the other hand, 
will have no systems with this range once the 
Pershing lA has been taken out of service. 
40. In the case of longer-range INF aircraft, 
NATO has 144 F-111s operational in Europe, 
DOCUMENT 1204 
compared with the Warsaw Pact's 360 Tu-16 
Badgers, Tu-22 Blinders and Tu-22m Backfires 
(excluding some 230 naval aircraft in Europe). 
41. The ratio in the case of s~orter-range INF 
aircraft (technically dual-capa~le in Europe) is 
4 000 (Su-7 /Su-1 7 Fitters, MiG-21 Fish beds, 
MiG-23 Floggers, Su-24 Fencers) to 1 800 
(F-104s, F-4s, F-16s, Tornadoes). 
42. The abovementioned sources contain the 
following figures on short-ran~e nuclear forces 
not affected by the INF treaty (which could be 
used in a nuclear role in Europe): NATO's stock 
of missile systems with a range of up to 150 km 
consists of 88 Lance systems, compared with the 
Warsaw Pact's 775 systems (140 SS-21s, 635 
Frogs); the Warsaw Pact has 3 800 dual-capable 
artillery systems (between 152 and 240 mm), 
NATO 1 200 ( 105 or 203 mm) - a ratio which 
has emerged only since the early 1980s, NATO 
having previously had superiority in such 
systems. 
43. It should be remembered that none of the 
figures on remaining nuclear intermediate- and 
short-range systems quoted here from the 
Federal Defence Ministry's force comparison 
includes French and British systems of these 
types. A separate table showing these forces 
therefore follows. 
TABLE 6 
British and French medium and short-range nuclear missiles 
(based on launchers or warheads) 
United Kingdom France 
Type Number Type 
Land-based 
IRBM .................. - - SSBS S-3/TN 61 
SRBM .................. Lance 14 Pluton 
Artillery ................ M-110 16 
M-109 110 
Sea-based 
SLBM .................. Polaris MSBS M-20/ 
A3 64 TN60 
MSBS M-4/ 
TN 70 
Land-based 
air forces ............... Tornado 210 Mirage Ill E 
lDS Mirage IVP 
Jaguar 108 Mirage 2000 N 
A Jaguar A 
Sea-based 
air forces ............... Sea Harrier 42 Super Etendard 
ASW 
air forces ............... Nimrod 36 
Buccaneer 52 
Source: The military balance 1988-1989. 
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Number 
18 
32 
64 
32 
15 
18 
13 
45 
64 
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44. Besides these missile systems and aircraft 
with nuclear capability, the two sides have sea-
based nuclear potential below the strategic level. 
According to the figures contained in " The mil-
itary balance 1988-1989 ", the situation in 
European/ Atlantic waters is as follows: 
TABLE 7 
Sea-based nuclear potential 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
SLBM .......... 1601 18 
SLCM .......... 41 58 
Air forces 2 •••••• 458 286 
ASW air forces .. 95 66 
Torpedoes ....... 337 
1. Plus 400 Poseidons assigned to SACEUR. 
2. These forces which are part of the navy are land-based in 
the Warsaw Pact's case, sea-based in NATO's case. 
45. The British and French forces listed m 
Table 6 are included in Table 7. 
TABLE 8 
The United States' strategic nuclear weapons 
System Number Warheads/ Total launchers warheads 
ICBM ......... 
Minuteman 11 .. 450 1 450 
Minuteman Ill . 511 3 1 533 
MX ........... 39 10 390 
Total .......... 1000 2 373 
SLBM ......... 
Poseidon C-3 . . 256 14 3 584 
Trident C-4 .... 384 8 3 072 
Total .......... 640 6 656 
Bombers 
B-52 G/H (non 
ALCM) ........ 105 12 1 260 
B-52 G (ALCM) 98 20 1 960 
B-52 H (ALCM) 60 20 1 200 
B-1 B .......... 99 12 1 188 
Total .......... 362 5 608 
Total .......... 2 002 14 637 
Source: The military balance 1988-1989. 
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(b) Strategic weapons 
46. NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's strategic 
nuclear weapons include weapons with a range 
of over 5 500 km. The statistical comparison 
shown in Tables 8 and 9 is possible. 
TABLE 9 
The USSR's strategic nuclear weapons 
System Number Warheads/ Total launchers warheads 
ICBM 
SS-11 .......... 420 1 420 
SS-13 .......... 60 1 60 
SS-17 .......... 138 4 552 
SS-18 .......... 308 10 3 080 
SS-19 .......... 350 6 2 100 
SS-24 .......... 10 10 100 
SS-25 .......... 100 1 100 
Total .......... 1 386 6 412 
SLBM 
SS-N-6 ........ 256 1 256 
SS-N-8 ........ 286 1 286 
SS-N-17 ....... 12 1 12 
SS-N-18 ....... 224 7 1 568 
SS-N-20 ....... 100 9 900 
SS-N-23 ....... 64 10 640 
Total .......... 942 3 662 
Bombers 
Bear H ........ 70 20 1 400 
Bear ........... 100 2 200 
Bison .......... 5 4 20 
Total .......... 175 1 620 
Total .......... 2 503 11 694 
Source: The military balance 1988-1989. 
(i") Le"el and use of resources 
(a) Population, industrial development, tech-
nology 
47. NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's military 
potential largely depends on their member coun-
tries' demographic and industrial options. Tech-
nology levels also impose limits on the devel-
opment of military potential. The following 
table shows the demographic situation in NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact: 
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TABLE 10 
Population of NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
('000) 
NATO 
Belgium ..................... . 
Canada ..................... . 
Denmark ................... . 
France ...................... . 
FRG ....................... . 
Greece ...................... . 
Italy ........................ . 
Luxembourg ................. . 
Netherlands ................. . 
Norway ..................... . 
Portugal .................... . 
Spain ....................... . 
Turkey ...................... . 
United Kingdom ............ . 
United States ............... . 
Source: The military balance 1988-1989. 
646 481 
9 876 
25 922 
5 125 
55 506 
60 931 
10055 
54472 
370 
14 630 
4 177 
10 373 
39 068 
51 385 
56 271 
245 320 
48. Related to the gross national product of 
the two sides, the above figures allow the fol-
lowing conclusion: 
TABLE 11 
Gross national product of NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
(in dollars) 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
Total ......... 8 524 billion 3 230 billion 
Per capita .... 13 176 8 157 
Source: Levin, Beyond the bean count, 1986 figures. 
Warsaw Pact 398 752 
Bulgaria .................... . 9 078 
15 676 
16 593 
10 628 
38 122 
23 836 
Czechoslovakia .............. . 
GDR ....................... . 
Hungary .................... . 
Poland ...................... . 
Romania .................... . 
USSR ...................... . 284 819 
211 
49. A comparison of United States and Soviet 
standing in the twenty basic technology areas 
produces the conclusions shown in Table 12. 
50. Table 13 compares technology levels in 
deployed military systems. 
(b) Expenditure on personnel and equipment 
51. This development depends not only on 
the previously mentioned factors, which gen-
erally give NATO an edge as regards military 
development options, but also on expenditure 
on personnel and equipment in the various 
budgets. As Table 14 shows, NATO is able to 
spend more on defence, despite the smaller per-
centage of its member couhtries' total budget 
devoted to this area. 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
TABLE 12 
Comparison of United States 
and Soviet technical performance 
Technology 
Aerodynamics/fluid dynamics ............................. 
Computers and software ................................. 
Conventional warheads (including all chemical explosives) .. 
Directed energy (laser) ................................... 
Electro-optical sensor (including infrared) .................. 
Guidance and navigation ................................. 
Life sciences (human factors, biotechnology) ............... 
Materials (lightweight, high strength, high temperature) ..... 
Micro-electronic materials and integrated circuit manufac-
turing ................................................... 
Nuclear warheads ........................................ 
Optics .................................................. 
Power sources (mobile) (includes energy storage) ........... 
Production/manufacturing (includes automated control) ..... 
Propulsion (aerospace and ground vehicles) ................ 
Radar sensor ............................................ 
Robotics and machine intelligence ........................ 
Signal processing ........................................ 
Signature reduction ...................................... 
Submarine detection ..................................... 
Telecommunications (includes fiber optics) ................ 
United States Equal 
superior 
X 
+- X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X-
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-
X-
X 
X 
X 
X-
X 
Source: Annual Report of the United States Secretary of Defence to the Congress for fiscal year 1987. 
USSR 
superior 
- The list is limited to 20 technologies, which were selected with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall 
United States and USSR basic technologies. The list is in alphabetical order. These technologies are "on the shelf" and 
available for application. (The technologies are not intended for comparing the technology level in currently deployed military 
systems.) 
- The technologies selected have the potential to change military options fundamentally in the next ten to twenty years. They are 
not static and are either evolving constantly or are inherently capable of major improvements. Future lists may include new 
technologies. 
- The arrows signify that the technology level concerned is undergoing fundamental change in the direction indicated. 
- The findings are based on a corresponding assessment of each basic technology. The USSR may have a lead in some subsidiary 
branches of a basic technology. If individual component parts of a technology are taken into account, the average assessment 
may include major deviations. 
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TABLE 13 
System 
-Strategic 
CBMs ...................................... . 
SSBNs ..................................... . 
SLBMs ..................................... . 
Bombers ................................... . 
SAMs ...................................... . 
Ballistic missile defence ..................... . 
Antisatellite ................................ . 
Cruise missiles .............................. . 
-
Tactical 
• 
Land forces 
SAMs (including naval) ...................... . 
Tanks ...................................... . 
Artillery .................................... . 
lntantry combat vehicles ..................... . 
Antitank guided missiles ..................... . 
Attack helicopters ........................... . 
Chemical warfare ........................... . 
Biological warfare ........................... . 
• 
Air forces 
United States 
superior 
• 
·-
• 
·-
Fighter attack and interceptor aircraft •-
Air-to-air missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •-
Air-to-surface munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •-
Airlift aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •-
• 
Naval forces 
SSNs ....................................... . 
·-Torpedoes .................................. . 
Sea-based aircraft ........................... . • Surface combatants ......................... . 
·-Naval cruise missiles ........................ . 
Mines ...................................... . 
• 
C31 
Communications ............................ . 
Electronic countermeasure ECCM ............ . 
·-Early warning ............................... . • Surveillance and reconnaissance .............. . 
·-
• 
Training simulators • 
Source: Soviet military power 1988. 
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United States/ 
USSR equal 
• 
-· 
·-
·-
• 
• 
·-
• 
·-
• 
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USSR 
superior 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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TABLE 14 
Defence spending by NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
(in dollars) 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
Total ........... 421 billion 345 billion 
Share ........... 4.9% 10.7% 
Source: Levin: Beyond the bean count, 1986 figures. 
Ill. Results and prospects 
of arms limitation policy 
(i) Conventional forces 
52. Since the beginning of the year, East-West 
arms limitation policy is again promising. While 
the MBFR talks that started in 1973 on the initi-
ative of NATO came to an end at the beginning 
of the year with an agreement between the two 
parties, the CFE negotiations, which started in 
Vienna on 9th March 1989, should lead to the 
signing of the first conventional disarmament 
agreement in 1990. 
53. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact has 
already announced unilateral arms reductions 
that may have a considerable effect on the quan-
titative balance of forces in Europe. 
(a) Unilateral disarmament measures announced 
by the Warsaw Pact countries and their imple-
mentation 
54. In his speech to the United Nations in 
New York on 7th December 1988, Mr. Gor-
bachev announced a unilateral reduction of 
Soviet conventional forces. By 1991, six 
armoured divisions are to be withdrawn from 
the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and dis-
banded, representing a total of 5 000 battle 
tanks and 50 000 men. For the European sector 
of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, the reduction in 
Soviet forces covers a total of 10 000 battle 
tanks, 8 500 pieces of artillery and 800 fighter 
aircraft. Without indicating a specific reductions 
area, Mr. Gorbachev also announced a 
reduction of 500 000 men in the Soviet forces in 
the next two years. On the NATO side, reactions 
to the Soviet General Secretary's declarations 
were, on the whole, positive, although there were 
a few warnings against excessive euphoria and 
many others held the view that it was possible 
for the Soviet Union to eliminate obsolete 
weapons systems and that the conventional 
East-West imbalance would not be totally 
eliminated 4• 
4. Cf. Jan Reifensburg, NATO's credibility is at stake, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15th December 1988. 
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55. Furthermore, according to highly reliable 
sources, the withdrawal of six armoured divi-
sions from the Soviet Union's European flank 
would significantly reduce the Soviet forces' 
offensive capability. In this connection, Sam 
Nunn stressed that NATO would have an addi-
tional warning time if the announced reductions 
were not offset in other areas 5• 
56. With the exception of Romania, even the 
smaller Warsaw Pact countries are considering 
making unilateral reductions in their forces and 
armaments in the next two years. As far as your 
Rapporteur knows, the unilateral reductions 
which the Warsaw Pact countries are to effect 
may be summed up as follows: the number of 
troops based in Europe will be reduced by 
321 000 by the end of 1990, battle tanks by 
12 750, MICVs and other armoured vehicles by 
975, artillery systems by 10 030 and fighter air-
craft by 930 (see Table 15). 
TABLE 15 
Other 
Soviet Warsaw Total Union Pact 
countries 
Troops ....... 240000 81 300 321 300 
Battle tanks ... 10000 1 750 12 750 
MICVs ....... - 975 975 
Artillery ...... 8 500 1 530 10030 
Fighter aircraft 800 130 930 
57. In the event of the local reductions an-
nounced becoming effective, the result, 
according to the first force comparison pub-
lished by the Warsaw Pact in January 1989, 
would be approximate parity in troops, fighter 
aircraft and artillery. For battle tanks, the super-
iority the Warsaw Pact admits it has in its force 
comparison would be reduced by almost half, 
whereas there would be only a slight fall in 
armoured vehicles. 
58. Conversely, compared with western 
figures, the Warsaw Pact will still have superi-
ority in conventional weapons, even after the 
unilateral reduction measures have been imple-
mented. 
59 Generally speaking, such declarations of 
intent will be of value only when it can be ver-
ified that they have been put into practice, i.e. 
when there is proof of their implementation, 
5. Cf. Sam Nunn, If Moscow means business, NATO has 
work to do, International Herald Tribune, 21st December 
1988. 
" 
' 
which is not yet the case. However, unusually 
clear criticism by Soviet military authorities of 
the announced reductions should provide food 
for thought. It is certainly not overestimating 
the psychological effect to assume that Mr. 
Gorbachev's announcement helped to speed up 
the conclusion of the talks on the mandate of the 
CFE negotiations and the opening of those nego-
tiations in Vienna. 
(b) Negotiations on conventional forces in Europe 
(CFE) 
60. Negotiations on conventional forces in 
Europe started in Vienna on 9th March 1989. 
They were preceded by talks on a mandate 
which lasted just two years. The mandate for the 
CFE negotiations includes the following 
important provisions: 
- Priority will be given in the negotia-
tions to the elimination of the capa-
bility for launching surprise attack and 
for initiating large-scale offensive 
action. The measures quoted includes 
reductions, limitations, redeployment 
provisions and equal ceilings. 
- The conventional armed forces, which 
include conventional armaments and 
equipment, of the twenty-three partici-
pants based on land within the territory 
of the participants in Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals are the subject of 
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which followed up President Bush's initiative at 
the NATO summit meeting in Brussels at the 
end of May 1989, gave strong impetus to the 
third series of CFE negotiations held at the 
Hofburg in Vienna. A summary of the most 
important elements of the negotiations is given 
at Appendix Ill, together with a recapitulation 
of the stage reached in the talks in September 
1989. 
62. When the committee visited Vienna on 
2nd and 3rd October 1989, it was given an 
assurance during important and interesting talks 
with the ambassadors of the two parties to the 
negotiations that both parties wanted early 
results. It is believed that the CFE negotiations 
made decisive progress at the first two sittings. 
Both parties were motivated by the same 
political will to aim at a first agreement in 1990. 
This strong impression is confirmed by a 
statement by the United States Ambassador at 
the negotiations, Mr. Ledogar, that " three 
months after they started, the CFE negotiations 
have light years of advanc~ over the MBFR, 
which lasted fifteen years ". 
63. A joint conceptual basis must now be 
established. It is beyond doubt the West which is 
playing the leading role in defining concepts 
and, with President Bush's initiative, for 
instance, it met the East's wishes by examining 
aircraft, helicopters and trQops. Here too, by 
introducing definitions, the western alliance 
allowed concrete discussions to be started. 
the negotiation. 64. It is important to achieve a consensus, 
Naval forces and chemical and nuclear particularly on the following points: 
weapons will not be a subject of the - six categories (see the summary on 
negotiation. CFE); 
Dual-capability armaments will be - asymmetrical reductions to 10 to 15% 
included in the negotiation because of below the lowest ceiling of one or other 
their conventional capability. · party; 
- The results of the negotiations will be - implementation in stages; 
determined only by the twenty-three 
participants. It is nevertheless agreed - principle of regional sub-ceilings; 
that they will hold regular meetings - limitation of stationed land forces, one 
with the twelve neutral and non-aligned country not being allowed more than a 
European countries to exchange views given percentage of the forces of all the 
and information. other countries, i.e. the sufficiency 
- The most important section, " Ex- rule; 
change of information and verifi- - agreement on the : structure of sub-
cation ", provides for a verification sequent negotiation$ by the creation of 
regime to be made responsible for veri- two working groups (WG): 
fying compliance with the provisions 
and conducting on-site inspections as a WG A: definitions, calculation criteria, 
matter of right and exchanging detailed exchanges of information and 
information. verification; 
61. As soon as the CFE negotiations opened - WG B: ceilings, regional sub-ceilings, 
on 9th March 1989, NATO made a series of stabilisation measures. 
in-depth, detailed offers which were completed, 65. When, on 21st September 1989, the West 
on 13th July and 21st September, by other firm submitted proposals on exchanges of infor-
proposals in important areas. For instance, the mation, stabilisation measures, verification and 
proposals made on 13th July 1989, in particular, non-circumvention of the agreements, it again 
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showed that it was playing the driving role in the 
definition of concepts. The alliance has thus 
placed on the negotiating table all the basic ele-
ments that will be necessary for drawing up the 
first agreement, to be concluded next year. 
66. The West's current proposals, together 
with those it has already made on the limitations 
applicable to six categories of conventional 
weapons, englobe the most complete, detailed 
and ambitious arms control system ever con-
ceived for conventional armed forces. 
67. The four outstanding political problems 
that the ambassadors referred to during our 
talks, i.e. aircraft, troops stationed, regional sub-
ceilings and stockpiles, do not seem insoluble. 
68. A cautious political assessment of the first 
agreement, which is to be concluded in the near 
future, allows your Rapporteur to make the fol-
lowing remarks: 
69. This first agreement will considerably 
limit the Soviet Union's present conventional 
military capabilities and, hence, continue to 
improve the state of European security. The 
Soviet Union will no longer be able to face 
Western Europe with a massive conventional 
threat or dominate the Warsaw Pact as strongly 
as hitherto. The CFE agreement will also 
amplify and strengthen the political impact of 
current developments in Eastern Europe, which 
will help to improve co-operation in the CSCE 
framework. 
70. The subsequent stages of the CFE process 
seek to freeze the conventional potential perma-
nently at a much lower level, which will elim-
inate the possibility of a threat from other coun-
tries since the armed forces will then have an 
optimum advanced defence structure. In this 
connection, it is gratifying that a seminar is to be 
organised at the beginning of 1990 at which 
high-ranking officers and scientists from both 
alliances will examine military doctrines and 
tactics with a view to making changes that have 
long been awaited. 
71. The figures given in the force compar-
isons and threat assessments will no longer be so 
important if it proves possible to adapt military 
doctrines to the results of negotiations and con-
sequently revise the military handbooks. All this 
requires patience because military inertia has to 
be contended with. 
(ii) Nuclear HlellJIORS 
72. Although the results of the NATO summit 
meeting on 30th and 31st May 1989 were widely 
approved in the West, the nuclear situation still 
causes some concern. At the summit meeting, it 
was admittedly agreed to defer taking a decision 
on modernising short-range Lance missiles and 
to endeavour to negotiate a reduction of short-
range missiles - excluding a zero option, 
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however - but it is still not known when it will 
be possible to start these negotiations. 
73. Conversely, in September 1989 new 
impetus was given to the will to hold negotia-
tions between the United States and the Soviet 
Union on strategic nuclear weapons. 
(a) Strategic nuclear weapons - the will to nego-
tiate since Reykjavik 
74. After President Reagan and Mr. 
Gorbachev had reached agreement on the prin-
ciple of a 50% reduction in the number of inter-
continental missiles, the negotiations came to a 
standstill and the eleventh round, which was 
opened in Geneva on 19th June 1989, came to 
an end on 7th August 1989 without making a 
decisive breakthrough. 
75. According to the Americans, the main 
obstacle during these negotiations was Soviet 
insistence on linking the question of strategic 
weapons with that of space-based systems. The 
Soviet Union had linked its agreement to a 
START treaty with a halt to the American stra-
tegic defence initiative (SDI) that included space 
systems. Among the other stumbling-blocks was 
the number of air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALCM), intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBM), problems relating to the verification of 
sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), interme-
diary ceilings for ballistic missiles and the elimi-
nation of heavy ICBMs. The draft START 
treaty, under negotiation since 1985, is now 
reported to be 400 pages long. As well as a fun-
damental treaty, it contains various protocols on 
inspection, reconversion or elimination of arms 
subject to reduction and the payload of mis-
siles. 
76. There is also a memorandum on data to 
be exchanged and an appendix containing 
jointly-established definitions. The meeting 
between the United States and Soviet Foreign 
Ministers, Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze, in 
Wyoming on 22nd September 1989 gave a 
strong boost to the START negotiations since 
Mr. Shevardnadze then renounced linking a 
START treaty with an agreement on ·weapons in 
space (SDI) as the Soviet Union had previously 
insisted. 
77. On 25th September 1989, the Chairmen 
of the Senate and House of Representatives 
Armed Forces Committees- Sam Nunn and Les 
Aspin - said they were in favour of an 
agreement on a 50% reduction in long-range 
nuclear missiles being linked with global agree-
ments on strategic weapons. Mr. Nunn under-
lined the dispute over the interpretation of the 
ABM treaty in regard to anti-missile defence. He 
considered it might prove negative to conclude 
an agreement without knowing what the other 
party was doing in the defence field. 
(b) INF - state of the INF treaty 
78. The signing of the INF treaty on 8th 
December 1987 brought about a change in 
East-West relations which, with the current 
negotiations on CFE, will lead to new and prom-
ising disarmament agreements. Under this 
treaty, which came into force on 11th June 1988 
when the United States President visited the 
Soviet Union and instruments of ratification 
were exchanged, the United States and the 
Soviet Union undertake to reduce and eliminate 
intermediate-range United States and Soviet 
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weapons based anywhere in the world. The pro-
visions of Articles IV and V on elimination 
show that the following missiles have to be 
destroyed between now and 30th November 
1989: 178 Pershing Is on the American side and 
726 SS-12 and 200 SS-23 missiles on the·Soviet 
side. Between now and 31st May (or Sep-
tember?) 1991, the United States will have to 
destroy a total of 689 other Pershings and 
GLCMs with a range of 1 000 to 5 500 km and 
the Soviet Union 910 equivalent systems (see 
Table 16). 
TABLE 16 
Summary of data on INF systems in the memorandum of understanding 6 
On Launchers Missiles 
1st November 
non-1987 deployed n£n-dep oyed total deployed deployed total 
United States 
LRINF 
Pershing 11 •.................. 115 
GLCM ...................... 99 
Sub-total ..................... 214 
SRINF 
Pershing I .................... -
Total ........................ 214 
Soviet Union 
LRINF 
SS-20 ........................ 405 
SS-4 ......................... 79 
SS-5 ......................... -
SSC-X-4 ..................... -
Sub-total ..................... 484 
SRINF 
SS-12 ........................ 115 
SS-23 ........................ 82 
Sub-total ..................... 197 
Total ........................ 681 
6. IISS, Strategic survey 1987-1988, London, page 27. 
79. Your Rapporteur has information that 
allows him to affirm that the contractual agree-
ments are being respected. 
80. It must now be ensured that, by elimi-
nating its SS-20s, the Soviet Union renounces a 
major strategic military potential targeted on 
NATO in Europe. 
51 
17 
68 
1 
69 
118 
6 
-
6 
130 
20 
20 
40 
170 
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166 120 127 247 
116 309 133 442 
282 429 260 689 
1 - 178 178 
283 429 438 867 
523 405 245 650 
85 65 105 170 
- - 6 6 
6 - 84 84 
614 470 • 440 910 
135 220 506 726 
102 167 33 200 
237 387 539 926 
851 857 979 1 836 
81. Renunciation of SS-13s and SS-23s, 
sophisticated weapons that 'can be used in con-
ventional roles, is equally significant. The 
importance of the INF treaty in terms of arms 
control policy may be summed up as follows: 
- The INF treaty c~ntains co-operative 
verification measures of a scope and 
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prectston that seemed inconceivable 
not very long ago. 
- In particular, the exchange of detailed 
information is a novelty because, apart 
from information on technical perfor-
mances, it includes a detailed des-
cription of the deployment of missiles 
at various sites. 
- The aim of parity at zero level is 
attained thanks to asymmetrical reduc-
tions based on the principle - just as 
important in the case of the CFE nego-
tiations - that it is incumbent upon the 
party with the most weapons to relin-
quish the greatest number. 
- The agreement is confined solely to 
American and Soviet systems. 
82. Independently of the INF agreement, 
NATO has withdrawn from Europe, since 1979, 
1 000 nuclear wearheads and, since the decision 
taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Monte-
bello in October 1983, 1 400 more nuclear war-
heads. Thus, after the implementation of the 
INF treaty, the number of American nuclear 
warheads remaining in Europe would fall from 
7 000 in 1979 to 4 000 - according to SIPRI 
figures 7 - by 1991, or 3 274 if sea-based systems 
are excluded. 
83. There are also the United Kingdom and 
French nuclear systems which the Soviet Union 
considers to be part of the NATO potential. The 
INF treaty places no restriction on the increase 
and modernisation of these systems. 
84. Your Rapporteur considers it interesting 
to mention in this context that, after the signing 
of the INF treaty in December 1987, the United 
States army and air force, with the support of 
conservative congressmen, called for compen-
satory arms measures, mainly in short-range 
nuclear weapons, to maintain the credibility of 
the American nuclear guarantee for Europe 
(enlarged deterrence). 
85. According to information in the United 
States press and statements by senior officers 
and representatives of the Department of De-
fence in the United States Congress, a vast com-
pensatory armaments programme for NATO 
was examined at the beginning of 1988, 
including: 
- modernisation of nuclear artillery gre-
nades; 
- introduction of a longer-range replace-
ment of Lance; 
- enhancing the survival capability of air-
craft for use in either a nuclear or a con-
7. SIPRI yearbook 1989, World armaments and disarm-
ament, page 14. 
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ventional role, inter alia by equipping 
them with air-to-surface missiles. 
86. The United States Secretary of Defence, 
Mr. Carlucci, repeated these requirements in his 
annual report to Congress early in 1989. 
87. In Bonn on 1st August 1989, our colleague 
Mr. Scheer published an expert and very 
authentic report on stocks of nuclear weapons 
and nuclear planning in Europe. Your Rap-
porteur wishes to quote a few passages from Mr. 
Scheer's conclusions on the political debate on 
strategy and nuclear disarmament initiatives for 
the nineties since he considers these questions 
have not been studied sufficiently in WEU: 
- What are the strategic and political 
roles of American nuclear weapons and 
those of France and the United 
Kingdom in the defence of Western 
Europe? 
- Which of these roles are essential and 
which are not? 
- Which nuclear weapons are essential 
for playing these roles and which are 
not? 
- Would it be possible, desirable and 
politically acceptable to remove all 
land-based systems from the territory of 
foreign states? 
- How much of a threat are the nuclear 
weapons of other alliances? 
- What should be thought of the intro-
duction of the SS-21 and the moder-
nisation of Scud? 
- What should be thought of NATO's 
nuclear arms modernisation plan fol-
lowing the Montebello decision? 
- In what conditions would it be possible, 
desirable and politically acceptable to 
take British and French nuclear systems 
into account in the arms limitation 
talks? 
88. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that 
the committee prepare a special report con-
taining an up-to-date political analysis of these 
important questions. 
(c) Short-range nuclear weapons (SNF) - pros 
and cons of negotiations 
89. Preparations for the NATO summit 
meeting in May 1989 took place in an atmo-
sphere overshadowed by the debate on moder-
nisation. Furthermore, a number of NATO 
member countries wished the outlook for SNP 
negotiations to be made clear. By adopting the 
report on the " Comprehensive concept of arms 
control and disarmament " at the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 29th 
and 30th May, the heads of state or of gov-
ernment made this wish subject to a com-
promise, as follows: 
" In keeping with its arms control objec-
tives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 and 
reaffirmed in Brussels in 1988, the 
alliance states that one of its highest prior-
ities in negotiations with the East is 
reaching an agreement on conventional 
force reductions which would achieve the 
objectives above. In this spirit, the allies 
will make every effort, as evidenced by 
the outcome of the May 1989 summit, to 
bring these conventional negotiations to 
an early and satisfactory conclusion. The 
United States has expressed the hope that 
this could be achieved within six to twelve 
months. Once implementation of such an 
agreement is underway, the United States, 
in consultation with the allies concerned, 
is prepared to enter into negotiations to 
achieve a partial reduction of American 
and Soviet land-based nuclear missile 
forces of shorter range to equal and veri-
fiable levels. With special reference to the 
western proposals on CFE tabled in 
Vienna, enhanced by the proposals by the 
United States at the May 1989 summit, 
the allies concerned proceed on the under-
standing that negotiated reductions 
leading to a level below the existing level 
of their SNF missiles will not be carried 
out until the results of these negotiations 
have been implemented. Reductions of 
Warsaw Pact SNF systems should be 
carried out before that date. " 
90. This position certainly takes account of 
German interests but does not allow an early 
start to negotiations on short-range weapons. 
Those in favour of SNF negotiations insist that a 
global concept that does not take account of the 
nuclear component is out of the question. If we 
wait for the results of the CFE negotiations to be 
implemented, they say much time will be lost, 
since this will take about five years. They also 
believe there is no justification for such a wait if 
it is still asserted that SNF are not intended to 
compensate for conventional inferiority. 
Moreover, the massive concentration of nuclear 
artillery or short-range nuclear missiles in 
Central Europe can no longer be explained by 
the need for a deterrent force. This is particu-
larly so in the Soviet Union which, according to 
available figures, has superiority that nothing 
can justify. Furthermore, the compromise 
solution adopted is tantamount to eluding Mr. 
Gorbachev's offer to hold concrete negotiations 
on SNF. Advocates of SNF negotiations refer to 
the Soviet General Secretary's address to the 
Council of Europe on 7th July 1989, when he 
made the following declaration on SNF: 
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" If it becomes clear that NATO countries 
are ready to join us in negotiations on tac-
tical nuclear weapons, we could, naturally 
after consulting our 1 allies, carry out 
without delay further uhilateral reductions 
in our tactical nuclear missiles in 
Europe." 
91. According to reliable supporters of negoti-
ations, Mr. Gorbachev's offer should be used to 
terminate as soon as possible the Warsaw Pact's 
present vast superiority in ~hort-range nuclear 
weapons. 1 
92. However, for the time being reserves 
about SNF negotiations are swaying the balance. 
That is why the alliance believes that in the near 
future, to attain the still valid goal of preventing 
war by deterrence, an adequate mix of appro-
priate and effective nuclear 1 and conventional 
weapons was required. SNF !belong to this cat-
egory. The short-range lallld-based weapons 
option must therefore be retained if NATO's 
strategy of flexible response is to be effective. 
References are also made to history which has 
shown that conventional weapons have never 
repelled an aggressor whereas, for almost 
forty-five years, nuclear w~apons have suc-
ceeded in safeguarding peace in Europe. It is 
therefore similarly deduced that a mix of con-
ventional and nuclear weapons remains nec-
essary even if there is a balance of conventional 
forces at a fairly low level. Renouncing nuclear 
weapons seems contrary to the aim of making 
war impossible. · 
93. Your Rapporteur ddes not claim to 
believe it is possible to settle the dispute about a 
fair assessment by making new proposals. He is 
convinced, however, that a weak point of this 
perennial discussion is that it combines 
excessive fear with a lack of clarity in concepts. 
An objective analysis of questions that have 
already been raised might help to overcome the 
most obvious shortcomings. 
Lance modernisation plans 
94. In spring 1989, the system which is to 
replace Lance, called the FOTL missile 
(follow-on to Lance) by experts, was at the heart 
of political debate in the Federal Republic and 
of the transatlantic controversy. For the 
financial year 198 9, Congress earmarked $7.4 
million for the initial development of this 
missile whose range is just under 500 km. The 
United States army had asked for $162 million 
for the financial years 1990 and 1991. The Pen-
tagon estimates that the tot311 development and 
procurement budget will am~unt to $1.2 billion. 
The political debate in the Federal Republic was 
therefore concentrated on the follow-on to 
Lance since that country would be one of the 
countries in which the FOTL might be deployed. 
The undisputed fact that the FOTL may, 
because of its long range, be considered a 
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nuclear weapon within the context of the FOF A 
doctrine played a major part in extremely 
heated public debates. The West Germans are 
overwhelmingly against this weapon and the 
new options it involves, as shown clearly in the 
results of opinion polls. 
95. The following questions were thus put 
with increasing insistence: 
- If a new nuclear weapon is developed, 
does this help to promote disarmament 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which is 
prepared to disarm? 
- Is it a proof of confidence in the success 
of conventional disarmament negotia-
tions to develop, just when negotiations 
are being started, weapons against 
targets which are to be eliminated? 
96. Moreover, the argument that only the 
presence of visible, i.e. land-based, nuclear 
weapons in Europe proves that the Americans' 
destiny is closely linked with that Western Euro-
peans is no longer substantiated. 
97. Your Rapporteur considers that it is time 
to put an end to the debate on the so-called 
coupling or decoupling between the United 
States and Western Europe which, basically, 
merely causes mistrust. When it is already so 
difficult to come to terms with nuclear deter-
rence, the potential of nuclear weapons should, 
in view of the fear it provokes among the public, 
be handled in such a way as to leave no doubt 
about the fact that these weapons are designed 
solely as political weapons. 
IV. Reply to the annual report of the Council 
(a) The committee's remit 
98. As previously, the Presidential Com-
mittee has referred to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments the sections 
of the Council's annual report concerning: 
- the Council's activities relating to 
security in the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance, the control of arma-
ments and disarmament; 
- the application of Protocol No. 11 on 
WEU forces; 
- the activities of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments and Agencies I 
and 11. 
(b) Information recei"ed 
99. The second part of the thirty-fourth 
annual report of the Council (Document 11 77) 
and the first part of the thirty-fifth annual report 
of the Council (Document 1200), plus the infor-
mation letters of the Secretary-General, have 
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tended towards providing much more of the sort 
of information the Assembly has been re-
questing and are indicative of the changing 
nature of the Council's work and consulta-
tions. 
(c) The work of the Council 
100. At its different levels and in its various 
bodies, the Council is to be congratulated on the 
breadth of the discussions which have taken 
place over the past year: 
(a) Work of the enlarged Council and the 
Special Working Group: 
- chemical weapons; 
- implementation of the Hague 
platform; 
- the impact of the single European 
market on European security interests; 
- defence planning; 
- defence contributions; 
- demographic problems; 
- logistics and training; 
- co-operation out-of-area; 
- the possibility of regular consultations 
between the General Staffs of member 
countries; 
- the implications of European projects 
and programmes in the field of space 
for the security of WEU member 
states; 
- arms control and European defence 
requirements; 
- conventional stability; 
- the START negotiations; 
- the modernisation of short-range 
nuclear missiles in Europe; 
- the possible implications of a CFE 
agreement, in particular its verification 
regime, for the security of WEU 
member states. 
(b) Work of the Defence Representatives 
Group: 
- proposals for practical defenc~ 
co-operation; 
- improving the use of training facil-
ities; 
- the joint use and development of simu-
lators; 
- exchange programmes for units and 
personnel; 
- possible European initiatives to prevent 
military accidents; 
- the study of operational concepts; 
- demographic problems in Western 
Europe; 
- the public perception of defence; 
- practical military implications of arms 
control verification and inspection 
(with, for the very first time, the note 
that " it could be appropriate for WEU 
to play a co-ordinating role in that field, 
given that it now appears desirable for 
there to be some pooling of national 
resources"). 
101. It is worth quoting the relevant paragraph 
from Document 1200 in full: 
" 3. The group has also begun to consider 
the practical military consequences of ver-
ification and inspection measures which 
might ensue from a CFE agreement. It 
was agreed that, although verification was 
a national responsibility, the member 
states would consider studying, as far as 
was possible, those areas of verification in 
which WEU countries might usefully 
co-operate and co-ordinate their activ-
ities. There was also a preliminary dis-
cussion of the impact which any conven-
tional force reductions agreed in CFE 
might have on defence planning by the 
ministries concerned in the member coun-
tries. " 
Over the past two years, the Assembly has been 
advocating exactly this, so it is very gratifying to 
hear that practical steps are now being taken. 
For example, one way in which WEU might con-
sider making a particular contribution could be 
by training the inspectors who will surely be 
required for on-site inspection in any post-CFE 
verification regime. WEU's experience over 
some thirty years of running its own " verifi-
cation regime " should prove especially useful in 
this respect. 
102. At the other end of the scale, in terms of 
verification, is the Special Working Group's 
" Ad Hoc Sub-Group on Space ". Set up in 
response to the recommendations contained in 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments' report on " Verification: a future 
European satellite agency" (Document 1159, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Fourre), and in the report of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions on " Scientific and tech-
nical aspects of arms control verification by sat-
ellite" (Document 1160, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Malfatti), the Sub-Group on Space is tasked to 
make recommendations as to the advisability of 
future European co-operation, on the basis of an 
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in-depth study of the potential for space tech-
nology in three areas: 
- verification of arms control agree-
ments, particularly in the conventional 
field; 
- crisis management; 
- prevention and control of environ-
mental crises. 
103. On that basis, the. sub-group was 
requested, more specifically, to summarise the 
member states' existing space activities and 
projects, and to examine the technical options 
that would be available if it became appropriate 
for Europe to use satellite equipment as an inde-
pendent means of ensuring compliance with the 
verification obligations laid down in arms 
reduction agreements applicable from the 
Atlantic to the U rals. 
104. By the time the current report is presented 
to the Assembly in plenary session, it is hoped 
that further progress will have been achieved 
and the sub-group properly established to 
examine other aspects of the proposal to create a 
WEU observation satellite agency. 
105. Another sub-group of the Special Working 
Group has continued work on an analysis of the 
situation in the Mediterranean in two specific 
areas: 
(a) developments in Yugoslavia and their 
repercussions in the Balkans; 
(b) developments in the Maghreb. 
At present the group is concentrating also on the 
role of naval units in the region. (It is to be 
hoped that some measure of cross fertilisation 
may be possible with the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments of the Assembly in 
the new year when the committee is scheduled 
to examine co-operation in the Western Medi-
terranean.) 
(d) The activities of the Paris ministerial organs 
106. The most recent mention of the activities 
of the Paris ministerial organs appears in Doc-
ument 1177: 
" The activities of the Paris ministerial 
organs have continued to centre on: 
- the study of arms control and disarm-
ament questions; 
- the study of security and defence ques-
tions; 
- the development of co-operation in the 
field of armaments, and the residual 
tasks of the Armaments Control 
Agency. 
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In the course of the year under review, the 
process of streamlining the principal 
activities outlined above has been 
pursued, with the expertise available to 
the Council and its subsidiary bodies 
being utilised in an appropriate manner. 
The Council continued to give careful 
consideration to all proposals for useful 
work falling within the scope of the Paris 
ministerial organs, including those made 
by the Assembly. 
1. Reports, studies and discussion 
papers on subjects in the main tasking 
areas have been submitted for consider-
ation by the Special Working Group and 
Defence Representatives Group as 
required. 
Most of these contributions have been 
requested in order to provide technical 
support for these groups and have princi-
pally concerned: 
- verification aspects of conventional 
arms control; 
- threat assessment; 
- resource management; 
- logistics and training; 
- armaments co-operation; 
- defence technologies. 
At the close of the year, further supporting 
work was called for to enable the ideas of 
the Paris experts to be taken into account 
in discussions on ways of giving further 
expression to implementation of the plat-
form on European security interests. " 
107. While much of this work has proved very 
useful, the uncertainty surrounding the " Paris 
ministerial organs " at the time of writing has 
not been conducive to any sense of optimism for 
the future, although it is obvious that certain 
aspects could and should be taken over by the 
proposed European Institute for Security 
Studies when it is formed. 
(e) The Agency for the Control of Armaments 
summansmg the ACA's experience in con-
trolling chemical weapons since 1955 and 
assisting the Secretary-General in preparations 
for the study among WEU specialists of a 
chemical weapons ban, requested by ministers. 
110. Although a" residual task" within WEU, 
the verification of accords on chemical weapons 
in particular is of growing importance. When the 
time comes to revise the Brussels Treaty, the 
work of the ACA must be remembered and safe-
guarded as the embryo for a Western European 
contribution to a satisfactory and global 
chemical weapons treaty (when such a treaty is 
signed). 
111. The Government of the Federal Republic 
of Germany has recently given a very full answer 
to a parliamentary question regarding the ACA's 
programme of chemical inspections and it 
would be appreciated if the same information 
could be included in the annual report of the 
Council to illustrate the value of continuing 
work in this field. 
112. The committee is disappointed that the 
information on such inspections, missing from 
the Council's report in 1986, reinstated at the 
committee's insistance in 1987, should again be 
missing in 1988. 
(f) Institutiolllll defence tasks of the Council 
113. Last year, in Document 1158, " Disarm-
ament - reply to the thirty-third annual report 
of the Council" (Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers), 
the committee was at pains to " underline the 
importance of maintaining agreed numbers and 
not making unilateral reductions unless and 
until agreed and verifiable multilateral arms 
control measures are negotiated ", and is partic-
ularly disappointed that the Council should 
immediately see fit to suppress all information 
concerning the levels of forces of member states 
(forces under NATO command and forces under 
national command) and limiting comment to 
United Kingdom forces "stationed on the 
mainland of Europe ". 
114. The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU place 
under NATO command are fixed in Articles I 
108. In addition to its residual tasks in respect and 11 of Protocol No. 11 to the modified 
of atomic, biological and chemical weapons Brussels Treaty. So that it may satisfy itself that 
control, the Agency for the Control of Arma- the limits laid down in Articles I and 11 of Pro-
ments followed the work of the Conference on tocol No. 11 are not exceeded, the Council 
Disarmament in Geneva in these areas, particu- receives information every year concerning the 
larly the negotiations to bring about a con- levels in question, in accordance with Article IV 
vention on the prohibition of chemical weapons of that protocol. This information is obtained in 
and those aimed at strengthening the 1972 con- the course of inspections carried out by the 
vention on the prohibition of biological Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and is 
weapons. transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking 
officer designated by him to that end. The com-
109. It has also contributed to the Council's mittee would welcome the Council's assurance 
work on chemical weapons, notably by that this procedure is still being respected. 
222 
115. This is a vital time for alliance solidarity 
j~st when ~he r~ductions of such forces are being 
discussed m VIenna. The next difficult step will 
be to " harmonise " such reductions and your 
Rapporteur suspects that the real reason why the 
necessary information is missing from the Coun-
cil's annual report is exactly because there is a 
lack of " harmony ", a definite " discord " 
amongst the allies concerning the subject! The 
committee would like to stress the fact that 
WEU must play a definite part in negotiating 
the sharing of reductions between member 
nations once agreement at the CFE talks in 
Vienna has been obtained. This is an obligation 
under the modified Brussels Treaty. 
116. In Article VI of Protocol No. 11, the 
United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the 
mainland of Europe the effective strength of 
" four divisions and the second tactical air force, 
or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Corn- · 
mander, Europe, regards as having equivalent 
fighting capacity". The United Kingdom 
undertook: " not to withdraw these forces 
against the wishes of the majority of the high 
contracting _parties ... this undertaking shall not, 
however, bmd her in the event of an acute 
overseas emergency ... ". In accordance with the 
procedure provided for in that article, the 
Council subsequently acquiesced in the United 
Kingdom's request to reduce the levels of forces 
it maintains on the mainland of Europe, and the 
level now agreed by the Council is 55 000 men 
plus a tactical air force. At the insistence of the 
Assembly, acting on reports from the com-
mittee, the United Kingdom agreed to include a 
statement in the Council's annual report setting 
forth the precise levels of the forces affected by 
this undertaking. 
117. The Council's annual report states that 
the" average" number of British land forces sta-
tioned on the mainland of Europe in 1988 in 
accordance with this commitment was 53 346 
but" .. .in 1988 there were an average 891 men 
redeployed ... to Northern Ireland". This means 
that the underlying average number of men on 
the mainland of Europe was 52 455 - a shortfall 
of 2 545 below the current level of the United 
Kingdom's obligation. As the figure quoted is an 
average level, it must be concluded that there 
were periods in 1988 when the actual level was 
lower still. 
118. The committee regrets that the United 
Kingdom fell short of its WEU commitment by 
an average of over 4.5% in 1988, exacerbating 
the previous year's trend, and would welcome an 
explanation of the underlying reasons, especially 
as the committee had understood from the 
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence that the 
trend was to be reversed and a special attempt 
made to reach WEU targets. The committee 
accepts the Council's assurance that BAOR 
units redeployed to Northern Ireland would be 
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speedily returned to their duty station in an 
emergency affecting NATO. · 
119. With regard to the United Kingdom's 
contribution to the second allied tactical air 
force in 1988, the Council's report provides the 
following information: 
United Kingdom contribution to the second allied tactical 
air force 
ROle Aircraft equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack .... Tornado 7 
Offensive support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance .. Jaguar/ 
Tornado 1 
Air defence ...... Phantom 2 
Rapier 
surface-to-air 
missiles 4 
Air transport .... Puma 1 
Chinook 1 
Ground defence . RAF regiment 1 
(g) Postscript 
120. As will be seen from the draft recommen-
dation, the committee especially welcomes the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 470 and 
strongly supports the French Prime Minister's 
proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU 
should start a specific programme of immediate 
co-operation with regard to verification and dis-
armament. 
121. At long last and after much urging from 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, the WEU Council seems to be 
tackling all aspects of arms control positively. 
V. Conclusions 
122. We are faced with universal challenges 
which compel us to co-operate at world level. No 
measure taken at national level can alone make 
up for the damage caused to the ozone layer or 
tackle the greenhouse effect. No state, however 
large or wealthy, can fight hunger in the world or 
ward off the coming North-South conflict while 
there is still time. 
123. Efforts by the two superpowers to seek 
joint solutions to regional conflicts in the world 
have manifestly been worth while and have been 
crowned with success, which is gratifying. 
124. Further material constraints and new 
problems exist, caused by the destruction of the 
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environment, world economic growth, the wors-
ening of the North-South conflict and new 
dangers to world peace due to mass fundamen-
talist movements and religious fanaticism and to 
the inadequacy of civilised procedure for set-
tling conflicts in certain parts of the world. The 
dangers these conflicts represent for our 
civilised world will increase still further - going 
perhaps even so far as to threaten our countries' 
existence - if we fail to put an end to the prolife-
ration of chemical and biological weapons and 
missiles and also guarantee the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons in the future. 
125. The need for peoples to co-operate in 
peace and to have rules stem and solve antag-
onism between them is a further argument of 
weight for holding on to alliances and friendship 
between nations. Another argument, added to 
experience of these proven friendships, is the 
friendship which for more than forty years has 
linked the United States with the whole of 
Western Europe. The need for peaceful 
co-operation between nations also strengthens 
the aims that the United States and Western 
Europe defined jointly and pursued in the CSCE 
process. Fourteen years after the conclusion of 
the Helsinki final act, the plans and regulations 
then worked out are proving particularly judi-
cious. The CSCE is a success which still offers 
many prospects for the future. 
126. In this context, an attempt may be made 
to sketch out the future of Europe and the 
United States' role in Europe: 
(i) Europe is determined to seize the 
opportunity to demilitarise the 
East-West conflict. There has never 
been such a good opportunity since 
the rewards of the CSCE can be 
reaped in at least two areas: the 
Soviet Union is prepared to disarm 
and remove the threat the Warsaw 
Pact represents for the West, and 
Eastern Europe, led by the Soviet 
Union, is undergoing a process of 
change which can hardly be reversed 
and which promises to reduce the 
many differences of principle bet-
ween East and West. The changes are 
accompanied by a differentiation 
between the Warsaw Pact states in 
the degree of internal liberalisation-
now ranging from the emergence of 
pluralism to terrorist dictatorship -
as well as matters relating to the eco-
nomic system or the extent of open 
economic co-operation with the 
West. 
(ii) These are nevertheless merely 
assumptions about a new trend which 
gives only a vague picture of the 
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future structure. It is clear that there 
are two superpowers and two military 
alliances which will continue to exist. 
In other words, in the future there 
will still be no East-West balance in 
Europe without the United States' 
presence on the continent and 
without close links between the 
United States and Western Europe. 
Where NATO is concerned, there is 
one essential conclusion: we need 
NATO and will still need it in the 
future. 
(iii) Our common aim is an economically 
strong Europe in which internal con-
flicts will be settled in a peaceful and 
civil manner and resources will be 
devoted to settling the world's 
humanitarian problems. Demilitari-
sation of the East-West conflict is a 
major prior condition for attaining a 
new degree of world civilisation in 
which economic relations and inter-
dependent relationships are creating, 
and must continue to create, increas-
ingly close solidarity so as to circum-
scribe and avert danger. 
127. This means our joint security policy 
should serve this aim. For this purpose, we must 
pursue what we have started in recent years: 
- The INF treaty was a breakthrough on 
the road to true disarmament. Disarm-
ament is to a certain extent synony-
mous with greater security. It must be 
continued and develop its own 
dynamism. Together, we have started 
to work to this end. 
- The aim of the START negotiations 
between the great powers is to caiTY. 
nuclear disarmament through to the 
area of strategic weapons. This aim is 
endorsed by all Europeans in both alli-
ances. 
- Since March 1989, negotiations have 
been under way for the reduction of 
conventional forces with the aim of 
removing the direct threat of surprise 
attack. 
- The verification provided for in the 
INF treaty, the wide-ranging verifi-
cation that must be included in the con-
ventional disarmament agreements, 
openness and inspections, all measures 
stemming from the Stockholm agree-
ments and which are still being 
improved, together make a significant 
contribution to extending warning 
times and preventing any form of 
attack. 
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- The two parties should now also be pre-
pared to tackle the question of the 
remaining nuclear weapons in Europe. 
128. All these efforts might lead to the" civili-
sation" or demilitarisation of the East-West 
conflict. If well understood and used know-
ledgeably, verification and confidence- and 
security-building measures can be strong foun-
dations on which to build security structures 
transcending the blocs. 
129. Through this prospect or view that has 
been called the common European house we are 
giving the Eastern Europeans the hope of better 
economic living conditions, more information 
and international exchanges and the external 
security they vitally need in order to obtain 
more freedom internally. For our fellow citizens, 
this prospect also means some degree of security 
vis-a-vis new military conflicts and the certainty 
of being able to continue to live as they wish. 
Materialisation of this view might have the 
additional advantage of solving our budgetary 
problems, the question of the means needed to 
protect the environment and help the devel-
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opment of the third world, and also might offer 
interesting ideas for settling the question of 
burden- or role-sharing. 
130. This view, a western ohe, has many sup-
porters. What is often called German Gorby-
mania does not mean adopting Soviet ideas at 
the expense of western values. In reality, Mr. 
Gorbachev merely added the tangible shape of 
the European house to this 1western view, the 
broad lines of which had already existed since 
the start of the CSCE and he has made this view 
now seem easier to achieve than before. 
131. The wish not to allow military security 
measures to hold up the process already defined 
arose in this context. Here too started the hope 
that in a foreseeable future nations will at least 
be freed of the nuclear weapons that they do not 
themselves possess and on which they cannot or 
do not wish to take a decision. It is therefore 
logical that pragmatism directed towards precise 
aims should seek arms reductions and the elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons rather than a balance 
between the powers based on increased arma-
ments. 
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APPENDIX I 
Strengths of Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces on 1st July 1988 
TABLE 1 
Numerical strength of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Europe and adjoining maritime areas 
(in '000 men) 
(at 1st July 1988, in this and all the following tables) 
Warsaw Pact Ratio 
General staff, principal and central staffs of the defence 
ministries ........................................... 30.2 1:1.6 
Land forces, airborne troops and army air corps ....... 1 823.5 1:1.2 
Air defence forces ................................... 550.5 4.0:1 
Air forces ........................................... 425.1 1:1.1 
Naval fleets (naval forces) ............................ 338.0 1:2.0 
Centrally assigned units (reconnaissance, electronic 
warfare, military training establishments, etc.) .......... 225.4 2.3:1 
Support units of the armed forces ..................... 146.3 1.7:1 
Civil defence troops (territorial defence) ............... 34.1 5.7:1 
Total armed forces in Europe and adjoining maritime 
areas ............................................... 3 573.1 1:1 
NATO 
49.47 
2 115.36 
137.7 
482.3 
685.0 
96.9 
87.5 
6.0 
3 660.23 
N.B.: The numerical strength of the internal affairs ministries (para-military police) and the frontier troops has not been included 
in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. 
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TABLE 2 
Main types of equipment deployed by the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation in Europe and adjoining maritime areas 
Front-line (tactical) combat aircraft, air defence forces and 
naval aircraft ....................................... . 
Thereof: 
- front-line combat aircraft, tactical air forces and air 
defence forces .................................... . 
- air defence fighter interceptors which are " incapable " 
of acting against ground targets .................... . 
- naval combat aircraft ............................. . 
Total number of attack aircraft (bombers, fighter bombers, 
ground attack aircraft) of front-line (tactical) air forces and 
maritime (naval) air forces .......................... . 
Armed helicopters, including those embarked ......... . 
Tactical missile launchers ........................... . 
Tanks .............................................. . 
Anti-tank guided missile systems ..................... . 
MICVs and armoured combat vehicles ............... . 
Multiple launchers, cannon (75 mm and above) and 
mortars (50 mm and above) ......................... . 
Submarines (excluding those carrying strategic ballistic 
missiles) ........................................... . 
Thereof nuclear powered ............................ . 
Large surface vessels (aircraft carriers, battleships, 
cruisers, destroyers, frigates, landing craft displacing 
1 200 tonnes or more) .............................. . 
Thereof: 
- missile ships with flight decks, aircraft carriers ...... . 
- missile ships ..................................... . 
- amphibious ships (displacing 1 200 tons or more) ... . 
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Warsaw 
Pact 
7 878 
5 355 
1 829 
692 
2 783 
2 785 
1 608 
59 470 
11 465 
70 330 
71 560 
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80 
102 
2 
23 
24 
Ratio 
1.1:1 
1:1 
36:1 
1:2.4 
1:1.5 
1:1.9 
11.8:1 
1.9:1 
1:1.6 
1.5:1 
1.3:1 ' 
1.1:1 
1:1 
1:5 
1:7.5 
1:11.9 
1:3.5 
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NATO 
7 130 
5 450 
50 
1 630 
4075 
5 270 
136 
30690 
18 070 
46 900 
57 060 
200 
76 
499 
15 
274 
84 
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TABLE 3 
Total strength of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces in Europe (in '000 men) 
Total Czecho-Warsaw Bulgaria Hungary GDR Poland Romania USSR 
slovakia Pact 
General staff, principal and 
central administration of the 
defence ministries, etc ......... 30.2 1.1 1.2 2.5 2.8 2.2 17.1 3.3 
Land forces, airborne troops and 
army air corps ............... 1 823.5 70.4 54.7 103.3 169.8 110.0 1 187.2 128.1 
Air defence forces ............ 550.5 17.6 19.8 29.9 49.8 22.0 389.1 22.3 
Air forces .................... 425.1 4.5 1.6 4.7 40.9 5.4 345.0 23.0 
Naval fleets (naval forces) ..... 338.0 6.3 - 14.2 22.2 6.4 288.9 -
Centrally assigned units (recon-
naissance, electronic warfare, 
military training establishments, 
etc.) .................... · · · · · 225.4 14.2 23.5 5.5 21.1 12.0 133.2 15.9 
Support units of the armed 
forces ........................ 146.3 2.7 6.0 13.0 33.5 12.0 75.1 4.0 
Civil defence troops (territorial 
defence) ..................... 34.1 0.7 - - 6.9 1.0 22.4 3.1 
Total armed forces in Europe 
and adjoining maritime areas .. 3 573.1 117.5 106.8 173.1 347.0 171.0 2 458.0 199.7 
N.B.: The numerical strength of the internal affairs ministries (para-military police) and of frontier troops has not been included in the Warsaw 
Pact armed forces totals. 
Explanations of Tables 1 and 2 
In the calculation of the ratio of the armed forces of the two sides in Europe and adjoining mar-
itime areas the following have been included in full in the total personnel and equipment figures: 
and 
- ground forces 
- air forces 
- air defence forces and 
- naval forces 
- operational and non-front line security troops and civil and territorial defence troops of both 
politico-military alliances. 
The calculation of the armed forces ofthe member countries of the Warsaw Pact covers all forces of all 
fleets deployed in the European zone, including the Soviet Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. 
Analogously, the naval and naval support forces of all Western European NATO countries have 
been included in the assessment of NATO naval forces. All personnel and equipment of US Naval 
forces operating in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean have similarly been included. 
None of the personnel and equipment deployed by the United States and Canada in their own 
territory and immediately adjoining areas of the Atlantic Ocean and throughout the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans has been included in the overall armed forces ratio. 
The numerical strength of the armed forces deployed in the Asian part of the USSR have simi-
larly been omitted. 
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The personnel and equipment of the Soviet Union's and United States' strategic nuclear forces 
and the units equipped with missiles which are to be scrapped under the INF treaty have not been 
taken into account. 
As submarines equipped with missiles, the missiles on the Plateau d' Albion (S-3) and Mirage IV 
bombers are not included in the overall ratio in the case of the United Kingdom and France, the 
USSR's medium-sized Tu-22 bombers (apart from naval aircraft) have not been considered. 
Civilian employees of the armed forces and the military engineers of both sides have not been 
included since they do not receive military training and do not bear arms in peacetime. 
In the comparison of equipment: the main types of equipment held by troops, in store and in 
reserve at operational centres have not been taken into account. 
They include: 
Combat aircraft of the following types: 
Warsaw Pact 
- Front-line bombers 
Su-24 
- Fighter bombers 
Su-22, Su-7b, Su-17, MiG-17, MiG-27 
- Close air support aircraft 
Su-25 
- Fighters 
MiG-29, MiG-23, MiG-21, Su-27 
- Fighter interceptors of the air defence forces 
MiG-31, MiG-25, Su-27, Su-15, Tu-128 and Yak-28 
- Reconnaissance and air defence aircraft 
MiG-25, MiG-21, Su-17, Su-24, Yak-28 
- Naval aircraft 
Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-142, 11-38, BE-12, Yak-38, Su-17, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29', Su-27 
NATO 
- Fighter bombers Buccaneer, Tornado, F-111, Mirage 5, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-18 Jaguar, Mirage Ill, 
F-104, Mirage 2000, F-100, F-35 Draken, F-5, F-84, G.91 
- Close air support aircraft A-17n A-10, Harrier, Alpha-jet 
- Fighters F-16, Tornado, Mirage 2000, F-4, F-104, Mirage F-1, F-5 
- Air defence fighter interceptors Lightning 
- Reconnaissance and ground attack aircraft EF-111, RF-4, Tornado, Jaguar, Mirage FIR, RF-5, 
Mirage IIIR, RF-16, Nimrod, P-3 Orion, G.91R, RF-104, RF-84, EC-130, DC-8, Canberra, 
Shackleton. 
- Naval aircraft A-4, A-6, A-7, Fl A-18, Sea Harrier, A V-8, Etendard, Super Etendard, F-4, Tornado, 
F-104, F-14, Crusader, anti-submarine, reconnaissance and ground attack aircr~ft, and air defence 
aircraft. 
Armed helicopters of the following types: 
Warsaw Pact 
- Gunships Mi-24 
- Airborne troop transport helicopters Mi-8 
- Reconnaissance and fire control helicopters Mi-24 and Mi-8 
- Air defence helicopters Mi-8 
- Naval helicopters Ka-25, Ka-27, Ka-29 and Mi-14 
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NATO 
- Gunships Apache, Huey Cobra, Cobra TOW, B0-105P, Lynx, Mangusta, Gazelle 
- Multi-purpose helicopters Iroquois, Black Hawk, B0-105M, Alouette, Lynx, AB.204, AB.205, 
AB.206, AB.212 
- Reconnaissance helicopters Kiowa, Gazelle, Alouette 
- Airborne troop transport and special helicopters Puma, EH-lH, EH-60 
- Naval helicopters Sea King, Wessex, Lynx, Super Frelon, Alouette, AB.212, Sea Cobra, Sea Stallion, 
Seahawk, Iroquois 
- Tanks: All types of tanks used by the Warsaw Pact and NATO anti-tank guided missile systems 
Warsaw Pact 
Anti-tank guided missile launcher vehicles at front-line, army, divisional and regimental level 
and portable systems at battalion level. 
NATO 
Systems needed for similar purposes and having similar parameters. 
MICVs, armoured combat vehicles, air-portable MICVs, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and recon-
naissance MICVs 
Multiple rocket launchers, field artillery cannon with a calibre of 75 mm and above, mortars with a 
calibre of 50 mm and above. 
230 
TABLE 4 
Total strength of the NATO countries' armed forces in Europe (in '000 men) 
thereof 
Total 
NATO 
UK FRG France Norway Den- Belgium Nether- Luxem- Italy Greece Portugal 
mark lands bourg 
General staff, principal and 
central administration of 
the defence ministries, etc. 49.47 1.0 1.8 5.0 0.08 0.06 1.0 1.0 0.03 17.0 0.3 1.9 
Land forces, airborne troops 
and army air corps ....... 2 115.36 143.9 342.0 238.2 21.2 17.3 59.2 60.4 0.71 234.75 135.4 43.6 
Air defence forces ........ 137.7 13.0 31.3 15.0 2.0 1.5 5.1 4.0 - 21.2 11.4 -
Air forces ................ 482.3 74.9 71.3 70.7 6.9 4.5 15.7 13.4 - 51.4 15.2 9.0 
Naval fleets (naval forces) 685.0 71.0 36.0 62.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 18.0 - 45.0 22.0 13.0 
Centrally assigned units 
(reconnaissance, electronic 
warfare, military training 
establishments, etc.) ...... 96.9 2.7 6.5 38.5 1.7 0.1 4.2 2.75 0.3 19.65 4.3 1.0 
Support units of the armed 
forces ................... 87.5 4.7 5.0 13.1 1.2 1.5 2.8 1.5 - 6.0 1.2 1.5 
Civil defence troops (terri-
torial defence) ........... 6.0 - 1.1 - - - - 0.8 - 1.0 0.2 -
Total armed forces m 
Europe and adjoining mari-
time areas ............... 3 660.23 311.2 495.0 442.5 41.08 30.96 92.0 101.85 1.04 396.0 190.0 70.0 
--
N.B.: The numerical strength of para-military forces and of frontier troops has not been included in NATO's armed forces. 
United States 
Spain Turkey In In the 
Europe Atlantic 
2.3 18.0 - -
185.0 420.0 208.8 -
12.0 12.0 9.2 -
23.1 44.2 80.1 -
48.0 52.0 32.5 261.5 
8.8 5.1 - -
3.3 44.5 0.9 -
0.5 2.4 - -
283.0 598.2 331.5 261.5 
593.0 
Canada 
In In the 
Europe Atlantic 
- -
4.9 -
- -
1.9 -
- 6.0 
1.3 -
0.3 -
- -
8.4 6.0 
14.4 
Iceland 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-N 
0 
.1:>-
TABLE 5 
Main types of equipment of the Wanaw Pact in Europe 
Total Bulgaria Hungary GDR Poland Romania USSR Czecho-Warsaw Pact slovakia 
Front-line (tactical) combat aircraft, air defence forces and naval aircraft 0 0 7 876 234 113 307 480 380 5 955 407 
Thereof: 
- front-line combat aircraft, tactical air forces and air defence forces 0 0 5 355 234 113 283 480 156 3 682 407 
- air defence fighter interceptors which are " incapable " of acting against 
ground targets 0 0 0 o o o 0 0 0 o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 829 - - - - 224 1 605 -
- naval combat aircraft ••••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 •• •••••••• 0 •• 692 - - 24 - - 668 -
Total number of attack aircraft (bombers, fighter bombers, ground attack 
aircraft) of front-line (tactical) air forces and maritime (naval) air forces 0 0 2 783 69 - 65 108 128 2 276 137 
Armed helicopters, including those embarked 0 0 0 o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 785 51 96 74 43 220 2 200 101 
Tactical missile launchers o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 608 72 27 80 81 50 1 221 77 
Tanks 0 0 o o o 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o o oo o o o o o o o o o o oo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o 0 00 o o o o o o o o o o oo 0 0 0 0 0 59470 2 200 1435 3 140 3 330 3 200 41 580 4 585 
Anti-tank guided missile systems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11465 360 270 620 435 400 8 840 540 
MICVs and armoured combat vehicles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 330 2 365 2 310 5900 4 855 5 000 45 000 4 900 
Multiple launchers, cannon (75 mm and above) and mortars (50 mm and 
above) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 71 560 3 990 1 750 2 435 3 065 6 600 50275 3 445 
Submarines (excluding those carrying strategic ballistic missiles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 228 4 - - 3 I 220 -
Thereof nuclear powered o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o o o 0 o o 0 o o o o 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 - - - - - 80 -
Large surface vessels (aircraft carriers, battleships, 
cruisers, destroyers, frigates, landing craft displacing 1 200 tons or more) 0 102 - - - - 1 101 -
Thereof: 
- missile ships with flight decks, aircraft carriers • 0 ••• 0 • ••••• 0 0 •• 0 0. 0. 2 - - - - - 2 -
- missile ships 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 - - - - - 23 -
- amphibious ships (displacing 1 200 tons or more) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 - - - - - 24 -
TABLE 6 
Main types of equipment of the NATO countries in Europe 
thereof 
r-rether- Lux em-UK FRG France Norway Denmark Belgium Italy lands bourg 
Front-line (tactical) combat aircraft, air 
defence forces and naval aircraft ........ 7 130 835 850 880 lOO lOO 170 200 - 450 
Thereof: 
- front-line combat aircraft, tactical air 
forces and air defence forces ......... 5 450 740 680 680 lOO lOO 170 180 - 430 
- air defence fighter interceptors which 
are " incapable " of acting against 
ground targets ....................... 50 50 - - - - - - - -
- naval combat aircraft ................ 1630 45 170 200 - - - 20 - 20 
Total number of attack aircraft (bombers, 
fighter bombers, ground attack aircraft) of 
front-line (tactical) air forces and maritime 
(naval) air forces ....................... 4075 410 615 460 50 50 llO 110 - 160 
Armed helicopters, including those 
embarked 5 270 700 450 700 - - 70 20 - 540 
Tactical missile launchers ............... 136 12 26 36 - - 6 8 - 12 
Tanks ................................. 30690 2000 4900 3 190 370 360 530 1 250 - 2 330 
Anti-tank guided missile systems ........ 18 070 1480 2 760 2000 150 310 560 764 6 2 130 
MICVs and armoured combat vehicles .. 46 900 5 480 6 840 4 520 190 l 090 2020 3 240 - 6 440 
Multiple launchers, cannon (75 mm and 
above) and mortars (50 mm and above). 57060 3 320 3 190 8 510 2 320 l 750 1 620 1410 10 5 510 
Submarines (excluding those carrying stra-
tegic ballistic missiles) .................. 200 28 24 17 11 7 - 5 - 10 
Thereof nuclear powered ............... 76 16 - 4 - - - - - -
Large- sunaQ} vessels (airctaft carriers, 
battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, 
landing craft displacing l 200 tons or 
more) ................................. 499 68 16 54 11 lO 4 17 - 27 
Thereof: 
- missile ships with flight decks, aircraft 
carriers .............................. 15 3 - 2 - - - - - -
- missile ships ......................... 274 31 13 40 5 5 4 17 - 19 
- amphibious ships (displacing l 200 tons 
or more) ............................ 84 10 - 9 3 - - - - 3 
Source: "Neues Deutschland ", 30th January 1989. 
Greece Portugal Spain 
450 150 296 
450 150 280 
- - -
- - 15 
230 130 140 
130 - 160 
- - -
2000 470 l 850 
320 40 190 
l 720 280 1 720 
3 960 l 870 5 010 
10 3 8 
- - -
29 17 29 
- - l 
8 - 13 
9 - 6 
USA 
Turkey in 
Europe 
640 l 960 
630 810 
- -
lO l 150 
410 1 150 
310 2 180 
- 36 
4 320 6 980 
2 350 4940 
5 270 7 590 
14 900 3 520 
17 57 
- 58 
31 173 
- 9 
10 109 
7 37 
~anada 
in 
!Europe 
50 
50 
-
-
50 
10 
-
150 
70 
500 
170 
3 
-
15 
-
-
-
Iceland 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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APPENDIX 11 
Unilateral reductions in troops and weapons to be effected by 
the Warsaw Pact by the end of 1990 
Bulgaria Czecho- GDR Poland 
slovakia 
Personnel in '000 ............. 10 12 10 42-
10(}3 
Tanks ....................... 200 850 600 ? 
MICVs ...................... - - - ? 
Armoured personnel carriers ... - 165 - ? 
Artillery systems b ............ 200 - - ? 
Tactical missile launchers ..... - - -
Combat aircraft .............. 20 51 51 ? 
Divisions to be disbanded ..... - - - 4c 
... to logistic divisions ......... - 3 - 2 
Tank regiments to be dissolved - ?? 6 -
Withdrawal of ... brigades ..... - - - -
Air defence regiments to be dis-
banded ...................... - ?? - -
Air defence squadrons to be dis-
banded ...................... - - 1 -
Withdrawals of unassigned bat-
talions ....................... - - -
Decommissioning of naval 
vessels ....................... 5 - - -
(For sources see next table) 
Notes (a) and (c) not mentioned in the table: 
APPENDIX 11 
Hungary Total 
9.3 bis 
141.3 
251 1901? 
- ? 
30 195? 
430 630? 
6 6 
9 130? 
- 4 
- 5 
- 6? 
- -
- ?? 
- 1 
- -
- 5 
(a) Extrapolation based on the measures announced by the Polish Government. In addition, the?? (not named) is said to have 
decided to reduce the Polish armed forces by 100 000 men. The decision has yet to be published. 
(b) Artillery systems include cannon, mortars and multiple rocket launchers, although their calibres are yet to be 
announced. 
(c) Including two divisions which were disbanded in 1988 but whose equipment is gradually being placed in supply depots. 
Unilateral reductions in the armed forces of the Soviet allies by the end of 1990 will thus be as follows: 
GDR 
Reduction by 10 000 men; disbanding of six tank regiments; reduction by 600 tanks, which will be con-
verted for civilian use or scrapped; disbanding of an air squadron and decommissioning of 50 combat 
aircraft; defensive restructuring; 10% reduction in the defence budget. 
Czechoslovakia 
Reduction in troops in combat units by 12 000 with a simultanuous increase in the army support 
organisation of 20 000 men; reduction in the tank and anti-aircraft regiments in ground and air forces; 
decommissioning of 850 tanks, 51 combat aircraft and 165 armoured vehicles, followed by gradual 
destruction; reorganisation of three motorised rifle divisions with conversion into logistic units; 
reduction in tactical troop exercises at regimental and divisional level by 50% and of exercises by 
25%-30%; reduction in reservists summoned to exercises by 15 000 men; 15% reduction in the defence 
budget. 
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Bulgaria 
Reduction by 10 000 men; decommissioning of 200 tanks, 200 artillery systems, 20 combat aircraft 
and 5 naval vessels; 15% reduction in the defence budget. 
Poland 
Reduction by 100 000 men; disbanding of two divisions and reduction in the personnel of two other 
divisions by 85% this year; storage in supply depots of the equipment of two divisions disbanded last 
year; 5% reduction in the defence budget. 
Hungary 
Reduction in the armed forces by 9 300 men; decommissioning of 251 tanks, 30 armoured personnel 
carriers, 430 artillery pieces, 6 tactical missile launchers and 9 fighter interceptors, which will be subse-
quently scrapped; 1 7% reduction in the defence budget. 
USSR in Eastern Total European part Total 
Central Europe Warsaw Pact of the USSR Warsaw Pact 
Personnel in '000 ............. 50 Up to 210d Up to 
191.3 401.3 
Tanks ....................... 5000 6 901? 5000 11 901? 
MICVs ...................... 1 440? 1440? ? 1440? 
Armoured personnel carriers ... 252 447? ? 447? 
Artillery systems b ............ 1 116e 1 746e 7 384e 9 130? 
Tactical missile-launchers ..... (24-36) (30-42) - (30-42) 
Combat aircraft .............. 6Q?e 190?e 74Qe 930? 
Divisions to be disbanded ..... 6 10 - 10 
... to logistic divisions ......... - 5 - 5 
Tank regiments to be dissolved 3f 9 ? 9? 
Withdrawal of ... brigades ..... 1? 1? - 1? 
Air defence regiments to be dis-
banded ...................... 1? ?? ? 1? 
Air defence squadrons to be dis-
banded ...................... 1? ? 1? 
Withdrawals of unassigned bat-
talions ....................... 11? 11? ? 11? 
Decommissioning of naval 
vessels ....................... - 5 - 5 
(a) and (c) See above 
(d) As Soviet troops in the Southern Military could also be deployed against the Asian part of Turkey, 20 000 of the 60 000 
troops to be withdrawn from the Southern Military District have also been included here. 
(e) The two figures probably do not reflect the likely breakdown. The proportion to be withdrawn from eastern central Europe 
will be far higher (because of defensive restructuring). 
(f) Training regiments 
?? = the reduction has been announced but the figure is not known 
( ) = estimate. 
Sources: Speech by Erich Honecker on 23rd January 1989 at a dinner in East Berlin in honour of the Swedish head of gov-
ernment, in: Dokument zur Politik der DDR, N° I, Berlin (East) 1989, pp. 7-8 
Novosti (APN) (ed.), Treffen Michael Gorbatschows mit Vertretern der Dreierkommission, in: Dokumente, N° 6, Cologne, 25th 
January 1989, p. 7 
dpa report of 31st January 1989 on the unilateral reductions in the Hungarian armed forces 
Moskau zieht 10 000 Soldaten und 450 Panzers aus Ungarn ab, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 2nd January 1989, p. 2 
Honecker folgt Gorbatschows Konzept, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25th January 1989, p. 2 
Polen: Zwei Divisionen auflosen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25th January 1989, p. 1 
Verteidigungsrat der CSSR beschloss Abriistungsmassnahmen, in: Neues Deutschland, 28/29th January 1989, p. 1 
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Equipment of the six Soviet land divisions of be withdrawn from Eastern Central Europe : 
Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 oooa 60 000 troops 
Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 968 
MICVs........................................... 1440 
Troop carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 
Artillery systems (including mortars and 
rocket-launchers of 100 mm and above) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 116 
Tanks carrying anti-aircraft guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
Tanks carrying anti-aircraft missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 
Attack helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
Bridging vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
(a) 75% deployed. 
Source: Philip A. Karber, " Military impact of the Gorbachev reductions ", BDM Corporation, McClean, 12th December 1988, 
page 11. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
NATO and Warsaw Pact CFE proposals 
The following tables show how various categories of equipment and troops in Europe between 
the Atlantic and the Urals would be limited in accordance with the NATO and Warsaw Pact proposals 
presented at the CFE talks in Vienna: 
The overall total of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces from the 
Atlantic to the Urals in each of the following categories not to exceed: 
Updated 
NATO proposal 
July 13th, 1989 
Main battle tanks (active and stored) .......... 40000 
Artillery (active and stored) ................... 33 000 
Armoured troop carriers (active and stored) .... 56000 
Aircraft 
Warsaw Pact 
proposal 
40000 
33000 
56000 
NATO has proposed a ceiling of 11 400 for total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings in perma-
nently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. This figure includes several aircraft types that the Warsaw 
Pact's proposed limit of 3 000 " strike " aircraft does not include - e.g. so-called " air defence only " 
aircraft - and therefore the proposed residual ceilings are different. 
Helicopters 
NATO has proposed a ceiling of 3 800 for total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings of perma-
nently land-based, combat-capable helicopters. This figure reflects a broader definition of combat heli-
copters than that used by the Warsaw Pact, which has proposed a ceiling of 3 400. 
Manpower 
2 700 000 (700 000 stationed in Europe outside national territory) 
NATO and Warsaw Pact limits 
in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals (attu) 
Updated Warsaw Pact 
NATO proposal proposal 
Main battle tanks ............................ 20000 20000 
(active units (in units 
and stored) and stored) 
Artillery ..................................... 16 500 24000 
(active units (in units 
and stored) and stored) 
Armoured troop carriers ...................... 28000 28000 
(active units (in units 
and stored) a:nd stored) 
Aircraft 
NATO has proposed a ceiling of 5 700 for each alliance's holding of permanently land-based, 
combat-capable aircraft. This figure includes several aircraft types that the Warsaw Pact's proposed 
limit of 1 500 strike aircraft does not include - e.g. so-called air defence only aircraft - and therefore 
the proposed residual ceilings are different. 
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Helicopters 
NATO has proposed a ceiling of 1 900 for each alliance's holdings of permanently land-based, 
combat-capable helicopters. The figure reflects a broader definition of combat helicopters than that 
used by the Warsaw Pact, which has proposed a ceiling of 1 700. 
Manpower 275 000 United States USSR and 
ground/ air force personnel (stationed 
in Europe, outside national territory) 
Suffrcieney rule 
1 350 000 (350 000 stationed in Europe, 
outside national territory) 
No one country to retain more than a specified percent of the overall limits in the following cate-
gories: 
Updated Warsaw Pact proposal NATO proposal (32-40%) 
Main battle tanks ............................ 12000 14000 
(active units (in units 
and stored) and stored) 
Artillery ..................................... 10000 17 000 
(active units (in units 
and stored) and stored) 
Armoured troop carriers ...................... 16800 18 000 
(active units (in units 
and stored) and stored) 
Aircraft 
NATO has proposed a ceiling of 3 420 for holdings by individual members of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact of permanently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. This figure includes several aircraft 
types which the Warsaw Pact's proposed limit of 1 200 strike aircraft does not include- e.g. so-called 
air defence-only aircraft - and therefore the proposed residual ceilings are different. 
Helicopters 
NATO has proposed a ceiling of 1 140 for holdings by individual members of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact of permanently land-based, combat-capable helicopters. This figure reflects a broader 
definition of combat helicopters than that used by the Warsaw Pact, which has proposed a ceiling of 
1 350. 
Manpower NATO proposal 
None 
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Limits on foreign stationed forces 
Among countries belonging to a treaty of alliance, neither side to station armaments/troops 
outside national territory in active units exceeding the following numbers: 
Updated Warsaw Pact 
NATO proposal proposal 
Main battle tanks ............................ 3 200 4 500 
(active units only) (in units 
and stored) 
Artillery ..................................... 1 700 4000 
(active units only) (in units 
and stored) 
Armoured troop carriers ...................... 6000 7 500 
(active units only) (in units 
and stored) 
Aircraft ..................................... NI AI 350 strike aircraft 
Helicopters .................................. NI AI 600 
Manpower ................................... 275 000 350000 
(United States 
and Soviet) 
Sub-limits 
In the areas below, each group of countries belonging to the same treaty <?f alliance shall not 
exceed the following levels: 
Updated 
NATO proposal 
In the area consisting of 
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, and the ter-
ritory of the USSR (west of the 
Ural mountains, the Ural River 
and the Caspian Sea) 
Main battle tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 000 
Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 500 
Armoured troop carriers . . . . . . 28 000 (of which no more than 
12 000 armoured infantry 
fighting vehicles) 
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 700 land-based combat air-
craft 
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 900 combat helicopters 
Manpower ................... (Warsaw Pact proposal) none 
Warsaw Pact 
proposal 1 
1. Because of the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters, regional sub-ceilings or ceilings on stationed equipment 
have not been proposed. 
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Main battle tanks ............ . 
Artillery .................... . 
Armoured troop carriers ..... . 
Aircraft ..................... . 
Helicopters .................. . 
Manpower .................. . 
Main battle tanks ............ . 
Artillery .................... . 
Armoured troop carriers ..... . 
Aircraft ..................... . 
Helicopters .................. . 
Manpower .................. . 
Updated 
NATO proposal 
APPENDIX Ill 
Warsaw Pact 
proposal 1 
In the area consisting of Forward Zone in the area con-
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal sisting of FRG, Benelux, 
Republic of Germany, France, Denmark, (Central Zone) plus 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether- Norway, Italy, Greece and 
lands, Portugal, Spain, the Turkey and GDR, Poland, 
United Kingdom, Czechoslo- Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
vakia, the German Democratic (Central Zone) plus the Baltic, 
Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Leningrad, North Caucasus, 
the territory of the USSR (West Odessa and Trans-Caucasus mil-
of the Urals comprising the itary districts plus Romania and 
Baltic, Byelorussian Carpathian, Bulgeria 
Moscow, Volga, and the Urals 
military districts in active units 
11 300 
9000 
20000 
N/A2 
N/A2 
(NATO proposal) none 
16 000 
16 500 
20500 
1 100 
strike aircraft 
1300 
1000000 
Updated Warsaw Pact 
NATO proposal proposal 1 
In the area consisting of Bel- Rear Zone 
gium, France, Italy, Denmark, In the area consisting of Iceland, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Byelorussian, 
the United Kingdom, the German Carpathian, Kiev, Moscow, 
Democratic Republic, Poland, Volga, Ural military districts 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the 
territory of the Soviet Union 
west of the Urals comprising the 
Baltic, Byelorussian, Capathian 
military districts in active units 
10300 
7 600 
18 000 
N/A1 
N/Al 
(NATO proposal) none 
4000 
7 500 
7 500 
400 
strike aircraft 
400 
350000 
1. The Warsaw Pact tabled an alternative regional proposal on 29th June 1989, defining four regions as follows: North Zone (the 
area consisting of north of the Leningrad Military District, and Norway); Center Zone (the area consisting of the GDR, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, The Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev Military Districts and Denmark, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, the FRG, France and the U.K.); South Zone (the area consisting of Romania, Bulgaria, the Odessa, North 
Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus Military Districts, and Italy, Greece and Turkey); Rear Zone (the area consisting of south of the 
Leningrad Military District, the Moscow, Volga, and Urals Military Districts, and Spain, Portugal and Iceland). 
2. Because of the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters, regional sub-ceilings or ceilings on stationed equipment 
have not been proposed. 
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Main battle tanks ............ . 
Artillery .................... . 
Armoured troop carriers ..... . 
Aircraft ..................... . 
Helicopters .................. . 
Manpower .................. . 
Updated 
NATO proposal 
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Warsaw Pact 
proposal 1 
In the area consisting of Central Zone 
Belgium, the Federal Republic In the area consisting of 
of Germany, Luxembourg, the Belgium, Denmark, the Federal 
Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Germany, Luxem-
German Democratic Republic, bourg, the Netherlands, Czecho-
Poland in active units slovakia, the German Demo-
cratic Republic and Poland 
8 000 8 700 
4 500 7 600 
11000 14 500 
NI AI 420 
strike aircraft 
N/Al 800 
- 570 000 
1. Because of the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters, regional sub-ceilings or ceilings on stationed equipment 
have not been proposed. 
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Summary of the state of the CFE negotiations - September 1989 
Progressive approach: 
Categories concerned: 
Aims of phase 1: 
Western proposal 
(taking account 
of the Bush initiative) 
Phase 1 (conclusion in 6 to 12 
months, implementation in 
1992/93: elimination of existing 
disparities 
Phase 2: other reductions 
Phase 3: reorganisation of defen-
sive structures 
Battle tanks (BT) 
Artillery (Art) 
Armoured troop carriers (A TC) 
Troops (United States and 
Soviet Union only) 
Combat helicopters (CH) 
Fighter aircraft (FA) (no dis-
tinction according to role) 
Equal collective ceilings through-
out Europe - for each alliance 
20000 BT 
16 500 Art 
28 000 ATC 
5 700 FA 
1 900 CH 
275 000 T each for American 
and Soviet land and air forces 
(except on national territory) 
Intermediate ceilings for equip-
Eastern proposal 
Phase 1 (conclusion before 1991, 
implementation in 5-6 years): 
elimination of existing dispar-
ities 
Phase 2 (up to 1997): additional 
25 % reduction 
Phase 3 (up to 2 000): reorga-
nisation of defensive structures 
Battle tanks 
Artillery 
Armoured troop carriers 
Troops (T) 
Combat helicopters 
Fighter aircraft 
(except strike aircraft). 
Equal collective ceilings through-
out Europe 
20000 BT 
24 000 Art 
28 000 VIC 
1 500 FA 
1 700 CH 
ment deployed in 3 overlapping Intermediate ceilings for 2 (pos-
sub-regions: sibly 3) sub-regions: 
Region 1 (FRG, Belgium, Neth- 1. Central Europe (FRG, 
erlands, Luxembourg, Czecho- Denmark, Belgium, Nether-
slovakia, GDR, Poland): lands, Luxembourg, Czechoslo-
8 000 BT, 4 500 Art, 11 000 vakia, GDR, Poland, Hungary): 
A TC Ceilings not yet specified 
Region 2 (1 +Denmark, France, 2. Contact zone (l + Norway, 
United Kingdom, Italy, Hun- Italy, Greece, Turkey; Lenin-
gary; Baltic, Carpathian, Byelo- grad, Baltic, Northern Caucasus 
russian military districts): 10 300 and Trans-Caucasus military 
BT, 7 600 Art, 18 000 ATC districts, Romania, But-
Region 3 (2 + Spain, Portugal, garia): 16 000 BT, 16 500 Art, 
Moscow, Urals and Volga mil- 20 500 ATC, 1 100 FA, 1 300 
itary districts): 11 300 BT, 9 000 CH, 1 million T 
Art, 20 000 ATC 3. Rear zone (Iceland, United 
Kingdom, France, Spain, Por-
tugal; Byelorussian, Carpathian, 
Kiev, Moscow, Volga and Urals 
military districts): 4 000 BT, 
7 500 Art, 7 500 ATC, 400 FA, 
400 CH, 350 000 T. Other 
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Treatment of equipment and 
troops to be reduced: 
Stationing outside national state 
territory: 
Sufficiency rule: 
Special measures: 
Verifications: 
Western proposal 
(taking account 
of the Bush initiative) 
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Eastern proposal 
proposals for intermediary 
ceilings for 4 regions: 
1. Central Europe (FRG, 
Denmark, United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Netherlands, GDR, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary; Baltic, Byelorussian, Car-
pathian and Kiev military dis-
tricts): 13 300 BT, 11 500 Art, 
20 750 ATC, 1120 FA, 1 250 
CH, 910000 T 
2. Northern Europe (Norway, 
northern part of Leningrad mil-
itary district): 200 BT, 1 000 
Art, 150 A TC, 30 FA, 30 CH, 
20000 T 
3. Southern Europe (Italy, 
Greece, Turk,y, Romania, Bul-
garia; Odessa, North Caucasus 
and Trans-Caucasus military 
districts): 5 200 BT, 8 000 Art, 
5 750 ATC, 290 FA, 360 CH, 
270000 T 
4. Peripheral zone (Spain, Por-
tugal, Iceland; Moscow, Volga 
and Urals military districts, 
southern part of the Leningrad 
military district): 1 300 BT, 
3 000 Art, 1 350 A TC, 60 FA, 60 
CH, 150 000 T. 
Equipment: destruction; 
(United States and 
Union): demobilisation 
troops Equipment: destruction or con-
Soviet version for civil use 
Up to 3 200 BT 
1 700 Art 
6000 ATC 
(Units in service only) 
For each state, a maximum of: 
12 000 BT 
10 000 Art 
16 800 ATC 
3 420 FA 
1140 CH 
Openness; compulsory notifi-
cation; limits on dismantling, 
stockpiling, movements and 
combat-readiness 
Up to 4 500 BT 
4000 Art 
7 500 ATC 
350 strike aircraft 
600 CH 
350000 T 
(Units in sen'ice + stocks) 
For each state a maximum of: 
14 000 BT 
17 000 Art 
18000 ATC 
1 200 strike aircraft 
1 350 CH 
920000 T 
Reduction of military budgets; 
conversion of armaments fac-
tories; no-increase obligation; 
emphasis on reciprocal reduc-
tions 
On-site inspections detailed On-site inspections; national 
exchanges of information technical means, international 
verification commission 
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APPENDIX IV 1 
Communique of the meeting 
of the Political Consultative Committee 
of the Warsaw Treaty states 
A meeting of the Political Consultative 
Committee of the states members of the Warsaw 
Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual 
assistance took place in Bucharest on 7th and 
8th July. 
The meeting participants exchanged 
opinions on the course of the international situ-
ation and surveyed the main directions of action 
of the allied states in the interest of consoli-
dating peace and stability in Europe, of disarm-
ament, of a broader international co-operation 
and dialogue. 
It was stressed that owing to the active 
policy of the socialist countries, to the action 
taken by all peace-loving and realistic forces 
there were positive developments in interna-
tional issues, in lessening tension and confron-
tation, in confidence-building, in developing 
political dialogue and intensifying inter-state 
contacts at various levels. The first steps in dis-
armament were taken, a control mechanism has 
been set in motion. The beginning of the Vienna 
negotiations is encouraging. Co-operation in the 
economic, technical, scientific and human rights 
areas has broadened. Progress has been made in 
the political settlement of regional conflicts. 
There is a growing readiness of the international 
community to co-operate in the field of security 
and in solving global issues. 
Nevertheless, the world situation con-
tinues to be complex and contradictory, as 
favourable processes have not become irre-
versible yet. The stockpiling of weapons and 
their modernisation has not been stopped. 
Nuclear tests continue and so do the actions for 
the militarisation of space. The conception of 
confrontation born in the cold war years of 
recourse to force is overcome with difficulty. 
The nuclear deterrence strategy, reiterated at the 
recent NATO session, is a dangerous anach-
ronism which runs counter to the interests of 
general security. The practice of interference in 
the domestic affairs of states and the attempts to 
destabilise them, and human right violations 
continue. 
1. The following texts were formally communicated by the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation to the Western European 
Union Assembly via the Romanian Ambassador in Paris on 
7th August 1989. 
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The meeting participants reasserted their 
states' attachment to the ideal of ridding 
mankind of the war threat by liquidating nuclear 
and chemical weapons, radically cutting conven-
tional weapons. They see disarmament as the 
cardinal question of the present-day world, the 
decisive factor of consolidating peace, security 
and confidence, deepening detente, developing 
broad international co-operation, and solving 
global issues. 
The Warsaw Treaty states attach pri-
mordial importance to the development of the 
all-European process in all areas, to the passage 
to a new level of security and co-operation on 
the continent, to the advancement on the path of 
building a united Europe of lasting peace and 
co-operation, of a European home in the 
diversity of its social and state systems, with 
respect for the current territorial and political 
realities, the inviolability of the existing fron-
tiers, each people's sovereignty and right to 
freely decide its destiny. The determination was 
expressed actively to contribute to the imple-
mentation of the understandings reached at the 
Vienna meeting to the end of strengthening 
peace and security, of a better understanding 
and co-operation on the continent. 
The participating states' position on the 
questions related to strengthening European and 
general security, to developing the disarmament 
process, is set forth in the document "For A 
Stable and Secure Europe, Free of Nuclear and 
Chemical Weapons, for Substantial Cuts in 
Troops, Arms and Military Spending " adopted 
by the meeting. 
The meeting participants spoke for setting 
the relations between the Warsaw Treaty and 
the North Atlantic Treaty on a non-
confrontation line, for the development of a 
constructive dialogue between them in the 
political and military sphere, for this dialogue to 
become a factor of security and co-operation on 
the continent. Furthermore, the principled stand 
of the Warsaw Treaty states on ridding Europe 
of military blocs, the simultaneous disman-
tlement of both alliances and on the liquidation 
of their military organisations, as a first step, 
remains unchanged. 
The states participating in the meeting 
firmly declaimed for a peaceful settlement of 
regional conflicts in the Middle East, Asia and 
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Central America. Life has proved there is no 
alternative to the fruitful road of negotiations. 
They will contribute also in future to the 
political settlement of the crisis situations in the 
world and to a further growth of the United 
Nations' role in this respect. 
In this context the treaty countries spoke 
up for an undelayed calling of a UN-sponsored 
international conference on the Middle East to 
be attended by all the sides concerned, including 
the PLO, and for a global solution of the 
problems in the region on the basis of the Pales-
tinian people's right to self-determination and to 
the independent state of Palestine to exist, as 
well as of the right to independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of all the states in the 
area, Israel included. 
The meeting participants expressed their 
support to the leadership of the Republic of 
Afghanistan, for a just settlement of the situ-
ation in that country on the basis of national 
reconciliation, for the building of a united, inde-
pendent and non-aligned Afghanistan whose 
people may decide its own destiny, without any 
outside interference. 
Expressing concern over the serious ecO.:" 
nomic problems facing mankind, the deepening 
gap between developed and developing coun-
tries, the rising foreign debt and the growing 
national means earmarked for its liquidation, 
the states represented at the meeting declared 
for a concerted effort of all countries to solve 
those problems on an equitable and just basis, 
with the active participation of the United 
Nations, for the establishment of a new interna-
tional economic order. The meeting under-
scored the need to eliminate discriminations 
and barriers to the growth of commercial, eco-
nomic and technical-scientific exchanges, to 
promote access to modern technology, on the 
basis of equal rights. Economic relations must 
not be conditional upon political or other con-
siderations. 
Examining the questions of collaboration 
in the conservation and restoration of the envi-
ronment, the meeting participants reiterated the 
position expressed by their countries in the doc-
ument " The consequences of the arms race on 
the environment and other aspects of ecologic 
security" endorsed by the Political Consultative 
Committee Meeting in 1988. The readiness was 
stated for active co-operation with other coun-
tries on a multilateral and bilateral basis in the 
resolution of ecological problems, to contribute 
to a good unfolding of the Sofia meeting on 
environmental protection this autumn so that it 
may mark a significant step toward a growing 
international collaboration in this area as well as 
to the preparation of the UN Conference on the 
environment and development planned for 
1992. 
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Underlining the important role of the 
non-aligned movement in the international life, 
the meeting participants eXlpressed their hope 
that the forthcoming summit of these countries 
would lead to a growing contribution of the 
movement to the settlement of the major 
problems of our days, to its rising prestige and 
influence. The states represented at the meeting 
attach due importance to the further growth of 
their relations and co-operation with the non-
aligned countries on international issues. 
The Warsaw Treaty Stfites will make their 
contribution to more fully use the potential and 
role of the United Nations Organisation, with 
the active participation of all countries, 
regardless of size and social system, to solving 
world problems. They stand for a growing effi-
ciency of the UN and wider use of the orga-
nisation's peace-keeping operations. Emphasis 
was placed on the importance of actively 
involving the UN in the efforts of preventing 
conflictual situations on an international plan. 
The meeting participants informed one 
another on their countries' development, on the 
course and problems of socialist construction, 
with emphasis on the growing interdependence 
between home and foreign policies. They under-
scored the influential force of the ideas of 
socialism, the importance of changes in the 
allied states to improve and renew socialist 
society, confer a permanent dynamism on the 
political and economic system, develop 
democracy, raise the people's welfare, improve 
the quality of life, better use the potential of all 
members of society, ensu* the fundamental 
human rights and liberties. They start from the 
fact that there are no universal models of 
socialism, nobody is the holder of truth. The 
construction of the new sQciety is a creative 
process and it is achieved in each country in 
harmony with its traditions, specific conditions 
and demands. 
The meeting reiteratetl the common aspi-
ration to work in the interest of socialism, of 
improving collaboration among the allied states, 
and of ensuring their lasting security. Confi-
dence was shown in the capflcity of the socialist 
states, of the leading forces of society to solve 
the problems that arose in their current devel-
opment stage. It was also stressed that their rela-
tions should develop on the basis of equality, 
independence and each one's right to make its 
own political line, strategy and tactics, without 
any outside interference. 
The meeting participants unanimously 
assessed the Warsaw Treaty as durably serving 
the ensurance of security of all participating 
states and being a major factor of peace and sta-
bility in Europe and the wQrld over. 
The constructive, itlldividual and col-
lective actions of the allied countries bear posi-
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tively on world developments, stimulate the 
growth of international relations on democratic 
principles, in the spirit of new political 
thinking. 
The general opinion favoured the consoli-
dation of the solidarity and co-operation of the 
allied states, the further development of their 
many-sided collaboration on the basis of 
equality of rights and mutual respect for the 
benefit of their peoples and in the interest of 
general peace. 
It was decided that efforts should con-
tinue toward strengthening the political char-
acter of the Warsaw Treaty and improving, on 
democratic bases, its mechanism of collabo-
ration. 
The activity of the Committee of Foreign 
Ministers and the Committee of Defence Min-
isters was assessed as positive and their future 
tasks were set. 
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The Political Consultative Committee 
adopted a decision in connection with the report 
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed 
Forces of the Warsaw Treaty states. 
The Socialist Republic of Romania, as 
host of the meeting, shall ensure the dissemi-
nation of its documents to other states and inter-
national organisations. 
The representative of the USSR, LP. 
Aboinov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
was appointed Secretary General of the Political 
Consultative Committee for the next period. 
The meeting was held in an atmosphere of 
friendship and collaboration. 
The next meeting of the Political Consul-
tative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states 
will be held in Moscow. 
For a stable and secure Europe free from nuclear 
and chemical weapons, for a substantial reduction of armed forces, 
armaments and military spending 
The top level representatives of the Peo-
ple's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic, the German Democratic 
Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the 
Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic 
of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, gathered in Bucharest on 7th and 8th 
July 1989 in a meeting of the Political Consul-
tative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member 
states, considering the realities of the contem-
porary world and guiding themselves by the 
states' aspirations to ensure security in Europe, 
to take new steps towards disarmament and 
actively to contribute to setting international 
relations on new bases, to mankind's passage to 
a new development stage, in a climate of peace 
and collaboration, declare the following: 
I 
The Warsaw Treaty member states con-
sider the consolidation of peace, mankind's 
relief of the war threat and the development of 
broad, mutually advantageous international col-
laboration to be the supreme goal of their 
foreign policy. They are ready to contribute in 
future too, in every way, to ensuring equal 
security for all. 
cation of underdevelopment and the estab-
lishment of the new international economic 
order, for the undelayed solution of ecological 
and the other global problems. 
The settlement of the issues on which 
mankind's survival and the progress of civili-
sation depend calls for joint efforts, for the 
active participation of all countries and peoples. 
In this context, the states represented at the 
meeting stress the need for a growing role of the 
UN and reassert their resolve to contribute to it 
by all means. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states firmly 
stand for the ensurance of security by political, 
not military means; the assertion of interna-
tional law in interstate relations; the mainte-
nance of normal relations and the development 
of collaboration among states regardless of their 
socio-political system; the renunciation of the 
policy of confrontation and hatemongering and 
its replacement by a policy of collaboration, 
understanding, mutual confidence and good 
neighbourliness, in consideration of the interests 
of all states and peoples; collaboration in the 
human rights and humanitarian fields, account 
being taken of those obligations which the states 
have assumed. 
The promotion of a policy of security, 
The states represented at the meeting mutual understanding and collaboration among 
reaffirm their resolve to do their utmost for states calls for the strict observance of the 
reaching new understandings on disarmament, national independence and sovereignty, and 
which must become a continuous and irre- equality of rights of all states, of the equality of 
versible process. They also declare for the eradi- rights among peoples and of each people's right 
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to self-determination, freely to choose its socio-
political development path; non-interference in 
internal affairs; the unconditional renunciation 
of the use and threat of force, whatever their 
form; the settlement of all disputes among states 
exclusively by peaceful means; the strict obser-
vance of territorial-political realities, of the invi-
olability of the existing frontiers and of the terri-
torial integrity of states; the achievement in each 
country of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all, irrespective of race, sex, lan-
guage, religion or nationality; the development 
of co-operation among states in various domains 
on the basis of mutual advantage; the obser-
vance of the pledges made in accordance with 
international law; the observance of all the prin-
ciples and purposes of the UN Charter, of the 
Helsinki Final Act principles, of the other gen-
erally acknowledged norms of international rela-
tions. 
In the context of the growing interdepend-
ences in the contemporary world, the implemen-
tation of all these principles and provisions all 
contribute to the assertion of generally human 
values and norms of conduct in international 
relations. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states are 
willing to develop and expand the dialogue with 
all states, to collaborate constructively on set-
tling the issues which Europe and the world are 
faced with. Such a dialogue and collaboration 
are particularly necessary at the present 
important moment in the evolution of the inter-
national situation. 
11 
Taking into account the fact that the elim-
ination of the danger of a nuclear and conven-
tional war and the building of international 
security are an objective prerequisite for man-
kind's survival and progress, the Warsaw Treaty 
member states consider the halting of the arms 
race and the achievement of disarmament to be 
the main task of the contemporary world. 
The ever broader understanding by gov-
ernments and peoples of their common security 
interests has allowed of taking the first steps 
towards reducing military confrontation. A pos-
sibility has taken shape of replacing senseless 
and dangerous military rivalry by the states' 
peaceful collaboration. In this context, the 
meeting participants highlight the special signifi-
cance of the treaty on medium- and shorter-
range missiles, whose applications marked the 
beginning of scrapping nuclear armament, as 
well as the working atmosphere which has lately 
become manifest in certain disarmament talks. 
However, no radical turning point in dis-
armament questions has been recorded yet. 
Despite acknowledgment by both alliances of 
the inadmissibility of a new war, the level of 
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military tension remains extremely high and 
dangerous. 
NA TO's efforts to perpetuate the policy of 
force, to go ahead with the nuclear deterrence 
strategy are a reason for concern. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states con-
sider that under these circumstances all coun-
tries, all realistic, peace-loving forces must take 
resolute action. Starting from the need for a 
global approach to security-related questions, 
they declare for the enslllrance of security 
through the maintenance of the military balance 
at an ever lower level which should be sufficient 
for defence, but which should not enable a sur-
prise attack or large-scale offensive actions to be 
launched. The objective puf~iued by the partici-
pating states is the reduction of armaments 
down to the complete elimination of the risk of a 
war to break out. This objective can be attained 
only through concerted efforts, by consolidating 
the political ways of ensuring security and sta-
bility, not the military ones. 
They are ready further to contribute, 
alongside all countries concerned, to the con-
clusion of agreements leading to the gradual 
reduction down to the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons, to the banrting and destruction 
of chemical weapons, to deep cuts in conven-
tional armed forces, to the prevention of outer 
space militarisation, to the gradual reduction of 
military production and the substantial cur-
tailment of military spendiQg. They also set out 
from the fact that the disarmament measures 
must ensure equal security tb all states, with the 
full observance of each state's sovereignty, inde-
pendence and territorial integrity within the 
existing frontiers, and rule out the possibility of 
the threat or use of force in interstate rela-
tions. 
Hailing the resumption of the Soviet-
American talks on major disarmament-related 
questions, the allied states voice their hope that 
these may yield tangible results as soon as pos-
sible. 
They consider that one of the priority 
goals should be the finalisation of the treaty on 
the 50% reduction of the. offensive strategic 
arms of the USSR and the United States with 
the observance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, as it was signed in 1972. 
The states represented at the meeting 
stand for the immediate cessation of nuclear 
weapon tests and the thorqugh examination of 
this problem, at a multilateral level included, 
viz. the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. 
They declare for the undelayed finalisation of 
the protocols on the verification of the 1974 and 
1976 Soviet-American agreements, and their 
entry into force as a step towards attaining the 
final target - banning all nuclear weapon tests. 
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The Warsaw Treaty states support the idea that 
the 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear 
weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space 
and under water may be extended to under-
ground tests as well, as a way of urgently solving 
the question of a comprehensive test ban. 
Retaining their topicality are the objecti~es to 
halt and in the long run ban the production of fissi~nabie material for arms manufacturing, 
just as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and of missile technology for military 
purposes. A major task is to .ensure ~he pro-
tection of peaceful nuclear proJects agamst any 
attack. 
The meeting participants state their 
concern over the danger spelt for international 
peace and security by the use of chemical 
weapons as long as they exist and are spread, 
and propose that effective steps should be taken 
in order to eliminate this danger. The partici-
pants call for a speedy drafting of a universal 
convention on the general and complete ban of 
chemical weapons and the destruction of the 
existing stockpiles. 
The key issue of security and stability in 
Europe is the reduction of armed forces and 
conventional weaponry, the limitation and 
eventual elimination of tactical nuclear arms, 
and confidence-building on the continent. 
The meeting participants consider that 
the immediate goal of the negotiations on con-
ventional armed forces in Europe is to agree, in 
a first stage, on collective ceilings, equal for the 
NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty 
member states, for troops and the principal 
classes of weapons, in Europe and various parts 
of the continent. The new ceilings should be sen-
sibly lower than the lowest levels either side has 
at present. The proposals advanced in Vienna by 
the allied socialist countries stipulate the mutual 
substantial reduction of armed forces and 
armament. These will make it possible to elim-
inate the existing imbalances in conventional 
weaponry. Troops and armament reductio.ns 
and limitations should be made under stnct 
international control. 
During the meeting it was noted that the 
additional proposals regarding the conventional 
armed forces in Europe made at the recent 
NATO Council summit session met halfway the 
allied socialist countries' stand. The meeting 
participants expect these proposals to be 
detailed out and tabled at the Vienna negotia-
tions as soon as possible. 
The Warsaw Treaty countries reiterated 
their determination to do their best for the 
Vienna talks to yield positive results without 
delay. The opinion was expressed that the situ-
ation of the negotiations is such that the first 
understandings may be achieved already in 
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1990 provided that a constructive approach is mad~ by all. Experts will be entrusted with 
urgently drafting adequate proposals. 
The concrete measures adopted by the 
Warsaw Treaty states, in keeping with th.eir 
defensive doctrine of unilaterally reducmg 
armed forces and armaments, of ensuring their 
non-offensive structure as well as of reducing 
their armament production and military 
expenditure aim to create the material and 
political conditions likely to ensure the steady 
continuation of the arms limitation process and 
the lowering of the level of military confron-
tation. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states call on 
the NATO countries to take similar measures 
concerning their troops and armaments, their 
military spending and activities. 
The meeting participants declared for the 
application of the Stockholm ag~ee!flents, for the 
adoption - as part of the negotiations on confi-
dence- and security-building measures in Europe 
by the 35 states participating in the CSCE - of 
new measures aimed at developing them, 
extending the notification, o~~ervation.a~~ limi-
tation measures to all mthtary activities of 
states, including the activity of their naval and 
air forces. 
A great contribution to confidence- and 
security-building, to increasing stability on the 
continent could be made by a centre for less-
ening the military threat and preventing surprise 
attacks in Europe - a body with informatory and 
consulting functions. 
The same confidence- and security-
building aims are pursued by the other proposals 
advanced by the Warsaw Treaty member states 
during the negotiations. 
An action of great importance, apt to raise 
the process of European disarmament and 
security building on a qualitatively new plan 
would be convening of a meeting of the heads of 
the 35 states participating in the CSCE to 
examine the results in these fields on the con-
tinent and to set the future objectives. 
The allied socialist states consider that the 
examination of military doctrines, of their char-
acter, of their political and military and te~h­
nical aspects, as well as their future evolution 
would also contribute to the development of 
military conceptions and doctrines on strictly 
defensive principles. 
Stability and security in Europe cannot be 
fully ensured unless the question of tactical 
nuclear means is solved. Moreover, as conven-
tional armaments are curtailed the destabilising 
effect of tactical nuclear weapons will grow inev-
itably. In this respect, the NATO plans to update 
its tactical nuclear arms cause great concern. 
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With respect to certain evolutions in the 
position taken by the NATO countries to the 
talks concerning tactical nuclear weapons in 
Europe, the Warsaw Treaty member states call 
on these countries to solve the tactical nuclear 
armaments issues not by modernising them but 
by negotiating their step-by-step reduction. The 
Warsaw Treaty countries reiterate the proposal 
they have already put forward in this sense. 
The meeting participants expressed their 
support for the Soviet Union's initiative to pass 
to new unilateral cutbacks on tactical nuclear 
missiles stationed in Europe provided the 
NATO states are willing to start negotiations on 
tactical nuclear weapons. 
The meeting participants also welcomed 
the Soviet Union's decision unilaterally to 
withdraw 500 warheads for tactical nuclear mis-
siles from the allied socialist states' territory this 
year, as well as its declaration that it is ready to 
remove all the nuclear warheads stationed in the 
territory of its allies over 1989-1991, provided 
the United States takes a similar step. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states are 
convinced that the stepwise curtailment and 
eventual liquidation of tactical nuclear weapons 
in Europe alongside deep cuts in conventional 
armed forces and armaments would be an effi-
cient means of lessening the war threat and 
strengthening mutual confidence. 
In ensuring security and stability at an 
ever lower level of the balance of military forces, 
account should be taken of the role played by 
the navy and its armaments, as well as of its mil-
itary activity, apt to have a destabilising 
influence on the situation and jeopardise the 
security of Europe and of other regions. The 
meeting participants stand for the intensifi-
cation of dialogue on those problems and take 
the view that separate negotiations should open 
between the states concerned and, first of all, 
between the great maritime states, to analyse 
them. 
The meeting stressed that the reduction of 
military expenditures allows the means thus 
saved to be used for social and economic devel-
opment. In this respect, of topical importance is 
the effective settlement of the question of chan-
neling the means used so far for military pro-
duction to economic and social purposes. This 
problem could become the object of consulta-
tions among states, the UN included. 
Also the significance of joint and indi-
vidual initiatives was underlined, which may 
help solve security issues in various regions of 
the continent, in particular: the creation of a 
nuclear and chemical free zone in the Balkans; 
the creation of a denuclearised corridor and a 
chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe; 
armaments cuts and confidence-building in 
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Central Europe; the creation of a zone of confi-
dence, collaboration and relations of good 
neighbourliness along the contact line between 
the states of the two alliances; the transfor-
mation of the Mediterranean into a zone of 
peace and collaboration; a sharp reduction of 
the level of military tension in Northern Europe. 
They support practical measures taken multi-
and bilaterally for the achie~ement of these ini-
tiatives. 
The Warsaw Treaty member countries 
consider that disarmament measures should be 
supported by appropriate measures to ensure a 
strict and effective control. They are ready to 
participate in the achievement of agreements 
pursuing the creation of a comprehensive dis-
armament control system. ln this framework, 
the United Nations would have a positive 
role. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states reit-
erate their appeal to the countries in the North 
Atlantic Alliance to use the opportunity taking 
shape at present for completely overcoming the 
consequences of the cold war in Europe and 
worldwide. They reassert their principled stance 
in favour of dismantling the two military and 
political alliances. 
Ill 
The goal of stability and security in 
Europe, of the affirmation of new relations on 
the continent founded on the overcoming of 
confrontation, on the strengthening of trust and 
good neighbourliness continues to be the focus 
of the Warsaw Treaty states' effort. They declare 
for the development of a broad, mutually advan-
tageous collaboration in various fields, for the 
participation of all countrie~ and all peoples in 
the settlement of the pressilng problems of the 
continent. The all-European process remains a 
basic element in the building of a new 
Europe. 
Stating their firm intention to contribute 
by all means to the deepening of the Helsinki 
process, the meeting's participants set out from 
the idea that, in building a Europe of peace and 
collaboration, everything that has been achieved 
on the continent over the centuries and in the 
past decades should be taken into account. Dif-
ferences between states or groups of states 
should not prevent mutual, understanding and 
co-operation. On the contrary, the European 
peoples' diversity of experience can be a source 
of mutual enrichment. In this connection, it is 
important that the proces~es taking place in 
various parts of the contin~nt should help the 
development of relations among states on a 
bilateral, as well as multilateral, all-European 
plan. 
The states participa~ing in the meeting 
attach a great importance to the promotion of 
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mutually advantageous economic and technical-
scientific collaboration among the CSCE coun-
tries. This may give each country the oppor-
tunity of efficiently using its material and 
human resources, the possibilities provided by 
the international division of labour for its socio-
economic development. This requires that the 
obstacles and restrictions standing in the way of 
broader commercial, scientific, technical and 
production exchanges should be removed, and 
that mutual access should be ensured to pres-
ent-day advances in technology. 
To develop and deepen multilateral and 
bilateral collaboration in Europe for the reso-
lution of urgent ecological problems is an 
increasingly topical question. Europe may set an 
example in this direction. 
The expansion of European co-operation 
calls - as part of it - for broader collaboration 
on humanitarian matters, encouragement of 
human contacts, the development of collabo-
ration in information exchanges and the flow of 
information as well as in culture and edu-
cation. 
At the same time, the ensurance of peace 
and collaboration in Europe demands that all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms con-
tained in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, in the International Covenants on eco-
nomic, social, civil and political rights, in the 
Helsinki Final Act and in other UN and CSCE 
documents should be achieved in each country. 
The Warsaw Treaty states declare for the full 
achievement of the civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural and other rights in their interde-
pendence. 
The strengthening of peace and security in 
Europe would contribute to solving many 
serious social problems with which the peoples 
of the continent are confronted, would ensure 
the right to life and to work. 
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The meeting participants underline that a 
firm response should be given to any manifesta-
tions of revanchism and chauvinism, any form 
of sowing hatred among peoples. They share the 
concern of public opinion in the West European 
countries about neofascist manifestations there. 
The allied socialist countries attach a pri-
mordial importance to the ensurance of mil-
itary, political and territorial stability in Europe. 
They start from the fact that each people decides 
the fate of its country, and has the right to 
choose its socio-political and economic system, 
the state system it thinks fit. There can be no 
single models for the organisation of society. 
Stability presupposes renunciation of con-
frontation, of the policy of force, non-admission 
of direct or indirect interference in the domestic 
affairs of states. No country has the right to 
dictate the events in another country, to assume 
the position of judge or arbiter. 
IV 
The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German 
Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's 
Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the 
Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics are ready to develop 
their collaboration with the other states partici-
pating in the all-European process, with all the 
states interested, to work together with these 
states with a view to reaching understanding on 
deep arms cuts and on disarmament, the 
strengthening of security and stability in Europe, 
the transition from confrontation to collabo-
ration in the relations among states, the building 
of a Europe of lasting peace, good neighbour-
liness and collaboration. They will be receptive 
and support any step or constructive proposal in 
this direction. 
Document 1204 
Amendment 1 
Force comparisons 
(NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) -
reply to the annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by MM. De Decker and Noerens 
5th December 1989 
1. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert " by the two super-
powers". 
I. See llth sitting, 6th December 1989 (amendment not moved). 
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Western European Union's information policy 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 2 
by Sir William She/ton, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFf ORDER 
on Western European Union's information policy 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Sir William Shelton, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Analysis of the problem 
(i) The Council and its public relations 
(ii) The London seminar - a first step towards new thinking? 
(iii) The Assembly's particular problems 
Ill. Conditions for improving the public impact of WEU's work 
IV. Some practical proposals 
APPENDICES 
8th November 1989 
I. The degree of information of the public on WEU and on defence questions 
11. WEU seminar organised by the United Kingdom presidency on changes in 
public perceptions of European defence, held on 6th-7th March 1989, Lan-
caster House, London 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Pontillon (Chairman); Mr. Ewing, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Biihler) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. 
Asselborn, Buchner, De Bondt, De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: Eisma), Ewing (Alternate: Hardy), Fiandrotti (Alternate: Pasquino), 
Sir John Hunt, MM. Kempinaire, Kollwelter, Stegagnini, Tummers. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Order 
on Western European Union's information policy 
The Assembly, 
(i) Stressing the importance of public opinion in the pursuit of a sound European security and 
defence policy; 
(ii) Considering, however, that the degree of public opinion's awareness of Western Europe's 
defence and security requirements leaves much to be desired; 
(iii) Noting that WED's role and activities are still hardly known to the wider public; 
(iv) Convinced that it cannot be left to the Assembly, the Secretary-General or the press to propagate 
knowledge of the organisation's work and posture but that the Council itself must make a much greater 
effort to inform public opinion, 
INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE 
1. In its contacts with the Council: 
(a) to ask how the Council intends to improve the organisation's public relations effort following 
the WEU seminar on changes in public perceptions of European defence; 
(b) to request that the Council inform the Assembly of the proposals the Secretary-General has 
made in this respect; 
2. To ask the Council to place the problem of WED's information policy on its agenda as a matter 
of urgency in order to consider specific initiatives such as: 
(a) issuing press guidelines after meetings of the Permanent Council; 
(b) preparing and publicising understandable basic information documents to be distributed 
widely in all member countries; 
(c) creating a WEU periodical in the official languages of all member countries to circulate 
articles, communiques and topical information on WED's activities; 
(d) establishing WEU information offices in European member countries of the alliance and in 
particular in the United States and Canada; 
(e) creating a logo for Western European Union, perhaps organised by a competition in member 
states; 
(f) encouraging member governments to provide more information about WEU; 
(g) defining the conditions for the organisation of opinion polls at European level; 
(h) considering how to increase co-operation with existing relevant private groups, associations 
and institutes to promote interest in studies of Western European security questions; 
(i) considering how to promote co-operation, debates and exchanges of views with social 
groups, industrial organisations, trade unions, cultural associations, schools and univer-
sities; 1 
lj) increasing the use of the televised media for presenting WEU; 
3. To ask the Council in view of the above considerations to grant the financial means needed for a 
WEU public information policy; 1 
4. To remind the Council that the Assembly is prepared to discuss with the Council ways and 
means of co-operating in public relations activities, it being understood that the Assembly's indepen-
dence will be strictly respected. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir William Shelton, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Five years after the Rome declaration in 
which ministers decided to reactivate Western 
European Union, the objective of promoting a 
European security identity is still far from being 
reached. A continuing concern of the Assembly 
has been to ensure that the significance of public 
awareness of the requirements of European 
security is not neglected. The importance of this 
increases as developments in a changing world, 
and particularly in Eastern Europe, might call 
for a new definition of security for Europe. 
2. Once again, therefore, in Recommen-
dation 4 72 1 the Assembly urged the Council to 
promote a more active public information 
policy in this matter. Unfortunately the Coun-
cil's reply 2 failed to cover this particular 
aspect. 
II. Analysis of the problem 
3. The results of two recent opinion polls 
carried out in a number of Western European 
countries might help to obtain an idea of what 
people know about the subject, although they 
should be considered only as specific examples 
and not as a final conclusion since this would 
require a far more fundamental study. 
4. The first poll 3 was conducted in 
April-May 1989 among citizens of four 
European countries: France, Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom, by SIRPA (Service for 
Information and Public Relations of the Armed 
Forces), an institution responsible to the French 
Defence Ministry for informing French public 
opinion about the country's defence policy. Only 
a tiny minority (1% in France, Germany and 
Italy, 3% in the United Kingdom) of the people 
consulted considered it was very well informed 
about problems of European defence. 
5. In three countries, France, the United 
Kingdom and Italy, the press and the media 
were the source of the most reliable information 
on defence problems. Conversely the credit 
given to political authorities as sources of infor-
mation was the lowest in all four countries. 
6. Inter alia, SIRP A asked about WEU and 
its work. 72% in the United Kingdom, 65% in 
France, 64% in Italy and 32% in Germany 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1989. 
2. Communicated to the Assembly on 6th September 1989, 
Document 1195. 
3. See Appendix I. 
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answered that they had never heard of WEU. 
Conversely, 5% in Germany, 4% in France, 2% 
in Italy and 1% in the United Kingdom were 
able to give a positive answer to the question. 
7. On the other hand, according to the 
"Flash-Eurobarometer" opinion poll carried 
out in July 1989 under the responsibility of the 
Commission of the European Communities in 
the twelve Community member countries, a 
majority of 54% of the citizens consulted were in 
favour of giving the European Community com-
petence in security and defence matters. In the 
nine WEU member countries, the specific 
results were as follows: 
- Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5% 
- Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75% 
- Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67% 
- France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62% 
- Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55% 
- Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52% 
- United Kingdom.............. 46% 
- Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42% 
-Spain ........................ 40% 
Both these polls show how far WED's ambitions 
for improving public awareness of security 
matters and its role are still far from being 
achieved. 
8. These ambitions were set out in the con-
clusion of the document entitled " WEU and 
public awareness " adopted by the Council on 
23rd April 1985: 
" Success in achieving the objectives of 
the Rome declaration will depend on 
many factors, a major one of which will be 
the stimulation of public interest in WEU 
and the generation of greater public 
awareness of policies which WEU 
members follow." 
Has there ever been a true political will to 
implement these intentions? 
(i) The Council and its public relations 
9. Press briefings given twice a year by the 
Chairman-in-Office at the close of ministerial 
meetings or communiques issued after meetings 
as in Bonn, Venice and Luxembourg are the 
Council's principal means of informing public 
opinion about its work. Only during the Gulf 
crisis was special information released when the 
Council issued several press guidelines on its 
role in the area. So a member of the operations 
staff in the German Defence Ministry concluded 
in an article on WEU published in 1988 by a 
German periodical specialised on defence 
matters 4: 
" WEU's public relations effort has not 
yet attained the scale required ~o c~n~ol­
idate the consensus among pubhc op1010n 
on defence and security requirements. It 
is not enough to make the press respon-
sible for reminding public opinion about 
WEU once every six months on the 
occasion of ministerial meetings. " 
10. The adoption of the Hague platform was 
an important step which created the hope that 
the political role _of WEU woul~ defini.tely be 
increased. But wtth one exception dur10g the 
Gulf crisis the Council has always avoided 
adopting joint positions in public when 
problems became more specific. One example_ is 
the problem of arms limitations in Europe. ~n 1_ts 
reply to Recommendation 464 5, the Council d~d 
not take up the Assembly's proposals to reply 10 
the name of WEU to Mr. Gorbachev's call for a 
pan-European summit on conventional arms. 
Nor did it take up the Assembly's recommen-
dation to give substance to the principles enun-
ciated in the Hague platform by defining ~nd 
stating publicly a Western European Umon 
posture on specific arms control issues. 
11. Thanks to relevant parliamentary ques-
tions put by members of the Assembly in their 
home countries, we know at least why some of 
the member governments are so reluctant. The 
German Government said that it used WEU as a 
framework for exchanging views on security 
matters (answer in the Bundestag on 9th May 
1989). The Luxembourg Government stated 
that the role of WEU was limited because it 
played no direct part in the negotiations (answer 
on 9th April 1989 to a question put by Mr. 
Burger). Finally the U:zi~~d Kingdom_ Gov-
ernment said the respons1b1hty for defin10g and 
publicising joint positions on specific aspects of 
arms limitations rested with NATO (reply on 1st 
February 1989 to a question put by Mr. Hill). 
12. In an article published in NATO Review 
No. 3 (June 1989) entitled "~EU: th_e way 
ahead " Sir Geoffrey Howe, outgo10g Chairman-
in-Office of the Council, specified that WEU 
was not a framework for developing a consensus 
in particular negotiations, but had a valuable 
role as ginger group. 
13. It is the formal position of the Council 
that all consultations within the special working 
4. Der Mittler-Brief-Informationsdienst zur Sicherheits-
politik, No. 3, 1988. 
5. Communicated to the Assembly on 1Oth February 
1989. 
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group and its subgroups creat~ within the _Per-
manent Council had to rema10 confidential 6• 
There has never been any publ;ic statement after 
meetings of the Permanent Council. Fur-
thermore the activities of the ministerial organs 
in Paris ~emain unknown to the public. Excep-
tionally, however, a communique was issued. in 
September 1989 announcing that the Stand10g 
Armaments Committee Working Group No. 8 
had organised a symposium on artificial intelli-
gence as an aid in operational military decision-
making, which took place o~ 20th and .21st Jut;te 
1989 at the WEU seat in Pans. ;But the 10terest 10 
such information was minimised by the fact that 
it was not issued until two months later! How 
does the Council hope to promote public interest 
in WEU's work under these conditions? 
14. The Council has always recognised the 
need to inform European public opinion as fully 
as possible (replies to Recommendations 411, 
420 429 438 459). It underlined several times 
that this' was' essentially the · responsibility of 
each member state (replies to Recommendati~ns 
411 429 464), the Chairman-in-Office wtth reg~rd to' press briefings after ministerial ses-
sions and the Secretary-General (reply to Rec-
ommendation 438). The responsibility of the 
latter for publicising WEU's activities was also 
underlined by the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment in a reply in the House of Commons on 
14th May 1987. 
15. But in face of the reluctance of the 
Council in regard to making public WEU's posi-
tions on specific matters concerning European 
security, it is difficult for the Secr~tary-G~neral 
to develop an effective informatiOn pohcy. It 
could therefore have only limited effect when in 
September 1986 a unit within the Political 
Division of the Secretariat-General was set up to 
be responsible for relations with the press and 
for providing information. It is to. be welcomed 
that in its reply to RecommendatiOn 449 7, the 
Council announced that " a separate press and 
information unit in the Secretariat-General is 
under consideration as part of the Council's con-
tinuing review of the restructuring of the minis-
terial organs ". 
16. The job description in a vacancy notice 
for the post of Assistant to the Public Relatio':ls 
Officer at the Secretariat-General of WEU 10 
London issued recently includes the " prepa-
ration of press briefings/meetings ". It would be 
interesting to know what kind of information 
the Secretariat-General is able to provide to the 
press, bearing in mind that all the a~tivities of 
the Permanent Council and the work10g groups 
are confidential and that ~he Chairman-in-
Office gives a press conference only twice a year. 
6. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 449, communi-
cated to the Assembly on 12th April 1988. 
7. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th April 1988. 
DOCUMENT 1205 
It is therefore not surprising that all the other 
activities of the new official concern internal 
administration matters, such as: 
- preparing the daily press review, 
- maintaining files on press contacts, 
- carrying out general secretariat duties, 
- maintaining up-to-date the required 
documentation in co-operation with the 
library service. 
Nevertheless, the notice announces that "as the 
press service is still in the process of expansion, 
other related tasks may emerge". Is this an indi-
cation that the Council's information activities 
will be intensified? 
17. At present, however, the process of 
restructuring the ministerial organs is still not 
completed. Despite these difficulties Mr. Alfred 
Cahen, former Secretary-General, had initiated 
considerable public relations activities under his 
own responsibility, writing articles and giving . 
lectures in various circles. He has now published 
an information booklet entitled "Western 
European Union and NATO - building a 
European defence identity within the context of 
Atlantic solidarity", so far available in English 
only. It seems that Mr. van Eekelen, the new 
Secretary-General of WEU, is determined on 
pursuing this active information policy of his 
predecessor. The Assembly has paid tribute 
several times to these personal activities but it is 
obvious that they cannot relieve the Council of 
its own responsibilities. 
18. It is to be welcomed that the new Secre-
tary-General is continuing his predecessor's 
practice of sending newsletters to the President 
of the Assembly, describing the activities of the 
intergovernmental organs. This new practice is 
based on a decision taken by the Permanent 
Council on 15th June 1988, specifying that the 
frequency of this letter would be " determined in 
the light of the rhythm and significance of these 
activities". More significant, however, is the 
fact that the Council underlined that all these 
letters would be issued under the Secretary-
General's own responsibility. Consequently the 
Council is in no way bound by the information 
given in these letters. There is a strong 
impression that, by using this kind of procedure, 
the Council is trying to entrust the Assembly 
with the task of circulating information on the 
Council's activities without being committed by 
the news transmitted. It is evident that the 
annual report the Council transmits statutorily 
to the Assembly, even in its new half-yearly 
form, is not an appropriate document for public 
relations use. 
19. Problems start already with regard to 
basic information about Western European 
Union. The modified Brussels Treaty, with the 
texts of protocols and other basic documents 
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concerning WEU, was last published by the 
Secretariat-General in 1969. It would be highly 
desirable for Assembly members and anyone 
else who might be interested to have an updated 
edition of the treaty and its protocols. 
20. In 1988, the Secretariat-General pub-
lished an information booklet entitled " The 
reactivation of WEU statements and 
communiques 1984 to 1987 " containing the 
Rome declaration, the platform on European 
security interests and the communiques issued 
after the ministerial meetings in Bonn, Venice 
and Luxembourg. Furthermore, it offers a the-
matic presentation of the general lines of a 
European security policy set out in the different 
documents just mentioned. Despite its 
somewhat dry presentation, this booklet is a 
very useful document for people with a certain 
basic knowledge ofWEU. But a drawback is that 
so far it has been published only in English and 
French. Furthermore, since only a limited 
number of copies have been sent to capitals of 
member countries, its public impact is practi-
cally nil. 
21. So far, the Council's position has been 
that developing further means of information 
shall not involve new expenditure 8• If the Coun-
cil's position remains unchanged, the prospects 
for more effective public relations activities will 
be gloomy. At present, it is difficult to show how 
much the Secretariat-General and the other min-
isterial organs are spending for informing the 
public since the sub-head " Information, etc. " 
covers the costs of documentation such as news-
papers, periodicals, books and other publica-
tions for internal use. The figure of this sub-head 
in the revised WEU budget for 1988 was 
£6 735. 
22. As far as the responsibilities of national 
governments are concerned, it is obvious that 
they act in a totally independent manner in this 
area except when a formal joint decision 
commits them to specific action. Obviously there 
is no particular pressure in this respect. It should 
be recalled that the Assembly regretted in Reso-
lution 78 9 on public information activities on 
security and defence matters in WEU member 
countries on the basis of Mr. Burger's report that 
member governments only exceptionally issue 
adequate information on the rOle of WEU. It 
might be useful to examine in a further report 
how the situation has developed in member 
countries since Mr. Burger's report. 
23. The attitude of certain governments vis-
a-vis a specific proposal is characteristic. In Rec-
ommendation 457 10 the Assembly noted that 
8. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 420, communi-
cated to the Assembly on 18th September 1985. 
9. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1987 (See 
Document 1112). 
10. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1988. 
international public optmon was still hardly 
aware that WEU was being reactivated and asked 
the Council in Recommendation 459 11 to 
provide adequate information on a regular basis 
to the North American media and public 
regarding the nature, scope and aims of the reac-
tivation of WEU, the specific constraints of the 
WEU countries in security matters and European 
co-operation in that area. As the Council assured 
in its reply 12 that it fully recognised the impor-
tance of the matter, a member of the Assembly 
proposed establishing a WEU information 
bureau in the United States. 
24. On 25th August 1988, the Luxembourg 
Government announced its readiness to support 
such an initiative insofar " as it seems likely to 
attain these aims ". It said that the usefulness of 
such a project would therefore have to be 
assessed from this point of view (reply to a 
question put in the Chamber of Deputies by Mr. 
Linster). When he was asked about the same 
subject by Mr. Antretter in a Bundestag debate 
on 13th October 1988, the German Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs said that he was not yet 
able to give a definite answer. Stressing the 
financial implications, he said in a personal 
capacity that he considered it worth endorsing. 
Conversely, the United Kingdom Government, 
answering a similar question put by Mr. Hill in 
the House of Commons on 19th July 1988, 
referred to the embassies of WEU member coun-
tries which already worked to develop awareness 
in North America of WEU's contributions and 
objectives. So far there are no indications that the 
subject has been taken up seriously. 
25. It follows from the second part of the 
thirty-fourth annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly 13 that the Council considers the 
organisation of European sessions for advanced 
defence studies and the creation of an associ-
ation of alumni of these sessions under the aegis 
of WEU to be an important contribution to 
public relations. In fact, these initiatives concur 
with the Assembly's view of the importance of 
developing the information conveyed to people 
in a position to influence public opinion. 
Further sessions should therefore be strongly 
encouraged as well as parliamentary partici-
pation in these events. Nevertheless it should be 
recalled that these meetings are first and 
foremost of an academic nature without imme-
diate effect on the wider public. 
(ii) The London seminar -
a first step towards new thinking? 
26. Obviously as a reaction to Mr. 
Gorbachev's impact on western public opinion 
the United Kingdom presidency took a so far 
11. Adopted by the Assembly on 9th June 1988. 
12. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988. 
13. Document 1177, page 5. 
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unique and entirely new initiative, when it 
decided to organise a WEU seminar on 
" Changes in public perceptions of European 
defence " which was held in London 14 on 6th 
and 7th March 1989. The importance of this 
seminar should not be underestimated. Three 
members of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations and two Assembly officials 
were able to play a full part in the seminar's 
work - perhaps a first step for closer 
co-operation between the Council and the 
Assembly in public relations. It is now time to 
ask the Council what practi~al conclusions it 
intends to draw from the semmar and what fol-
low-up action it intends to take. 
27. During the seminar many courses of pos-
sible action emerged, some of which are listed 
below: 
(i) there is a lack of interest in defence 
in certain countries (Major General 
Hollants van Loocke ); 
(ii) in some countries there is a taboo 
on discussing strategic issues 
(working group one); 
(iii) there is a possil::!le lack of public 
support for necessary defence 
spending ( Sir William Shelton); 
(iv) it is vital to ensure that the sub-
stance of policy ·is right (Edward 
Mortimer, assistant foreign editor 
of the Financial Times); 
(v) there is a need to define a basic 
European consen$US on defence, as 
well as an effective explanation of 
policies (Major General Hollants 
van Loocke, Director of the Royal 
High Institute for Defence, 
Brussels, and working group 
three); 
(vi) there is a need for a common 
European threat analysis (working 
group three); 
(vii) effective security should be seen as 
a political imperative for Europe 
irrespective of the threat stemming 
from the Warsaw Pact (working 
group two); 
(viii) in the case of disarmament, there 
was no clear public statement of the 
WEU Council's views on important 
recent developments (Mr. Pon-
tillon, Chairman of the Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions); 
(ix) the threats to Europe coming from 
other parts of the world should be 
explained (working group one); 
14. Summary report prepared by the United Kingdom presi-
dency at Appendix 11. 
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(x) the Hague platform is a good basis 
for appealing to a sophisticated 
public. But a shorter visionary doc-
ument could also be helpful 
(working group two); 
(xi) WEU language should be accessible 
to the public (working group three) 
and WEU should have regular con-
tacts with the media (working group 
one); 
(xii) there could be advantages in pre-
senting policy at two levels, e.g. for 
quality and popular press (working 
group two); 
(xiii) a publicity think-tank could be val-
uable (working group three); 
(xiv) a WEU public relations committee 
should be created with representa-
tives from both the Assembly and 
the Council (Mr. Pontillon); 
(xv) the role of parliamentarians is 
important (working group three). 
28. The initiative of the United Kingdom 
presidency in organising this seminar was a very 
useful and necessary exercise. Both the Council 
and the Assembly should now examine seriously 
the practical consequences to be drawn. It 
appears from the first part of the thirty-fifth 
annual report of the Council to the Assembly 
that at their meeting in April WEU ministers 
took note of this seminar and instructed the Per-
manent Council to suggest ways of improving 
the organisation's public relations effort. Fur-
thermore, according to the annual report, the 
Secretariat-General is currently working on the 
proposals to be submitted to the Council in this 
respect. Now is therefore the right time to 
submit the Assembly's views to the Council. 
(iii) The Assembly's particular problems 
29. The Assembly, composed of representa-
tives of the people of member countries who are 
responsible to their electorate, is inevitably in 
permanent contact with public opinion. It has 
always tried to give maximum publicity to its 
sessions and to the reports it examines. But as 
Mr. Pontillon emphasised in his address at the 
London seminar, a parliamentary assembly such 
as the WEU Assembly cannot arouse the interest 
of public opinion on its own. It is first the 
standard of the public dialogue between the par-
liamentary and the governmental sides of WEU 
that can elicit a meaningful response from 
public opinion. Yet this dialogue is still far from 
satisfactory. The Assembly is mostly alone in 
publicising common positions regarding 
European security interests. 
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30. A recent example was the Assembly's 
Defence Committee's recommendation to defer 
decisions on the production and deployment of 
short-range nuclear missiles for replacing the 
Lance systems. The committee's position was 
made public in April 1989. The WEU Council 
remained mute on the matter. When it finally 
replied to Recommendation 470 in September 
1989, it simply referred to the decision reached 
in the meantime within the alliance. 
31. This is not the only instance of the " one 
way street " aspect of the public dialogue the 
Assembly endeavours to develop with the 
Council. How can the public assess the value of 
the Assembly's initiatives in these circum-
stances? 
32. It is not surprising, therefore, that, for 
instance, in May 1989 a member of the Belgian 
Chamber of Representatives, with reference to 
the Defence Committee's recommendation 
mentioned above, asked the Belgian Gov-
ernment for information about the status, role, 
competence and membership of the Assembly's 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments. 
33. Efforts to strengthen the impact of the 
Assembly's work through national parliaments 
have so far been partly successful. In this respect 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations has had special responsibility from the 
very outset. 
34. Following the selection by the committee 
of four recommendations (467, 470, 471 and 
472) for debate in national parliaments, the rel-
evant recommendations and the corresponding 
reports were transmitted to the presidents of 
member parliaments. Futhermore, because of its 
particular topicality, the report by Mr. Pontillon 
on the development of East-West relations and 
Western European security (Recommendation 
4 71) was transmitted to all foreign affairs and 
defence committees of member parliaments, 
including those of Portugal and Spain, as well as 
to the relevant committees of both houses of the 
American Congress and the Canadian Par-
liament. 
35. It has been very rare in the past for a 
member of a national government to refer in 
public to an Assembly report. It is therefore par-
ticularly welcome that Mr. Francis Maude, 
United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, seized the oppor-
tunity of a House of Commons debate on 27th 
July 1989 on Eastern European problems to pay 
tribute to Mr. Pontillon's report which he called 
a " coherent and imaginative basis for the devel-
opment of the alliance's role in both protecting 
security and improving East-West relations 
through arms control ". If more ministers of 
national governments followed this United 
Kingdom example by referring to Assembly 
reports in parliamentary and other political 
speeches it would be a considerable help to 
expanding public knowledge of the Assembly's 
activities. 
36. It is also to be welcomed that the United 
Kingdom Minister of State referred in the same 
debate to the Assembly's efforts in activating the 
East-West parliamentary dialogue. He said: 
" that the WEU Assembly can play a 
useful role in talking to parliamentarians 
and to other opinion formers in the Soviet 
Union and other Eastern European coun-
tries. It is good news that the Assembly 
began exchanges with the Supreme Soviet. 
I hope that these can be developed in 
future, and perhaps expanded to take in 
equivalent bodies in other such countries, 
notably, perhaps, Poland and Hungary." 
3 7. It should be noted that this debate in the 
House of Commons was initiated by members 
of the United Kingdom Delegation to the 
Assembly. Several delegation members under-
lined the importance ofthe WEU Assembly. Mr. 
Wilkinson, in particular, pleaded for a stronger 
role for WEU in concerting a Western European 
position on key strategic issues, East-West rela-
tions, arms control and out-of-area security 
problems. 
38. However, the committee's efforts to 
increase the number of Assembly representa-
tives putting questions in parliaments on the 
basis of texts adopted by the Assembly were suc-
cessful only in three member parliaments. Mr. 
Pontillon, Chairman of the committee, put in 
the French Senate, on 27th July 1989, five ques-
tions relating to Recommendations 467, 469, 
470, 471 and 472. So far, three of them were 
answered by the French Government on 5th 
October 1989. On 18th September 1989, Mr. 
Fourre put similar questions in the French 
National Assembly. 
39. On 27th June 1989, the House of 
Commons adopted an early day motion ini-
tiated by the United Kingdom Delegation to the 
WEU Assembly welcoming its Resolution 80 on 
the condemnation of the repression and mas-
sacre of students and others in the People's 
Republic of China. Furthermore, Mr. Hill put a 
question on Recommendation 467 answered by 
Mr. Wa/degrave, Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, and a question on 
progress in arms co-operation (Recommen-
dation 469) answered on 28th July 1989 by Mr. 
A/an Clark, Minister of State for Defence Pro-
curement. Attention should be paid to the last 
phrase of this answer which reads as follow: 
"The Western European Union has taken 
interest in these and other areas (of arms 
co-operation) but progress on these issues 
within Europe as a whole is, and will 
remain, the responsibility of IEPG." 
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40. " Taking interest " is far away from ambi-
tions made public in the Rome declaration 
according to which ministers decided to "give 
political impetus " to arms co-operation or in 
the Hague platform in which ministers decided 
" to... intensify armaments co-operation ". The 
United Kingdom answers should be further 
reason for the Assembly to ask the Council again 
to explain how it intends to implement the 
political impetus it decided to give to 
co-operation in armaments matters as requested 
in Recommendation 457. 
41. With regard to the Bundestag, it is to be 
noted that it took up the question of the revision 
of the modified Brussels Treaty which is an 
important subject of Recommendation 472. In 
the framework of the ratification procedure of 
the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain 
to Western European Union, the Bundestag 
adopted, on 22nd June 198~, a resolution in 
which it welcomes the enlargement and stresses 
that WEU should remain open to candidates 
from other European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance. Turning to the revision of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, the resolutiqn underlines that 
the growing importance of. WEU makes it 
essential to improve the working conditions of the 
Assembly of WEU. Furthermore: 
" Changing the provisions of the treaty 
should allow an end to be put to the obli-
gation to appoint a single delegation of 
representatives of the Bundestag to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe and the Assembly of WEU." 
42. The presentation of the half-yearly dele-
gation information report given by the German 
Delegation to the Bundestag on the ordinary 
Assembly session has been modified. The report 
covering the June 1989 sessi()n now contains a 
lively summary of the debates, rendering the 
document more interesting for the reader. This 
is a valid contribution to improving parlia-
mentary and public information in Germany 
regarding the Assembly's work. This is worth 
being followed by other delegations. 
43. On 14th September 1989, Mr. Schafer, 
German Minister of State fdr Foreign Affairs, 
answered two questions put by Mr. Steiner 
relating to Recommendations 470 and 472. On 
2nd October 1989, Mr. Antretter put a question 
on Recommendation 4 72, answered on 11th 
October 1989 by Mr. Adam Schwaetzer, Min-
ister of State for Foreign Affairs, and two ques-
tions on Recommendation 469, answered on 
13th October 1989 by Mr. Wimmer, Parlia-
mentary Secretary of State of the Federal Min-
istry of Defence. On 12th September 1989, Mr. 
Schafer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
answered two questions put by Mrs. Teubner 
(Die Griinen) on the activities of the WEU 
Agency for the Control of Attmaments. 
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44. So far, no specific initiatives have been 
registered by other delegations and member par-
liaments. It should be taken into account that a 
new delegation had to be appointed in Luxem-
bourg, general elections were held in the Nether-
lands and there were difficulties in forming new 
governments in Italy and Belgium. Such internal 
events show how difficult it sometimes is for the 
Assembly to ensure the continuity of its work in 
national parliaments. 
45. In order to strengthen the impact of the 
committee's work, initiatives have been taken 
following Mr. Pontillon's memorandum dated 
31st May 1989 to make the Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations a permanent 
WEU committee with the same status as the 
other committees. It is to be hoped that the rel-
evant revision of the Charter and Rules of Pro-
cedure will improve the impact of this commit-
tee's work among Assembly members, the 
Council and the public. 
46. Furthermore, as reported in the draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1990, further 
efforts are being made to implement the 
Assembly's general communications strategy 
with a view to improving the way the public 
is informed. It is proposed to appropriate 
F 500 000 for informing the public which is an 
increase of F 90 000 over the revised budget for 
1989. In order to show how modest these sums 
are, it should be noted that the estimate in one 
of the member parliaments - the Bundestag - in 
the draft budget for 1990 is for DM 7.5 millions 
expenditure for public relations work plus DM 3 
millions for information arrangements (the Bun-
desrat will be authorised to allocate more than 
DM 1 million for the same purposes). 
4 7. Provided the Council approves the 
budget, the increased means will be used mainly 
for the purchase of a second personal computer 
for the Assembly's press service and for the 
preparation of an Assembly logo. It should be 
recalled that the Presidential Committee 
instructed the press counsellor to study the cre-
ation of a logo which is considered as an 
essential means in modem communications 
policy for creating a public image. Unlike the 
Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly 
and the European Parliament, the WEU 
Assembly so far does not have a logo. 
48. The new "letter from the Assembly", 
issued for the first time in January 1989 under 
the responsibility of the Assembly's press 
department, will be published four times each 
year in order to propagate information about the 
Assembly's activities and order of business. 
Recipients are: 
- members of the Assembly; 
- the foreign affairs and defence com-
mittees of member parliaments; 
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- the foreign affairs and defence minis-
tries of member countries; 
- all press agencies; 
- academic institutions, universities and 
political research institutes; 
- the ambassadors of member countries 
in every capital of WEU; 
- the political parties in member coun-
tries; 
- all present recipients of Assembly docu-
ments; 
- all who ask individually for the letter. 
49. Arrangements are being made to expand 
the list by including the relevant committees of 
the United States Congress and Canadian Par-
liament, as well as the parliaments of other 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and other 
interested recipients. 
50. Apart from updating the WEU infor-
mation booklet prepared by Mr. Tummers on 
behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations as a necessary basic infor-
mation document, the publication of shorter 
information booklets or leaflets under the 
responsibility of the press department within the 
financial limits imposed on the Assembly are 
under way. 
51. Thanks to the telefax now installed, the 
possibilities of rapid communication with press 
agencies have been considerably improved. Fur-
thermore, the press list has been completed and 
the press counsellor establishes more systematic 
contacts with the media in member countries. 
52. As explained above, the Assembly is 
making considerable efforts to improve the 
public impact of its work. But this is an area in 
which both the Council and the Assembly 
should be more aware that they can and must 
play a complementary role. 
Ill. Conditions for improving 
the public impact of WEU's work 
53. First, the political importance of public 
opinion for Western European security should 
be realised. The lack of sound public knowledge 
of security and defence matters as reported in 
opinion polls and the lack of interest in the 
subject in certain countries as diagnosed during 
the London seminar should lead the Council to 
put the problem of public information policy on 
the agenda of its consultations. 
54. Secondly, the objectives of WEU and the 
Council's activities should be clearly defined 
and publicly explained. To achieve this, com-
mitments under the WEU treaty should be 
recalled. The modified Brussels Treaty is clear 
and distinct in its far-reaching commitments in 
regard to collective defence, strengthening peace 
and security and promoting the unity and inte-
gration of Europe. Such commitments call for an 
active policy and appropriate decisions. 
55. Thirdly, a clear joint concept of WEU's 
role in the framework of the building of Europe, 
the Atlantic Alliance and vis-a-vis the dramatic 
progress of East-West relations must be defined 
and made public. Here the difficulties begin, 
since there is so far no joint Western European 
Union voice but a great diversity of voices, 
those of different WEU politicians. 
56. So the public is told that WEU was 
created to sort out internal European defence 
problems and not to assume external res-
ponsibilities 15; furthermore, that WEU is not an 
operational forum, and not a framework for 
developing a consensus in particular nego-
tiations 16; it has a limited role because it does 
not participate in disarmament negotiations 17 
but on the other hand: " WEU is used as a 
framework" for exchanging views 18 and even a 
"ginger group" 19• "Its aim is to try and ensure 
the closest possible identity of view on security 
issues between its members so that they can, 
individually, make a stronger input to the 
alliance 20• " 
57. Does the public understand what is meant 
in practical terms when the future goals of WEU 
are described as to: 
" confirm and carry forward the vital 
process of a joint reflection and 
concertation on security problems now in 
progress ", 
"give concrete expression to the prin-
ciples concerning the security of its 
member states ", 
" provide the necessary political impetus 
in order that in the much wider fora ... 
European co-operation in the field of 
armaments can progress ", or to 
" clarify the politically concerted and 
technically co-ordinated approach... to 
problems outside the Brussels Treaty 
area ... "? 21 
15. See Willem F. van Eekelen in "Future defence 
co-operation, the role of WEU ", published in September 
1989 by the European Strategy Group, page 22. 
16. See Sir Geoffrey Howe in NATO Review, No. 3, June 
1989, page 13. 
17. See Luxembourg Government on 9th April 1989. 
18. See the German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in 
the Bundestag on 9th May 1989. 
19. See Sir Geoffrey Howe in NATO Review, No. 3, June 
1989, page 13. 
20. See Sir Geoffrey Howe in NATO Review, No. 3, June 
1989, page 13. 
21. See the information letter from the Secretary-General of 
WEU, April-May 1989, Document 1188, pages 15-16. 
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58. As requested at the London seminar, 
WEU's language should IJ>e accessible to the 
public. Furthermore, it is crucial for the sub-
stance of WEU's activities to become more 
interesting for the public. This applies of course 
also to Assembly documents. Furthermore, it 
was rightly said that the language of the Hague 
platform was perhaps suitable for appealing to a 
sophisticated public, but a shorter visionary 
document would be helpful. If no efforts are 
made to provide clear public guidelines on 
WEU's role, how can it in future successfully 
" pursue efforts to create a European public 
awareness of security problems in the countries 
belonging to the organisation " 22 or to help " to 
maintain public support for minimum defence 
and deterrence " 23 as demanded by Sir Geoffrey 
Howe for a WEU strategy 'to the year 2000? 
59. The more the WEU Council is considered 
as an internal debating society, the more dif-
ficult it is to explain to public opinion the use-
fulness of its activities and - even more 
important - their conformity with the commit-
ments arising from the 
1 
modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
60. The degree of an organisation's political 
profile also has a strong influence on its public 
impact, as rightly stated in the conclusions of 
the document " WEU and public awareness " 
adopted by the WEU Council four years ago. 
Although WEU's profile has improved since 
1984, there is a strong impression that it has so 
far hardly been possible to make the appropriate 
heads of state or of government take a serious 
interest in its work. Since WEU's reactivation, 
only one head of government, the French Prime 
Minister, has addressed the Assembly. Fur-
thermore, to be self-critical: are the majority of 
the parliamentary experts in defence and foreign 
affairs matters really represented in the delega-
tions to the Assembly? In any case, thanks to a 
higher political profile, the Council should be 
less sparing and issue more public comments 
and positions on current political events and 
developments. 
61. Finally it should be recognised that 
improving public awareness of security matters 
costs more money, otherwise it must be con-
cluded that there is no real political will behind 
all the declarations of intention on the matter. 
IV. Some practict# proposals 
I 
62. As a consequence of the London seminar, 
the Council should put the question of infor-
mation policy on its agenda as a matter of 
22. Information letter from the Secretary-General of WEU 
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs, April-May 
1989, page 16 (Document 1188). 1 
23. Sir Geoffrey Howe in NATO Review No. 3, June 1989, 
page 15. 
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urgency. The purpose of deliberations should 
be to seek a consensus including the concrete 
initiatives proposed in the preliminary draft 
order. 
63. The WEU Public Relations Committee 
proposed during the London seminar, composed 
of representatives of both the Assembly and the 
Council, should be set up soon in order to work 
out ways and means by which it should be pos-
sible to achieve a sort of division of labour 
between the Assembly and the Council in public 
relations. 
64. Independently of that, the Assembly must 
not slacken its efforts to reconsider its own 
working methods in order to improve the 
impact of its activities on public opinion and the 
media. When Assembly committees meet, they 
should seek wide publicity by holding press con-
ferences, even if they do not adopt formal texts. 
The example given by Sir Dudley Smith, 
Chairman of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, who gave a press con-
ference on 2nd October 1989 on the occasion of 
the committee's meeting in Vienna with several 
delegation members of the CFE and CSBM 
negotiations, should be followed. 
65. The increased resources for the 
Assembly's external relations and press service 
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should also be used for establishing closer rela-
tions with the televised media in member coun-
tries. Such relations could be useful in opening 
these channels for senior Assembly members 
such as the President, vice-presidents, com-
mittee chairmen or rapporteurs to present the 
views and positions of the Assembly on appro-
priate occasions. 
66. The Assembly should do its utmost to 
facilitate the use of its reports and recommenda-
tions in parliaments and by the public. It should 
carefully select the subjects of its reports and 
debates in order to choose those of interest to 
public opinion. This is not always easy since 
matters dealt with by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments or the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions, for instance, are often very technical. It is 
therefore most important that all rapporteurs 
endeavour to use language that is accessible to 
the public. 
67. In a further stage it might be worth 
studying how style and presentation of reports 
and recommendations can be modernised. In 
this respect initiatives now being discussed in 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe on improving the public impact of its 
activities should be carefully studied. 
APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX I 
The degree of information of the 
public on WEU and on defence questions 
Result of an enquiry conducted by a French service: the Service for 
Information and Public Relations of the Armed Forces (SIRPA), 
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in France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy 
(Extracts) 
April-May 1989 
SIRPA (Service for Information and Public Relations of the Armed Forces), created in 1969, is 
an institution responsible to the French Defence Ministry for informing French public opinion on the 
country's defence policy. 
Its activities include regular opinion polls on such questions. 
The following extracts are drawn from a wider enquiry on defence questions conducted in 
April-May 1989 with the assistance of OPTEM (Options for the Policies of Firms and Marketing), con-
ducted among citizens of four European countries. 
Knowledge of WEU 
Question: Of the present European organisations, there is one, Western European Union (WEU) which 
handles defence problems. Of the sentences on this card, which is the most appropriate in your case? 
France UK Germany Italy 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
I know this organisation and I have a fair 
idea of what it does ..................... 4 1 5 2 
I have heard of it but I am not very sure 
what it does ............................ 12 11 20 10 
I only know its name ................... 16 13 23 9 
I have never heard of it ................. 65 72 32 64 
(NP) ................................... (3) (3) (19) (15) 
Result (SIRPA assessment): 
Very little is known about WEU in all countries (the situation in Germany is slightly better than in 
other countries). 
Degree of information on problems of European defence 
Question: On problems of European defence, do you think you are: 
France UK Germany Italy 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Very well-informed ..................... 1 3 1 1 
Fairly well-informed .................... 14 20 25 16 
Fairly badly-informed .............. , .... 48 46 43 35 
Very badly-informed .................... 34 26 23 41 
(NP) ................................... (3) (4) (8) (7) 
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Result (SIRPA assessment): 
In the four countries, a tiny minority considers it is very well informed of defence problems. 
Those who consider they are very well or fairly well informed represent one citizen in six in France and 
Italy, one in four in the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Sources of information on defence problems 
Question: On defence questions, which of the following sources of information do you consider to be 
the most reliable? 
France UK Germany Italy 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
The political authorities ................. 10 12 20 10 
The military authorities ................. 27 19 21 15 
The press and the media ................ 44 51 39 58 
(NP) ................................... (19) (18) (20) (18) 
Result (SIRPA assessment): 
In three countries, the press and radio are the source of information considered to be the most reliable 
on defence problems. It is of course the one with which citizens are in the most direct contact. 
In Italy and in the United Kingdom, the press score is particularly high, that of the political and mil-
itary authorities the lowest. 
Opinion in France is more nuance and gives greater credit than elsewhere to the military authorities. 
Opinion in Germany tends to give greater credit than in all the other countries to the political author-
ities. 
Methods applied in conducting the enquiry 
Country Poll Dates of Poll Number institute of persons questioned 
France .................................. BVA 15/4-20/4/89 1 059 
United Kingdom ......................... BMRB 13/4-19/4/89 866 
Germany ................................ EMNID 20/4-6/5/89 945 
Italy .................................... DEMOSKOPEA 16/4-5/5/89 902 
Selections were made according to the quota method in France (sex, age, CSP, region, domicile), 
random selection in Italy, random route in the United Kingdom and Germany. 
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APPENDIX 11 
WEU seminar organised by the United Kingdom presidency on changes 
in public perceptions of European defence, held on 6th-7th March 11989, 
Lancaster House, London 
(Summary of proceedings prepared by the United Kingdom presidency) 1 
1. This paper describes proceedings at the 
seminar held by the presidency in London on 
6th-7th March 1989. 
2. The seminar was opened by the Hon-
ourable Archie Hamilton, United Kingdom Min-
ister of State for the Armed Forces. He 
explained that the important changes now 
taking place in the Soviet Union resulted in 
large part from the resolute approach adopted 
by the western alliance for many decades. In 
welcoming the proposed reductions announced 
by the Warsaw Pact, Mr. Hamilton drew 
attention to the massive superiority in conven-
tional forces that would remain even after the 
latest proposals. For example, the Warsaw Pa~t 
would retain a superiority of about 1.5 to 1 m 
the key area of tanks and artillery. Mr. Hamilton 
stressed the importance of ensuring that public 
perception took account of the continuing m~l­
itary realities in Europe, and reflected capabzl-
ities as well as intentions. He concluded that the 
West must hold onto its winning formula and 
press for increased international understanding 
while retaining the strength necessary to ensure 
lasting security. 
3. The second talk (" The impact of Pres-
ident Gorbachev on western public opinion ") 
by Dr. Phi/ip Sabin of King's College, University 
of London, provided a detailed consideration of 
opinion poll evidence on shifts in European atti-
tudes to defence. Dr. Sabin's data concentrated 
particularly on opinion in the United Kingdom, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and France. 
He showed substantial evidence of a shift to 
more favourable views of the Soviet Union. 
Confidence in the United States was also shown 
to be rising. However, evidence in the United 
Kingdom showed that more Britons would feel 
threatened by the Soviet Union if Gorbachev 
was deposed. 
4. Dr. Sabin highlighted two main issues: 
spending on defence, and nuclear weapons. 
Support for spending had declined in r~c~nt 
years. On nuclear weapons, a large maJ?nty 
indicated opposition of the Federal Repubhc of 
Germany while the United Kingdom (and 
France) showed divided opinion. In general, 
opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany 
1. The texts of the speeches quoted are available ~t the 
Office of the Clerk in the language in which they were given. 
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was more inclined to see thl~ main threat from 
the superpower arms race. Others had different 
concerns, e.g. the United Kingdom public saw 
more danger from the Middle East. European 
publics retained support for the alliance, but 
more support was visible in countries that felt 
themselves to have an independent defence 
capability. All Western European nati?ns h~d 
felt the impact of Gorbachev, but detailed ~tf­
ferences of views on defence related to other JUS-
tifying factors. 
5. The subsequent discussion touched on the 
generally low level of public knowledge of 
defence and the difficulty of measuring the 
saliency of such issues froiJ!I. p~ll data. On the 
image of the Federal Repubhc of Germany 
among other allies, it was suggested that any 
concerns were held only at an elite level. There 
was some agreement that, while politicians 
could be influenced by poll data, they needed to 
view results cautiously, e.g. events had shown 
the wisdom of INF deployment despite evidence 
of strong public concern. 
6. Major General Hol(ants van Loocke, 
Director of the Royal Higher Institute for 
Defence, Brussels, provided the third address to 
the seminar on the subject of " Defence and 
Europe: Public Perceptions ". He started by 
noting a need for basic consensus on defence, as 
well as effective explanati~n of policies; the 
debate had not, perhaps, been sufficiently 
democratised. Despite agreement on funda-
mental values of freedom, justice and solidarity, 
questions could be asked about different 
American and European interests. The Kennedy 
thesis on " imperial overstretch " could provoke 
questions on Europe's relative value to the 
United States. Europe might anyway need to 
look at wider concerns for all of Europe. 
Moreover, there was European concern at non-
defence threats such as environmental and 
health problems, and financial issues such as 
third world debt. 
7. Major General HoUants van Loocke 
pointed out that the comim.unist threat now 
came only from military power and not from 
ideology. In presenting the threat it was 
important to have credible and reliable figures. 
It was also important to guard against the 
assumption that Russia could never change, or 
that real initiatives could only come from the 
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West. Suggestions that Soviet actions threatened 
to drive a wedge between the American and 
European allies implied that NATO was only 
united by the Soviet threat. 
8. Further points included European con-
cern at some United States actions, and a lack 
of interest in defence in certain countries. 
Defence spending was sometimes seen as a 
" tribute " payable to NATO to ensure peace, 
but with no wish for further involvment. Such 
feelings in smaller nations, such as Belgium, 
could be helped by fuller involvement in NATO 
decision-making. In looking at wider European 
defence, it could be argued that an Atlantic 
pillar was required to counter the threat from 
the East, with other arrangements to deal with 
other threats. Particular problems for NATO 
concerned the image of detente as a poor 
relation, nuclear concerns and doubts over the 
morality of flexible response and reduced will-
ingness to pay for defence or accept burdens of 
military presence and exercising. 
9. In the subsequent question and answer 
period there was further discussion of the trans-
atlantic link. Europe's shared values with the 
United States were mentioned, as was the possi-
bility that the United States might want Europe 
strong militarily but not economically. The role 
of WEU was touched on in terms of the firm 
defence commitments of the Brussels Treaty. 
However, the non-operational nature of WEU 
was also mentioned. 
10. The first day of the seminar closed with a 
report back from the three working groups. The 
following main points were made, concentrating 
on an analysis of changes in public opinion. 
Group One 
- changes in Soviet foreign policy led to a 
need to redefine policy in NATO coun-
tries; 
- the European pillar should be 
strengthened and the European interest 
redefined; 
- more European sources of information 
on Soviet capabilities would be 
helpful; 
- in some countries there was a taboo on 
discussing strategic issues; 
- military service could provide an 
opportunity to make the case for 
European defence. 
Group Two 
- there are probably pragmatic as well as 
ideological reasons for Gorbachev's ini-
tiatives, with links between arms 
control and perestroi'ka; 
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- domestic problems more difficult for 
Gorbachev than dealings with the 
West; 
- the silent majority in Europe support 
the transatlantic link. But issues like 
low flying could overshadow this; 
- in future, public opinion may focus 
more on specific national contributions 
to defence and on national problems; 
- presentation might benefit from more 
emphasis on bilateral co-operation and 
from a clearer European dynamic and 
should avoid implying some countries 
are " hard line " on defence, which 
others focus on arms control; 
- there could be advantages in presenting 
policy at two levels, e.g. for quality and 
popular press; 
- the firm presentation of policy on INF 
deployment succeeded. But it was for 
consideration whether a continued firm 
approach was right, or might endanger 
consensus in some countries. 
Group Three 
- is support for defence linked to the 
threat? What is the threat? 
- threat goes beyond defence and can be 
perceived at many levels; 
- polls may give a partial impression of 
Gorbachev's impact, given the evidence 
of a wide recognition of the continuing 
need for defence and membership of 
the alliance; 
- Soviet internal problems have an 
impact on foreign relations; is the 
Soviet system really changing? 
- Gorbachev is good at appealing to 
western media; he understands the 
appeal of the spectacular; 
- UN offer could be a poisoned chalice if 
West obliged to made concessions in 
return; 
- appropriate for WEU to consider 
western defence. Bound to be different 
views within alliance. Must look for 
equilibrium with United States; 
- should our reply to Gorbachev be single 
or diverse (reflecting national differ-
ences)? Role of parliamentarians 
important; 
- West should be optimistic. 
The chairman then raised three further issues: 
European perceptions of United States defence 
in the early Reagan years; the potential 
involvement of the Soviet military in affecting 
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proposed changes in the Soviet Union; and 
Gorbachev's ability to deliver real change in the 
face of severe domestic difficulties. 
11. The second day of the seminar started 
with a presentation from Edward Mortimer, 
assistant foreign editor of the Financial Times. 
He started by noting that it is a journalist's job 
to see through government " presentation " of 
issues. It was therefore vital to ensure that the 
substance of policy was right. Western govern-
ments need to agree on the threat and the need 
for modernisation. In presenting policy, it was 
wrong to be preoccupied by headlines, or to feel 
obliged to launch initiatives for their own sake. 
Gorbachev's ability to catch attention marked 
the Soviet's continuing room to do better. 
12. Mr. Mortimer suggested the following 
advice: 
- do not make proposals if you fear 
acceptance; 
- do not grudge Gorbachev good pub-
licity when he deserves it. Dangerous to 
imply that a more benign Soviet Union 
would be bad for the West; 
- do not present perestroi'ka as a trap to 
delude the West. The public will not 
agree; 
- do not sound as though West was trying 
to score debating points; 
- do not fear media criticism; 
- do publicise continuing Soviet war 
machine to help public appreciate need 
for " worst case " defence planning; 
- do consider predicting what Gorbachev 
will do next. If he does, it will seem 
stale; if not, he will seem to have failed; 
- do focus on risk that Gorbachev will 
fail in his attempts to change the Soviet 
Union. His task is daunting, with no 
precedent for dismantling state 
economy. Two generations have not 
known market forces, so there will be 
much resistance to change. Also nation-
ality problems; 
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need also to appreciate the divergence 
of United States and European 
interests; 
- do ensure clear aims for arms control. 
13. In conclusion, Mr. Mortimer pointed to 
the continuing need for a ~uclear element in 
deterrence. The superpowers' view of this 
requirement could diverge from the European 
view, with the United States and Soviet Union 
perhaps inclined to look ultimately for a 
nuclear-free world. A long-term aim would be 
needed to ensure public support for the con-
tinued need for nuclear weapons; one possibility 
would be a multinational nuclear force. 
14. In discussion, Mr. Mortimer touched on 
the continuing difficulties of EC involvement in 
security issues. These would grow if, for 
example, Austria joined the 1Community. WEU 
would therefore have an mteresting role in 
European defence. Europe should, however, be 
cautious about suggestions of shared interest 
with the Soviet Union; Western Europe would 
be a small part of a " common European home " 
covering the Eurasian landmass. 
15. A talk on the role of the WEU Assembly 
was then delivered by Mr. Robert Pontillon, 
Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations of the WEU Assembly. He 
emphasised the long-standing involvement of 
the Assembly in the question of public 
awareness and welcomed the seminar as evi-
dence of increased Council interest in the issue. 
Mr. Pontillon went on to emphasise the roles of 
the different parts of WEU, find the importance 
of maintaining an independent voice for the 
Assembly. He described the value of the 
Assembly's debates, both for the media and to 
compare divergent views on questions of 
European security. 
16. Continuing, Mr. Pontillon considered 
how the Assembly tries to do more. It seeks to 
maximise publicity for its s'ssions and reports, 
and organises colloquies to improve public 
awareness of European intetiests in security and 
defence matters. The Assembly also seeks to 
intensify debate in national parliaments. 
Moreover, the Presidential Committee has 
sought additional funding to enhance public 
information activities. - do point out threats to security, e.g. in 
Middle East; with CW and ballistic 
missiles. Third world threats could 17. Mr. Pontillon also stressed the impor-
affect Europe, e.g. Libya's attack on tance of effective public dialogue between par-
ltaly; Islamic resurgence. The threat to liamentarians and governments. He expressed 
Europe is especially appropriate for concerns, in this context, at the bland responses 
consideration in WEU; sometimes produced by the Council to 
Assembly messages. In the case of disarmament, 
- do build on the European element of there was no clear public stlatement of Council 
the alliance. The United States link can views on important recent developments. 
be unpopular in Europe, with United Recent replies in the United Kingdom Par-
States forces seen as more " foreign " liament were a case in point. The Council 
that European forces. Must avoid pro- should at least issue communiques after its min-
voking United States withdrawal, but isterial meetings. Mr. Pontillon commended two 
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French proposals: the first to establish a 
European institute for advanced defence studies; 
the second for an " openness centre " to make 
known the armaments at the disposal of coun-
tries in Eastern and Western Europe. Finally, 
Mr. Pontillon mentioned the possible creation 
of a WEU Public Relations Committee with rep-
resentatives of both the Assembly and the 
Council. 
18. After a further period of study by the 
working groups, the Secretary-Genera/ offered 
some brief remarks. Mr. Cahen started by 
stressing the good relations between the 
Assembly and the Council. Both shared a need 
to improve public interest in, and knowledge of, 
security matters. There was a need to act dis-
creetly at a time when public opinion saw a 
reducing threat. It would be important to stress 
European concerns in trade and foreign policy 
to explain the importance of security issues. Mr. 
Cahen went on to express interest in the pro-
posals for a PR Committee, a European defence 
institute and an " openness centre ". 
19. Sir Wil/iam She/ton then outlined some 
areas of agreement that had emerged during the 
seminar: 
- welcome for the profound changes 
starting in Russia; 
- a clear change in public perceptions of 
the Soviet threat; 
- the need for defence spending to plan 
for the worst case; 
- the continuing military strength of the 
Soviet Union and the risk of Gor-
bachev failing; 
- the continuing need for a western 
nuclear capability; 
- possible lack of public support for nec-
essary spending. 
He went on to discuss the importance of getting 
agreement on policy within WEU and of 
ensuring good public awareness of WEU dis-
cussion. 
20. Mr. Tummers then spoke of the need to 
consider change in new circumstances. There 
could be a risk in continuing as before. He asked 
if we could reconstruct our general defence 
culture and our style of dealing with the public. 
He also touched on the scope for co-operation in 
a Europe running from the Atlantic to the Urals, 
and the role of the WEU Assembly which was 
elected by a convoluted route. Mr. Pontillon 
then remarked on the consensus of aims that 
had been evident, and on the need for a novel, 
direct and appropriate message. We should not 
appear to be fighting a rear-guard battle; Soviet 
initiatives reflected our past efforts. 
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21. The seminar then received a final report 
from the working groups, focusing on prescrip-
tions for improving public appreciation of 
defence issues: 
Group One 
- WEU might usefully be linked to ideas 
of building up Europe, a popular and 
easily understood idea; 
- non-WP threats should be explained; 
- WEU should have regular contacts with 
the media; 
- there should be scope to build on insti-
tutes such as IHEDN; 
- disputes between European leaders 
were counter-productive; 
- the public is receptive to WEU's 
message, but it needs to be conveyed 
with skill. 
Group Two 
- the public perceives a change in climate 
primarily linked to Gorbachev; 
- governments must, and do, welcome 
this change; 
- polls show the long-term potential 
threat continues to be understood; 
- we should highlight the western values 
that unite us. The West is more 
cohesive than the Warsaw Pact; 
- effective security should be seen as a 
political imperative for Europe, irre-
spective of the Warsaw Pact threat. A 
clear view of European security is 
needed; 
- The Hague platform is a good basis for 
appealing to a sophisticated public. But 
a shorter, visionary document could 
also be helpful. 
Group Three 
- Mr. Mortimer's suggestion to set targets 
for the Soviets would need careful 
handling; 
- it would be wrong to disparage progress 
in the Soviet Union; 
- we must be open to new ideas in our 
societies; 
- WEU language should be accessible to 
the public; 
- there is a need to define a European 
consensus; 
- force levels must be distinguished from 
intentions to use force. The public sees 
no Warsaw Pact intention, but a 
growing threat in other parts of the 
world; 
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- we need .a common threat analysis; 
- public knowledge of WEU should be 
improved. A publicity think-tank could 
be valuable; 
- we need to reflect on what we have in 
common with the United States and 
what are special European concerns. 
22. In a final address, Sir Michael Quinlan, 
Permanent Under Secretary of State at the 
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, stressed 
the importance of the subject discussed at the 
seminar. He stressed that our problems were 
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those of success. Gorbachev has acknowledged 
the weakness of his system and adopted our 
agenda. We need unity and firmness. It would 
be particularly important to ~ensure continuing 
support for the transatlantic link and for 
retention of effective nuclear forces. He 
emphasised that the concepts of nuclear strategy 
are not easy. But it would be wrong to resort to 
over-simplified and misleading arguments. In 
general, Sir Michael argued, we are in the 
middle of a western success. If we feel on 
uncertain ground, it is because the territory is 
unfamiliar not unwelcome. ' 
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Amendment 1 
Western European Union's information policy 
AMENDMENT 1 I 
tabled by Mr. Eisma 
1. At the end of the preamble to the draft order, add a new paragraph: 
4th December 1989 
"(v) Noting that the seats ofthe Assembly and the Council ofWEU are not in the same location 
as the press agencies specialising in defence matters; " 
Signed: Eisma 
1. See 13th sitting, 7th December 1989 (amendment not moved). 
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DRAFT ORDER 
Western European Union 
(Draft of a new booklet) 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 2 
by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Draft Order 
on the draft of a new booklet on 
Western European Union 
8th November 1989 
(i) Noting the report on the draft of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations; 
fii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians 
c.nd the public in member countries, 
INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 
1. To ensure that a booklet based on the report submitted is published in the seven languages ofthe 
WEU member countries; 
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet will be brought up to date in the event of major develop-
ments in WEU prior to its publication. 
l. Adopted by the committee by 6 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Pontillon (Chairman); Mr. Ewing (Alternate: Hardy), Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Buhler) (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, Buchner, De Bondt, De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: Eisma), Fiandrotti (Alternate: Pasquino), Sir John 
Hunt (Alternate: Sir William She/ton), MM. Kempinaire, Kollwelter, Lacour, Stegagnini, Tummers. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur) 
Manual for parliamentarians and the public 
1. The purpose of this manual will be to 
provide members of the WEU Assembly, partic-
ularly those attending its meetings for the first 
time and all persons interested in the 
organisation, with documentation which is as 
brief, clear and specific as possible about 
Western European Union. It is intended to 
replace the booklet entitled" Western European 
Union " prepared in 1986 by Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges on behalf of the Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations, since this 
booklet, published in the five languages of the 
member countries, could not take account of 
events occurring after its publication and no 
longer describes WEU as it has developed since 
Reykjavik. 
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2. It is therefore essential to produce 
accurate information about WEU in its reno-
vated form. This aim is particularly important 
since the public still has little knowledge of the 
European dimension of security and defence 
problems. It is therefore desirable for this 
booklet to be circulated not only to parliamen-
tarians but also to a wide public in all member 
countries. 
3. However, the text of this booklet can but 
be a provisional text since WEU will remain in a 
transitional stage until the Council reaches a 
decision on the final structure and location of its 
ministerial organs and completes the revision of 
the modified Brussels Treaty announced in a 
November 1988 political declaration accompa-
nying the protocol of accession of Portugal and 
Spain. 
-----~------------
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Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 
(Cocom) 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
lOth November 1989 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
RAPPORTEUR'S PREFACE 
DRAFT RECOMMANDATION 
on the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Cocom: history, procedures and policy 
(a) History and procedures 
(i) Control lists 
(ii) Co-ordination of export control 
(iii) Review of special cases 
(b) Policy 
Ill. Western technology 
IV. Soviet technology 
(a) Position of defence industry in the Soviet Union 
(b) Specific capabilities of the Soviet defence industry 
(c) The urgent need for better assessment of Soviet technology 
(d) Konversiya 
V. The specific position of China 
VI. Changes in Cocom's policy 
(a) The January 1988 high-level meeting 
(b) Allied criticism of the United States posture 
(i) The " no exceptions " rule 
(ii) The claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction 
(c) The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
(d) Recent changes in United States and Cocom export control policy 
(e) More reform projects? 
(j) The October 1989 Cocom meetings 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman); MM. Garrett (Alternate: Lambie), Hill (Vice-Chairmen); MM. 
Adriaensens (Alternate: Noerens), Bohm (Alternate: Muller), Caccia (Alternate: Ma/fatti), De Bondt, Dimmer (Alternate: Mrs. 
Lentz-Cornette), Eich, Mrs. Francese, MM. Intini, Lagorce, Lenzer, Parry, Schmidt, Valleix, Verbeek (Alternate: Aarts), 
Wilkinson, Worms, Worrell. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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VII. The pros and cons of the Cocom export control debate 
(a) Moderates and orthodox 
(b) Availability of technology in third countries 
(c) Cocom and missed business opportunities 
VIII. Illegal exports and re-exports 
IX. No relaxation of eastern bloc attempts to acquire western high tech-
nology through espionage 
X. Joint ventures 
XI. Cocom and perestroi"ka 
(a) Restructuring the Soviet economy and ensuing needs 
(b) Western conditions for Soviet economic integration in the world 
economy 
(c) Soviet efforts to meet these conditions 
XII. Conclusions 
APPENDIX 
Statistics regarding joint ventures in the USSR- Situation on 1st October 1989 
274 
DOCUMENT 1207 
Rapporteur's Preface 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews with the following experts: 
Washington DC. (Department of Defence), 6th March 1989 
Mr. Francis M. Cevasco, Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence. 
Mr. John Konfala, Director of Strategic Trade, Defence Technology Security Agency. 
London, 6th September 1989 
Mr. lan S. McDonald, Head of Defence Export Services Secretariat, Ministry of Defence. 
Mr. Eric Beston, Department of Trade and Industry. 
Mr. Roy Reeve, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
Brussels, 14th September 1989 
Mr. David Fischer, Charge d'Affaires, Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom at 
NATO; 
Mr. Chris Donnelly, Sovietologist-in-residence, NATO Headquarters. 
Paris, 5th and 6th October 1989 
Mr. Ranieri Tallarigo, Ambassador. 
Mr. Michael Hentley, First Secretary, Technology Service, British Embassy. 
Moscow, 23rd and 24th October 1989 
Dr. I. lvanov, Vice-Chairman of the State External Economic Commission of the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR. 
Mr. V. Karpov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. 
Mr. A. Serdiuk, Deputy Chief of the Department of Scientific and Technological Co-operation 
with Developed and Developing Countries ofthe State Committee of Science and Technology of 
the USSR. 
Mr. Yuri S. Derjabin, Head of the Department for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs. 
Mr. G. Rahimbayev, Deputy Minister for External Economic Relations of the USSR. 
Mr. V. Lapigin, Chairman of the Committee of Defence and State Security Problems of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 
The Rapporteur expresses his special thanks to all the officials and senior officers who met him 
and kindly replied to the many questions they were asked. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the future of the Co-ordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) 
(i) Aware that the technology gap between the western alliance and the Soviet bloc in sophisticated 
weaponry has narrowed in recent years; 
(ii) Confirming the continued need to protect advanced western defence technology through Cocom 
until arms control and reduction, confidence-building and enhanced security over a reasonable period 
of time justify that need being reviewed; 
(iii) Concerned at past violations of Cocom rules which have led to a serious transfer of strategic 
technology to proscribed countries, thus enhancing Soviet offensive capability in vital areas at the 
expense of western security; 
(iv) Concerned at variations in methods of enforcing export controls between Cocom member states; 
(v) Noting the concern of WEU member states at United States extra-territorial claims which effec-
tively discourage exports of non-sensitive technology; 
(vi) Acknowledging the complaints of western high-technology companies that Cocom rules prevent 
them from taking advantage of valuable trading opportunities, including joint ventures in the Soviet 
bloc; 
(vii) Welcoming the improvements in Cocom review procedures in recent years, which have reduced 
the list of sensitive items, but fearing that they may still not be keeping up with the pace of progress in 
technology; 
(viii) Aware of President Gorbachev's appeal to the Parliamentary Assembly ofthe Council ofEurope 
on 6th July 1989 to rescind the Cocom rules; 
(ix) Noting requests to grant exceptions to Cocom rules for Hungary and Poland and the Soviet 
request for closer co-operation with the West on the development of new technologies, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Call for 
1. A fundamental reassessment of the current state of Soviet technology; 
2. A complete review of the Cocom lists in the light of this reassessment, with a view to encour-
aging maximum opportunities for trade; 
3. Common export and re-export controls and common enforcement policies in the Cocom 
member countries; 
4. Negotiations with proscribed countries for the introduction of on-site verification procedures to 
accompany all future sales of western strategic technology where appropriate in return for the further 
liberalisation of the Cocom list; 
5. The forthcoming conference on economic co-operation in Europe, to be held in Bonn from 19th 
March to 11th April 1990, to be used for a discussion of high-technology trade between East and West 
and the role of Cocom in that framework; 
6. The establishment of a committee of experts within the CSCE framework which should make 
recommendations for the sharing of high technology between East and West. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The last time that the Assembly of WEU 
considered Cocom was in the context of a report 
on economic relations with the Soviet Union 
(Document 958) by its General Affairs Com-
mittee which was debated by the Assembly on 
30th November 1983. 
2. This report was in response to concerns 
that the alliance required greater unity of 
purpose and action by all its members following 
attempts by the United States Government to 
apply sanctions on western firms which were 
supplying technology for the Siberian gas 
pipeline, the use of western credit to defaulting 
Comecon countries, and the use of trade as a 
weapon of diplomacy. 
3. It noted the Kremlin aim, set by 
Khrushchev following the Cuban crisis, to 
secure superiority in arms over the West, in 
which western technology would be transferred 
by fair means or foul. Furthermore it said that, 
in response to the very long list of technology 
obtained in the West which was threatening its 
lead, the United States Government was calling 
for a stricter limit on supplies of advanced tech-
nology to the eastern bloc. 
4. In a recommendation adopted by the 
Assembly ( 401 ), the Council was recommended 
to promote consultation between all democratic 
countries with a view " to ban all exports of 
advanced technology which might be used for 
armament purposes, " and to " adapt this and 
other principles accordingly in the light of 
results obtained in international negotiations on 
the limitation of armaments ". 
5. In its reply to this recommendation (Doc-
ument 980), the Council referred to various 
communiques adopted at the conclusion of min-
isterial meetings such as those of the North 
Atlantic Council on 9th-10th June and 8th-9th 
December 1983, which read as follows: 
" Trade conducted on the basis of commer-
cially sound terms and mutual advantage, 
that avoids preferential treatment of the 
Soviet Union, contributes to constructive 
East-West relations. At the same time, 
bilateral economic relations with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe 
must remain consistent with broad allied 
security concerns. These include avoiding 
dependence on the Soviet Union, or con-
tributing to Soviet military capabilities. " 
The Council further stated: 
" The WEU member states consider that 
their security interests are best served by 
stable economic and political relations 
with the Soviet Union. The benefits of 
East-West trade to the Soviet and Eastern 
European economies must be weighed 
against this consideration, and against the 
advantages which such trade brings to 
western businesses and economies. " 
6. Now, six years have gone by since 
November 1983 and the world is witness to 
unprecedented developments in Eastern Europe. 
The elimination of the iron curtain between 
Hungary and Austria has allowed tens of thou-
sands of East Germans to lea1ve their country for 
West Germany. Beginning in November 1989, 
the East German Government lifted a number 
of travel restrictions and East Germans can now 
legitimately travel to the West. Even the most 
wretched symbol of the cold war, the Berlin 
Wall, is being demolished ,in some places in 
order to allow more people to cross the line 
between East and West Berlin. Poland has its 
first non-communist led government since the 
communists seized power after World War 11 
and the establishment of a western-style market 
economy has been declared its economic goal. In 
Hungary free elections are forthcoming and 
a stock exchange has been established in 
Budapest. 
7. In the Soviet Union a tentative start with 
a more democratic representation of the people 
to discuss political questipns has led to a 
national outburst of emotions in an urgent need 
to finish with the past and seek new ways for the 
economy to improve the quality of life. 
8. In this light, the existence of the Co-ordi-
nating Committee for Multilateral Expert Con-
trols (Cocom), which controls western high-
technology exports to the eastern bloc, is fast 
appearing to be a relic of the cold war policy. 
9. However this may b~, in the turmoil of 
sweeping changes in East-West relations, the 
principle of Cocom's rules h~s not yet been chal-
lenged, except by President i Gorbachev himself. 
While on the one hand there is strong pressure 
to relax controls on western technology exports 
to the East, on the other haqd there are voices in 
defence of Cocom arguing that it remains as nec-
essary as ever. 
10. It is extremely difficult to predict where 
the present developments in Eastern Europe will 
, lead, but if Western European governments in 
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the face of history feel responsible for the future 
of their own continent, which may have 
important consequences for the rest of the 
world, they cannot sit idly and just look at what 
is happening in Eastern Europe. Fortunately 
they are moving, and the atmosphere in negotia-
tions in both the framework of CFE (conven-
tional forces in Europe) and CSCE (Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe) is fos-
tering optimism. There are doubts, however, 
whether the same can be said for East-West tech-
nology transfer, where Cocom has an important 
influence. 
11. This report seeks to make a contribution 
to the discussion on questions regarding Cocom 
which may have to be reconsidered, among 
which are the following: Has Cocom a con-
tinuing role to play in the light of this unprece-
dented and encouraging progress towards 
democracy, respect for human rights and even 
an economic system which keeps account of 
certain capitalist market mechanisms in Eastern 
Europe, which - it is being suggested - is ending 
the cold war? If it still has, how can the demands 
from western firms for a relaxation of these con-
trols be met so that they can pursue the 
undoubted trading opportunities which exist? 
Do the Cocom rules in the light of new assess-
ments of the state of Soviet technology require 
radical reappraisal to ensure that their original 
aim - to protect western superiority in arms -
can better be met? 
11. Cocom: history, procedures and policy 
(a) History and procedures 
12. As the history and workings of Cocom 
have been described in detail in several recent 
public documents, this report will mention them 
only briefly, referring to other documents for 
more details 1• 
13. Cocom was established in 1949 and 
began operating in 1950 with the aim to avoid 
delivering to potential adversaries the high-
technology items which could enhance their mil-
itary capabilities and thus reduce the national 
security of members of the western alliance. 
14. Cocom is not based upon a treaty. It is 
an informal co-ordinating arrangement, the 
members of which are all NATO countries 
minus Iceland plus Japan and Australia. Pro-
scribed countries are Afghanistan, Albania, Bul-
garia, the People's Republic of China, Czecho-
l. In particular, mention should be made here of two 
reports: Trade with Eastern Europe, second report from the 
Trade and Industry Committee, House of Commons, 
Session 1988-1989; second report drawn up on behalf of the 
Committee on External Economic Relations on restrictions 
on strategic exports and US-EC technology transfer, Rap-
porteur: Mr. M. Toussaint, European Parliament, Document 
A 2-31189/part B. 
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slovakia, the German Democratic Republic, 
Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, 
Romania, the USSR and Vietnam. 
15. Cocom is located in Paris and has a rela-
tively small permanent secretariat. It is in con-
stant and permanent session with a permanent 
committee meeting weekly and other meetings 
being held at various intervals, depending on the 
type of meeting. 
16. At these meetings, each of the member 
states is represented by a delegation which 
varies from country to country. In general, 
member states are represented by officials from 
their Paris embassies, from their Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) delegation or from their national minis-
tries most concerned. Once a year, a high-level 
meeting is held in order to consider major policy 
problems and other questions of exceptional 
interest. 
1 7. In order to be able to understand the 
activities of Cocom better, it should be recalled 
that it has to perform three major functions, i.e. 
the establishment and revision of the three 
control lists, the co-ordination of export control 
enforcement activities and the review of special 
cases where member states are allowed to export 
embargoed goods to proscribed countries, all of 
which will be briefly reviewed here. 
(i) Control lists 
18. The establishment and revision of the 
control lists is the most important of the 
abovementioned functions. There are three lists 
under the following headings: (a) atomic energy 
- goods used for nuclear energy; (b) munitions-
military goods; (c) industrial- goods with mil-
itary and civil applications. 
19. The atomic energy and munitions lists are 
relatively short, straightforward and unchal-
lenged. The industrial list, however, including 
technology used in both military and civil or 
dual-use technology, is inevitably long and com-
plicated and almost monopolises Cocom's 
attention. 
20. Since 1984, the industrial list has been 
under a rotating review which reconsiders one-
fourth of the list every year. For an item to be 
placed on or taken off the list, a unanimous vote 
by the members of Cocom is required. At the 
request of members, an item not included in the 
part of the list currently under review can be 
reconsidered with priority. In 1988, an exec-
utive committee was created to oversee the 
review process. At present a majority of the 
member countries wishes to streamline the list 
and a process is under way to review the entire 
control list for items which no longer need to be 
controlled. According to these member coun-
tries, such a thorough revision would allow 
Cocom to concentrate its attention more closely 
on items which are really significant militarily. 
(ii) Co-ordination of export control 
21. The co-ordination of export control 
enforcement activities is carried out by the 
Cocom Sub-Committee on Export Controls. It 
should be repeated here that Cocom is not based 
on a treaty or international executive agreement. 
Consequently, it has no power to enforce its 
export rules, which leaves legal enforcement to 
the law of the individual member countries. 
Even if it is true that enforcement has gradually 
improved over the years, there are still countries 
where the prosecution of violations is not up to 
standard. 
(iii) Review of special cases 
22. If the export of specific technology to pro-
scribed nations may involve only a small risk of 
diversion for military purposes, it can be con-
sidered a special case. About half the items on 
the industrial list belong to a category of special 
cases which are determined at national dis-
cretion. The export of other items, not under 
national discretion, must be approved unani-
mously by the committee. In this category, 
about 4 000 requests are submitted annually for 
review by the committee, with about 1 600 being 
granted an export licence, altogether repre-
senting some 1. 7 billion dollars. 
(b) Policy 
23. In order to achieve its main objective of 
preventing the eastern bloc from obtaining 
highly sensitive technology from the West, 
Cocom applies a mix of two different tactics -
relative and absolute control. 
24. Relative control is concerned with main-
taining a relative technological lead over the 
eastern bloc. Here, only the control of " leading 
edge " and " state of the art " technologies is 
important. If applied consistently, such a control 
policy does not entail controlling second- and 
third-generation technology, even if more 
advanced than current Soviet technology. 
25. Absolute control covers a far wider range 
of technology, given that its objective is the 
control of any technology which is more 
advanced than Soviet technology, no matter if it 
is out-dated according to western standards. 
26. It is quite obvious that a number of the 
recurring complaints being made by trade and 
industry is a result of the control policy which is 
in two minds. 
27. A clear choice should be made between 
two different objectives, of which one is to 
simply stay ahead of Soviet technology by one 
step, while the other is to make sure that the 
Soviet Union has to spend as much money on 
research and development as possible in order to 
keep pace with the most advanced technology 
available in the world. 
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28. It seems worth while to consider pursuing 
a more consistent export control policy. Obvi-
ously, as long as there is not a reliable, common 
assessment of the state of Soviet technology, an 
absolute-control policy is the safest way to 
ensure Cocom's objectives. At the same time, an 
all too prudent attitude is ·ruling out export 
markets for western firms which should not 
always be underestimated. 
29. There can be little d<imbt that accurate 
knowledge and a common assessment of the 
state of Soviet technology, agreed to by all 
member countries, would facilitate the mainte-
nance of a not necessarily shorter but certainly 
different and more credible Cocom export list. 
30. If a choice were made exclusively for rel-
ative control, it would not necessarily make the 
export control regime less complicated. Such a 
control policy would require an even more 
accurate procedure for rapidly reviewing the list. 
A number of different questions would have to 
be solved, including the question of whether 
Cocom as it is now organised would be able to 
handle the consequences of this different 
approach. However, the choice for relative 
control would have the undeniably immense 
advantage of transparency in Cocom's policy, 
for both the member count~s and for the pro-
scribed countries. 
Ill. Western technology 
31. It has been said above that the only 
rationale for the existence of Cocom is for the 
West to maintain its lead in technology - espe-
cially for use in military equipment - over the 
eastern bloc. 
32. This rationale is still valid forty years 
after Cocom's creation. In a report recently pre-
sented by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 2 this was explained in 
detail. The report made it clear that many 
problems of the inadequate NATO defence 
system can be solved only by capitalising on the 
relative advantages and streq.gths of the western 
alliance while exploiting the1 disadvantages and 
weaknesses of the Warsaw Pact. Here, advanced 
weapon technology is con~idered one of the 
West's strong points. 
33. Areas where the West is said to have tech-
nological superiority are in~er alia: microelec-
tronics, optics, superconductivity, passive 
sensors, phased array radars, lightweight com-
posite materials and air-breathing propulsion. 
34. In general, it is believed that the West has 
a ten-year technology lead over the East. It is 
2. New technologies and their implications for European 
defence (Document 1186). 
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assumed, for instance, that the eastern bloc is 
eight years behind the West in semiconductors, 
five to seven years behind in computers and a 
decade behind in machine tools. 
35. It should be stressed, however, that in the 
West the civilian technology has in practically 
all areas taken over the leading edge from mil-
itary technology. Research and development in 
the civilian sector have long had priority and 
in many instances the military are taking 
advantage of civilian high technology. 
IV. Soviet technology 
36. In general, Cocom members can boast a 
technological edge over the eastern bloc, more 
specifically the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
there can be little question that the Soviet Union 
is lagging behind in the application of modem 
technologies to the advantage of the quality of 
everyday life. But these general statements are 
not accurate if subject to more detailed consid-
eration. In this chapter, a number of phenomena 
regarding technology in Soviet society will be 
discussed which might lead to a more accurate 
and slightly different assessment of the true situ-
ation. 
(a) Position of defence industry in the Soviet Union 
37. For a number of reasons among which the 
traumatising experience of the second world war 
is only one, the Soviet Union has for a long time 
been preoccupied with the building up and 
maintaining of a formidable military power. 
This has led to an organisation of its society 
where, ever since the first five-year plan more 
than fifty years ago, the military have had pri-
ority. Unlike, and in recent years almost con-
trary to, the situation in the West, the Soviet 
military have always been given priority when 
improved industrial skills or results in high-
technology research and development became 
available. They also without exception had pri-
ority in allotment of scarce production means 
and technical personnel and its employees are 
among the best paid in the country. 
38. The particular Soviet defence procure-
ment system has proved its efficiency. Contrary 
to what happens in the West, no money is 
wasted in designing and producing several dif-
ferent weapon systems for the same purpose. 
New technology is incorporated in defence 
equipment much faster than in the West, the 
production rate is high and in general the 
equipment is of good quality, robust and techni-
cally reliable. Moreover, any piece of equipment 
being fielded is integrated in a conceptual 
system where it is assigned a specific role. 
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39. More so than western defence equipment, 
Soviet weaponry has been designed with a view to 
training and use under wartime conditions. The 
consequent lack of attention for details which are 
considered inessential makes that weaponry often 
look crude. When assessing the skill and capabil-
ities of the Soviet defence industry and its 
products therefore, western observers have often 
been misled by the consequences of the Soviet 
approach to weapon systems. In short, an unpol-
ished rivet does not necessarily influence the per-
formance of the MiG-29. 
40. This approach also implied, for instance, 
that the Soviets did not have to put a major 
effort into the design and production of a jet 
engine for fighter aircraft which runs 1 500 
hours without a major overhaul, simply because 
the life expectancy of a fighter aircraft in 
wartime is much less than 1 500 hours. The 
same is true for safety standards and many other 
issues which have been important for the West 
where the armed forces - considered to be a 
heavy financial burden - have always been 
subject to democratic scrutiny. 
41. The Soviets consider design to be of 
foremost importance: while in the West weapon 
systems carry the name of the industrial 
.company which produced them, in the Soviet 
Union they carry the name of the design bureau 
which conceived them. These design bureaux, 
where all technological knowledge is concen-
trated, can at any given time produce a complete 
synopsis of the technologies they need, i.e. a spe-
cific shopping list. The Soviet intelligence ser-
vices - the KGB (Soviet Committee for State 
Security) and GRU (Chief Intelligence Direc-
torate of the Soviet General Staff) and their ~ur­
rogates among Eastern European services - and 
Soviet trade and scientific organisations are 
actively involved in acquiring items from this 
shopping list. 
42. In 1975, the KGB established a special 
office for industrial espionage composed of 
qualified specialists in all fields of advanced 
technologies. These specialists suggest objectives 
to be pursued, upon which an executive com-
mittee together with the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs considers the possibilities of acquiring 
the technology under review. In some cases this 
technology can be obtained legally in countries 
with a more lenient export control system. 
However, the Soviet Union does not consider 
third countries to be an important source of high 
technology (see Chapter VII (b)). Illegal means 
of active industrial espionage are used only if 
the secret technologies desired cannot be 
obtained in the open market. 
(b) Specific capabilities of the So-,iet defence industry 
43. All in all, in recent years the Soviet Union 
has been able to field a whole series of defence 
equipment, well-integrated into its defence 
concept which in terms of suitability for use in 
an armed conflict is very well able to stand com-
parison with the equipment of allied forces in 
Europe. 
44. True, there is not enough reason to 
believe that a 1986 United States Department of 
Defence assessment which cited the Soviet 
Union as being behind in 14 out of 20 key tech-
nologies with military applications has since 
changed considerably to the advantage of the 
Soviet Union. On the other hand it would be 
mere arrogance to assume that the weapon 
systems which have been developed by allied 
countries are superior to Soviet weapon systems 
under war conditions. 
45. Soviet aircraft such as the MiG-29, 
Fulcrum A fighter/interceptor and the Su-27 
Flanker B fighter, both of which could be seen at 
recent air shows in the West, certainly com-
pelled admiration. The manoeuvrability of the 
Su-27 is remarkable and it remains to be seen if 
any allied fighter-bomber would be its match in 
a real wartime situation. 
46. One should also bear in mind that the 
Soviets have been very well able to develop key 
military technologies independently from the 
West. One example is the highly accurate 
guidance system in Soviet nuclear missiles. It is 
acknowledged that in general the United States 
has the lead in missile guidance technique, and 
this has caused many analysts to argue that the 
Soviets have stolen western technology for their 
nuclear missile guidance system. In fact, a recent 
study has demonstrated that the Soviets have 
not relied on the West for key technologies in 
their strategic missile guidance systems for more 
than forty years 3• 
4 7. Submarine technology is another area in 
which the Soviets are very inventive and 
extremely advanced. Their command of metal-
lurgical techniques enabled them to build hulls 
from titanium alloys for submarines with a 
diving depth of around 3 000 feet in the 1970s. 
At the same time, they have been experimenting 
with many different propulsion techniques, 
among which the liquid metal-cooled nuclear 
reactor, which requires less space for the same 
power output as compared with a water-cooled 
reactor and which provides the Alfa-class sub-
marines with a speed of no less than 42 knots 
when submerged. 
48. Without going into any further detail, 
suffice it to quote the foreword to the 1985-86 
edition of Jane's fighting ships where - four 
years ago - it is stated that " western research 
has been fully matched by that in the Soviet 
Union and that the new classes of the latter's 
submarines with anechoic tiles, well-formed 
3. Donald MacKenzie: The Soviet Union and strategic 
missile guidance: technology transfer, nuclear strategy and 
arms control, 1988. 
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fins, polymer ejectors, small screws to break up 
the water flow and the probability of a capability 
to vary fin shape, are very advanced designs ". It 
also says that " innovation, forward thinking, 
the support of new ideas and the cash to 
implement them mark the Soviet approach as an 
unusual one ". 
49. With these factors in mind, the 
Kongsberg-Toshiba case may be seen in a 
slightly different light. This case· was denounced 
long after Jane's assessment of Soviet submarine 
technology at the time when the United States 
heavily contested Japan's dumping practices on 
the American electronics consumer market. 
Toshiba was promptly punished with a denial 
for it to enter the American, market for several 
years. It is still difficult to believe that, without 
the illegal transfer of sophisticated milling 
machines for submarine propellers, Soviet sub-
marines would not have been able to challenge 
the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance's trans-
atlantic maritime supply lines. 
50. A report on crucial defence technologies 
published by the United States Department of 
Defence in May 1989 stated that the Soviet 
Union appeared to have superior technology in 
high-power microwaves, which can be used as 
weapons, and in pulsed power, i.e. mobile high-
power lasers. The report further noted that the 
Soviet Union may have a technological lead in 
developing very high-power sources for electro-
magnetic or electrothermal guns 4• 
(c) The urgent need for better assessment 
of Soviet technology 
51. On occasion, ominous stories are told in 
the West about operational high-technology mil-
itary equipment which afterwards turn out to be 
red herrings. Such was the case with the Sary 
Shagan facility in Kazakhstan. For many years, 
the United States Department of Defence had 
been arguing that the Soviet Union had 
developed very powerful ground-based lasers 
which would be able to knock out satellites. The 
facility in Sary Shagan was ~aid to be the site of 
a laser weapon which could1 be used in an anti-
satellite role today and possibly in a ballistic-
missile defence role in the future. The Pentagon 
used this false informatioq as a rationale for 
major investments in anti-satellite and anti-
ballistic missile programmes, which in turn 
made the Soviets feel uneasy and compelled 
them to react. 
52. Indeed, the Soviets had planned this 
facility in the 1960s as a high-powered system 
capable of shooting down ballistic missiles, but 
it was downgraded after the signing of the 1972 
ABM treaty. 
4. International Herald Tribune, 17th May 1989. 
53. In July 1989, a mixed delegation of 
United States congressmen, scientists and jour-
nalists was allowed to visit the facility only to 
discover some very ordinary lasers with beams a 
thousand times less powerful than those of the 
Mid-infrared Chemical Laser (MIRACL) at the 
Strategic Defence Initiative's White Sands 
proving ground. 
54. In fact, what the United States delegation 
found matched the assessment of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Earlier, intelligence 
experts had, however, acknowledged their 
uncertainty about what kind of laser was 
actually at Sary Shagan. Pentagon officials 
allegedly decided to present only a worst-case 
assessment in unclassified publications in a 
deliberate attempt to mislead public opinion 
and boost its own high-technology SDI 
programme 5• 
55. This is certainly not the only example of 
misinformation being disseminated in order to 
help public opinion to accept political goals. 
56. Of course, despite a network of intelli-
gence sources, it has not always been easy to 
make a clear assessment of technology develop-
ments in the Soviet Union. With increasing 
openness in the Soviet Union, however, the 
West cannot afford to deceive public opinion in 
order to maintain some of the less attractive 
relics of the cold war. 
57. Recently, a State Department official, 
Francis Fukuyama, referred to the era of the 
cold war as history, arguing that " The struggle 
for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life 
for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideo-
logical struggle that called forth daring, courage, 
imagination and idealism will be replaced by 
economic calculation, the endless solving of 
technical problems, environmental concerns." 
He then confessed a " powerful nostalgia for the 
time when history existed ". 
58. West Europeans are less attracted to this 
sort of nostalgia for an ideological dreamworld. 
For many years, they have been exposed to the 
icy breeze of the cold war, dividing countries, 
families and people with a common history and 
cultural background, and they no longer accept 
deception about what is really going on in the 
eastern bloc. 
59. At the initiative of the United States, 
Cocom members have recently established 
Security and Technology Experts Meetings 
(STEM). The assessments of western and eastern 
technology resulting from the work of STEM, 
however, are not being reported to Cocom, but 
to the individual national administrations. In 
fact, it is left to national administrations to 
5. New York Times, 19th August 1989. 
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interpret the expert advice according to their 
own interests and to decide if they wish to 
discuss certain technology issues in Cocom or 
not. Moreover, it seems that until now, STEM 
has only provided very limited information on 
technology developments in the Soviet Union. 
60. Consequently, discussions in Cocom on 
placing items on or taking them off the control 
lists are not based on a common assessment. 
Combined with the principle of unanimous deci-
sions, this leaves ample room for painstaking 
and endless discussions and does not help to 
speed up the review process of the lists. There is 
urgent need for a better co-ordinated and less 
ideologically-inspired state-of-the-art technology 
assessment of the Soviet Union on which to base 
a sound Cocom policy. 
(d) Konversiya 
61. With all the efforts of its rigidly centrally-
planned economy concentrated on military pro-
duction and no scope for private enterprise and 
initiative, there remains little for civil pro-
duction and the related sorely-needed impro-
vement in the quality of life. The consequence of 
so many years of this policy for the Soviet 
economy and society are known only too well to 
be repeated here. In recent years the leadership 
of the Soviet Union has started a vast pro-
gramme to stop and reverse the process of a des-
perately declining economy. 
62. One aspect of this new policy is Kon-
versiya, a dedicated conversion effort within a 
framework of government directives to reduce 
military spending and channel the technological 
knowledge and production capability thus 
becoming available to the civilian and consumer 
sector. 
63. According to the Chairman of the Com-
mittee of Defence and State Security Problems 
of the Supreme Soviet, drastic reductions in mil-
itary expenditure are being planned. While the 
budget for military expenditure in 1989 is 77.3 
billion roubles or 8.9% ofGDP, it is planned to 
be reduced to 70.9 billion roubles, or less than 
8% of GDP in 1990. 
64. It need not be explained here that not all 
production equipment which has been used for 
military production can easily be adapted for 
the production of other goods. This is a reason 
why the Soviet Union is interested in co-
operation with western companies and the 
acquisition of western technology, since the 
western economic system has always focused its 
attention on production for the consumer 
market. 
65. In a recent example of this new approach, 
the Sukhoi design bureau, well known for its 
fighter aircraft, has tabled a research programme 
for a supersonic business aircraft to be called 
Mk VI Su in partnership with the United States 
manufacturer Gulfstream. 
66. Furthermore, apart from a reduction in 
the number of aircraft being procured for the 
Soviet armed forces, the Politburo has proposed 
a 14.2% cut in aerospace research and devel-
opment over the next three years with the 
money most likely being diverted to general con-
sumer products, although it seems that a final 
decision has not been taken yet 6• 
V. The specific position of China 
67. Following improved relations between 
member countries and China and in encour-
agement of the Chinese Government's policy of 
economic modernisation, Cocom agreed in 1985 
to maintain a differential in the application of 
controls of strategic goods to the People's 
Republic of China. In 1988, export control bar-
riers with this country were again relaxed. 
68. It is a well-known objective of the Chinese 
leadership since 1978-79 to have an auton-
omous defence industry and at the same time, if 
there is a requirement for off-the-shelf military 
technology, to diversify its imports among a 
number of countries in order not to be 
dependent on one specific country. 
69. At the moment, China is a rather suc-
cessful exporter of weapons systems to third 
world countries. In many cases it has established 
different ways of co-operating with western sup-
pliers in order to produce weaponry such as air-
craft, tanks, missiles and guns which is relatively 
cheap yet still equipped with sufficiently 
modem technology to be efficient and attractive 
to third world countries. This co-operation has 
also been attractive for the western companies 
involved, especially since many of them in 
recent years had to deal with a shrinking 
market. 
70. After the violent crackdown on the 
movement for more democracy on 4th June 
1989, all Cocom member countries reacted with 
indignation. For the time being, negotiations 
within Cocom for further relaxation of the rules 
towards China have been deferred, but on the 
whole Cocom has not changed its earlier relaxed 
rules for exports to China. At national level, the 
United States suspended all government-to-
government sales and commercial exports of 
weapons and the United Kingdom, following 
this example, announced that it would ban all 
arms sales to China. 
71. So far, however, the United States' sus-
pension of arms shipments to China has had 
little effect. United States military contractors 
6. Jane's Defence Weekly, 16th September 1989. 
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are still producing the weaponry and China is 
still paying the bills to keep the production lines 
open. Delivery is being held up, but most of 
these items, including a $502.1 million deal for 
United States electronics to upgrade China's J-8 
11 fighter planes, will not be ready until 1991 or 
later 7• 
72. In September 1989, the United Kingdom 
allowed the export of equipment for the F-7M 
fighter aircraft, a Chinese equivalent of the 
Soviet MiG 21, which has been developed for 
export, while denying that it was breaking its 
own embargo on arms sales to Beijing. In this 
£30 million deal, Marconi and GEC A vionics 
were allowed to export cock~it display screens, 
radar and other equipment. The aircraft con-
cerned here are destined la11gely for export to 
Pakistan. According to a Foreign Office spokes-
man, the ban on arms sales to China covers 
weapons, such as firearms, missiles and ammu-
nition, and any equipment that could be used 
for internal repression, which is not the case for 
avionics equipment 8• 
73. It can rightly be argued that export of the 
abovementioned items will not constitute a stra-
tegic threat from China to th~ Cocom countries. 
Indeed, the British Government has recently 
stressed that amendments to .the Cocom control 
lists, which can be agreed only by consensus, are 
made on strategic rather than political grounds, 
following an assessment of the strategic threat 
posed by a given country to' western security 9• 
74. All in all, the prinpipal objective of 
western countries can only be to resume 
effective business with Chin~ and not to isolate 
it, a policy which is also being recommended in 
the report " Western Europe~n security: defence 
implications of the People's Republic of China's 
evolving geopolitical situat~on ", presented by 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments of the Asseml:lly of WEU (Doc-
ument 1203). Consequently there can be no 
doubt that eventually Coconlt rules will again be 
relaxed as regards China in the not too distant 
future. 
VI. Changes in Cocpm's policy 
(a) The January 1988 higll-le11el meeting 
75. From the establishment of Cocom until 
the early 1980s, the United States has had a 
near-monopoly of many adyanced technologies 
and consequently it could easily dictate Cocom 
policy. This situation has changed in recent 
years with the spread of advanced technological 
7. International Herald Tribune, 29th August 1989. 
8. The Independent, 15th September 1989. 
9. Reply from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to a 
question by Mr. David Atkinson, House of Commons, 13th 
June 1989. 
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knowledge to the other Cocom member coun-
tries and also to emerging industrial nations in 
South-East Asia and in the Far East. 
76. On the other hand, the United States still 
has a dominant position in a number of high-
technology areas. Of all goods and technologies 
related to computers ( 60% of the special cases in 
Cocom), 80% of the value of contracts which 
were granted an export licence accrues to 
American companies, 11% to Japanese, 3% to 
West German, 2% to British and 1% to French 
companies 10• 
77. With its allies being more assertive in 
demanding more flexible regulations, increasing 
pressure from its own Deparment of Commerce 
and important changes in the Soviet Union, the 
United States had little choice but to reconsider 
its position regarding strategic export controls. 
78. This led to a first round of major changes 
agreed at the high-level meeting of representa-
tives from all Cocom countries in January 
1988. 
79. Having confirmed their determination to 
control the exports of items and technology 
which could endanger their security, the 
member countries agreed that they should: 
- rationalise the lists by concentrating the 
controls on products and technologies 
with a strategic value; 
- enhance co-operation with third coun-
tries regarding the transfer of tech-
nology and the control of the final des-
tination of these products and 
technologies; 
- harmonise and enhance the efficiency 
of national controls in order to prevent 
illegal transfers of these products and 
technologies more efficiently; 
- facilitate exchanges of these products 
and technologies between member 
countries. 
80. Furthermore, they decided to organise 
regular high-level meetings - normally once a 
year - in order to evaluate the progress made 
and define the direction to be taken. 
(b) Allied criticism of the United States posture 
81. Recognising the importance of the 
January 1988 decisions, the other member coun-
tries still strongly felt that more should be done, 
and with the advent of the Bush administration, 
western allies increased their pressure on the 
United States Government to respond inno-
vatively to the political and economic changes 
under way in the Soviet Union. West Germany 
10. Le Monde, 28th October 1989. 
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and the United Kingdom in particular urged 
greater flexibility in export controls. Moreover, 
two specific issues in the United States export 
policy were in particular subject to criticism 
from other Cocom members, the " no excep-
tions " rule and the claim to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. 
(i) The " no exceptions " rule 
82. A thorn in the allies' side was the mainte-
nance of the so-called " no exceptions " rule, 
introduced by President Carter after the Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan and meaning that for 
products subject to the Cocom embargo no 
exception whatever would be made. 
83. Under this rule, the United States consist-
ently opposed any attempt to approve the sale of 
items included in the Cocom lists. This had the 
effect of a veto, since Cocom rules by consensus. 
The rule has been strictly applied, in particular 
for computers. 
84. In its ten-year existence, the rule has effec-
tively blocked sales of strategic goods manufac-
tured in the United States, but it has not always 
curbed sales of controlled goods produced in 
allied countries. Allied countries have been able 
to approve certain contested sales without 
bringing the matter up for Cocom approval. 
This was the case for the largest industrial con-
tract between the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union yet, a Simon-Carves £246 million 
contract to build a plant for factory automation 
equipment in Y erevan. This plant, scheduled for 
completion in 1991, will make " programmable 
logic controllers " - industrial microcomputers 
used to control robots in factories. It will use 
technology developed by GEC, which has itself 
exported similar technology to the Soviet Union 
and argues that it is not sufficiently sophisti-
cated to be used for military purposes. In disa-
greement with the Americans, the British Gov-
ernment backed GEC's argument and has 
refused to submit the contract to Cocom. 
85. During the Reagan administration, propo-
nents of the hard-line policy towards the eastern 
bloc were all too happy about the " no excep-
tions " rule because, as Richard Perle, former 
Assistant Secretary of Defence for international 
security policy put it recently: " (before 1979) it 
got to the point where they (Cocom members) 
were making deals, promising to support the 
other's requests for exceptions and negating the 
safeguards for export control 11 • In fact, with or 
without a no exceptions rule, in a body which 
rules by unanimity such as Cocom, the making 
of deals is the most effective way of making 
progress. Consequently, one might wonder 
whether deciding by simple or qualified majo-
11. Comments made on 28th February 1989 before the 
Technology Transfer Caucus of the House Republican Study 
Committee, Defense News, lOth April 1989. 
rity would not improve and speed up the 
decision-making process in Cocom. 
(ii) The claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction 
86. Another bone of contention within Cocom 
is the United States' claim to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction which in practice means that the 
United States authorities go to great lengths to 
punish companies in allied countries which re-
export or transfer United States technology to 
any other user without United States Gov-
ernment permission. This requirement for any 
user of United States controlled technology to 
comply with American export controls applies 
to both technology produced in the United 
States or by United States companies abroad 
and to foreign users of United States technology. 
All technology items containing one or more 
United States controlled components are 
covered by this requirement. A system of distri-
bution licences permits United States exporters 
to make multiple shipments of specified goods 
to approved overseas importers. However, to be 
an " approved " importer, these importers have 
to establish an internal control programme and 
also keep records for inspection or " audit " by 
United States Department of Commerce offi-
cials. 
(c) The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competiti11eness Act 
87. The United States Congress had already 
given signs of weariness with the federal export 
control legislation when, in an attempt to reduce 
the trade deficit and boost United States 
exports, it passed the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act in August 1988. This trade 
act, signed into law on 23rd August 1988, con-
tains a number of measures designed to loosen 
United States controls over exports of sensitive 
technology. Most of these measures deal with 
exports to Cocom members and other western 
nations. Complaints have been made by industry 
and government experts that the coming into 
effect of some of the most important regulations 
of the trade act is being blocked in the adminis-
trative jungle of the Office of Management and 
Budget. One of these was a regulation which, 
with some exceptions, would remove the need to 
license the re-export of goods to Cocom countries 
(the so-called extraterritoriality claim) if these 
goods contain 25% or less United States compo-
nents. Until now this re-export licence was not 
required for goods with 10% or less United States 
components. The other was a regulation which 
removes the requirement that exports of low-
level technology to Cocom countries and to 
countries with Cocom-like export controls be 
licensed. 
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1989, the Secretary of Commerce, Robert 
Mosbacher, declared that the first of these regu-
lations had now come into force. He also 
declared that the export controls on a majority 
of low-level technology goods have been 
removed as required by the abovementioned 
1988 trade act, while the remainder should be 
decontrolled by the end of 1 ~89. 
(d) Recent changes in United States 
and Cocom export co11trol policy 
89. In his 29th May 1989 press conference in 
Brussels, President Bush made the long-awaited 
announcement that the United States would lift 
the " no exceptions " rule. This was followed in 
July 1989 by the decision to remove export 
restrictions from certain types of desktop com-
puters. A compromise, negotiated within the 
Cocom framework, later led to the expansion of 
the export restrictions list to laptop and more 
powerful types of desktop computers. The 
agreement, which came into effect on 15th 
August 1989, will permit the shipment of per-
sonal computer systems based on 16/32 bit 
microprocessors and with a maximum 4 M Byte 
of RAM. 
(e) More reform projects? 
90. Recently, the United States Under-
Secretary of Commerce, Dennis Kloske, 
announced that the Departments of Commerce 
and of Defence had agreed upon a joint recom-
mendation on reforming export controls for 
machine tools with an emphasis on enforcement 
and streamlining, which had been accepted by 
President Bush and submitted to Cocom. At the 
moment, no information is available on the con-
tents of this recommendation. 
91. The Secretary of Commerce recently 
stated that the Bush administration is actively 
discussing the removal of some export controls 
for the Soviet Union. In particular, the prohi-
bition on exports of equipment and technical 
data which is useful for the Kama River and Zil 
truck manufacturing plants may be re-examined. 
(/) The October 1989 C«om meetings 
92. In September last, President Bush is said 
to have written to all the ltllders of the Cocom 
member countries to say that he was " extremely 
concerned about the rapid erosion of the Cocom 
regime ". He then urged the allies to tighten 
their export controls and enforce the embargo. 
93. He also said that at a Cocom meeting 
88. However, in an announcement in the which took place on 4th and 5th October 1989 
United States House of Representatives' the Americans announced that all negotiations 
Foreign Affairs Committee on 5th October for streamlining the list of ,embargoed dual-use 
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goods would be cancelled until the Europeans 
and the Japanese come up with new proposals 
for the enforcement of existing agreements 12• 
94. On 25th and 26th October 1989, a high-
level meeting of representatives of Cocom 
member countries was held in Paris. At that 
meeting, no progress was made towards the 
further relaxation of the Cocom export regime 
desired by the European member countries. 
West Germany obtained no immediate reply to 
its request for special treatment for Poland and 
Hungary. However, requests to make exceptions 
for these two countries could be taken into con-
sideration more quickly 13• In general, the results 
of this high-level meeting have fallen short of the 
expectations of the European and Japanese 
member countries for a changing attitude 
towards Eastern Europe. The United States has 
again succeeded in avoiding making a funda-
mental choice in the ever-more urgent debate on 
the vital role of western high technology in the 
restructuring of Eastern European economies 
and - even more so - societies. 
VII. The pros and cons 
of the Cocom export control debate 
(a) Moderates and orthodox 
95. The debate which accompanied the 
August 1989 decisions on a relaxation in com-
puter export controls in the United States is 
typical of the diverging points of view of those 
who might be called the moderates and the 
orthodox. 
96. The moderates, led by Commerce Sec-
retary Mosbacher and supported by all other 
Cocom member states, argued that the former 
United States restrictions on computer sales 
harmed companies and aided their competitors. 
They pointed out that nearly 100 companies in 
19 countries have the ability to produce these 
computers - " absolutely a middling level of 
technology " - of which some are likely to sell 
them to the eastern bloc. They argued that per-
sonal computers made in Taiwan, India, Brazil, 
China and other nations which do not co-
operate with western export controls are already 
being sold to the Soviet bloc. The orthodox, on 
the other hand, led by Defence Secretary 
Cheney, asserted that the sale of these com-
puters with a technology which, according to 
him, is not generally available, would give the 
Soviet Union and eastern bloc countries" signif-
icant capabilities they do not now possess " 
which could also be used for military pur-
poses. 
97. Apart from this, Mr. Cheney has 
advanced the view that the Soviet reform 
movement is largely motivated by a desire to 
12. Sunday Times, 8th October 1989. 
13. Le Monde, 28th October 1989. 
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obtain ready access to western technology. If the 
West likes to help the Soviet Union in this 
acquisition process, he thinks it should be paid 
for with effective troop reductions and genuine 
democracy. 
(b) Availability of technology in third countries 
98. Advocates of a more relaxed Cocom 
regime always argue that much of the 
embargoed technology is freely available in non-
Cocom countries. Indeed, an increasing number 
of non-Cocom member countries throughout the 
world have technology available which is 
embargoed under Cocom restrictions. Obviously 
the eastern bloc does not refrain from trying to 
obtain items of its technology shopping list from 
these third countries. The importance of this 
third countries availability should not be exagge-
rated. Soviet authorities admit that some tech-
nology can be obtained in third countries. Such 
was the case for electronics components 
obtained from Taiwan which were used for 
assembling computers in Hungary. In general, it 
is only bottom-line technology that is freely 
available. The Soviet authorities unanimously 
agreed that advanced high technology is very 
difficult to obtain even from non-Cocom coun-
tries since countries which have it normally try 
to respect rules that concord with Cocom 
rules. 
99. The fact is that western countries, and 
especially the United States, have appealed to 
the countries most concerned to introduce 
export and re-export legislation in order to 
prevent the transfer of high technology to 
eastern bloc countries. A number of these coun-
tries, such as Austria, Finland, Singapore, 
South Korea and Sweden, have replied posi-
tively. 
100. For a long time, the United States has 
considered Austria, to mention only one 
example, to be a sieve for technology transfer to 
the eastern bloc. As a neutral country, it had 
always been reluctant to offend the eastern bloc 
by imposing a too rigid export control regime. 
Moreover, national legislation did not grant 
Austrian customs the power to search and seize 
suspicious consignments. Nevertheless, in the 
summer of 1986, the seizure of a load of key 
computer parts, including computer work sta-
tions which could be used in the design of air-
craft, missiles and components of space-based 
weapons, intensified existing negotiations 
between the United States and Austria on tJie 
technology transfer issue. Recently, the Austrian 
Government agreed to step up enforcement 
efforts and strengthened its customs laws, 
including a new provision allowing customs offi-
cials to search suspicious consignments passing 
through Austrian transit or free-trade zones. 
Since then, whatever flow of technology there 
might have been through Austria to the eastern 
bloc has been curtailed 14• 
101. A different approach has been chosen by 
Australia. For many years it had already 
co-operated with the western strategic com-
munity in controlling the export of dual-use 
technology. In April 1989 it decided to join 
Cocom as a full member. One of the reasons for 
this decision was that it had not previously par-
ticipated in the work of Cocom other than as 
a spectator and consequently had minimal 
influence on the content of the guidelines 
applied. Exports of dual-use technology subject 
to the administration's export controls had been 
increasingly handicapped by the government's 
non-participation in Cocom. The ministers con-
cerned stated that notwithstanding the major 
recent thaw in East-West relations the under-
lying rationale for Cocom still existed and was 
accepted by Australia. 
102. The problem with third countries is that 
sovereign states can by no means be forced to 
adopt specific legislation as proposed by other 
states. The United States tried to find a solution 
to this problem by including a provision in its 
1985 Export Administration Act whereby non-
Cocom members are granted Cocom-like 
trading privileges if they co-operate fully 
on export control issues. This provision 
undoubtedly encouraged certain states to co-
operate more closely in this field. 
103. Another solution advocated by all other 
Cocom member countries is to rationalise the 
Cocom list further and remove obsolescent 
items in order to be able to concentrate on really 
important strategic items and technology. It may 
still take some time before this solution is 
reached. 
104. Meanwhile it is rather unlikely that most 
of the other third countries concerned will 
follow the Australian example of joining Cocom. 
Third countries might be tempted more easily to 
co-operate on export control issues if Western 
European countries could develop a common 
encouragement policy towards these countries, 
a solution which would have the additional 
advantage of creating more uniformity in export 
regimes. 
(c) Cocom and missed business opportunities 
105. A well-known argument in discussions on 
Cocom is that companies in Cocom countries 
might be deprived of vast business opportunities 
and billions of dollars in contracts. Missed 
opportunities are here understood to be those 
cases where a proscribed country has made a call 
for bids from one or more companies estab-
lished in Cocom countries and where the final 
14. Washington Post, 28th August 1989. 
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offer could not be made because of Cocom 
restrictions, presupposing that 'the proscribed 
country had the financial means to fulfil its 
potential obligations. 
106. In fact, it is extremely difficult to give a 
reliable figure for these missed opportunities, in 
particular since any such estimate would also 
include a number of impondetables of which the 
following are only two examples: would a 
country have had the financial means to make a 
bid for another contract if a preceding bid had 
led to a contract with the ensuing financial obli-
gations? Would an earlier bid, if it had been 
successful, have led to better economic 
performance and, as a consequence, to even 
more financial means for the country in 
question to buy western technology? 
107. Notwithstanding these impediments which 
are being acknowledged by the Soviet Union, 
estimates have been made. The Soviet author-
ities estimate the missed 'opportunities for 
France over the years 1981 L86 at 2.3 billion 
roubles, or 23 billion francs. A western source 
has given a figure of 9.3 billion dollars for the 
same period for the United States 15• 
108. These figures may be fundamentally unre-
liable, but there can be no question that western 
companies are missing contracts because of 
Cocom embargoes. 
109. On the other hand, at a hearing in the 
European Parliament's Committee on External 
Economic Relations with representatives of the 
Union of Industries of the European Com-
munity in September 1985, the industrialists 
stated that Cocom does not paralyse East-West 
trade 16• It should be noted, however, that this 
hearing was held four years ago, long before 
June 1987, when the Communist Party's Central 
Committee ordered extensive changes in Soviet 
economic management, including a specific 
emphasis on higher technology. 
110. There is also a different kind of missed 
business opportunities. This occurs when a pro-
scribed country such as the Soviet Union is 
denied technology from Cocom countries which 
cannot be obtained in third countries. On 
several such occasions, to n~me only pumping 
stations for pipelines, the Soviet Union after 
developing and producing these goods on its 
own, has been able to compete successfully with 
western companies on foreign markets. 
VIII. Illegal exports atJd re-exports 
111. Even if Cocom countries have a rea-
sonably efficient system to control exports of 
dual-use technology to prosJribed countries, it 
15. Messe Magazin International, 1987, No. 7. 
16. Second report on restrictions go strategic exports and 
United States-EC technology transfer, Rapporteur: Mr. M. 
Toussaint, European Parliament lt>ocument A 2-31189/-
part B. 
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will never be leak-proof. Each year there are 
incidents of illegal exports, either through 
trickery by shrewd businessmen, or through 
laxity in administrative controls. Especially in 
the business world, the complaint is often made 
that some countries have a greater tolerance of 
Cocom violations than others, thus favouring 
their national identity. It seems fair to state that 
illegal export scandals occur in each of the 
Cocom member countries in turn. Under-
standably enough, these scandals get more 
attention as the technology involved is more 
sensitive, which causes countries with a highly-
developed level of technology to be more 
exposed. A few cases are cited here as examples 
to show that such exports may occur in any 
Cocom country. 
112. This year it became known that furnaces 
worth £7 million to make a secret substance 
which can help to give ballistic missiles pinpoint 
accuracy had been exported freely from the 
United Kingdom to the Soviet Union because of 
blunders by the CIA and the United Kingdom 
Department of Trade and Industry. The 
material, known as carbon carbon, placed on the 
missiles as a nose cone shield, bums evenly on 
re-entry into the atmosphere, eliminating the 
wobble which causes inaccuracy in metal-tipped 
warheads. The producer of the furnaces had 
received export clearance from the DTI and offi-
cials changed their minds only when it was too 
late. A United States committee recently investi-
gated this incident as one of the worst five 
security lapses since the second world war 17• 
113. In February 1989, two Japanese execu-
tives were arrested on suspicion of having ille-
gally sold to the Soviet Union a chemical 
solution that can be used in missile guidance 
systems 18• 
114. A French executive has been under 
criminal investigation since 1988 for his alleged 
role in the sale to the Soviet Union of sophisti-
cated milling machines used in building war 
planes. The executive had a combination of 
jobs, which is not unusual in Cocom countries, 
but which at the same time entails potential con-
flicts of interest. He was employed by France's 
electronics-manufacturing association and 
advised Machines Fran~aises Lourdes, a leading 
French machine-tool manufacturer involved in 
the contested sale to the Soviet Union. The sale 
took place in 1986 for delivery in 1987 and 
1988. At the same time, this executive worked as 
a consultant for the Ministry of Industry, pre-
paring official lists of embargoed technology, 
and represented the Foreign Ministry in 
meetings of allied governments on strategic 
trade. Industrial observers have said that 
France's machine-tool sector is losing ground to 
European and Asian competition which might 
17. Manchester Guardian International, 1987, No. 7. 
18. Daily Telegraph, 21st February 1989. 
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make it vulnerable to Soviet agents seeking to 
sign contracts with companies prepared to get 
round western embargoes. 
115. The West German Government decided 
to tighten its export control procedures after the 
all too well known illegal export of chemical 
technology to Libya. 
116. Recently, an Italian computer firm was 
accused of having exported $25 million of 
embargoed state-of-the art flexible manufac-
turing systems to the aviation industry of the 
Soviet Union. It is being said that this 
equipment, combined with the computer firm's 
technicians stationed at the plant to keep 
the manufacturing systems operating, produces 
components for the Y ak-41, a supersonic 
vertical-take-off fighter aircraft 19• It should be 
mentioned here that this case still has to be 
settled. 
11 7. In these cases, it would be very difficult to 
prove that government agencies have been neg-
ligent on purpose. Yet there is no doubt that 
many Cocom countries do not have an adequate 
export control system. Moreover, the fact that 
half of the items on the industrial list are deter-
mined at national discretion opens the way for 
individual interpretation of the control lists. In 
this light, it can be no surprise that countries will 
interpret the list according to their own national 
interests, which may be different from one 
country to the other. The more items there are 
on the list, the more reasons there are for 
internal differences. 
118. On top of this, there are great differences 
among Cocom countries when it comes to the 
system for enforcing national export legislation. 
Differences range from one country not having 
an export control system at all, others not pub-
lishing their national control lists and countries 
with rather elaborate systems and too much red 
tape. A better tuning-in of the export control 
and enforcement systems in Western European 
countries might solve many recurring questions 
and remove legitimate tension. It would also 
contribute to the much needed transparancy and 
predictability of the Cocom control regime for 
everybody concerned. 
IX. No relaxation of eastern bloc attempts 
to acquire western high technology 
through espionage 
119. With on the one hand the existence of 
extensive Cocom lists of embargoed technology 
and increasing efforts in the West to develop 
new technologies which are so advanced that 
they are not yet included in the Cocom lists, and 
on the other hand a number of eastern bloc 
countries which are eager to acquire these tech-
19. Sunday Times, 8th October 1989. 
nologies for various reasons, there can be little 
doubt that these countries will employ all pos-
sible means to attain this end. 
120. Although it is difficult to provide hard 
evidence for this grey area of perpetual human 
activity, there are indications that the relaxation 
in the cold war attitude has increased rather 
than reduced eastern bloc spying efforts. 
Western intelligence officials have made it clear 
that the KGB, GRU and other eastern bloc 
intelligence services have intensified their 
efforts to obtain western technology, trying to 
take advantage of the improved climate in 
East-West relations. 
121. The interest of the Soviet Union in 
illicitly obtaining information in the United 
Kingdom even went so far that there was no way 
decently to stop it. Recently the British 
Government, confronted with a continued 
expansion of Soviet espionage activities, opted 
for a discreet approach in the hope that a 
mixture of strong hints and quiet diplomacy 
would have an effect upon the Kremlin lead-
ership. In the long run, neither this policy nor a 
personal appeal by Prime Minister Thatcher to 
President Gorbachev had any effect, which then 
resulted in the expulsion of 11 Soviet diplomats 
and journalists in May 1989 20• 
122. According to counter-intelligence author-
ities in West Germany, there has been a rise 
in attempts by eastern bloc, especially East 
German, agents to recruit West German busi-
nessmen to supply them with blueprints and 
other data 21 • It was said that the East has 
focused in particular on data about electronics, 
data-processing, telecommunications and lasers. 
Most probably the principal goal of this activity 
is to modernise the Soviet economy, but it 
should not be forgotten that the military, used to 
decades of preferential treatment, will not easily 
give up the best part of the cake if it becomes 
available. 
123. In a recent report on foreign espionage 
activities in Switzerland from 1980 to 1988, the 
Swiss Government made it clear that the share 
of espionage by the eastern bloc has increas-
ed considerably. Advanced technology, in par-
ticular computers, microelectronics and know-
how, has been their main goal 22• 
124. In the quest for new technologies, no 
methods are left untried. This year, an inter-
esting new way of spying was again brought to 
public attention when three West German com-
puter hackers were arrested on suspicion that 
they conducted electronic espionage by stealing 
secrets from western computer banks world 
wide and selling the data to an eastern bloc intel-
ligence service. This intelligence service was 
20. The Independent, 22nd May 1989. 
21. International Herald Tribune, 29th August 1989. 
22. Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 11th August 1989. 
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believed to have used passwords and other 
information obtained from the hackers to pene-
trate top secret United States computer systems, 
including the United States Department of 
Defence staff data bank, and data banks of the 
United States nuclear arms laboratory at Los 
Alamos and NASA 23• 
125. The fact that eastern bloc intelligence 
activities for obtaining western technology are 
continuing or have been intensified is no reason 
for special alarm. Such activities have existed as 
long as there have been friendly or less friendly 
relations between nations. In the capitalist 
industry, companies are at great pains to obtain 
secrets from their competitors. Even if the 
methods used are not always fair or legal, it is a 
fact of life with which nations have to deal, in 
the first place through their counter-intelligence 
services. 
126. The case of eastern bloc technological 
espionage clearly shows the continuing great 
interest in western technology, which these 
countries need for their military and at least as 
much for their civilian industry. The existence 
of Cocom rules certainly compels the eastern 
bloc to be more active in the1 intelligence field, 
but it would be erroneous to think that these 
activities would stop if Cocom did not exist. 
Secrets there will always be, not only between 
states but also between industrial companies, if 
not for security reasons, for reasons of economic 
competition. 
127. With all the indignatio~ manifested by the 
party which has unmasked a spy ring, both sides 
know that espionage is a fair game, played with 
foul means. 
X. Joint ventures 
128. A fairly recent way for the Soviet Union 
to acquire western technology is the estab-
lishment of joint ventures with western coun-
tries, the first of which were established in 1987. 
In Appendix I to this report, some very recent 
statistics are given, released by the State 
External Economic Commission of the Council 
of Ministers of the USSR, These statistics 
clearly show that many of the 'existing joint ven-
tures are in public catering and consultancy. 
129. Officially, the government of the Soviet 
Union has not set any prioriti~s for the nature of 
activities of joint ventures, ldst this be wrongly 
interpreted, but apparently there is a strong 
desire for more foreign capital and know-how to 
be channelled to industrial production such as 
machine building, making u~e of components 
which are not available in the country itself. 
130. The USSR has bilateral agreements on 
technology co-operation with a number of 
23. International Herald Tribune, 3rd March 1989. 
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Cocom member countries, but in all these agree-
ments the base-line is the Cocom list together 
with the United States extraterritoriality claim 
which means that in general no high technology 
is involved. 
131. Cocom rules have prevented the estab-
lishment of joint ventures proposed by Soviet 
partners in such fields as laser technology, 
machine-tool equipment, computers, elec-
tronics, metallurgy, printing technology and 
chemical technology. 
132. According to Soviet authorities, Cocom 
was also an insurmountable obstacle when, in 
negotiations with the European Community, 
they proposed co-operative projects in such 
fields as the control of transcontinental pol-
lution and the restoration of bronze art 
objects. 
133. The abovementioned practice can hardly 
be reconciled with a joint venture, Sterch, 
recently established between Honeywell Inc. and 
the Soviet Ministry of Mineral Fertiliser Pro-
duction in a programme to modernise state-run 
fertiliser production plants. Sterch will provide 
the Soviet Union with production equipment 
involving microprocessors, computer software, a 
special data system and related training tech-
niques. 
134. Here, the United States Department of 
Commerce, which approved the deal, described 
the equipment as old, low-level technology 
which was no longer banned from export. 
135. The conservative Centre for Security 
Policy, however, alleged that "the venture 
would entail the transfer of the necessary 
machinery and continuing technical support 
needed to permit the Soviets domestically to 
produce highly-advanced control devices", all 
" modem technology exceedingly well-suited to 
efficient chemical - and nuclear - weapons pro-
duction". 
136. It was also said that this deal would 
"encourage others both in the United States 
and in allied nations to seek to export similar 
dual-use equipment and know-how to the 
Soviet bloc". The United States Government 
was accused of inconsistency in its efforts to 
curb the export from western countries of 
systems applicable for manufacturing 
chemical weapons. 
137. Without detailed knowledge of the tech-
nology involved in this deal, it is difficult to 
say who is right, but if technological 
co-operation can be the subject of such widely 
differing views between those who know more, 
it needs no explanation that the export control 
regime for dual-use technology in Cocom 
countries is far from transparent and 
predictible. 
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XI. Cocom and perestroi1ca 
(a) Restructuring the Soviet economy and ensuing needs 
138. No discussion of Cocom would be com-
plete without mentioning perestroi"ka, or the 
restructuring of Soviet society, initiated by Pres-
ident Gorbachev, who now seems to have gained 
support for his ideas from the majority of 
policy-makers in his country. Several other 
Warsaw Pact countries, while having chosen a 
slightly different approach to their own specific 
situation, equally support his policy. 
139. The main goal of this immense restruc-
turing plan is to improve the quality of life of 
the Soviet citizen. A major obstacle is the des-
perate situation of the country's economy, which 
needs almost instant treatment with radical 
means. 
140. To this end, the Central Committee of the 
Cbmmunist Party took drastic decisions at its 
June 1987 meeting. It ordered changes in Soviet 
economic management including an end to fixed 
subsidised prices and decentralisation of eco-
nomic decision-making. Firms should be more 
independent with direct links between manufac-
turing companies and the suppliers of raw mate-
rials. Telecommunications and computer links 
should be built up or improved. There should be 
a dedicated commitment to high technology. 
141. In the West, as in the East, the prevailing 
opinion is that if the Soviet economy is not 
going to improve, there will be little scope for 
real changes in other areas. At the moment, the 
circumstances are such that only advanced tech-
nologies and management techniques available 
in the West can help to modernise the industry 
by making it less labour-intensive and more effi-
cient. This is where Cocom appears on the 
scene. 
142. In his speech in the Council of Europe of 
6th July 1989, President Gorbachev specifically 
referred to Cocom, venturing the following 
opinion: 
" I think that the distinguished audience 
will agree that in our age segregating eco-
nomic ties from scientific and techno-
logical ties is something less than normal. 
Yet, East-West relations have of late been 
bled white by Cocom. 
If one could justify such practices at the 
peak of the cold war, today many restric-
tions seem utterly ridiculous. 
Of course, we, too, are often excessively 
closed. However, we have begun to 
straighten this out. We have started to 
take down our ' domestic Cocom ' - the 
wall separating military and civilian pro-
duction - in particular, in connection 
with conversion. 
So maybe experts and representatives of 
the respective governments could get 
together and break all those cold war log-
jams. 
To bring secrecy down to reasonable 
limits which are indeed required for 
security, and to give the green light to the 
normal two-way flow of scientific 
knowledge and technical art ". 
143. In the Soviet Union, there is indeed a vast 
and urgent need for high technology. 
144. The western computer industry, for 
instance, estimates that the Soviet Union needs 
about twenty million personal computers and an 
unknown number of higher-performance com-
puters to help it to streamline its bureaucracy 
and industry. Cocom lifted its restrictions on 
certain categories of personal computers only a 
few months ago, but many others are still on the 
list. 
145. Another sector which, according to the 
Soviet leadership, urgently needs to be 
modernised and expanded is telecommunica-
tions. The Ministry of Communications is 
planning to triple the number of telephones in 
the country by the year 2000, which should give 
the Soviet Union a telephone penetration of 90 
million sets at that time. There can be no doubt 
that a telecommunication system not only ben-
efits the consumer, but also serves state and 
security purposes. The transfer of communica-
tions technology is therefore also watched by 
Cocom. A $1 billion contract between Alcatel 
and the USSR comprising the delivery of 
250 000 telephone lines and the creation of a 
joint venture for assembling digital telephone 
exchanges is still pending because of objections 
raised in Cocom. In particular, Cocom has 
objected to the joint venture for digital 
equipment which could threaten western 
security in case of hostilities. 
146. In fact, Cocom's difficulty is that virtually 
all modem technology is dual-use, including 
computer equipment and related software which 
is being used for managing live-stock in modem 
dairy farms and automated manufacturing 
equipment for the most trivial consumer goods. 
A prominent example was given by the Soviet 
Deputy Minister for External Economic Rela-
tions, G. Rahimbayev, who in an earlier 
capacity had signed a contract with a company 
in California for delivery to the Soviet Union of 
an electronically controlled system, regulating 
weight and moisture of paper in a paper mill. 
The contract was later embargoed by the United 
States authorities for reasons of possible dual 
use of the technology concerned. 
14 7. Soviet authorities have made it clear that 
practically all potential high-technology co-
operation projects with the West fail because of 
Cocom restrictions. This is particularly so in 
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the areas of telecommunications, chemical 
technology, electronics, biotechnology, data-
processing, computer science and machine 
tooling, all fields with a vast potential for trade 
and co-operation. 
(b) Western conditions for Soviet economic integration 
in the world economy 
148. The Soviet Union has made it ever more 
clear that in order to improve the quality of life 
of its citizens and to make its restructuring 
process a really durable success, it is aiming at 
integration into the economic system of Europe, 
thus opening its economic windows to the world 
and improve its overall trade relations. 
149. Although there may be minor differences 
between western industrialised countries, they 
agree on the general conditions to be fulfilled for 
real integration. Some of these conditions have 
been met in the recent past, such as legalisation 
of foreign investment, and the possibility of 
joint ventures and private co-operatives. 
150. What remains to be done has been most 
clearly stated by the United States Government 
which, notwithstanding the changing attitude in 
the Soviet Union, is apparently maintaining its 
hardline policy of letting the Soviets solve their 
own problems. On 4th October 1989, Secretary 
of State James Baker made it clear that the 
United States would block Soviet accession to 
the World Bank, the IMF and the GATT, as 
long as it did not fully introduce within its 
borders the free market economy, the legal right 
to private ownership, the end of state control 
and state monopolies and stabilisation and con-
vertibility of the rouble. 
(c) Soviet efforts to meet these conditions 
151. The Soviet Government is well aware 
that, in order to reach its goal, more is needed 
than good intentions and solemn declarations. 
Rather radical changes are now taking place 
regarding the convertibility! of the rouble. In 
December 1988, it ordered an end to the mul-
tiple exchange rate system for roubles against 
foreign currency. At the moment, there seems to 
be agreement among Soviet officials to replace 
the multiple exchange rate for business transac-
tions and private citizens with just three: one 
each for the earnings from e)'(ports of raw mate-
rials and of manufactured gobds, one for tourists 
and one for Soviet citizens. Even more exciting 
is a decree which calls for the eventual convert-
ibility of the rouble. As an initial step, the gov-
ernment ordered auctions in which rouble-rich 
firms in need of hard currency would be able to 
buy surplus dollars from otber firms. 
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152. On 5th November 1989, a first auction 
was held at a rate between 13 and 15 roubles to 
the dollar. Hard currency auctions will be held 
regularly and groups permitted to participate 
will be broadened. 
153. On 25th October 1989, the Soviet Union 
announced that the tourist exchange rate of the 
rouble would be slashed by 90% as from 1st 
November 1989. This will also affect Soviet cit-
izens travelling abroad who will have to pay 6.26 
roubles to the dollar instead of the present official 
rate of around 63 kopecks to the dollar. 
154. This new step certainly reflects the Soviet 
Government's willingness to take dramatic steps 
in pursuit of integration into the world 
economy. It is expected that this first step in 
devaluation of the rouble will soon be followed 
by other changes in exchange rates for all export 
transactions. 
155. The Soviet authorities are also well aware 
that their price-fixing system, which has no 
relation to economic reality, is a main stumbling-
block on the road towards restructuring. Legis-
lation to bring about price reforms will be 
examined in November 1989. According to 
current planning, wholesale prices will first be 
subject to reform, with retail prices to follow 
after a few more years. 
156. Decentralisation of the economic decision 
process is being introduced and, according to 
Deputy Minister G. Rahimbayev, a total of 
8 000 Soviet companies are now allowed to 
make contacts with foreign counterparts autono-
mously. 
15 7. A first explosion of liberty in doing 
business with foreign countries has led to pur-
chases in equipment and materials up to a total 
of 5.5 billion roubles which later could not be 
justified and is now standing idly. 
158. The planning now being implemented is 
to make these companies fully responsible for 
their own budget and cashflow. In fact, they will 
have. to manage with the money they are 
earnmg. If they do not have enough, they will 
have to borrow. 
15 9. Co-operative firms are still considered to 
be a hot issue in the Soviet Union. High profits 
and the corresponding high incomes of members 
of these firms have sometimes caused envy. For 
western observers it is no surprise that such small 
.~exibl~ fi~s ~ave wide scope for profiting from 
mef!:icie~~Ies m the present economic system. 
Soviet Citizens understandably are still inclined 
to denoun~e. these methods of doing business, but 
the authontles have not challenged the principle 
of co-operative firms and it is trusted that this 
ne~ branch of activity will survive its growing 
pams. At the moment, co-operative firms are not 
allowed to be middlemen in East-West trade, but 
according to Deputy Minister G. Rahimbayev: 
they could be granted a licence for such business 
in specific cases. 
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160. In connection with the abovementioned 
changes in economic policy, Soviet authorities 
keep asking western economists for advice to 
help their economy emerge from the slump. 
161. Alan Greenspan, the United States 
F~~eral Reserve Board Chairman, recently 
visited Moscow at the invitation of Leonid 
Aba~in, J:>resident Gorbachev's leading eco-
nomic adviser. The purpose of Greenspan's visit 
was to advise the Kremlin on ways to rebuild the 
Soviet financial system. 
XII. Conclusions 
162. The entire debate on Cocom which is 
being pursued at the moment can be reduced to 
two main questions: what is the current 
assessment of what is traditionally called the 
threat, as posed by the Soviet Union and its 
allies, mainly united in the Warsaw Pact? What 
can or should the West, and more specifically 
those countries which are members of Cocom 
do to encourage and help the current process of 
change taking place in Eastern Europe? 
163. As regards the first question, regarding the 
" threat ", it may be interesting to note here that 
in government officials' statements made at the 
presentation of the latest edition of the United 
States Department of Defence's " Soviet Mil-
itary Power", published in September 1989 the 
usual aggressive propaganda tone has been tem-
pered considerably. 
164. True, in this publication, it was said that 
Soviet strategic nuclear forces were modernised 
with " extraordinary momentum " and that 
despite Moscow's plans to cut defence spending 
by 14.2%, expenditure since 1985 has increased 
by an average of 3% a year in real terms. At the 
same time, however, the publication notes a 
" significant trend " in reduced Soviet naval 
activities around the globe and it evaluates the 
likeli~ood of. a United States-Soviet military 
conflict as bemg " perhaps as low as it has been 
at any time in the postwar era ". 
165. Likewise, the Military Balance 1989-90 a 
publication of the London-based Internatio~al 
Institute for Strategic Studies, is making it clear 
that the ability of the Warsaw Pact to mount a 
surp~se a!tack on NATO will shortly be " barely 
plausible because of the unilateral troop cuts 
started nine months ago by the Kremlin. Mr. 
Heisbourg, the Institute's Director, has said that 
growing tensions between different members of 
the Warsaw Pact are undermining its ability to 
act as an alliance. 
1 ~6. Indeed, the rapidly-changing situation in 
different Eastern European countries where 
divergent opinions and decisions on ~ational 
political and economic developments inevitably 
must have consequences for their mutual rela-
tions and for the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact 
' 
makes one wonder about the effectiveness of the 
Warsaw Pact as a political and military alliance. 
In this framework, it appears ever less appro-
priate to speak of an existing threat. One might 
rather speak of security risks, caused by internal 
social and political unrest. 
167. All in all, the general conviction is clearly 
that the " threat " has diminished, even if some 
of the allies still prefer to give an ambiguous 
reply when the question is asked directly. 
168. As for the second question - what should 
the West do to help restructuring in Eastern 
Europe to succeed - there is far less una-
nimity. 
169. Regarding Poland and Hungary, both the 
United States and its European allies agree that 
they can and must act to help these countries in 
modernising their economies. But the United 
States is still more cautious when it comes to 
bold action. This was again demonstrated at the 
Cocom high-level meeting of 25th-26th October 
1989 in Paris. 
170. Until now, the United States adminis-
tration has been adamant in its opinion that it 
can (and wishes to) do nothing to help the Soviet 
Union out of its economic swamp. It still seems 
to aim at winning an ideological battle which it 
won long ago. 
1 71. There has been little basic disagreement 
on this issue between the Republican gov-
ernment and the Democratic opposition, as was 
perfectly demonstrated by Senator Nunn in a 
recent address before the United States Con-
gress when he said: "We should give a red light 
to offering Moscow money or materials which 
serve mainly to defer the hard choices between 
guns and butter, between muddling through and 
systematic reform. " 
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quickly enough without substantial western aid, 
both financial and technological. A failure of the 
present Soviet leadership to provide citizens 
with enough food and consumer goods in the 
short term may well have disastrous conse-
quences for internal security in Eastern Europe, 
with possible unpleasant consequences for 
Western Europe. 
175. Whether or not history repeats itself, it is 
useful to recall historic parallels. After the first 
world war, the allies wished to punish Germany 
by imposing an extremely restrictive peace 
treaty with absolutely no regard for possible 
financial repercussions. The subsequent impact 
of this peace treaty turned out to be among the 
main origins of the second world war. 
176. If the cold war has l!>een an ideological 
struggle, the western world has won it gloriously. 
It should now act correct!~ to consolidate its 
victory by preventing a world power in disso-
lution becoming a serious s~curity risk. 
1 77. What should be done in the framework of 
Cocom in order to reflect a more positive and 
forthcoming attitude by its member countries 
towards Eastern Europe? 
178. First and foremost, it should be noted that 
under present circumstances Cocom still has a 
right to exist. At the same time, it seems irra-
tional to make exceptions in the Cocom export 
control regime for Poland alnd Hungary as long 
as these countries are full members of the 
Warsaw Pact, which automatically implies the 
exchange of any information of military rele-
vance, including technological information. 
179. As long as there are no perfect guarantees 
for peace and security, Cocom members have a 
right to protect their advanced military tech-
nology. 
180. There is general unanimity among the 
172. There are signs however that the United Cocom countries that the industrial list of dual-
States administration is starting to move, partic- use technology is too extensive and inaccurate. 
ularly in response to the accelerating changes in On the other hand, it is also true that the rules 
Eastern Europe. are interpreted differently in the various 
173. An instance of this is the announcement member countries and the situation is not clear. 
that President Bush and President Gorbachev An important effort should therefore be made to 
are to meet informally on 2nd and 3rd make Cocom rules and their application trans-
December on board American and Soviet war- parent and predictable, which is in the interest 
ships in the Mediterranean. Both sides agree of both Cocom member states and the pro-
that the main burden of arms talks would fall on scribed countries. 
the formal summit conference in 1990, and have 181. For member countries to be able to agree 
suggested that co-operation and economy might on more accurate Cocom lists, a serious effort 
be the main subject for their informal meeting in should be made to establish a commonly-agreed 
December, with other subjects not being and regularly-revised assessment of the state of 
excluded. military technology in the Soviet Union. 
17 4. In Western Europe, the prevailing opinion 182. Consideration should be given to oppor-
appears rightly to be that the Soviet Union has tunities for on-site verification as regards end-
already made the choice between guns and user destination and application of technologies 
butter in favour of the latter. The trouble is that and goods with a possible dual-use capability 
the systematic reform which has already been set which are being exported from Cocom countries 
in motion will most likely not be able to perform to proscribed countries. 
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183. The conference on economic co-operation 
in Europe, to be held in the CSCE framework in 
Bonn from 19th March to 11th April 1990, 
offers a starting point for discussions on indus-
trial and technological co-operation as men-
tioned in the agenda. In this framework, western 
countries should be prepared to discuss Cocom 
with an open mind. 
184. Many opponents of a more flexible 
attitude towards the Soviet Union maintain that 
the process of restructuring is doomed, that 
recent developments can easily be reversed if 
hard-line politicians take over from the present 
Soviet leadership. In this opinion, the West 
should not therefore be flexible or co-operative 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Of course, nobody 
can predict the future but it seems very difficult 
to imagine how a process. can be reversed which 
has already introduced changes in the Soviet 
Union and some of its Eastern European allies 
which are forcing Western Europe to reconsider 
the bases of its position. Conducting imagi-
native politics involves taking risks and requires 
courage. At the moment, the Soviet Union is 
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seeking to co-operate with the West. This calls 
for restrictions on the export of sensitive tech-
nology to be eased, and other steps such as the 
removal of the veto on the Soviet Union joining 
organisations like the IMF and the GATT. 
185. Admittedly, the Cocom countries would 
be taking a risk if they decided to lift certain res-
trictions on the export of sensitive technology. 
But the Soviet Union is certainly prepared to 
negotiate conditions under which restrictions 
could be eased. 
186. Moreover, one should bear in mind that 
Cocom countries will also be taking a risk if they 
decide to keep present export restrictions intact 
as has been argued elsewhere in this report. 
187. Given the fact that Cocom countries have 
to choose between two alternatives, both of 
which involve taking risks, they would be well 
advised to take the more imaginative decision to 
negotiate with the Soviet Union and other eli-
gible countries regarding the conditions under 
which certain export restrictions might be 
lifted. 
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APPENDIX 
Statistics regarding joint ventures in the USSR * 
Situation on 1st October 1989 
1. Number of joint ventures 
Overall ................................ . 
With socialist countries ................. . 
With capitalist countries ................ . 
Mixed (with both socialist and capitalist 
countries) ............................. . 
With developing countries .............. . 
Mixed (with both capitalist and developing 
countries) ............................. . 
Mixed (with both socialist and developing 
countries) ............................. . 
2. Contributions in the statutory fund 
Overall ................................. 
Soviet .................................. 
Foreign ................................ 
Socialist countries ....................... 
Capitalist countries ..................... 
Other countries ......................... 
Units 
940 
105 
748 
12 
60 
8 
Million roubles 
2 505.6 
1 439.1 
1 066.5 
172.8 
862.1 
31.7 
o/o 
100.0 
11.2 
79.6 
1.3 
6.4 
0.9 
Statutory fund 
(millions 
of roubles) 
2 505.6 
352.1 
2 036.2 
26.2 
63.2 
27.9 
Million US dollars 
1 436.8 
52.8 
o/o 
100.0 
13.9 
80.6 
o/o 
1.0 
2.5 
1.1 
100.0 
57.4 
42.6 
6.9 
34.4 
1.3 
* Source: Soviet National Institute for Studies on External Economic Relations attached to the State Committee on External 
Economic Relations of the Soviet Council of Ministers. 
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3. Distribution of joint ventures in the economy of the USSR 
Economic activity 
Overall ............................ . 
1. Fuel-energetics ..................... . 
2. Metallurgy ......................... . 
3. Wood chemics ..................... . 
4. Machine building .................. . 
5. Production of personal computers and 
software ........................... . 
6. Construction and production of build-
ing materials ....................... . 
7. Transport and communications ..... . 
8. Agro-industrial activities ............ . 
9. Social activities .................... . 
9 .1. Trade and catering ............. . 
9.2. Tourism, hotel and transport ser-
vices for the public ............ . 
9.3. Medicine, public health service .. 
9.4. National education ............ . 
9.5. Light industry ................. . 
9.6. Consumer goods ............... . 
9. 7. Film and video-production, concert 
activities ...................... . 
9.8. Printing industry .............. . 
10. Preproduction models, engineering 
consultancy and mediation services and 
staff education ..................... . 
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Number 
940 
5 
5 
47 
122 
60 
18 
41 
308 
58 
53 
46 
0 
31 
58 
37 
25 
287 
% 
100.0 
0.5 
0.5 
5.0 
13.0 
6.4 
1.9 
4.4 
32.8 
6.2 
5.6 
4.9 
0.0 
3.3 
6.2 
3.9 
2.7 
30.5 
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Amendment 1 
Co-ordinating committee for Multilateral Export Controls 
(Cocom) 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Rathbone and others 
Sth December 1989 
1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert " and for worldwide 
co-operation in controlling the supply of munitions and of industrial goods with military applications 
to terrorist groups ". 
Signed: Rathbone, Finsberg, Pontillon, Sarti 
I. See 12th sitting, 7th December 1989 (amendment amended and agreed to). 
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Document 1208 1st December 1989 
Action by the Presidential Committee 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee 
by Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Dialogue with the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council 
II. Visit by a delegation from the Supreme Soviet 
III. Preparation of the session 
IV. Reorganisation of the WEU building 
APPENDICES 
I. Exchange of correspondence between Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and Mr. Goerens, President of the 
Assembly 
II. Composition of the Supreme Soviet delegation to the WEU Assembly - I Oth-13th 
July 1989 
1. In the second half of 19 8 9, the Presi-
dential Committee's main activities were to 
ensure the continuity of the Assembly's political 
action, prepare the December session and 
ensure that the Assembly had the material and 
financial means to carry out its tasks. 
I. Dialogue with the Chairmanship-in-Office 
of the Council 
2. In political matters, the Presidential Com-
mittee was able to establish an in-depth dialogue 
with the Belgian presidency. It endeavoured to 
encourage the Council to strengthen WEU as an 
instrument for European consultations on 
security questions. 
3. Thus, at its meetings with the Chairman-
ship-in-Office, it underlined the value it atta-
ched to WEU studying the new conditions of 
European security following the progressive col-
lapse of the regimes set up by Stalin and to the 
Council examining the consequences to be 
drawn from future disarmament agreements and 
the introduction of European measures to verify 
these agreements. 
4. The decision to set up an institute to 
promote a European identity in security matters 
helped the reactivation of WEU. In this con-
nection, the Presidential Committee congratu-
lated the Belgian presidency for having obtained 
the Council's agreement to the creation of a 
WEU institute for security studies. 
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5. Last June, the Assembly asked the 
Council to conduct a joint study of the implica-
tions of the implementation of this plan. 
6. In his exchange of correspondence with 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 1, the 
President of the Assembly, clarifying certain 
points, stressed how necessary he believed it to 
be to ensure co-operation between the Assembly 
and the future institute. He made firm proposals 
to this end and asked that a representative of the 
Assembly be able to explain the views he had 
just expressed. The Presidential Committee 
hopes that a dialogue with the Council will allow 
harmonious relations to be established between 
the Assembly and an institute whose aims seem 
to converge with its own and whose physical 
proximity implies close co-operation between 
the two users of the same building. 
II. Visit by a delegation 
from the Supreme Soviet 
7. The Presidential Committee also imple-
mented Order 70, addressed to it by the 
Assembly, asking it to invite members of the 
Supreme Soviet to continue the exchanges of 
views that were started in Moscow in April 
1987. To this end, it arranged to receive a dele-
gation from the Supreme Soviet consisting of 
five parliamentarians led by Mr. Kravets, Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic 
I. See Appendix I. 
of Ukraine and Vice-Chairman of the Com-
mittee for International Affairs of the Supreme 
Soviet. of the Soviet Union. Admittedly, rather a 
long time had elapsed between the two invita-
tions, but the Soviets themselves had drawn the 
Assembly's attention to the value of inviting 
members of the new Supreme Soviet elected in 
spring 1989 by more democratic means in the 
context of perestroika. 
8. The members of the delegation which the 
Supreme Soviet sent to Paris 2 had a particularly 
open approach indeed and this enhanced the 
interest of the talks the Presidential Committee 
had with them after their meetings with the 
General Affairs Committee and the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments. The 
Soviet delegates listened attentively to the 
briefing on the democratic working methods of 
our Assembly and, under the heading of the 
common house, discussed our views on the 
foundations of European security. 
9. The leader of the Soviet delegation, for his 
part, underlined the importance of and need for 
perestroika in the Soviet Union, denied the exis-
tence of a Soviet threat and rejected the accu-
sat~on that his country was seeking to encourage 
a nft between Europeans and North Americans. 
He protested at WEU statements on the need to 
maintain nuclear deterrence, stressing that a 
technical incident might trigger off a disaster. 
Referring to Mr. Gorbachev's words, he pre-
dicted the end of the division of Europe thanks 
to a system of technical, cultural and economic 
co-operation agreements for the greatest benefit 
of the inhabitants of the common house. 
10. Winding up the meeting, the Soviet dele-
gation expressed its satisfaction with the talks 
that had just been held. It considered a con-
structive approach had prevailed over con-
flicting views and the talks should therefore be 
continued. The Presidential Committee agreed 
and it was decided to organise a further meeting 
in Moscow in 1990. Further to this, however, it 
was planned to hold regular meetings of parlia-
mentarians at least once a year alternately in 
Paris and Moscow, the chair being taken by the 
delegation of the host country. Discussions 
would be limited to the political and military 
aspects of European security to take account of 
the Assembly's concern to concentrate on these 
matters in accordance with Article IX of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. 
11. These talks on the conditions of peace, 
disarmament and co-operation in Europe have 
already been overtaken by recent events in the 
Central and Eastern European countries. The 
opening of the Berlin wall and political develop-
ments in the GDR and Czechoslovakia mean 
WEU must define new conditions for European 
2. List at Appendix II. 
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security and take immediate steps to sketch the 
outline of a new European order. Informed that 
a .motion on these matters was being prepared 
wtth a request for urgent procedure, the Presi-
dential Committee agreed on the interest of 
holding such a debate during the December 
session. 
Ill. Preparation of the session 
12. The agenda adopted by the Presidential 
Committee at an earlier meeting will thus be 
amended and completed by the Assembly. 
13. Conversely, it is with regret that the com-
mittee took note of requests to withdraw from 
the agenda reports attributed to committees. 
This was the case for the report by the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
on the future of low flying and the report by the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions on developments in 
command, control, communications and intelli-
gence. 
14. Since the agenda of a session forms a bal-
anced whole, the President of the Assembly has 
informed your Rapporteur that he proposes to 
ask the committees to ensure that they submit 
realistic proposals to the Presidential Com-
mittee when the agenda of the subsequent 
session is drawn up. For the debates to be 
coherent, the committees must complete their 
work within the prescribed time-limits, i.e. at 
least three weeks before the session opens. 
15. In preparing for the session, the Presi-
dential Committee also examined the question 
of parliamentary observers since Greece and 
Turkey's interest in WEU had to be taken into 
consideration. It will be recalled that, while 
believing their wish to accede was premature, 
the Council decided to allow privileged 
treatment for these two countries, which are 
inf?rmed of the results of its discussions through 
thetr ambassadors to the country exercising the 
presidency. The Presidential Committee, for its 
part, has decided to increase the number of 
members of the Greek and Turkish delegations 
of_parliamentary observers in proportion to the 
number of members of their parliamentary dele-
gations to the Council of Europe: Greece, which 
has seven representatives to, the Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, will have four to the WEU 
Assembly and Turkey, which has twelve in 
Strasbourg, will have seven in Paris. 
16. The Presidential Committee was con-
cerned at certain parliaments' delay in ratifying 
the protocols of accession of Portugal and Spain 
to the modified Brussels 1freaty. It therefore 
instructed the President of the Assembly to 
approach the countries concerned to endeavour 
to ensure that the enlargement of WEU was 
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completed before the December session. Unfor-
tunately, the Assembly has to note that, more 
than a year after the Council's decision to 
enlarge WEU, the parliamentary ratification 
process has still not been completed. However, 
it is to be hoped that it will be before the end of 
the year. 
17. In the light of the forecasts communicated 
to it by the Council and in view of time-limits 
which cannot be reduced, however, the 
Assembly secretariat had to make the necessary 
arrangements to allow the Portuguese and 
Spanish parliamentarians to speak in their own 
languages. A special effort has been made to 
recruit, for the first time, not only interpreters 
capable of working in the organisation's two new 
languages but also staff capable of recording 
speeches in those languages. 
18. Since the Assembly's premises are not yet 
adapted to these new working conditions, transi-
tional measures have had to be taken for the 
December session. Thus, it was decided to ask 
the Council of Europe to allow the Assembly, on 
an exceptional basis, to use a large room in its 
avenue Kleber premises. The Presidential Com-
mittee wishes to thank the Secretary-General of 
the Council of Europe, Mrs. Lalumiere, for 
kindly acceding to our request. 
19. The Presidential Committee is therefore 
happy to be able to allow the delegations of Por-
tuguese and Spanish observers to benefit here 
and now from the facilities provided for in the 
Rules of Procedure for full members. At the next 
session, we expect to have the pleasure of 
extending an official welcome to the Portuguese 
and Spanish Delegations with full rights. 
IV. Reorganisation of the WEU building 
20. The Presidential Committee's main admi-
nistrative concern was to reorganise the 
Assembly's premises as soon as possible to allow 
it to hold its sessions and committee meetings in 
accordance with the requirements of the Rules 
of Procedure. The draft supplementary budget 
transmitted to the Council in January therefore 
included detailed proposals, drawn up on the 
basis of an architect's study, for work to be 
undertaken to reorganise the building. These 
proposals were not agreed to by the Council, 
which considered that the work proposed went 
further than the strict requirements of the 
enlargement of WEU. New and less costly pro-
posals were therefore submitted to the Council 
but the latter insisted on even larger reductions. 
It then had another architect conduct a further 
study for comparative purposes. Since it was not 
satisfied with the result of the study it had asked 
for, the Council finally agreed to the study sub-
mitted by the Assembly, subject to its reduc-
tions. 
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21. On completion of this preliminary work, 
the Council asked the Assembly to submit a new 
draft supplementary budget giving only the 
details of expenditure necessary for enlarging 
the organisation, excluding all other consi-
derations. When revising its draft, the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
not only updated estimates for reorganising the 
premises but also those relating to other budget 
heads. Indeed, because of the delay in the pro-
cedure for ratifying the convention of accession, 
some of the elements taken as a basis for esti-
mates under these heads had changed. 
22. It should be stressed that the draft supple-
mentary budget was approved by the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration only 
subject to a reservation about the inadequacy of 
the sums foreseen for reorganising the As-
sembly's premises. The Presidential Committee 
in turn approved this document only in the light 
of the reservation expressed by that 
committee.The draft supplementary budget was 
therefore transmitted to the Council with a spe-
cific reference to this reservation. 
23. By approving the draft supplementary 
budget submitted to it, with the amendments 
contained in document BA (89) 11 Revised, at 
its meeting on 28th November, the Council 
appears to have expressed at least its partial 
agreement with the Assembly. It endorsed the 
remark by the Council's financial experts on the 
Budget and Organisation Committee that it was 
important to attribute sufficiently well-equipped 
and spacious offices to the Portuguese and 
Spanish parliamentary delegations. The 
reduction in sums earmarked for reorganising 
the building had, indeed, led to a reduction in 
the space to be used by the Assembly since trans-
ferring the documents reproduction service to 
the basement had not been authorised. Fur-
thermore, the Council asked that an office be 
reserved for the Secretary-General on the second 
floor of the building which had been attributed 
to the Assembly. Finally, by insisting that the 
work on the second floor be limited to the instal-
lation of a few communicating doors between 
offices, the Council achieved substantial 
savings, but did not allow the same amount of 
floor space to be given to delegations with equal 
numbers of members. 
24. The Presidential Committee's action in 
regard to the preparation of the revised supple-
mentary budget is now submitted to the 
Assembly for ratification in accordance with 
Rule 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure. 
25. As soon as the preparatory stage of the 
plan was started, a problem of responsibilities 
arose because the Council considered, in view of 
its responsibility for the WEU building, that the 
President of the Assembly would have to submit 
to it for prior approval all administrative acts 
relating to the execution of the work, whereas 
the Presidential Committee considered this to 
be essentially the responsibility of the President 
of the Assembly in accordance with the principle 
of the Assembly's autonomy in managing its 
budget, since the work was included in its sup-
plementary budget at the request of the Council 
itself. Budgetary autonomy seemed indeed to be 
the basis of the Assembly's political indepen-
dence and, as such, an essential condition for 
carrying out its tasks. A compromise solution 
now makes the Assembly the contracting 
authority for the reorganisation of the building, 
the agreement of the· Council or the Chairman-
ship-in-Office being sought for certain specific 
acts. 
26. Because of the delay in approving the plan 
for reorganising the Assembly's premises, it will 
not be possible for work to start until after the 
December session. It is therefore not at all 
certain that it will be completed by 15th May 
1990 as planned. The Presidential Committee 
has therefore asked that the budget for the 
financial year 1990 include the appropriations 
necessary to allow the Assembly to hold its 
spring session away from the seat of the 
Assembly. However, since it is impossible for 
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the Presidential Committee to take a final 
decision at present in view of the uncertainty 
still prevailing about the date of the effective 
enlargement of WEU and the date on which 
work will be completed, the credits relating to a 
session away from the seat have been frozen, fol-
lowing an agreement between the Council and 
the Assembly, pending a decision by the Presi-
dential Committee, probably at the beginning of 
next year. 
27. On 29th November 1989, the Council 
approved, with amendments, the draft budget 
for the financial year 1990. This budget will be 
examined by the Assembly at the sitting indi-
cated in the order of business. 
28. On the whole, in the second half of this 
year the Presidential Committee has had to take 
many steps linked with the present period of 
enlargement and restructuring of WEU. It is to 
be hoped that the solution of the problems now 
pending will allow the Presidential Committee 
to concentrate in future on the deepening of its 
political dialogue with the Council. Such a dia-
logue will be particularly necessary at this new 
juncture in Europe, which imposes increased 
responsibilities on WEU. 
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APPENDIX I 
Letter from Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council of WEU, 
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly 
APPENDIX I 
16th October 1989 
I was delighted with our talk on 14th September, which gave us an opportunity to review 
problems facing WEU, be it in the activities of the ministerial organs or of the Assembly. I am gratified 
to note that we hold parallel views on the development of WEU as an organisation and its place in the 
building of Europe. 
Like you, I attach the greatest importance to close, confident co-operation between the Council 
and the Assembly. 
On the problems raised in your letter of 25th September relating to the enlargement of WEU and 
the consequent necessary transformations in the Assembly premises, I can but confirm that it is the 
presidency's wish that the organisation be able to work as soon as possible in the best conditions. The 
Assembly, as a service using the premises, must clearly have a say in the implementation of the work, 
the Council obviously being concerned that this should be done in accordance with the global budget 
adopted for this purpose. The matter was discussed by the Permanent Council on 2nd October. The 
Secretary-General will contact you to determine procedure allowing the work to be carried out flexibly 
and rapidly to the satisfaction of all concerned. 
Like you, I hope it will be possible to decide at the ministerial meeting on 13th November to 
create in WEU a European institute for advanced security studies with its seat in Paris subject to deci-
sions that will have to be taken at the appropriate time on the seat of the ministerial organs, in the 
prospect of the building of Europe. 
I think we are very broadly in agreement on the aims and tasks that should be attributed to such 
an institute. Similarly, I bear in mind the Assembly's interest in such a project insofar as it will have to 
share premises with the institute which may be instructed to conduct studies or other work connected 
with that of the Assembly. 
As you know, the presidency is endeavouring, not without difficulty, to draw up a draft decision 
likely to obtain the approval of all parties. I believe our efforts will bear fruit in the few weeks still sepa-
rating us from the ministerial meeting. 
The presidency will receive with interest any suggestions you wish to make to it on this delicate 
matter and will endeavour to ensure that they are taken into account whenever possible. 
The idea of inviting a representative of the Assembly to inform the institutional group of the 
Assembly's views may raise certain problems insofar as this is a technical body dependent on the 
Council. However, I will inform the Permanent Council of the content of the communication you 
intend to make to me on this subject. 
I am sure we shall have an opportunity to pursue this dialogue, to which I attach great value, at 
the meeting with the Presidential Committee on 17th October. 
Mr. Charles GoERENS, 
President of the Assembly, 
Western European Union 
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17th October 1989 
Further to my letter of 25th September 1989, I have the honour to enclose a note setting out the 
Presidential Committee's views on relations between the WEU Assembly and the Etlropean institution 
now being set up. 
I should be very grateful if you would bring this note to the attention of the Council and allow a 
representative of the Assembly to be heard when it is examined. 
H.E. Mr. Mark EYSKENS, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, 
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council of Ministers, 
2, rue des Quatre-Bras, 
1000 Brussels. 
Note on relations between the WEU Assembly 
and the European institute 
Charles GoERENS 
17th October 1989 
In Recommendation 467, the Assembly indicated the value it attaches to the early creation of an 
institute for advanced security studies under senior officials and with the wide degree of independence 
necessary for accomplishing its tasks. This autonomy does not seem incompatible with the status of 
" subsidiary body of the Council " in view of the precedents created by Protocol No. IV relating to the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Council decision of 7th May 19 55 creating the Standing 
Armaments Committee. 
However, information available to the Assembly makes it wonder how far the plan now being 
worked out by the Council corresponds to the views it expressed. 
However this may be, the Presidential Committee wishes to hold a dialogue with the Council on 
this subject to which it attaches particular importance and take part in the definition of principles 
which should govern the close relations that the Assembly considers should be established with the 
institute. 
The committee first notes that the Assembly will be concerned by the institute's work in gath-
ering information. This task will necessarily imply the creation of a data bank that 
1
the Assembly should 
be able to use for the preparation of the reports it attributes to its committees. Above all, however, the 
institute's exercise of its task of promoting a European security identity among public opinion in 
member countries may raise problems of co-ordination with Assembly action. The Assembly therefore 
wishes to take part in guiding the institute's work in this area and consider with the Council the condi-
tions for such participation. 
Finally, since the Assembly and the institute will be accommodated in the same building, there 
will have to be administrative co-operation in managing services of joint interest. 
Conditions for such co-operation will have to be worked out with due respect for the principle 
that the services of the Assembly come under its authority alone. The Assembly believes that its 
political independence, essential to the exercise of its twofold role of political im~tus and supervision, 
implies that it have full responsibility for running all the services provided by its secretariat. 
The conditions for harmonious co-operation can be defined within the framework of these prin-
ciples. 
The Assembly's views on its administrative co-operation with the institute ~re set out hereafter. 
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Administrative co-operation between the Assembly and the institute 
Since the Assembly and the institute are to be accommodated in the same building, there will 
have to be administrative co-operation between them in running the following services: 
-security; 
- reproduction of documents; 
- documentation; 
- managing the building; 
- liaison with the French authorities. 
There should be a more rational sharing of responsibilities in this connection and a management 
committee should be set up composed of representatives of the Assembly and the institute, responsible 
for settling problems linked with the use of services of joint interest. 
There are two aspects to security: 
- security of persons; 
- security of classified documents. 
1. Security 
At present, responsibility for security as a whole is incumbent upon a service of the Paris minis-
terial organs which give priority to the protection of secret documents. The Assembly for its part has to 
take the necessary steps to ensure the security of parliamentarians at Assembly sessions and committee 
meetings. 
Responsibility for the security of persons should be incumbent upon the Assembly while the 
institute would ensure the security of its classified information. 
Problems raised by the security of persons have increased in magnitude due to the threat of ter-
rorism, while the enlargement of WEU has increased the number of parliamentarians exposed to this 
danger. The Assembly is intent on its officials being fully responsible for solutions to its own problems. 
The Assembly official responsible for security should therefore be empowered to take all necessary 
steps to ensure the security of persons, which implies having authority over the security guards. 
It should be recalled that, in its supplementary budget for 1989, the Assembly already included 
the estimates necessary for installing diverse equipment in the entrance hall to ensure effective control 
over the movement of persons and the introduction of miscellaneous objects into the security area. 
2. Reproduction of documents 
The Assembly, which already has a large documents reproduction service, is studying the possi-
bility of an installation with a higher performance to cope with the increase in its work linked with the 
reactivation and enlargement of WEU. While remaining under the responsibility of the Assembly, this 
service might be made available to the institute, bearing in mind that at certain times the reproduction 
of Assembly documents has to be effected very urgently and must be given priority. 
3. Documentation 
The Assembly had thought of establishing a more advanced, computerised documentation 
service. 
However, because of the nature of its work, the institute will have to set up a large documen-
tation service including a data bank and a well-stocked library. It might allow the Office of the Clerk to 
make use of its documentation and library which would mean the Assembly would not have to make 
what would necessarily be a costly effort in terms of both staff and finance. 
The libraries of the institute and the Assembly might be merged, the Assembly allocating its 
library estimates to the institute in exchange for free access to the latter's library. 
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4. General services 
To date, these services have been run by the administrative service of the WEU ministerial 
organs in Paris which had the largest number of staff and occupied two-thirds of the building. 
However, without even counting the large number of temporary staff, theve will certainly be 
more staff in the Assembly secretariat than in that of the institute and they will occupy most of the 
space. 
It should also be emphasised that the conference rooms are used mainly by the Assembly, which 
included in its supplementary budget for 1989 estimates for building two large rooms, each with fifty 
seats and seven interpretation booths. It would be particularly rational for the Assembly to be made 
responsible for their upkeep and programming their use, since the disparity between parliamentary 
time-tables in member countries and the many considerations that will have to be borne in mind when 
it fixes the dates of its meetings make its own programming delicate. 
The same is true of the restaurant which will have to meet the requirements of clients consisting 
mainly of parliamentarians and permanent or temporary members of the Office of the Clerk. 
Finally, the Office of the Clerk seems to be the main user of the telephone. 
For all these reasons, responsibility for managing the building and all the abovementioned ser-
vices should be given to the Assembly secretariat, which would ensure that the institute's needs were 
met. 
Transferring these services would obviously imply transferring posts with dlue respect for their 
holders' interests. 
5. Liaison with the French authorities 
Since the majority of members of the WEU staff depend on the Assembly, it would be normal for 
duties such as the issue of official residence cards, the distribution of petrol coupons, etc., to be 
attributed to an official of the Office of the Clerk. If there are legal obstacles to transferring these 
duties, the Assembly's Head of Administration should be able, through the management committee, to 
share in running this service. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Composition of the Supreme Soviet delegation to the WEU Assembly 
1Oth-13th July 1989 
Mr. Vladimir KRA VETS 
Vice-President of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for International Affairs 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Ukraine 
Mr. Oleg BOGOMOLOV 
Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for Economic Reforms 
Director of the Economics Institute of the World Socialist System of the USSR Academy of 
Sciences 
Mr. Fedor BOURLATSKI 
Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for International Affairs 
Political observer of the Literary Gazette 
Mr. Vladimir LOBOV 
Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for International Affairs 
First Deputy Commander of headquarters of the armed forces of the USSR 
Accompanied by: 
Mr.lvan KOROSTIOLEV 
Charge de mission at the Department for International Relations of the secretariat of the 
Supreme Soviet 
Secretary of the delegation 
Mr. Vladimir OROKHOVSKI 
Section head at the Department for Co-operation and Security in Europe 
Delegation counsellor 
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Written questions 282 to 284 and replies of the Council 
QUESTION 282 
put to the Council by Mr. Caro 
on 20th September 1989 
1. What services will the WEU ministerial 
organs provide to ensure the continuity of the 
various European sessions for advanced defence 
studies organised by specialised institutes in the 
member countries and to assist the association 
of alumni set up at the close of the first session 
in Paris in November 1988, in view of the fact 
that the Council specified in the second part of 
its thirty-fourth annual report that " this associ-
ation would be under the aegis of, and receive 
material support from, WEU " ? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 7th November 1989 
1. The WEU ministerial organs support the 
association of alumni, set up in November 1988 
at the first European session for advanced 
defence studies, by providing the association's 
secretariat with practical assistance on an ad hoc 
basis, for example, with the preparation of 
agendas, summary records and correspondence 
with members. On 21st April 1989, the associ-
ation held a meeting of its delegates in the WEU 
building in Paris, at which the ministerial organs 
and the Office of the Clerk were represented. 
2. If the association develops, as is hoped, 
following the second European session for 
advanced defence studies, it will no doubt direct 
its activities towards a consideration of defence 
programmes and problems in the WEU member 
states, and to providing the alumni with the rel-
evant detailed information. Other forms of 
support could then be considered in conjunction 
with the leaders of the association. 
3. The ministerial organs are, in any case, 
keen to ensure the continuity of the European 
sessions whilst respecting each host country's 
preferences with regard to the duration of activ-
ities, the topics covered, and the publicity 
required. 
QUESTION 283 
put to the Council by Mr. Pecriaux 
In accordance with Assembly Recommen-
dation 467, the Council seems determined to 
put an end to the existence of the WEU 
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specialised agencies at the end of 1989 and to set 
up a European institute for strategic studies. 
1. In view of that institute's specific staff 
requirements, it seems probable that there will 
be no place for at least some of the officials 
employed by the agencies. Can the Council say 
how many officials employed by the agencies 
will be offered posts in the institute? 
2. Will the staff of the agencies having con-
tracts of indefinite duration have these contracts 
maintained by the institute or will they have to 
accept fixed-term contracts? In the latter case, 
how will they be compensated for the deterio-
ration in their status decided upon unilaterally 
by the Council? 
3. In the case of staff with indefinite con-
tracts or whose contracts are terminated prema-
turely, will the Council take as a basis the prece-
dents created when the EurQpean Communities 
were enlarged or when ESA replaced ELDO and 
ESRO in fixing accompanying measures 
adapted to the implementation of a highly 
political collective measurtt which cannot be 
assimilated to the termination of individual con-
tracts provided for in the roles of procedure of 
the co-ordinated European organisations? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 28th November 1989 
1. At its ministerial meeting on 13th 
November 1989 in Brussels, the Council 
decided to set up a " WEU institute for security 
studies ". The institute will be housed in the 
organisation's building in Paris. The aim is that 
it should be operational with effect from 1st July 
1990. Apart from the director, who should be 
appointed by 1st February at the latest, the 
institute will have a team of five permanent 
experts. 
At the same time, the Council decided to 
wind up the Paris-based Agencies for Security 
Questions 1 and the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee. The Council will take the necessary mea-
sures to terminate the contracts of staff currently 
employed by those bodies, in accordance with 
the legal provisions in force. 
The director of the institute will be 
appointed by the Council. Under the Council's 
supervision, he will recruit the other A-grade 
staff. 
I. Excluding the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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The candidatures of those staff currently 
serving in the agencies and wishing to be 
recruited by the institute will be considered by 
the director having regard to the requirements 
and particular nature of the duties to be carried 
out. Priority consideration will be given to the 
merits and aptitude of those persons. 
The Council is fully aware of the human 
dimension of the problem created and will do 
everything it can to prevent personal hardship to 
the staff members concerned. With regard to 
those staff who are not re-engaged, the WEU 
Staff Rules will apply, in particular Annex VI 
concerning regulations on the indemnity for loss 
of job. 
The Council has already offered B and 
C-grade staff members the option of voluntary 
resignation with loss-of-job indemnity. To date, 
seven staff members have taken up this offer. 
QUESTION 284 
put to the Council by Mr. De Decker 
Can the Council indicate: 
- how the arms controls provided for in 
the modified Brussels Treaty that were 
not abolished in 1985 will be applied, 
in particular control of the non-
production of chemical weapons; 
- how the secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committees and its groups 
and working sub-groups will be 
assured, 
when an institute for defence studies replaces 
the present WEU Agency? 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 7th November 1989 
1. Under the Rome declaration, the controls 
on conventional armaments which the modified 
Brussels Treaty assigned to the ACA were, in 
accordance with Article V of Protocol No. Ill, 
entirely lifted with effect from 1st January 1986. 
In the same declaration, ministers decided that 
the " commitments and controls concerning 
ABC weapons would be maintained at the 
existing levels and in accordance with the pro-
cedure agreed up to the present time ". 
Since the ACA was established by the 
treaty, its fate can be decided only in the context 
of a review of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. The Standing Armaments Committee and 
its international secretariat were set up by a 
Council decision of 7th May 1955. 
In accordance with a decision of the Min-
isterial Council in Bonn, the international secre-
tariat was abolished on 23rd April 1985. 
In the context of the possible abolition of 
the Agencies for Security Questions, the Council 
would necessarily be called upon to decide on 
the fate of the SAC. 
Whatever happens, any decision con-
cerning the SAC will in no way prevent WEU 
from addressing, in accordance with the appro-
priate procedures, questions of co-operation 
between the member countries in the field of 
armaments. 
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INFORMATION LETTER 
from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU 
on the activities of the ministerial organs 
(mid-September- mid-November 1989) 
27th November 1989 
London, 23rd November 1989 
Dear President, 
I am sending you this eighth information letter in the aftermath of the Brussels Ministerial 
Council and with a view to your Assembly's forthcoming debates during the second part of its thirty-
fifth ordinary session. It therefore concerns the activities ofthe ministerial organs from mid-September 
until 14th November. 
* 
* * 
Europe has embarked upon a new phase in its history, a phase characterised not only by the end 
of armed conflict and the renunciation of the use of force but also by an extraordinary awakening of the 
people living between the Elbe and the Urals. The fundamental principles laid down in the Helsinki 
Final Act spelt the break-up of totalitarianism and the destruction of the barriers erected in the heart of 
Europe. Today, we are seeing them disintegrate under pressure from the people. Only recently, Poland 
and Hungary seemed a fragile avant-garde. Today, we are wondering how much longer Czechoslovakia 
and Romania can resist the tide of freedom. 
The remarkable thing about this irresistible and no doubt irreversible movement - since it 
springs from the very depths of oppressed societies- is its peaceful nature. But we must not be blind to 
the dangers inherent in both the latent risks of confrontation between the countries of Eastern Europe 
and the extremely high social cost of the necessarily slow transition of a closed and interventionist eco-
nomic system to an open market economy. Whereas, after the war, we witnessed several examples of 
the transition of capitalism to Marxist socialism, we have so far had no experience of the transition -
no doubt full of pitfalls - in the reverse direction. 
There is an urgent need to give political and economic endorsement to Western Europe's active 
solidarity and this means progressing towards European union. It would be a mistake to mark time and 
opt for a " wait-and-see " policy just when the attraction of the successes of the European construction 
process is having such a tangible liberating effect. We are gathering the fruits of forty years of perse-
verance in the defence of freedom and of firmness in dissuading all attempts at aggression. 
WEU is at the hub of this Europe around which are organised the concentric circles of European 
political co-operation, the European economic institutions (EC and EFT A), the European security 
organisations (Eurogroup and IEPG) and, lastly, the Council of Europe. It is important to maintain 
their homogeneity and extend their activity. 
The member states of WEU have just reaffirmed their willingness to widen the process of joint 
strategic thinking. Priority has been given to an assessment of the likely repercussions on European 
security of the future CFE treaty, particularly as regards the role and structure of the nuclear deterrent, 
the arrangements for defence at the borders and the stationing of forces on the territory of other WEU 
member states. 
The happy prospect of a cut in force levels and armaments and the removal of asymmetries must 
not cause us to be carried away nor prompt us to take unilateral and premature measures. The Soviet 
military machine will no doubt make up for any loss of numerical strength by increased power and 
effectiveness. Whatever happens, the Soviet Union will remain a major military power. Its domestic 
difficulties may block the progress of perestroika. The reforms desired by the leadership may tomorrow 
Mr. Charles GOERENS, 
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be stopped by the leadership. Consequently, an assessment of the threat is not an outmoded and useless 
exercise for WEU. Defence co-operation has lost nothing of its topicality and urgency. At the same 
time, we are witnessing the emergence of a new mission for our security forces, namely the verification 
of arms control agreements and the implementation of confidence-building measures. That will require 
us to devise new forms of co-operation, whether in relation to on-site inspections or to space-based 
observation. 
In all these areas, WEU - Assembly and Council - will in the coming months have to play a 
pivotal role in the service of European security. 
* 
* * 
Over the last two months, the activities of the Permanent Council and its working groups have 
been geared principally to the completion of the prescribed reports with a view to the Enlarged Council 
on 30th October and the Ministerial Council in Brussels. The Permanent Council met three times, on 
20th September, 25th October and 8th November respectively. 
The Special Working Group met on 24th August, 12th September and 6th October. On 5th and 
20th October, joint meetings were held with the Defence Representatives Group (DRG). Discussions 
focused on the preparation of the ministerial debate on topical questions. Both groups carried on their 
assessment of European security requirements in the period 1992-199 5 and considered how this 
subject should be addressed in order to allow ministers to have an informed discussion and to decide 
on further work in that area. Possible co-operation between member countries on verification of a CFE 
agreement was also discussed with a view to identifying specific areas for such co-operation. The DRG 
finalised its report on training. 
As regards the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space, its work has progressed remarkably quickly since, by 
its third meeting on 28th July, the interim report for ministers was already in its final states of compi-
lation and drafting. The Belgian presidency, with the help of the Secretariat, had submitted a draft 
which was discussed on 4th September and consequently reworked. A new draft was circulated on 14th 
September together with a draft executive summary. These two documents were reviewed by the sub-
group on 29th September and then finalised by WEUCOM, consensus having been reached on the 
report's concluding chapter. The Enlarged Council was therefore able to approve the report and 
summary without any difficulty. 
At its meeting on 20th October, the Mediterranean Sub-Group continued its exchange of infor-
mation on the evolution of the situation in the Balkans, the Maghreb and Cyprus. It also considered a 
joint report regarding naval deployments in the Mediterranean which underlines the need for 
European countries to carry on shouldering their responsibilities in the Mediterranean basin with ade-
quate forces to play an active peace-time role in the prevention and, if the need arises, management of 
local crises. 
At its meeting on 12th September 1989, the Special Working Group agreed to ask the 
Meditarranean Sub-Group to reflect on the future direction of its work so that it might focus more 
sharply on the assessment, from a politico-military point of view, of the current and potential threats to 
the security interests of WEU member countries in the region. 
The group agreed that its terms of reference were geographically limited to the Mediterranean, 
but that this did not preclude other areas where the politico-military stakes affected the security of the 
riparian states. Thus, the group will continue its assessment of regional situations and, where appro-
priate, its exchanges of information on bilateral relations but it will also from now on report on wider 
politico-military problems affecting European security. A number of topics are being considered for 
1990. 
At its meetings on 18th September and 19th October, the Institutional Working Group con-
tinued its work on finalising the draft ministerial decision concerning the setting-up of a WEU 
institute. The Enlarged Council was able to resolve the question of the director's grade and to agree on 
what the institute should be called. It should be pointed out that all the discussions, which culminated 
in a draft ministerial decision satisfactory to all the delegations, took place in an excellent atmosphere 
which reflected member states' willingness to arrive at a positive solution to the benefit of the 
organisation as a whole and to that of its future development. 
* 
* * 
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Let me now turn to the direct relations between the Council and your Assembly during the same 
period. 
For the record, I should mention the now traditional meeting between the Council presidency 
and your Presidential Committee prior to the Ministerial Council, which took plaae in Brussels at the 
Palais d'Egmont on Tuesday, 17th October. 
At this meeting, Mr. Mark Eyskens, Belgian Minister for External Relations and Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, stressed that we were at a turning point in East-West relations and as regards the 
problems of the relationships between WEU and the other elements of the European construction 
process. 
The prospect of a CFE treaty being signed raises the problem of a new approach to sharing roles 
and responsibilities in implementing the reductions and also the problem of possible verification pro-
cedures. 
The new course of East-West relations throws into sharper relief the emergence of a common 
foreign policy for the Twelve, Community enlargement and the recognition of the, security dimension 
in this context. In the medium term, WED's future may depend on these developments, requiring 
in-depth reflection on the part of the Council and the Assembly. 
The Belgian Defence Minister, Mr. Coeme, has made it clear that the Belgian General Defence 
Staff had organised itself in such a way as to be able to follow each specific problem raised within 
WEU. 
Mr. Coeme drew a number of conclusions from his recent trip to the United States which are of 
special interest for WEU as a whole. In particular, he mentioned the fact that WEU was relatively 
unknown in the new administration; its reticence about certain military co-operation projects between 
Europeans within NATO (for example, an air-mobile division); the desire to promote specialisation 
among alliance members in the implementation of the future CFE treaty; lastly, t:be continuation of a 
very lively debate on burden-sharing involving Japan and Korea as well as Europe, in an economic 
climate increasingly conducive to substantial cuts in defence spending. These subjects will no doubt 
capture the attention of WEU parliamentarians. 
The first part of the Council's thirty-fifth annual report to the Assembly was sent to you on lOth 
October so that it was available to the General Affairs Committee before its meeting on 26th October 
to prepare for the forthcoming Assembly session. The Council was also able to send all but two of its 
replies to the recommendations adopted in June. It was in fact considered preferable, as regards the 
institute and new technologies, to give you a reply which took account of the decisions of the Minis-
terial Council. The same applies to Written Question 283 on staff of the Paris ministerial organs. 
On 1st November, I had the privilege of welcoming at the Secretariat 14 members of the United 
Kingdom Delegation to your Assembly, led by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. We reviewed progress in the 
political work programme of the ministerial organs and discussed the new pn!)spects for Europe's 
security in the light of the major transformation taking place in the European political landscape. The 
questions put to me allowed me to clarify the Council's positions specifically with regard to the 
problems of adapting the Paris building to meet the new requirements created by enlargement and to 
institutional problems. I shall not dwell on these matters since, on all these points, we have made sub-
stantial progress as a result of the decisions reached by the Ministerial Council. 
May I merely emphasise that I and the Secretariat are at the disposal of national parliamentary 
delegations and your Assembly's committees should any of them wish to come to London to be briefed 
on our work and to discuss the problems of WEU. I am of course also prepared to visit national parlia-
ments to meet with WEU parliamentarians. 
* 
* * 
The WEU Ministerial Council took on special significance given the historic events which had 
taken place the previous week. 
Consequently, the discussion of topical questions and East-West relations was much more 
extensive than usual. 
Ministers heard a statement by Mr. Genscher given on behalf of the Govemment of the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the latest developments in Eastern Europe, particularly those affecting 
Poland and the GDR. 
They unanimously stressed the absolute necessity to support the development of the reforms 
under way. They also recalled that the Harmel doctrine, which provided for the establishment of a 
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peaceful and secure order in Europe, was still valid, the foundations having been subsequently laid by 
the Helsinki Final Act. They were pleased to see that the ideas originally put forward by the govern-
ments of Western Europe now had a real prospect of becoming a reality. Their aim was to achieve suc-
cessive and controlled stages of disarmament in a balanced and stable atmosphere. 
They stressed the need to pursue and implement the CSCE process and to insist that free elec-
tions be held as a prerequisite for the advent of pluralist democracies. 
They stressed their commitment to the pursuit of European integration and in particular to the 
implementation of the Single European Act. 
They also stressed the need to maintain a system of deterrence within the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance, having regard to the achievements of the arms control negotiations. 
Ministers believed that there was an urgent need to help and encourage the countries of Eastern 
Europe which were embarking on the road to democracy by means of a varied package of economic aid 
geared to the specific situation of each country, preferably within the Community framework. 
Ministers also exchanged views on the European security environment in the period 
1991-95. 
Whilst emphasising the undeniable benefits of a CFE agreement, they noted that the residual 
capability in the East following the reductions would continue to pose a potential military threat. 
Ministers concluded that, against a background of rapid political change, the reforms in the East 
had to be supported in any event and the stability of the broad strategic balance maintained. They con-
sidered that an assessment of the likely security environment of Western Europe in the period 1991-95 
would be an important topic for discussion at future meetings. 
Ministers instructed the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group to 
conduct a comprehensive and in-depth study on the basis of the issues raised during their meeting and 
of the preliminary work done by both groups. 
They requested that a report be prepared for their next meeting in spring 1990. 
This subject will therefore dominate consultations between WEU member states in the months 
to come. Since, first and foremost, it is Europe's security environment which is changing so rapidly, it 
is vital that a European organisation should take the true measure of these changes and make recom-
mendations on how to respond. Given that WEU is not involved in the day-to-day decisions about 
defence and the conduct of the current negotiations aimed at arms reductions, taking a medium- and 
long-term view was precisely what it should be doing with the help of defence experts and diplomats. 
Ministers mandated the Defence Representatives Group and the Special Working Group to 
draw up a report on the conditions needed to maintain an undiminished level of security during the 
transition period pending the full implementation of a CFE treaty. 
The Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group are to present joint pro-
posals, for the next ministerial meeting, on the practical arrangements for co-operation between the 
WEU member countries in order to ensure their optimum participation in the process of verifying the 
implementation of a CFE treaty. These proposals might, for example, include the co-ordination of veri-
fication activities such as those of inspection teams or even co-operation in the training of inspectors. 
Ministers discussed an interim report prepared by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space on the 
potential for security-related co-operation between WEU member states in the field of space tech-
nology, a field in which the potential at their disposal had not been exploited. 
They agreed that satellite observation was of interest to Europe mainly in the field of verification 
of arms control agreements, and for monitoring crises with security implications and also environ-
mental hazards. It could offer greater security for member states and the alliance as a whole, an 
increase in Europe's contribution to, and expertise in, the verification of arms control agreements and 
an enhancement of European industrial and technological capabilities. 
Ministers agreed that joint exploration of the potential for European security-related 
co-operation in the space field was important, and they tasked the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to study 
the concrete possibilities for co-operation as regards an analysis of the operational requirements, the 
development, setting up and operation of a space-based observation satellite system and the associated 
costs, and also the data accessible by means of existing or planned systems. This second phase of more 
technical studies would provide the basis for a possible decision to develop and launch a future satellite 
observation system. 
Ministers discussed a report on how best to promote further co-operation with a view to main-
taining effective and realistic training while keeping the associated nuisance resulting from exercises 
and manoeuvres to a minimum. 
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They recognised that proper training was essential for the credibility ofthe armed forces and that 
there was no perfect substitute for exercises in open terrain. They noted, however, that there was pos-
sible scope for changing the present mix of field training and other exercises, in· the light of studies 
under way, and by increasing the use of simulators. Ministers also agreed that member states should 
continue to share information on national developments in these areas. 
Ministers welcomed the exchange of information which had taken place between member states 
on their training facilities and exchange programmes, and they agreed that the widest possible take-up 
of opportunities for bi- and multilateral co-operation in these fields should be encouraged. 
Ministers agreed that the report should be kept up to date. 
Since 1987, the Mediterranean Sub-Group has focused its work on the assessment of regional sit-
uations which posed a potential threat to the security interests of WEU member states. I gave an oral 
report on the work of the sub-group and ministers confirmed the group's original mandate and 
endorsed the new orientation as defined in October. 
Ministers decided to set up a WEU institute for security studies which would be located in Paris 
in the organisation's premises. The institute has been set up in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 
2, of the modified Brussels Treaty and with the conclusions on institutional questions reached by min-
isters in The Hague on 27th October 1987 and 19th April 1988 respectively. This decision meets the 
wish to strengthen the organisation's effectiveness and impact on the identification of European 
security interests by providing it with a capacity to study, and provide documentation on, all questions 
concerning European security. 
Essentially, the role of the institute will be to promote a European security identity and to assist 
the organisation in implementing the provisions of the Hague platform. 
The institute's five main tasks are as follows: 
(a) to carry out research, principally for the Council, calling on national experts if necessary and 
in consultation with the Secretariat-General; this research will be carri~d out independently 
and objectively; 
(b) to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states to promote a greater 
awareness of European security issues and, specifically, to organise courses and seminars to 
that end; 
(c) in collaboration with existing institutes, to organise meetings with institutes in countries not 
belonging to Western Europe, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact countries; 
(d) to establish and keep up to date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence 
efforts of the WEU member countries and for studies relating to European security; 
(e) to contribute to academic work on these topics. 
The institute will comprise a director and five permanent experts. Funds will also be earmarked 
for enlisting the expertise available in the member countries to carry out specific and in-depth studies. 
The director will report to the Council on the execution of the scientific tasks assigned to him 
and on how the budget has been used. For 1990, the budget will be F 11 380 000, including 
F 1 730 000 for functional expenditure. The director is to be appointed by the Council by 1st February 
1990 at the latest and will take up his duties as soon as possible to enable the institute to be operational 
from 1st July 1990 onwards. The Council also decided to wind up the Paris-based Agencies for Security 
Questions and Standing Armaments Committee. The Council will take the necessary measures to ter-
minate the contracts of staff currently employed by these bodies, in accordance with the legal provi-
sions in force. 
Ministers have asked the Permanent Council to take appropriate decisions, after consulting the 
Assembly, on the organisational aspects of setting up the institute in the org~isation's building. In 
practice, this will involve consultations between you, Mr. President, the Council residency and myself 
under appropriate arrangements to be worked out in the coming weeks. The erk and the institute 
director will of course be closely involved in the necessary decisions. 
* 
* * 
The day after the ministerial meeting, your Presidential Committee was briefed by Mr. Eyskens 
and Mr. Coeme on the Council's decisions and discussions. 
* 
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I have continued my round of contacts with senior officials from the foreign affairs and defence 
ministries of the member states. On 25th September, I met Mr. William Waldegrave, Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and, on 7th November, Mr. Tom King, Secretary of State for 
Defence, both meetings providing an opportunity for fruitful exchanges of view. On 6th November, I 
was received in Paris by Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Minister of Defence. We reviewed the prior-
ities for European security in preparation for the Ministerial Council and discussed the future direction 
of WEU's work in the context of the forthcoming French presidency from July 1990 onwards. 
* 
* * 
Turning to public relations and information on the role and activities ofWEU, these last weeks 
have been particularly busy. 
From 14th to 17th September 1989, I took part in the thirty-first annual conference of the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). For the first time, participants included representatives 
of the Warsaw Pact alongside western experts. Mr. Bogomolov gave a surprisingly frank assessment of 
the weaknesses of the Soviet Union, stressing in his conclusion that the success of perestroika would 
require western aid. In his reply, Mr. Marshall Shulman reviewed the uncertainties weighing heavily on 
Mr. Gorbachev's enterprise, i.e., economic collapse, reactions of the Soviet communist party and the 
nationalities problem in its three manifestations, namely, Russian nationalism, claims for indepen-
dence and confrontation between ethnic groups. For some years to come, uncertainty would no doubt 
be the dominant feature of any analysis of change in the Soviet Union. The uncertainty would be par-
ticularly great as regards the future pace and extent of reforms. 
On 21st September, I gave the inaugural address to mark the start of the academic year of the 
Institut Royal Superieur de Defense in Brussels (a copy of which is annexed hereto). 
The following day, Ambassador Holthoff was a guest speaker at the Bow Group in London. He 
reviewed the problem of restructuring Europe's defence industries and the respective roles of the Com-
munity, the IEPG and WEU in this connection. 
On 29th September in Hamburg, I addressed a seminar of young political leaders on the future 
of the Atlantic Alliance. 
From 6th to 9th October, Ambassador Holthoff represented the Secretariat-General at the 
annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly which was held at the Palais Montecitorio in Rome. As 
usual, the reports covered the whole gamut of problems facing the Atlantic Alliance. This meeting pro-
vided an opportunity for a great deal of public and private discussion on what role WEU should play at 
a time of rapid change in Central Europe and with regard to the progress needed in the building of 
Europe in order to maintain an adequate level of security. Apart from the speeches made by the Italian 
Prime Minister, Mr. Giulio Andreotti, and the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Manfred Worn er, the 
NAA parliamentarians heard a debate between General Galvin and General Lubov, the latter dis-
playing embarrassing reservations at questions from the floor. At the same time, Ambassador Holthoff 
had talks with senior Italian officials from the foreign affairs and defence ministries. 
From 9th to 13th October, I was in Washington, the purpose of my visit being twofold. 
First, to have talks with the most senior representatives of the United States diplomatic service 
and the defence establishment. I was received by Mr. James Baker and Mr. Dick Cheney and by 
Under-Secretary of State Bartholomew. Together with experts from the State Department, I took part 
in a round table chaired by Mrs. A vis Bohlen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, on 
major issues of European security (European pillar, defence co-operation). 
All my interlocutors impressed upon me that the speech given by President Bush on 21st May at 
the University of Boston on the construction of Europe was the cornerstone of American policy 
towards our continent. Our allies expect more and better of us whereas the concept of burden-sharing, 
based too much on "bean counting", is now giving way to a more qualitative and imaginative 
approach, namely the sharing of responsibilities, a development borne out by the appointment of Mr. 
Alan Holmes as Ambassador Extraordinary with responsibility for this dossier. 
The second purpose of my visit was to reply to an invitation from the organisers ofthe COMBEF 
'89 symposium and the Eurogroup seminar. 
The aim of the symposium was to discuss the military problems which would face the alliance in 
the next decade. I spoke on the subject of defence co-operation, focusing on the new prospects opening 
up for the development of multilateral armaments programmes in Europe. 
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The Eurogroup seminar, organised on 12th October under the auspices of the Washington 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, was a useful contribution to the Euro-Atlantic dialogue. 
Lastly, I met Dr. Alton Frye of the Council of Foreign Relations and Mrs. Rozanne Ridgway, 
former Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at the Atlantic Council of the United States. 
The overriding impression I had from all these meetings was that WEU is UJp.deniably seen in a 
very favourable light in the United States. But this will only last as long as our organisation demon-
strates its ability to make a concrete and dynamic contribution to the building of the European pillar, 
by which our transatlantic allies set so much store. 
Mr. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, represented the WEU minis-
terial organs at the seminar on European security in the 1990s, organised in Madrid by the Institute for 
International Affairs (INCI). He spoke about the place of WEU in the transatlantic dialogue and its 
role in building the European pillar. You too, Mr. President, were also present on this occasion and 
made a remarkable speech on the implications of the single market for the process of European con-
struction and for WEU; I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating you. 
On 22nd October, I gave the closing address at Valkenburg to the fourth international con-
ference ofthe Young Europeans for Security Movement, taking as my theme" What kind ofEurope do 
we want?". 
On 23rd October, I took part in a debate on European defence co-operation in a post-CFE 
context at the IISS in London. 
On 26th October, I was invited to give the WEU viewpoint at a conference in Southampton 
organised by the British " Peace through NATO " association. 
Finally, on 8th November, I addressed the "Dunamis Open Forum" in London. 
Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented WEU at a ' seminar on public 
opinion organised by the NATO Information Service in Brussels on 3rd November. The aim of these 
seminars is to review trends in public opinion in alliance countries and the effect of such trends on gov-
ernments. They also aim to provide an opportunity to reflect on the content and methods of dissemi-
nating the NATO message. The invitation to the WEU Secretariat-General illustrates the mutual will-
ingness of both institutions to be kept informed of their respective concerns and plans as regards 
keeping European public opinion properly informed about the specific conditions dftheir security. The 
Norwegian participants in particular were interested in the presentation of current activities within 
WEU. 
Finally, I have had an opportunity to talk with many press and television journalists, both 
British and foreign (in particular, The Economist, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Le Monde, le 
Quotidien de Paris, Die Welt). Prior to the Ministerial Council, the" Foreign Press Association" in 
London invited me to take part in a debate, involving some twenty journalists, on the implications for 
WEU of the current events and on the topics on the Ministerial Council's agenda in Brussels. 
Willem V AN EEKELEN 
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The Assembly, 
Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 1 
tabled by Mr. Ahrens and others 
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure 
with a request for urgent procedure 
4th December 1989 
(i) Noting with satisfaction the measures taken by the Soviet Union and several Central and Eastern 
European countries to: 
- ensure greater respect for individual freedoms and human rights; 
- promote free expression of opinions, a free choice for the electorate and the development of a 
certain degree of political pluralism; 
- facilitate the free movement of persons; 
- allow freedom of information; 
(ii) In particular, welcoming with joy the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons in 
Berlin on 9th November 1989; 
(iii) Further welcoming the progress made towards agreements on the limitation of strategic nuclear 
weapons, chemical weapons and conventional weapons; 
(iv) Considering that this rapid turn of events is likely to attenuate significantly the division of 
Europe that has existed since the end of the second world war and to accelerate the establishment of a 
peaceful and secure order in Europe, in accordance with the aims the members of the Atlantic Alliance 
set themselves in December 1967; 
(v) Gratified that, on 13th November, the Council held " a detailed exchange of views on the latest 
developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in the German Democratic Republic "; 
(vi) Considering that it is for the Assembly to consider without delay the new prospects these devel-
opments offer for organising peace, security and co-operation in Europe and to clarify the role of WEU 
at this new juncture, · 
INSTRUCfS THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
To present to it, at the first part of its thirty-sixth ordinary session, a report on the prospects 
offered by developments in Central and Eastern Europe with a view to establishing peace and security 
in Europe. 
Signed: Ahrens, Goerens, Finsberg, Pieral/i, Stegagnini, Soe/1, Staels-Dompas, Kittelmann, 
Reddemann, Unland, Niegel, Lenzer, Fischer 
I. See 7th sitting, 4th December 1989 (urgent procedure agreed to). 
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The Assembly, 
Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe 
DRAFf ORDER I 
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee 2 
by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur 
Sth December 1989 
(i) Noting with satisfaction the measures taken by the Soviet Union and several Central and Eastern 
European countries to: 
- ensure greater respect for individual freedoms and human rights; 
- promote free expression of opinions, a free choice for the electorate and the development of a 
certain degree of political pluralism; 
- facilitate the free movement of persons; 
- allow freedom of information; 
(ii) In particular, welcoming with joy the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons in 
Berlin on 9th November 1989; 
(iii) Further welcoming the progress made towards agreements on the limitation of strategic nuclear 
weapons, chemical weapons and conventional weapons; 
(iv) Gratified that, on 13th November, the Council held" a detailed exchange of views on the latest 
developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in the German Democratic Republic "; 
(v) Considering that it is for the Assembly to consider without delay the new prospects these devel-
opments offer for organising peace, security and co-operation in Europe and to clarify the role ofWEU 
at this new juncture, 
CoNSIDERS 
1. That these rapid developments are likely to attenuate considerably the division of Europe that 
has existed since the end of the second world war and speed up " the establishment of a peaceful and 
secure order in Europe " in accordance with the aim the members of the Atlantic Alliance set them-
selves in December 1967; 
DECIDES 
2. To hold an extraordinary session during the first quarter of 1990 to examine the prospects 
stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe for the establishment of a just, peaceful 
and secure order in Europe; 
INSTRUCTS THE PoLITICAL CoMMITTEE 
3. To present a report to it on this subject. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix, 
Bohm, Caro, Coleman, Collart, Eich, Forni (Alternate: Pontil/on), Foschi (Alternate: Spitella), Hill (Alternate: Ward), Hitschler, 
Koehl, van der Linden, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Muller, Natali, Pecriaux, Pieralli, Mrs. Polfer, Mr. Sarti, Sir William 
Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Stoffelen, Thyraud. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed m italics. 
317 
Document 1212 
Amendment 1 
6th December 1989 
Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe 
AMENDMENT 1 I 
tabled by Mr. Speed and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
1. In paragraph 2 of the draft order proper, before "peaceful" insert "just,". 
1. See 11th sitting, 6th December 1989 (amendment agreed to). 
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